A Pretext For Power

The United States, Anti-communism and the Democrats of Latin America, 1933-1965.

A thesis submitted for the degree of 'Doctorate of Philosophy' at the University of Western Sydney.

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Statement of Authenticity

The work presented in the thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

Signature:__________________________________Date: ***June 22, 2015***

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Abstract

This thesis offers a revisionist interpretation of the anti-communist pretext that justified US interference in Latin America to the detriment of social democratic leaders between 1933 and 1965. It posits that the Latin American social democratic ideology of 'nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism', adopted in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba, Colombia, Guatemala and Costa Rica, posed a systematic threat to the established Latin American oligarchies and their North American supporters. This ideology sought to transform the political and economic structures of those individual Latin American nations in order to increase the quality of life for the majority of the population. Yet the social democrats emerged during the transition between World War II and the Cold War, when progressive politics were viewed with caution. This placed their nationalist movements within the broader context of the global Cold War. While the Latin American social democrats distanced themselves from the small Latin American communist movement, Washington characterised their economic policies as within 'the communist line'. Despite their lack of evidence, US policy makers directly contributed to the downfall of several social democratic governments between 1948 and 1965 under the pretext of anti-communism. This pretext effectively ended the movement for Latin American social democracy. Significant 'blowback' then occurred in the form of the radicalisation of the democratic left, the implantation of a communist regime in Cuba and the destabilisation of the region in its aftermath. By revising the contextual and ideological origins of the anti-communist pretext as a mechanism to thwart social democracy in Latin America, this thesis will contribute to the literature regarding the political, military and economic machinations of the US in Latin America during the Cold War.

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Introduction: A Pretext for Power

This thesis explains the origins of the anti-communist pretext that was utilised against a generation of Latin American 'social democratic' and 'populist' leaders between 1933 and 1965. It will argue that the United States' (US) 'Cold War' policies in Latin America were not motivated by communism or the Soviet Union (USSR). Rather, these policies were motivated by Imperial expansion against those countries that expressed nationalist economic policies. This assertion is supported, for instance, by the case of Guatemala in 1954.[1] When historians examined the early Cold War case of US foreign policy in Guatemala they revealed the disparity between the Americans' rhetoric of anti-communism and their actions, in deposing a democratically elected reformer. Several historians have demonstrated that the reform regime of Jacobo Árbenz was not communist (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 138).[2] Rather, the Árbenz regime threatened US private corporate interests, which provided sufficient motivation for a US-led coup. Despite the widespread acceptance of this view of events in Guatemala, best articulated by Greg Grandin (2004) and Piero Gleijes (1990), no scholar has sought to extend this conclusion into a regional examination of the anti-communist pretext utilised elsewhere. Guatemala was not unique, but an extreme example of a regional policy of anti-communism that targeted a generation of reform-minded leaders in Latin America. The US-initiated coup in Guatemala had a similar outcome to the dozens of domestic military coups that occurred between 1948 and 1965 under the pretext of anti-communism.[3] As this thesis has evolved, its focus has shifted to defining those reformist governments and individuals targeted by American-led anti-communism, in order to comprehend the threat that they posed to US interests. Hence the project diverges into two key arguments: that the US formed an alliance with conservative Latin American elements to prevent economic reform under the pretext of anti-communism; and that Latin American progressives followed a pragmatic path of social democracy to reposition their nations' places within the international capitalist economy. This introduction will briefly explain those two points.

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[1] See Chapter Six for a thorough analysis of Guatemala.
[2] See also: Gleijes, 1990; Grow, 2008; Grandin, 2004; Immerman, 1982; Aybar de Soto, 1978.
[3] For information on Latin American authoritarianism, see Schmitz, 1999. For more information on anti-communism and military coups see Chapters Five, Six and Ten.

Anti-communism was utilised in Latin America by local oligarchies and the US State Department considerably earlier than traditional notions of the Latin American Cold War, emerging in 1947-48, would suggest. Anti-communist rhetoric was utilised against progressive governments that challenged US interests as early as the 1920s. In 1927, US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg warned of the Bolshevist threat in Mexico and its influence upon Augusto Sandino's guerrilla campaign in Nicaragua (as cited in, Wood, 1961, p. 20). The US Ambassador to Peru, Fred Dearing, described the *Aprista* movement as "the reddest of the red" and "under the influence of Moscow" during the 1931 presidential election (as cited in, Stein, 1980, p. 172). In 1933-34 the US Ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, accused the short-lived Grau administration of supporting communist land seizures in rural areas, leading to the overthrow of his government (Ameringer, 2000, p. 9). As the international Cold War descended, in 1948, US Secretary of State George Marshall accused rioters responding to the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Bogotá of having communist motivations (as cited in, Randall, 1992, p. 189). Later, in 1954, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accused Guatemala of communist infiltration to justify the overthrow of the Árbenz regime (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 145). Then US Vice-President Richard Nixon (1978) labelled rioters in Lima and Caracas communist during his 1958 trip (p. 190). The threat of communism in the Caribbean eventually took the US army to the Dominican Republic in 1965, as it was by then an institutionalised pretext for interference and intervention (Crandle, 2006, p. 66). The National Security Council (NSC) referred to its actual enemies as "impractical idealists" who "promised change" (NSC, 1953). Thus, anti-communism can be seen as a pervasive political strategy that demonised all opponents of Washington's vision for Latin America. This thesis will demonstrate that these accusations of communism were exaggerations and falsifications levied for political expediency and the expansion of US imperial interests. Of equal significance to these American accusations were the domestic military coups between 1948 and 1965, also under pretexts of anti-communism.

Scholarly discussion on the forms of Latin American democracy is well established.[4] It has gained additional attention during the past decade with the emergence of a new generation of socially minded, often populist, democratic

[4] The literature on Latin American democracy will be reviewed in the following chapter.

leaders.[5] The Venezuelan Hugo Chávez led these 'Bolívarians' to continental relevancy from his 1999 presidential inauguration until his death in 2013. Daniel Hellinger (2011) has concluded that:

> During the Chávez years, political polarisation and conflict have themselves pushed scholars studying Venezuela toward abstract, normative portraits that replace empirical research with praise or condemnation (p. 21).

Hence, most interpretations of Chávez's government are heavily reliant on polarised interpretations of Chávez himself. This is a poignant feature of Latin American political history. Critique and analysis often centre upon the leader, over their policies or achievements. Conservative academic and media sources often claimed that Chávez was a 'dictator', a 'socialist' or a 'communist', and argue that the oppressed majority would have removed his government given the opportunity.[6] Progressive and liberal academic and media sources claimed that Chávez's revolution was the last, and best, hope of Venezuela and broader Latin America to reinvigorate the middle-class and to reduce dependency upon the US-led capitalist world economy.[7] This thesis is not about Hugo Chávez, because Chávez is not unique in Latin American history. While his success may be unique due to large Venezuelan oil revenues, Chávez's policies generally fell within the Latin American social democratic and populist traditions. Rather, the focus here is upon the initial emergence of socially progressive movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina between 1933 and 1965. Each movement was uniquely based on political and economic realities in their individual nations. However, the transnational influence of intellectual and political thought demonstrates a series of correlations within these movements. As such there is a need to provide a detailed theoretical analysis of those efforts towards social progress in Latin America during the mid-twentieth century. The ideological orientation of this generation of Latin American leaders is explored in this work. It will also explain the conflict that this ideological orientation caused between these leaders and the United States and domestic oligarchies.

[5] For information on the Bolívarian movement, see: Gott, 2005; Cannon, 2009; Ponniah and Eastwood, 2011.
[6] For the pro-Chávez side, see: Webber and Carr, 2013; Burbach, Fox and Fuentes, 2013.
[7] For the anti-Chávez side, see: Clark, 2009; Brewer, 2010.

This thesis will argue that there was, in fact, a 'Cold War' waged in Latin America between 1933 and 1965. The choice of time-period is intentional. It covers the period when this anti-communist pretext emerged to when it became an institutionalised part of regional politics. Accordingly, it chooses to end at a time when the traditionally defined Cold War is just beginning. This thesis is not about the so-called 'Cold War' between the USSR and the US. Hence, it is not defined by the traditional historical parameters. While the conclusions of this thesis have obvious implications for the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, the Sandinista war in Nicaragua and the broader Cold War struggles between 1965 and 1990, the cause of that conflict is the direct interest of this thesis. Accordingly, recounting those events and demonstrating directly how the earlier conclusions led to those outcomes is not a priority here. Rather, the thesis studies the Cold War between conflicting visions of Latin America's place in the capitalist world economy, between the region's social democrats and the oligarchic position supported by the US, which occurred between 1933 and 1965.

Contribution to the field

The study will address a problem that has not been approached in over fifty years: how one defines this generation of politically progressive leaders and why they were persecuted during the Latin American 'Cold War'. The ex-Guatemalan President, Arévalo, last confronted this issue in 1963. Arévalo (1963) claims that 'anti-Kommunism' is "more than a doctrine, more than a political theory, it wears the garb of a practical tool: a wall to block off the wide avenue of popular revindications; a barricade to hold back social progress, the rights of the humble, a just distribution of wealth, and the winning of national control by the people" (p. 36). He believed that the US, the Latin American militaries, the media and the Catholic Church had created anti-communism to maintain a status-quo of inequality in Guatemala, and Latin America more broadly (Arévalo, 1963, pp. 22-25, 73-75, 106, 166). However this, largely, philosophical argument was not supported by an extensive study to correlate his logical argument. Hence, it has been relegated to a peripheral analysis of Latin American political discourse. This thesis will explore the claims of Arévalo. It will critically test his argument. To perform this task, this thesis is situated between several academic fields. It draws in scholars from fields including political science, political history, Latin American

history, international relations, propaganda studies and political economy. This is necessary to the scope of the thesis as it has evolved over the course of the project. It will not be possible to review all of the relevant literature required within the following section. Accordingly, this thesis will continually engage with the academic literature when approaching topics of substantial intellectual debate, and will inform the discussions that follow. It will now demonstrate its position within the scholarly discourse.

Many authors have approached similar concerns about Latin American politics in a variety of ways. This macro-historical method of studying political science is not unique in the field. Charles Ameringer (1974; 1978; 2000; 2009) has written extensively on the "democratic left" in Latin America (Ameringer, 1974, p. 5). He concludes, "the impulse to create a socialist form of government was common among the countries of Latin America during the twentieth century" (Ameringer, 2009, p. 1). However, this analysis somewhat oversimplifies the disparities between these movements. It also overlooks the external political factors motivating this push towards socialism. Robert Alexander (1964; 1979; 1982; 1988; 1991; 2009) has written several books on the social democratic governments of Latin America. His personal insight into the philosophies of these governments is informed by personal relationships formed with many regional leaders. While this may compromise objectivity, it offers an unparalleled insight into the ideology of the social democratic governments. Stephen Rabe (1988; 1999) examines the anti-communism of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. He identifies the "virulent anti-communism" of Eisenhower and Kennedy's view of Latin America as a "Cold War battleground" (Rabe, 1988, p. 177; Rabe, 1999, p. 196). The revisionism of Rabe is an irreplaceable contribution to the discourse of American Cold War diplomacy between 1953 and 1963. Grandin (2004; 2010) provides insight into the machinations of US imperial policy in Latin America. Using Guatemala as a starting point, Grandin (2004) identifies the motivations for the Latin American revolutions as distinct from the Russian Revolution (p. 175). Moreover, this thesis fits into the revisionist field of political science in Latin America. These scholars have enriched the field through their theoretical analysis and insight into the Cold War in Latin America. This thesis approaches a different question. However, it relies upon the examples of these, and other, political analyses.

There is a clear gap in the literature. This notion of an anti-communist pretext against the region's social democrats has not been conclusively demonstrated elsewhere. Many scholars, including Rabe (1988; 1999) and Grandin (2006), have indicated that American foreign policy was dominated by anti-communism at specific intervals. However, no text has traced the ideological origins of this anti-communist pretext. It is a general assumption that anti-communism in Latin America emerged during the 1950s in response to leftist deviation in Guatemala and Cuba. This thesis will prove that anti-communism was a regional policy that originated in the 1930s, and was institutionalised in the 1940s. It will also demonstrate that anti-communism scarcely targeted doctrinal communists. Anti-communism focussed upon the region's social democrats and populists. This raises a series of other questions, including: who were the social democrats?; why was the US opposed to social democracy in Latin America?; how was anti-communist propaganda utilised?; and what were the effects of the anti-communist pretext in Latin America? Hence, a study into the anti-communist pretext is a legitimate task that will provide insight into inter-American diplomacy between 1933 and 1965. While this thesis does not confront a heterogeneous field of literature, its interdisciplinary approach will offer a valuable analysis of manifestations of Latin American social democracy. It is also necessary because different intellectual questions require separate methodological approaches. Similarly, while this thesis is not wholly dependent on primary research, certain areas demand new perspectives. Hence, this thesis will engage in primary research in cases where the scholarly community has underestimated the political significance of historical events. This will make the thesis a more effective analysis than a simple historical study. It will also make for a comprehensive narrative.

Structure and Overview

This thesis is written as an historical narrative. This will demonstrate the chronological correlations between what some consider to be disparate manifestations in individual Latin American nations. This thesis will attempt to look for patterns and similarities across movements for social democracy and, to a lesser extent, populism, in Latin American history. It will argue that these movements posed a common vision for Latin America's altered role in the global economy and their domestic political systems. It will also argue that these

movements were the primary targets of anti-communist policy within Latin America, and from the US. The thesis will begin with a formal literature review and theoretic framework. This section will inform the historical narrative throughout by providing clear working definitions. The historical study is divided into two distinct historical periods separated by the 1952 US presidential election. In the section 'The causes of anti-communism' the thesis will argue that the ideological Cold War between the two distinct visions for Latin America's future economic direction, between 1933 and 1952. It will compare the views and perspectives of both sides, concluding that US interests created a continental Cold War against a rhetorical 'communist' threat, which undermined the region's social democrats. The subsequent section, 'The effects of anti-communism' will examine the lasting consequences of this accusation. It will argue that beyond the obvious effects of forced authoritarianism and humanitarian concerns, this ideological battle defined regional politics between 1953 and 1965. The key evidence for this includes the radicalisation the segments within democratic left, the arrival of a communist regime in Cuba, the demand for economic assistance, and the moderation and eventual defeat of the remaining social democrats. Moreover, the effects of anti-communism were the creation of a legitimate Cold War theatre at the expense of pragmatic reform in Latin America. This led to the ravages of the late-Cold War period from 1965 until 1991. By following a historical narrative, this thesis will demonstrate a consistent ideological conflict in Latin American history.

The first chapter seeks to contextualise the arguments of the thesis. This firstly involves the comparative development of the 'Anglo' and 'Latin' Americas. It will explain the divergence of the two geographic regions through sociological, political and economic analysis, contextualising the political climates of both North and South America. It will also explain why, and how, North America was able to assert territorial, political and economic influence over parts of Latin America as a nascent form of imperialism. The chapter will further demonstrate that the expansion of US influence occurred concurrently to independent political events within Latin America. The emergence of progressive political thought coincided with large-scale migration from Europe in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.[8] Europeans brought political theories including anarchism, syndicalism, socialism and communism. These European communities influenced

[8] Specifically to the southeastern parts of the continent.

labour activity throughout Latin America. They also inspired politicians in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile to begin including the masses within the political process. This evolution influenced activists in more conservative and repressive states. While certainly influential, European intellectuals did not determine the first manifestation of social democratic principals in Latin America. Rather, they emerged as a result of the multiclass alliances present within the Mexican Revolution. The alliance formed between peasants, workers, and middle-class revolutionaries were solidified through the Mexican Constitution of 1917. Considered one of the most radical of its time, it laid out a program for reformers within the continent, which focused on economic sovereignty, labour reform and social security. US secretary of State Frank Kellogg incorrectly accused Mexico of 'Bolshevism' in 1927 (as cited in Wood, 1961, p. 20). The consistent pattern of US officials accusing reformers of an alliance with Russia began in this period. The chapter finishes by setting the scene of the Great Depression and the limitations of the US position in Latin America.

The second chapter examines two distinct visions for Latin America that emerged during 1933. It argues that these two visions defined the conflict witnessed throughout the Cold War. Accordingly, the emergence of social democratic parties and ideology is detailed. This section explains the theoretical perspective of: the Mexican Revolution led by President Cárdenas; the Peruvian *Apristas* under political candidate Haya de la Torre; the Venezuelan AD led by the exiled intellectual Betancourt; the Colombian left liberal Gaitán and the Cuban *Auténticos* led by the brief presidency of Grau San Martín. It will argue that these organisations set the foundations for ideologically similar manifestations in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. While political outcomes were extremely modest between 1933 and 1941, the ideology of social democracy was developed into a regional philosophy during this period. The chapter will also survey regional communism to demonstrate that it was a movement separate from, and inferior to social democracy. Whilst in unique cases collaboration was achieved, the two concepts and party organisations were distinct. The other vision for the region's role within the global economy was pursued by the Roosevelt administration in Washington. The advent of the Good Neighbour Policy (GNP) facilitated the Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs Act (RTTA) of 1934. In establishing contracts of reciprocal trade, the US supported conservative

dictatorships throughout Central America and the Caribbean. Its support for the oligarchic political position was based on economic pragmatism and self-interest. However, this positioned the US against progressive political ideas. Whilst this did not cause significant problems prior to World War II, its established support for the oligarchic position would define its position within the ideological Cold War.

The third chapter examines the effects of World War II upon Latin America. While the War did not physically expand to the Western Hemisphere, it dramatically changed the political and economic climate in the region. The US did not hold a dominant political or economic position in the large republics of South America prior to WWII. It competed with Europeans for trade and investment opportunities. It struggled to attain the political and military loyalties of strategically significant nations. Moreover, the US was not a regional leader in 1939. The closing of markets in Europe and Asia, however, fostered co-dependency between the advanced US, and the export-orientated Latin American economies. It also provided a common 'extra-hemispheric' enemy. This elevated the concept of the Monroe Doctrine to regional significance. Many Latin American leaders believed that their alliance with the US would yield economic developmental assistance. However, it was the ideological alliance that brought direct results for the people of the region. Roosevelt's war rhetoric led to a democratic revolution in much of Latin America. Social democratic leaders in Peru, Venezuela, Cuba, Guatemala and Costa Rica replaced longstanding dictatorships and oligarchic control between 1944 and 1948. They were, in part, motivated by the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and the ideals of the 'Four Freedoms'. They sought to remove those types of totalitarianism, upon which the US had waged war in Europe, in their own nations. Washington furthered this initiative by demanding that the nationalist dictators of Brazil and Argentina hold democratic elections. Moreover, progressive democracy was implanted upon the majority of Latin American people between 1944 and 1948. The era of the Four Freedoms was briefly realised in this oppressed part of the world. Unfortunately for US leaders, many of these progressive democracies limited the expected post-war expansion of US trade and investment in Latin America. Their frustration with those leaders led to a policy reversal regarding regional democracy between 1947 and 1950.

The fourth chapter argues that the Cold War in Latin America began after April 9, 1948 when Gaitán was murdered in Bogotá (Braun, 1985, p. 134). This

chapter argues that Latin America was not part of the global Cold War between communism and capitalism. However, it was in Washington's sphere of influence. As such, Washington began consolidating its leadership over the region. This was achieved through the coordination of military alliances, arms sales and training. The 1947 Rio Pact ensured collective defence against external threats. However, the more significant Organisation of American States (OAS), established in April 1948, sought to exercise greater authority over the domestic politics of member states. As Washington had largely achieved its dominant stance over the region during WWII, it did not commit to large-scale developmental assistance in return for Latin American assistance in their Cold War. It was expected that the export-orientated economies of Latin America would continue to exclusively supply the US with materials and would absorb their industrial exports. Additionally, their moral support at the UN was of special significance. During April 1948, the US delegation led by George Marshall attempted to include Latin America in their global Cold War. However, there was no evidence in 1948 that communism posed a threat to Latin America. This changed on April 9, when Gaitán's murder and the subsequent 'Bogotázo' was characterised as a communist insurrection by Marshall. This led to a unanimous anti-communist declaration by the Organisation of American States, and to the expansion of the Cold War in Latin America.

The fifth chapter explains the effect of American anti-communism upon Latin American democracy. This requires a detailed evaluation of the shift in US policy known as the Miller Doctrine. Policy documents by George Kennan, Louis Halle, Francis Truslow and Edward G. Miller indicate a fundamental shift from the pro-democracy position of 'Bradenism' to one of pragmatic support for military regimes. In fact, Halle suggested that military governments could provide more stability and could better repel 'communists'. Stability had returned as Washington's policy in Latin America. This policy reversal was based on Washington's view of Latin America's place within the global capitalist economy. Social democratic and populist governments espoused economic nationalism. This nationalism led several governments to pursue labour reform, market reform and financial reform. All of these manoeuvres sought to moderate the effects of international capitalism upon their populations. This was especially detrimental to US firms operating in those republics. In their dealings with Mexico, the US inadvertently revealed their conception of the 'communist line' as any economic

policy that diverted from US interests. This in turn led to a regional withdrawal from democratic governance between 1948 and 1955. While the US only directly overthrew the Árbenz regime in Guatemala, the shift in US policy facilitated several interconnected military coups during this period. As a result, military regimes emerged in Peru in 1948, Venezuela in 1948, Haiti in 1950, Cuba in 1952, Colombia in 1953, Paraguay in 1954, Guatemala in 1954 and Argentina in 1955. Anti-communism motivated these coups. In both Peru and Venezuela the social democratic leadership were characterised as communist to justify military leadership. The US continued to work closely with Latin American military regimes, providing increased military assistance and training. The climate of the Cold War eradicated democratic rule in much of Latin America. Hence, the social democratic community, and its collective ideology, was in exile for much of the 1950s.

The sixth chapter begins to explore the effects of international anti-communism. It will do so by examining the motivation for the removal of governments in Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala. The Guatemalan coup of June 1954 has been debated for decades. Most scholars have concluded that Jacobo Árbenz was not a communist or under the direct influence of communists. This thesis extends that view by placing Guatemala into a regional context. It can be seen as the epitome of a policy of anti-communism, rather than an aberration caused by corrupting corporate influences upon the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. This chapter explains Eisenhower's South American problem. NSC 144/1 defined those leaders antithetic to US interests in Latin America in 1953 (NSC, 1953). Unsurprisingly, many of the social democrats had been removed indirectly through the policies of the Miller Doctrine. Yet Árbenz, Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón remained. The US Department of State and the CIA argued that each of these leaders was under the control, or influence, of communists. This forged a pretext for their removal. It was also revealing that the 'South American problem' was less influenced by governmental style than by economic ideology. That is, idealistic leaders like Arévalo and Haya de la Torre were linked to military leaders such as Perón and Vargas. Nevertheless, from 1953 the process of removing these three governments was underway. The CIA operation PBSUCCESS overthrew Árbenz in 1954. After Vargas lost the loyalty of the military establishment in 1954, he took his own life to preserve the democratic order in

Brazil. Perón was overthrown by the military in 1955. While the CIA was only directly involved in one of these instances, US ambitions in Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina were identical; to remove a progressive leader and help install a more pliable government that could ensure fiscal and social stability. By the end of 1955 democracy remained in only five Latin American countries, all led by the conservative wing of their movement.

The seventh chapter begins to examine the effect of imposed authoritarianism upon the intellectual exiles. It starts by surveying the effect of US policy upon the lives of Latin American people in 1955. Many of the autocratic rulers oversaw a significant decrease in living standards. The US policy at the 1955 Rio economic conference maintained the economic status quo between the two continents. However, this status quo could not continue indefinitely due to the continuing presence of social democratic, and other more radical elements present in virtually all Latin American countries. During the period from 1956 until 1960 several of the authoritarian regimes fell to pro-democratic elements. However, the nature of the alliances against military rule threatened the leadership of many social democrats. While they celebrated the removal of military regimes, the radicalisation of former allies challenged their control over the masses. Latin American anger at US policy boiled over in May 1958 when Vice President Richard Nixon embarked on a goodwill tour. The people of Lima, Peru, and Caracas, Venezuela, verbally and physically abused Nixon. The violence in Caracas was so severe that Eisenhower sent warships to Venezuela's Caribbean coast. The only remaining member of the social democratic community not exiled by his own government was Figueres. He was invited to address the US Congress' Inter-American Affairs committee on June 9, 1958. There, he deplored US policy towards Latin America's dictators, suggesting that other means of communication between progressives and the US had failed, and "the only thing left to do [was] spitting" upon Nixon and US policy (Ameringer, 1978, p. 146). The Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek provided the Eisenhower administration with the opportunity to decrease tensions and to build an effective dialogue with Latin America's progressives through 'Operation Pan-America' (OPA). However, Eisenhower refused. He continued to assume military strength would maintain a status quo and did not intend to jeopardise that. Within six months it would be too late, as the first declared communist regime was established in Cuba.

The eighth chapter explains that the most direct consequence of imposed authoritarianism was the radicalisation of democratic socialism in Cuba. In analysing the radicalisation of the Cuban Revolution, this thesis asserts that Fidel Castro was not a communist prior to the revolution. In fact Castro was a follower of the anti-communist politician Eduardo (Eddy) Chibás. Chibás' death in 1951, followed by the Batista coup in 1952 radicalised many in his Ortoxodo Party. The Cuban Revolution is a clear example of the nature of anti-dictatorial movements in the 1950s. Castro's 'revolutionary army' worked directly with the urban rebels of Frank País and the old social democrats led by Grau San Martín, and even received funding from regional allies including Figueres and Betancourt. The sole non-oligarchic group to avoid collaboration with the Revolution was the Cuban Communist Party. When in power, the Cuban revolutionaries proposed a modest reform agenda and elections and forfeited some power to more moderate democratic elements. However, as US business interests and the State Department opposed these fundamental economic reforms, control of the nation was handed to radicals, led by Castro during 1959. Castro asserted that pragmatism would fail and that the reforms were necessary to maintain popular enthusiasm. Castro continued to develop Cuba without US support, constantly fearing retaliation. His position was confirmed in 1961 when the CIA sponsored the invasion of Cuba at Playa Girón. From 1961, Castro's revolutionary regime became increasingly similar to a communist dictatorship. This distanced Castro from the social democrats of the region. This thesis will prove that the CIA used this conflict to coerce the democratic left into its camp against Castro, significantly holding its major conferences against Castro in Costa Rica, in 1960, and Venezuela, in 1961. The US was committed to isolating Castro prior to the eventual destruction of his regime. This campaign of intimidation backfired in 1962 when Castro, under the threat of invasion, invited the USSR to station missiles in Cuba, increasing Cold War tensions. The chapter concludes that US actions radicalised Castro's Cuban Revolution.

The ninth chapter exposes Washington's attempts to isolate Cuba from their former allies through the rhetorical Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for Progress was John F. Kennedy's version of the Good Neighbour Policy. He acknowledged that US policy had contributed to Castro's revolution. The propaganda of the AFP was masterful. Figueres wrote to Betancourt in 1960, asserting that the Latin

American democrats would be positioned as US allies against dictatorships. The CIA assassination of Rafael Trujillo confirmed this view. The AFP Charter of 1961 proposed to enact the social democratic revolution in Latin America. It committed to land reform, labour reform, economic development, political freedoms and even commodity price reform through 'common markets'. This thesis asserts that not only did the AFP fail, however; in fact it was designed to fail. The AFP did not set up the mechanisms to make the structural reforms necessary to evolve the political economies of underdeveloped states. It essentially placed the onus of enacting a revolution upon the oligarchic politicians in whose interest it was to prevent one. Therefore, Kennedy was not an impractical idealist – he was a masterful propagandist. Kennedy has had the greatest impact upon the US image in Latin America since Cordell Hull's declaration of unwavering US commitment to sovereignty in December 1933. The US ideologically positioned itself as an ally of Latin American social democracy. However, the majority of the aid provided to Latin America during the 1960s, serviced debts and devaluated currencies created token development projects and increased the military capacity of dictatorial governments. Hence, the AFP was designed to fail Latin America. However it was a great policy success for the US as it further isolated Castro and justified increased economic and military involvement throughout the continent.

The final chapter outlines the demise of social democracy due to the expansion of Cold War anti-communism. The death of the social democratic philosophy was slow. The revolutionary impetus had passed on to Castro, and Castroism-communism would define the struggles with authoritarian regimes in Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru, Guatemala and El Salvador. Moreover, social democracy declined in significance as a result of the anti-communist pretext. The deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch suggested in 1963 that the Americas were "in the grip of psychosis" about reform and communism (Alexander, 1995, p. 230). That is, the middle path that his allies had tracked for the past thirty years had ceased to exist. This chapter explains the demise of social democratic principles in Latin America. Firstly, the social democrats lost control of the revolutionary leadership. The rise of insurgent movements in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela, among others, gave the emphasis back to the Castroists. The conflict became one between radical leftists and US-supported regimes from 1962 and 1965. This condemned social democracy to virtual irrelevancy. To combat

these new insurgent organisations, the US developed concepts of counter-insurgency. The vast majority of US military aid to Latin America following The Cuban Revolution was designed for counter-insurgency programs. This blurred the distinction between the military and the police and increased the potential to defeat insurgent organisations anywhere in Latin America. Expanded military assistance propelled Washington to become a regional leader of not only external defence but also internal defence against anti-American forces. This position was finally solidified through a series of military coups in Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Bolivia. By 1965 the Cold War battle lines were drawn and the social democratic movement was over.

This historical narrative confronts the standard definition of the Cold War as a conflict between the US and USSR. While the following section will outline the thesis position on several academic discussions in thematic, the larger thesis can only be told as a narrative. It follows the careers and ideological development of several leaders and movements that are broadly considered disparate. This thesis demonstrates that this is not the case as these movements developed concurrently. Leaders watched events unfold in their sister republics to gauge the different attitudes of American leaders towards democracy and economic nationalism to base their own national policies upon. This is a history of an entire continent comprised of twenty individual independent republics. A nation-by-nation or thematic approach would fail to grasp the enormous significance in regional history or to underline the role played by external forces.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

As the thesis is structured as a historical narrative, this section is designed to overview the literature in the diverse fields covered, provide clear definitions of terminology based on that literature, and explain the methodology that underpins the thesis arguments. This allows the remainder of the thesis to flow as a macro-historical narrative. This section will accordingly define its position on: the evolution of Latin American political though; the social democratic movement; and the expansion of US imperialism in the Americas. This will clarify the use of potentially contentious terms throughout the thesis and demonstrate where this thesis' position on several topics fits within the academic field. It will also provide the assumptions that underpin the thesis arguments throughout. This chapter will also explain the theoretical framework of the thesis by overviewing the position of the thesis within the fields of examination. This will explain the methodology which underpins the arguments surrounding: anti-communist accusations; the motivation which underpins those accusations; the politics of social progress in Latin America; and the forces of conservatism in Latin America. This chapter is designed to provide some academic insight that underpins the historical narrative of the thesis.

The Evolution of Latin American Thought

Latin American political thought emerged within the system created by the nationalist independence movements of the nineteenth century.[9] This system was centred on a moneyed "oligarchy". An oligarchy can be defined by the ownership of a region or nation by a small, wealthy group. These oligarchic regimes intentionally excluded the masses from politics on the basis of class, race, gender and for personal economic interests. The concentration of power within the oligarchies was determined by the size of the creole aristocracy at the time of their respective revolutions. Fourteen families, for example, ruled El Salvador, for over a century (Dunkerley, 1979, p.7). While in larger states like Venezuela the oligarchy was much larger and a bigger portion of the population. The size and the economic

[9] While chapter one will provide the historical context of those revolutions, it is important to begin by establishing definitions for the relevant terminology. It is also important to note that these broad definitions of political actors and organisations throughout Latin America will not always fit the circumstance of each nation. Hence, qualifications will be required throughout the thesis.

interests of the oligarchs determined the form of government employed. Where large oligarchies with competing interests existed, countries routinely operated, what Smith (2012) has called, "oligarchic democracies" (p. 26). An oligarchic democracy is a very limited form of democracy where factors such as wealth, class, race, gender, and land ownership determined whether a person could vote or hold office, excluding all non-oligarchic people. These competing interests between "conservatives" and "liberals", discussed below, often led to military conflict necessitating the rise of the military "caudillo". A caudillo is in essence a military dictator (Di Tella, 2004). In theory, however, the caudillo emerges from outside of the oligarchy and serves the oligarchic interests in exchange for personal power and wealth. Caudilloism also emerged to protect the interests of small-unified oligarchies from peasant and worker insurrections. Almond (1989) asserts that there are several impediments to Latin American democracy including militarism and oligarchic reaction (p. 21). Hence, thoughts about Latin American democracy emerged within this unstable and cyclical context.

The intellectual and political traditions of Latin American politics have often been defined through the polarisation of Liberals and Conservative Parties. While this thesis will assert that their coalition against progressive ideologies is more significant than their opposition, it is important to define the two positions. Woodward (1963) defines Latin American "conservatism" as a reaction to radical philosophies that emerged in nineteenth century Europe (pp. 1-9). Conservatism was ideologically very close to the Catholic Church, which "upheld the existing order" in the Catholic countries of the Americas (Woodward, 1963, p. 5). Hence, the emergence of conservatism in Latin America was a response to the arrival of liberalism during the national revolutions. Henderson (1988) asserts that the emergence of Latin American conservatism "illustrate[s] both the unity of Western history and the element of lag in the spread and acceptance of new ideas" (p. 6). This lag was both geographical and programmatic. As De Tella (2004) demonstrates, conservative parties are a continuing part of the political landscape in Latin America. Latin American liberalism originated from within European thought. Fawcett (2014) defines "liberalism" as the belief, "that societies were constantly evolving" with a specific emphasis "on people's rights, toleration, constitutional government, the rule of law, and liberty" (pp. 1-9). All of the nineteenth century philosophical traditions, including Marxism, defined liberty as

a goal. Liberalism, however, diverges from Marxism through its emphasis on the individual.

Liberals emphasise harnessing the power of people, who may be unequal and even immoral (Fawcett, 2014, p. 11). This analysis is based on classical liberal works including Hobhouse (1964) and Weber (2008). It is, however, important to make a distinction between economic and social components of liberalism. Grampp (1965) defines "economic liberalism" as a "laissez-faire" approach to the economy that utilises human energy (p. 167). Hence, economic liberals have sought to unleash the powers of the free market to rapidly expand economic output in their respective nations. Alternatively, Macer (2003) defines the social liberal, or "progressive" agenda as "requiring an impressive host of reforms," including the improvement of the "conditions of workers" (p. 79). Progressivism began as an isolated strand of liberalism that sought to regenerate society by utilising the potential of the working class. According to Peeler (1998) "most Latin American liberals were less deeply committed to the political side of liberalism, with its emphasis on constitutionalism, limited government and freedom of expression" as they were preoccupied by 'economic liberalism,' which advantaged the entrepreneurial oligarchic class (p. 36). Hence, when it is said that the principle conflict in Latin American politics was between liberalism and conservatism, the statement concerns economic theories rather than progressive notions of egalitarianism.

Hence, the first century of Latin American independence witnessed small factions compete for control over the political and economic system. However, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century several competing ideologies emerged. Smith (2012) defines democracy as "free completion or competition" and "accountability" within a participatory system (p.23). He also defined "semi-democracies", such as the Mexican PIR, as being able to work for the public good (Smith, 2012, p. 25). However, Joseph (2008) identifies the "alternating cycles of social reform and intense conservative reaction" as "an international Civil War" (p. 4). The vulnerability of these democratic experiments was due to the strength of the oligarchic position, which in many cases was supported by the US prior to and during the Cold War. Hence, Ames (1987) furthers this point by stating the need for "survival coalitions" against this oligarchic position. There is no simple

definition for Latin American democracy. Rather, one must look at the ideology and class composition that underpins the motivation for democratic rule.

"Left-liberalism" emerged in Britain during the late nineteenth century and is evident in parts of Latin America. Green (2003) emphasises the role of "general will" within left-liberalism (p. 27). He identifies that in its simplest form liberalism refers to "the natural rights of the individual" (Green, 2003, p. 27). Hence, the left-liberals of this era identified a contradiction in holding an ideology that emphasised the economic freedoms of a small minority at the expense of the political and economic freedoms of the great majority. This was a movement for equality that came from above and underpinned the expansion of democracy in Uruguay during the 1910s and Colombia during the 1930s. Both socialism and communism were also emerging from above. Socialism refers to the radical readjustment of the economic system to promote equality through taxation, regulation and taxation. Because many socialists believed that their vision for equality was compatible with the democratic system, Socialist parties competed, often successfully, in Latin American elections. Like socialism and left-liberalism, communism was a movement from above within Latin America. The one movement for democracy that emerged from below was unionism, which usually relied upon "Anarchism and Syndicalism". The collectivism of the union movement was expanded into a political movement due to large union membership in the early twentieth century. As the oligarchs were both "capital" and the "arbitrator" the rise of democracy was closely linked to the rise of the unionism, anarchism and syndicalism. Hence, to refer to Latin American "democracy" is a difficult and complicated task. One must also consider the ideology, class backing and national interest of any democrat.

The fragility of Latin American democracy that Joseph (2008) identifies led to another distinct characteristic within the regional political order. The emergence of "populism" in the 1930s was necessitated by the strong oligarchic reaction to any level of democratisation in Latin America. While there had been elements of "personalistic" within the oligarchy and caudilloism, the new coalition between military leaders and the masses that emerged in the 1930s was a new phenomenon. Di Tella (2004) defines populism as "a political movement based on a mobilised but not yet autonomously organized popular sector" led by an elite, or elites (p. 90). That is, a charismatic leader (often from the military) who can

develop a "personalised link" with that "popular sector" through appeals to their social welfare (Di Tella, 2004, p. 90). This was done in Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, as military leaders sought alliances with the lower classes against the established oligarchic position. The populists used the forces of the masses in order to reach their personal and nationalistic goals.[10] This forms the central contrast between populism and democracy. In theory, democracy is about autonomy of the people and accountability of their leaders. Whereas within populism a free and independent press did not exist to ensure that those two goals were achieved. Rather, populists used their platform to dictate goals that were often advantageous to the masses, however, the goal was to advantage the leader. Hence, there is a clear distinction between the "military populists" and the region's "democrats".

The Social Democratic Movement

This thesis defines "social democracy" as a reformist ideology that sought to enact a series of constitutional revolutions to overcome the endemic class inequalities in their Latin American nations. While the Latin American parties were quite different from their European counterparts, due to distinct political, social and economic circumstances, it remains necessary to develop a clear definition of "social democracy" through the literature concerning global movements for social democracy. Padgett and Patterson (1991) view "social democracy as a hybrid political tradition composed of socialism and liberalism" (p. 1). Hinnfors (2006) adds that, "efficiency, full employment and equality… Such would be a brief definition of social democracy. A specific approach towards the market economy takes central stage as the defining ideological characteristic of social democracy" (p. 21). Meyer (2007) asserts that social democracy diverged from other forms of 'liberalism' over the concept of liberty itself (p. 15). He argues that "a self-sustaining society" had to protect "labour from the vicissitudes of the market" (Meyer, 2007, p. 16). Giddens (1998) highlights that "a strong government presence in the economy" is desirable, "since public power, in a democratic society, represents collective will" (p. 9). While Przeworski (1985) concludes:

[10] While the distinction is important at this stage, as the thesis progresses it will become evident that Washington viewed these two groups in a similar light as the threat posed to US trade and investment was consistent between the groups.

> The social revolution envisioned by social democrats was necessary because capitalism was irrational and unjust….They could and did pursue ad-hoc measures designed to improve the conditions of the workers: develop housing programs, introduce minimal wage laws, institute some protection from unemployment, income and inheritance taxes, old age pensions (pp. 31-35).

Moreover, social democracy has inherited traits of both liberalism and socialism in order to regulate the capitalist system. It emerged during the Second International of Workers in Europe (1889-1916). European social democrats sought to progressively bring socialism to their nations through evolutionary measures consented to by the majority of the population. These changes formed the basis of what we now call the "welfare state". Social democrats regulate the relationship between capitalists and labour, which disadvantaged the oligarchic members of society. They utilise the liberal conception of human ingenuity but regulate human activity because, as Fawcett (2014) recognised, individuals can be unequal and immoral (p. 11).

The Latin American "social democrats" attempted to follow this ideological framework. However, this philosophy was significantly "Latinised", regionalised and nationalised to fit individual priorities. The emergence of this new political ideology in the 1920s and 1930s in Latin America was designed to accommodate a larger per cent of the population into the political system. This literature review will briefly overview the works on the first two movements to espouse this philosophy, in Mexico and Peru. González (2002) defines Cárdenas' political strategy in terms "radical social policies," "economic nationalism" and sovereignty from foreign capital (p. 222-235). While Cardenas emerged from the military the unique class alliances that resulted from the Mexican Revolution meant that he inherited a government that relied upon the support of both labour and the peasantry. Accordingly, his political manoeuvres between 1934 and 1940 were targeted towards those groups. The largest land reform package in regional history and the expropriation of productive industries, including American oil companies, that defied the labour code laid the foundation for the economic philosophies of the social democratic movement. Despite the limitations of democracy within Mexico, the PIR were the first regional state to successful administer a social democratic revolution. Stein (1980) identifies the central platform of the American

APRA as "nationalism", "anti-Imperialism", and "social security" (pp. 162-163). Haya's revolutionary philosophy was heavily influenced by his experience in Mexico. He sought to develop a regional network of anti-dictatorial and social democratic governments. Haworth (1992) defines the democratic experience in Peru as "herald[ing] an era of freedom for popular political organisation…economic restructuring and social change" (p. 170). These were the two most significant movements for social democracy in the 1930s that lead to a regional revolution.

The ideology of social democracy resonated with an emerging revolutionary class in Venezuela, Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. These parties have been individually analysed as follows. The preeminent source on the Venezuelan '*trienio*', Robert Alexander (1982), identifies the conversion of Betancourt's 1945 coup "into a process of fundamentally changing the political, economic, and social structures of Venezuela" (p. 224). After 17 years of resisting totalitarianism in Venezuela, Betancourt and AD brought a social democratic revolution that emphasised an expansion of the welfare state through making better use of oil income. Gleijes (1990) defines the Guatemalan 'ten years of spring' as "an attempt to break the power of a foreign enclave that threatened the country's sovereignty". The revolution of Arevalo and Arbenz's PAR used Mexico as a precedent in enacting meaningful labour and land reform. They also attempted to nationalise significant parts of the economy to expand their revolution. Ameringer (2000) defines the period of *Auténtico* rule under Grau as a force for "nationalism, socialism, and anti-Imperialism" (p. 44). Grau focussed his revolutionary efforts on creating legal and political equality between all classes and used the little revenue available to expand the welfare state. Costa Rica, under Jose Figueres, and the Dominican Republic, under Juan Bosch, also enacted limited social democratic revolutions. Costa Rica was limited by their own pragmatism following the 1954 coup against Guatemala, while the Dominican Republic were limited by US involvement due to the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

The similarities in these movements demonstrate the significant point that this ideology was multinational. In their edited collection, Bethell and Roxborough (1992) assert, "despite differences in political regime… there [were] striking similarities in the experience of the majority of the republics" between 1944 and 1948 (p. 1). Ameringer (1996) also states that "the democratising trends of World

War II accelerated the pressure for change in the Caribbean" (p. 1). Ameringer (1996) goes on to assert that these changes "were more evolutionary than revolutionary," as the decentralisation of economic power during World War I led to the gradual decentralisation of political power in the ensuing decades (p. 1). Finally, this movement for social democracy was evident within the following of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Green (2003) defines the movement for Gaitánism in Colombia as a "pronounced intellectual tradition" of the "home grown left" (p. 205). He notes that in the province of Bolívar, "all the campesinos have a portrait of Gaitán in their homes, and daily tend it with a mystique that approaches adoration" (Green, 2003, p. 203). Braun (1985) saw Gaitán's downfall as "inevitable" (p. 134). He argues that "he was too dangerous and too feared by the leaders of both parties" (Braun, 1985, p. 134). More significant than his cult status, however, was the movement that he spawned. Green (2003) asserts, "by 1944 it was clear that *Gaitánismo* represented a pronounced intellectual tradition in Colombia that may be referred as a home grown left" (p. 205). And while there are programmatic differences between Gaitanism and social democracy, the ideology, class composition, and response to his movement fits within the movement. Like his regional colleagues, Gaitán advocated social upheaval through government regulation in the economy. Hence, they were 'democratic socialists'. They sought to change their society with the consent of their population. The central task was the removal of the dictatorships through civil protest. Once in government they advocated a very moderate version of socialism that emphasised the regulation of the capitalist economy. They were not communists. They were not allied to the USSR. However, their vision differentiated them from the US-led capitalist system. Divergences in the social democratic ideological tradition have also been studied in depth. The failure of the social democratic movement to overcome the obstacles of US intervention and oligarchic resistance led many within the movement towards more radical ideologies, including Communism.

Castro, and those regional insurgents who followed his doctrine, promoted a political and economic philosophy in line with the social democratic movement. However, they aggressively fought for those programs that previous constitutional governments had failed to deliver. Aguilar (1988) presents the most useful analysis: Cuban Marxism "is merely a repertoire of slogans serving to organise various interests, most of them completely remote from those which Marxism

originally identified itself" (p. 140). Moreover, Castroism pragmatically utilised Marxist rhetoric in applying reforms that were not initially 'revolutionary', but were demanded by the bulk of the population. This afforded his regime the support of the USSR, in light of the inevitable aggression from the US. Sánchez (1967) offers the most detailed analysis of Castroism. He summarised its characteristics as: "exceptional powers and qualities" of the leader; economic dependence on an external source; and a commitment to "revolutionary duties" in the hemisphere (pp. 214-215). He asserts that "Castroism" was unique from communism. Thomas Whickham-Crowley (1991, 1992) argues that the "leftist insurgent" movements were formed within the hemisphere. That is, they were not imported from the Soviet Union. Through substantial research, Wickham-Crowley (1992) concludes "guerrilla movements do not begin among the peasants in the countryside but among urban-based intellectuals, especially in the twin milieus of universities and political parties" (p. 30). He goes on to argue that the Cuban example was utilised by other leftist groups that existed within the standing political system. This demonstrates the class origins of the region's leading insurgents. They were not peasants or communist agents, but disenfranchised reformers from the now redundant social democratic movement. Radu (1988) confirms this view, although from a different perspective (pp. 1-15). He argues that guerrilla movements were an "elite phenomenon" made by those "unwilling to accept…the prevailing social conventions of his class or group" (Radu, 1988, p. 3). This thesis adheres to the view that university-educated politicians alienated by the perceived failure of the social democratic parties created the guerrilla movements of 1961-1965. The machinations of anti-Communism viewed all of the above as within the "Communist Line" (Niblo ,2006, p. 231). This thesis utilises the extensive research conducted in this time period to break down that stereotype and develop a clear distinction between: oligarchic democracy; liberal democracy, social democracy, populism, Castroism, leftist insurgency and communism.

US Imperialism in Latin America

This thesis views "American Imperialism" in Latin America as the policies of successive administrations designed to advantage US trade and investment at the expense of Latin American sovereignty, prosperity and development. This is both consistent with traditional notions, that highlight political, economic and military

control, and Leninist views, that highlight economic exploitation of the periphery by the metropole (Harvey, 2005, p. 26; Lenin, 1916). Inasmuch, this thesis traces the literature on American "Imperialism" from Franklin Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbour Policy' to John Kennedy's 'Alliance for Progress'. Within this examination a clear pattern of imperialist behaviour towards Latin America becomes clear. It suggests that different strategies have the same aim. Hence, the invasion of Guatemala and the pressure placed on the Bolivian MNR to reopen oil reserves can be seen as mechanisms of the same American imperialism. This thesis predominately focuses on the "Imperialism" implicit within the GNP and the AFP because it sees those acts of 'good-will' as the most pervasive form of regional imperialism. Black (1988) asserts, "the main impact of the good neighbour policy seemed to be the reaffirmation of the United States' faith in its own virtues" (p. 61). This was occurring simultaneous to the US condemnation of half a dozen Caribbean nations to autocracy and leveraged others into damaging RTAs. Gellman (1979) argues that the Good Neighbour was an accidental label given to Roosevelt's foreign policy (p. 1). And that the GNP could be "separated into its components": of diplomacy, economic expansion and collective security measures (Gellman, 1979, p. 1). Steward (1975) describes it as "the reversal of the trend toward economic nationalism", which was the principal point of the GNP (p. 7). Cordell Hull had advocated this action since 1916, as he foresaw "a stable world-order of liberal-capitalist internationalism" (Steward, 1975, p. 7). Steward (1975) continues by describing the RTTA as "the internationally coordinated restoration of commerce, shipping, and industry through liberalised trade measures" (p. 11). As Bauer (1963) argues, "the philosophy of the RTA became the bipartisan cornerstone of American foreign economic policy during and after WWII" (p. 26). Grandin (2010) extends this argument to state that "this economic expansion into Latin America" became "the keystones of the New Deal state for the next three decades: liberalism at home and internationalism abroad" (p. 36). This economic imperialism drew much of the region into America's sphere of influence during the Roosevelt presidency.

As Hull had suggested, once the Latin American states were coerced into his economic line-up, the political line-up would follow. This political line-up was both diplomatic and militaristic. Pach (1991) argues that WWII Lend-Lease was a mechanism the JCS used to achieve "the standardisation of hemispheric military

establishments…thus ensuring the orientation of Latin America towards the United States" (p. 41). This also applied to personnel training. Gill (2004) indicates that the estrangement of military relations between Latin America and Europe during WWII allowed for the effective US monopolisation of leadership (p. 62). This leadership was institutionalised in 1946 (Gill, 2004, p. 62). Child (1980) sees the "early Cold War period [as] one of consolidation of codification" of the inter-American military system (p. 72). Given that there was no credible threat to hemispheric security in 1947, the increase of a US military presence on the continent through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was perplexing. The signing of the 1947 "Rio-Pact" and the consolidation regionalism through the 1948 OAS agreement created Latin American states as appendages of US interests. The increased emphasis on domestic intelligence indicated the true motivation of these alliances: to create a political line-up that served US interests above regional actors. This was clear at the May 1954 meeting of the OAS where the Latin American states condemned the Arbenz regime to its eventual downfall. It was also evident at the 1961 meeting is Punta del Este where the Latin Americans sided with Kennedy in its ostracism of the Cuban Revolution. Despite the lack of a credible regional security threat the American military presence in Latin America became virtually hegemonic between 1933 and 1965, to the point that they could choose foreign leaders and even invade nations on behalf of 'regional security'. This is a form of Imperialism that exceeds classical definitions, although fits within the concepts of both Harvey (2005) and Lenin (1916).

The US was also able to change the concept of regional security through its Imperial leadership of the continent. The propaganda around the proliferation of regional communism exemplifies this point. Arévalo (1963) claims that anti-communism is "more than a doctrine, more than a political theory, it wears the garb of a practical tool…a barricade to hold back social progress…" (p. 36). While communism existed in Latin America between 1919 and 1965 its size and influence was limited. The studies conducted during the 1960s by Alexander (1963) and Aguilar (1968) provide the most comprehensive and direct analysis of the Communist movement. The peak membership of 400,000 during 1947 represented around 0.22 per cent of the hemispheric population. At all other times during the focus period the proportion was much lower. Steinberg (1984) argues that the purge of the US State Department created "a mental straightjacket" that

dictated all facets of foreign policy (p. 59). He continues that the "unfolding of the loyalty program…served to maintain the generalised atmosphere of fear" in the US State Department (Steinberg, 1984, p. 59). Boyle (2005) asserts that "the deep fears and anxieties of America in the Cold War created the irrationality of the Red Scare" (p. 21). Moreover, the anti-Communist paranoia, which would eventually be characterised as a psychosis, was not simply aimed at the small and weak Communist parties. To build upon Arevalo's claim that it held "back social progress", Niblo (2006) demonstrates that the US were concerned by a hypothetical "communist line", which is "any radical ideas they disapproved of" (p.284). That is, anti-communist accusations were utilised against any leader, or movement, that threatened US imperial interests. We see this clearly with Gaitan, Peron and Vargas. All of these leaders were accused of sympathising with the Nazis during WWII. However, when it was expedient, anti-communist accusations were drawn, demonstrating that anti-communism was not simply a tool to discredit communists.

Social democratic leaders fell into the so-called "communist line" due to their "radical ideas" (as cited in Niblo, 2006, p.284). This thesis outlines the historical origins, application and demise of social democracy in Latin America. The emergence of this pragmatic reform philosophy during the 1930s represented the future empowerment of many oppressed people in Latin America. Its failure was due to its philosophical incompatibility with the US-led modern world system. The first tenet of Latin American social democracy was anti-imperialism. In the context of 1930s Latin America, this meant anti-American. While the isolated and short-lived concept of regional solidarity with people oppressed by US actions can be considered as noble, its proponents did not realise or acknowledge the role that Washington would play in their political future. Hence, Washington's opposition to social democratic leaders made the application of political and economic policies extremely difficult. The second tenet of Latin American social democracy was nationalism. Economic nationalism opposed unregulated trade and investment. However, the world economy following WWII was increasingly globalised. Hence, these leaders were seen as radical for opposing further US integration within their economies. The third and final tenet of social democracy was socialism. The Latin Americans promoted a form of socialism that followed the US New Deal and post-WWII Western European social democracy; the US became increasingly concerned

about communist infiltration. Latin American socialism was compatible with capitalism. However, the emergence of the global Cold War drew very rigid definitions. The US opposed any government who followed the hypothetical 'communist line' on economic development, condemning many social democratic leaders. The failure of social democracy caused a new generation of radicals to oppose US imperialism through physical force. While some success was evident in Cuba and Nicaragua, the result of this new strategy of insurgency had drastic consequences for the people of Latin America.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis is not a traditional historical analysis. It does not claim access to a large collection of documents capable of proving that anti-communism was a product of propaganda. No unified collection could exist. This is a theoretical study into the concepts of social democracy, populism and anti-communism. It requires a large amount of secondary source analysis. Primary sources are used sparingly in cases where diplomats have exposed their prejudices and a tendency to create propaganda against the social democratic movement. This study could not exist as a classical historical analysis. It seeks to write a multi-national narrative with specific emphasis on political development, foreign relations, economic policy and military coups. Moreover, there are weaknesses in macro-historical studies that are heavily reliant on documentary analysis. They rely heavily upon generalised assumptions regarding the Cold War. Hal Brand's (2010) 'Latin America's Cold War' exemplifies this point. It is capable of providing valuable historical knowledge to the debate. However, the focus is reliant upon the generalised 'events' of the Cold War. Hence its bias is towards Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1959, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, Nicaragua from 1979, the operations of Condor and the Civil Wars in Central America. This adds to the archive of information, but it does not attempt to draw thematic links. Stephen Kinzer (2007) and Eric Grow (2008) follow a similar narrative. They focus on the aggressive components of American foreign policy as exemplified within the same case studies. Again, this is a natural conclusion to draw from the archival evidence. Yet it overlooks the transnational narrative. Traditional notions of the Cold War highlight the struggle between the

communists[11] and the Latin American militaries supported by the US. This relegates the period prior to the Cuban Revolution to virtual irrelevancy, outside of Washington's Guatemalan mishap. The Cold War in Latin America originated in the ideological battles that preceded Castro's triumph. Hence, this work has concurrent value to those who archive historical events.

The theoretical framework of this thesis is defined by its position on several topics at the end of the project. Hence, this chapter will conclude with an examination of: the potential of Communism in Latin America; its place within the broader context of Latin American politics; an examination into the potential of economic nationalism; and the motivation of the armed struggle. Communism can be defined as a radical ideology that demanded the overthrow of the economic and political system to create a more just society. Hence, Communism cannot evolve out of a standing system. It must replace the system with something new, as occurred in Russia. According to Femia (1993) "Marx denounces bourgeois civil society, based on unrestricted individualism, as a violation of man's social being" (p. 70). Marx did not believe that rampant individualism could bring about social betterment. He stated that "[t]rue democracy would abolish the alienation between the individual and the political community by resolving the split between egoistic interests of individuals in civil society and the social character of political life" (as cited in Femia, 1993, p. 70). Hence "[in]n Marx's opinion, then, the classic representative principle, as defined by the liberal tradition, fails to achieve its two main goals: (i) accountability, and (ii) protection of the public interest" (Femia, 1993, p. 73). It should also be noted that the Latin American society was not conducive to classical Marxism. With the exceptions of the metropolitan centres of the 'Southern Cone', the vast majority of the population worked in agriculture. Hence, the 'proletarian' class were disjointed and not prepared to stage a Leninist revolution. Literacy was low in peasant communities and they were far more concerned with pragmatic reform around labour and land reform to liberate them from indentured labour. While these Communist Parties existed, there needs to be a clear distinction between, Communism, Castroism, and leftist insurgency. Even the Cold Warrior, George Kennan made this distinction.

[11]The better analyses define between 'insurgencies' and the Moscow-orientated communist parties. See Wickham-Crowley, 1992; Ratliff, 1976.

Communism posed little threat to Latin America. The Soviet Union was not in a position to challenge the US militarily in the hemisphere and the Communist parties were small and ill equipped to challenge the civil order. Ironically, the Communists of Latin America emerged in the upper echelons of

This thesis will pay particular attention to the domestic political economies of individual Latin American states and battle over 'economic nationalism'. However, it will do so within the context of the competing interpretations Latin America's place within the global capitalist economy. These two visions can broadly be defined as the "dependency theory," advocated by the ECLA, Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer and Andre Frank, and the "modernisation theory," advocated by American foreign policy and Walt Rostow adopted by US policy makers. Palma (1981) demonstrates, "the development of the core necessarily requires the underdevelopment of the periphery" (pp. 44-45). The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), led by Prebisch, developed the economic theory that underpinned dependency theory. The Prebisch-Singer Thesis (PST) argued that continued free trade between the global North and South would lead to a "divergence" of wealth between the two regions. Andre Gunder Frank's (1967; 1970) research proves this point. His analysis of terms of trade demonstrated the structural underdevelopment of Latin America, and unresolvable position of debt it was taking on (Frank, 1970, p. 186). Proponents of dependency theory advocated economic nationalistic measures to combat underdevelopment. These measures were adopted in many nations. Rostow (1971) argues that all nations go through the same pattern of economic development irrespective of national circumstances (pp. 4-12). He argues that desire, education, government, available capital, technology and raw materials determine the "take-off" into capitalism (pp. 6-7). In this respect, all states have the potential to become advanced capitalist economies. This thesis was advocated by the US throughout the Cold War. It was the central tenet of the Alliance for Progress (AFP) (Latham, 2000, p. 71). It required the opening of the economy to the invisible hand of the market (Latham, 2000, p. 89). While this is an intellectual battle, there were practical applications for the continent. As this thesis will demonstrate, the conflict between the two theories dominated economic discourse between Anglo and Latin America.

Then the question becomes: did the US overestimate the communist threat in Latin America?; Or was this an intentional falsification? After extensive analysis, this thesis is of the opinion that anti-communism was an intentional falsification, a ready expedient, a convenient pretext to further their interests and to combat the trend of political and economic nationalism in the hemisphere.

The Causes of Anti-communism

Divergent Continents: The Origins of 'Anglo' and 'Latin' America, 1898-1933

This thesis attempts to redefine the parameters of the Cold War in Latin America. It argues that the Latin American Cold War was an ideological battle distinct from the generational conflict between the US and the USSR. Rather, the Latin American Cold War was waged between distinct visions over the future involvement of each individual Latin American nation within the world capitalist system. On one side, the US regarded most Latin American nations for their raw materials and their markets for industrial goods. All discussion on political and social development, within the hemisphere, was relegated by this simple fact. On the opposing side were Latin America's social democrats and military populists who sought to utilise the desires of the masses to transform many aspects of Latin American society to resemble those of Europe and North America. This thesis will argue that this struggle began during 1933. No struggle emerges in a vacuum, however; extensive contextualisation is required. This chapter will provide context to: the development of Latin American society, culture, politics and political economy; US visions of expansionism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; the origins of Latin American democracy, liberalism, anarchism, unionism, socialism and communism at the onset of the twentieth century; the significance of a multiclass revolution as demonstrated in Mexico, 1910-1920; the beginning of US regional leadership during the 1920s; the rapid expansion of US trade and investment during the 1920s; the fomenting of anti-Americanism as a response to both formal and informal imperialist actions on the part of the US; and the regional views of the 1929 economic crisis. In doing so this chapter will demonstrate the unequal development of the 'Anglo' and 'Latin' Americas. It does not seek to rewrite the historiography of events that precede its focus area, however it is necessary to demonstrate how several historical events set the framework for the emergent Cold War that this thesis will examine. Moreover, this chapter will provide a narrative that will explain how, and why, the two distinct visions for Latin America emerged in several Latin American states from 1933 onwards.

A New World in the Service of the Old

Europeans discovered the New World by chance. In the quest for Asian commodities, the Venetian explorer Christopher Columbus navigated the islands of the Caribbean in 1492, prior to opening up a 'New World' to Europeans in subsequent voyages (Maltby, 2009, pp. 19-24). The Spanish Crown claimed ownership of the Americas without any prior knowledge of the peoples they were colonising (Thomas, 2010, pp. 3-15, 212- 240). The Americas were home to great empires prior to Columbus' voyage. The Mayans had constructed a civilisation that rivalled Europe at its peak (Maltby, 2009, p. 45). The Aztecs ruled over much of Mexico and the Southwest of the US (Thomas, 2010, p. 3). The Incas dominated Northwest South America from their Peruvian capital (Maltby, 2009, p. 57). The Indian tribes of North America also posed an obstacle to European colonisation (Van Deusen, 1959, p. 171). However, the effects of the 'Colombian Exchange' – of goods, ideas and pathogens – crippled these pre-Colombian civilisations, allowing for European ascendancy (Thomas, 2010, pp. 1-15). After establishing bases in the Caribbean, the Spanish began the invasion of Mexico in the 1520s and of South America in the 1530s (Thomas, 2010, pp. 3-15, 212-240). Their motivation was gold, silver and power. Europeans targeted the unexploited gold and silver mines of the New World, at the expense of indentured native labour. This brought Europe to the centre of the global capitalist system for the first time (Wallerstein, 2011, pp. 169-175). Britain, Portugal, France and Holland emulated Spain's rapid exploitation of American resources (Frank, 1978, pp. 25-31; Ferguson, 2003, pp. 1-15). Spain imposed coercive rule upon its portion of Latin America and became the dominant regional power. The natives were subjected to slavery in the mines, and to indentured labour on agricultural plantations (Maltby, 2009, p. 65; Thomas, 2010 pp. 12-21). When native labour declined due to disease and, in certain cases, genocide, Europeans initiated the largest forced migration of a human population in history (Mintz, 1984, pp. 1-8). The African slave trade saw twenty million individuals captured and condemned to a life of suffering (Mintz, 1984, pp. 1-8). By the onset of the American Revolution of 1776, virtually all of the New World had been colonised by Europeans.

Latin America's political system has been defined by its Iberian history (Henderson, 2009, pp. 11-27). Europeans were sent to the New World to operate the Spanish Empire through force, coercion and 'conversion'. The Spaniards

believed in converting the American masses to Catholicism in order to promote cooperation and eventual assimilation (Maltby, 2009, pp. 73-77). The Spanish 'compradors' ensured a steady flow of capital to Spain throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Hopkins, 2013, p. 54). The ruling class was Spanish, with an allegiance to the Crown. However, global circumstances changed in the late eighteenth century. Spain was defeated and occupied in the Napoleonic Wars, rendering Joseph Bonaparte control of the vast Spanish Empire in the Americas (May, 1975, p. 94; Henderson, 2009, p. 33). The French and American Revolutions also challenged the established notions of colonialism (May, 1975, p. 209). The declaration of Haitian independence from France also motivated Latin American 'revolutionaries' to reconsider their dependence on Spain (Aristide, 2008, pp. 3-7). However, the principal motivation for the Latin American oligarchs was financial. By severing ties with the Spanish Empire, Latin America's ruling class could enrich themselves through foreign trade, primarily with Britain (Henderson, 2009, pp. 54-59; Di Tella, 2004 pp. 1-19). Spanish America's Iberian oligarchy was not encouraged by idealistic sentiments of equality and no state sought to extend suffrage to all its citizens (Rivera, 1978, p. 121). Rather, the ruling groups operated quasi-democratic governments that excluded all indigenous, 'Mestizo' and dissenting voices. Descendants of Europeans, known as 'Creole', owned the majority of land (Frank, 1953, p. 79). Moreover, the monopolisation of land led to the monopolisation of labour. When peasants resisted, they were suppressed. The extension of international trade in the late nineteenth century further burdened the indigenous population (Henderson, 2009, pp. 161-167; Frank, 1978, pp. 250-270).[12] The advent of rail transportation rapidly increased the amount of arable land in Latin America available for agricultural exploitation (Woodward, 1985, pp. 171-174). This last great land grab cemented the power of oligarchic rule.

Latin America's political economy is defined by its export economies. The failure to sufficiently develop internal demand for domestically produced goods, as occurred in the US, meant that the oligarchy became dependent on foreign capital, industrial goods and, most significantly, markets (Bertola and Williamson, 2006, pp. 11-20). British, German, and later North American trade and investment replaced the formal relationship of the Spanish, French and Portuguese colonies of

[12] The example of Guatemala in the 1880s highlights this pattern (McCrary, 1983, pp. 45-60).

Latin America through 'free' trading competition. The Uruguayan historian and activist Eduardo Galliano (1997) said of Latin America, it "continues to exist at the service of others' needs" (p. 1). Moreover, it was the material wealth of the region that condemned it to export economics. During the colonial period, the continent was looted of its gold and silver at huge mines such as Zacatecas, in Mexico, and Potosi, in Peru (Thomas, 2010, p. 41). To service these large endeavours, the Spanish also established agricultural plantations, called *haciendas*, and rudimentary factories, called *obrajes* (Bertola and Williamson, 2006, pp. 22-23). As the scope of mining operations reduced in the early Republican period, *hacienda* farming grew in significance (Bertola and Williamson, 2006, pp. 22-25). The *hacienda structure* resembled feudalism in Europe (Barraclough and Domike, 1970, p. 50; Gilhodes, 1970, p. 411). A single owner controlled vast amounts of land designated towards the production of a single commodity (Stone, 1990, p. 19). In much of 'tropical' Latin America the commodity was coffee (Safford, 1995, pp. 121-133; Gudmundson, 1995, p. 167). The indigenous and Mestizo workforce belonged to the land, and their labour was exchanged for small tracts of land to produce subsistence foodstuffs (Bertola and Williamson, 2006, pp. 22-25). Any actual wage was extremely low and usually returned to the landowner to pay for minimal commodities through the system of debt peonage. The exceptions to this economic pattern were the European settler societies of Argentina, Uruguay and Southern Brazil.[13] Within those political economies, high numbers of European immigrants replaced the indigenous population in the late nineteenth century (Laforcade, 2010, p. 327). Accordingly, urbanisation and industrialisation paralleled North American development patterns. Nevertheless, by 1900 the vast majority of Latin America's population was engaged in commodity production, either farming or mining, for European and North American consumption.

A Rising Star in the North

The British established a settler society along the Eastern coast of North America during the seventeenth century (Ferguson, 2003, pp. 58-73). This settler society was fundamentally different to the Iberian colonies established during the

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[13] Ceslo Furtando has defined three categories of the nineteenth-century Latin American economies: temperate agricultural production of valuable commodities; tropical agricultural production of cheap commodities through cheap, and often unpaid labour; and mineral production (as cited in Bertola and Williamson, 2006, p. 20). The temperate economies of the Southern Cone were unique due to their social, political and economic development in the late nineteenth century.

previous century. Europeans virtually replaced the indigenous population of British North America. Meanwhile, each class of European society was transported to form a neo-Europe in the New World (Henretta and Nobles, 1987, p. 221). The American Declaration of Independence was different to Latin American independence in a number of ways. Its most significant characteristics were its notions of nationalism and individualism. While a moneyed oligarchy remained dominant over the political system, the European citizens of the US supported the general manoeuvres of the Federal Government that they had elected (Armitage, 2008, pp. 53-57; Ferling, 2007, pp. 555-560).[14] North American society was composed of a variety of social classes, from 'robber baron' to slave. While peripheral members of society, such as Native Americans and African slaves, were excluded through forced unpaid labour and persecution, the majority of the European citizens were free to undertake independent economic and social activities (Henretta and Nobles, 1987, pp. 221-236; Horsman, 1981, p. 100). This forms the central contrast to Latin American societies of the late eighteenth century. The Latin American oligarchy was visible and directly controlled the majority of the population. There was no attempt to have lower-class individual economic activity contribute to the central development of a vibrant economy. Moreover, the United States began its path to regional economic leadership through its implementation of a rapidly expanding capitalist economy that encouraged a variety of productive activities.

The thirteen colonies sought to geographically expand at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War in 1788 (Plesur, 1971, pp. 4-11). The continuing threat of British aggression to the North directed the US both southward and westward. This brought it into conflict with the 'Latin'[15] American world for the first time. Following the peaceful acquisitions of the regions of French Louisiana, in 1803, and Spanish Florida in 1819, the US engaged in the eradication of indigenous peoples throughout their westward expansion (Horsman, 1981, pp. 81-90; Philbrink, 2010, pp. 190-195). Foreseeing this great expansion into 'Latin' America, US President James Monroe declared that European colonisation of the Americas would amount to a declaration of war against the US. The 'Monroe Doctrine' of 1823 necessitated a westward expansion that would bring the US to the border of

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[14] Full male suffrage was ensured after 1822 (Henretta and Nobles, 1987, p. 228)

[15] Latin America encompasses the French, Portuguese and Spanish speaking regions. This definition means that it geographically shifts over time.

the newly independent Mexican Empire during the 1820s (Horsman, 1981, pp. 101-109). While the US lacked the military capacity to prevent European colonisation, an implicit alliance was formed with Britain (May, 1975, p. 197). Both nations sought to prevent further economic competition in the Americas. They sought to freely compete for resources and markets. Meanwhile, the US continued its continental expansion. The Texan region of the Mexican Empire was sparsely populated. The US government commissioned the settlements led by Moses Houston into East Texas from the late 1820s (Martínez, 1975, p. 20). US Nationals withdrew Texas from Mexican authority in 1836 (Van Deusen, 1959, p. 171). Against the calls of expansionists, US president Martin Van Buren decided against the annexation of Texas in 1836 to prevent a continental war, as the US did not then have the military power, or the will, to do so (Martínez, 1975, p. 32). The following decade saw a resurgence of nationalism under the doctrine of “manifest destiny” (Schroeder, 1973, p. 6). Many nationalists argued that it was the US’ mission to spread itself across the continent. James Polk revisited the issue in 1846 (Nevins, 1952, p. 6). Polk’s dominance in the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848 gained the US 2.5 million square kilometres, over half of Mexican territory (Martínez, 1975, p. 147). More significantly, it provided the US with access to the Pacific Ocean and the impetus to become a global power. In 1848 the US announced itself to the region.

Despite its continental geographic ascendancy, the US suffered deep social and economic divisions (Reid, 1999, pp. 62-65; Richardson, 2007, pp. 1-3). The nation was polarised over the issue of slavery, descending into the Civil War of 1861-1865 (Henretta and Nobles, 1987, p. 236; Richardson, 2007, pp. 3-7). The reconstruction of national identity was a difficult task, especially in the defeated South. The influx of non-British migrants in the late nineteenth century also created urban sub-cultures, which challenged social cohesion. Furthermore, the post-Civil War era saw a shift away from plantation farming, and towards an advanced industrial economy (Richardson, 2007, pp. 7-11). In many respects this shift did not reflect the reality of its position within the global capitalist economy (Davis and Cull, 1994, p. 79). Europe was, during the nineteenth century, the principal market for US exports and the principal source of foreign capital (Davis and Cull, 1994, p. 79; Henretta and Nobles, 1987, p. 225). The US was positioning

itself against the most powerful nautical and industrial global power, Britain.[16] It sought to utilise its geographic position to replace Britain as the leading industrial exporter to the New World and Asia. The depression of the 1890s further demonstrated to US policy makers, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan, that the US required significant markets beyond Europe for its export commodities (Hunt, 1992, pp. 16-28; Williams, 1972, pp. 48-53). The "open-door notes" urged the US to initiate an expansionist trade policy in both East Asia and Latin America. American politicians urged that US expansionism would be different to European colonialism (Williams, 1972, pp. 48-53). The US sought to achieve its economic goals in both Asia and Latin America through competition with the Europeans, and the geographic proximity to those regions gave the US a natural advantage. Accordingly, the US adopted a policy of trade liberalism in Asia. During the 1890s the US transformed its economic position from raw material exporter to industrial and material exporter (Pletcher, 1998, pp. 21-30; Henretta and Nobles, 1987, p. 225). Competition for necessary primary resources and foreign markets became a central goal of US foreign policy thereafter (Williams, 1973, pp. 48-53). This, in turn, motivated US imperial expansion at the turn of the century (Secunda and Moran, 2007, pp. 11-13).

The Imperial Moment

The onset of an American Imperial presence in the Caribbean was sudden. Between 1890 and 1933, US Presidents utilised the armed forces forty-three times without Congressional approval (Crawley, 2007, pp. 8-9). Thirty-two of these actions occurred in the Caribbean Basin, demonstrating its significance to American expansion (Crawley, 2007, pp. 8-9). The US did not hold a dominant position in the Caribbean prior to 1898. Spain held onto its remaining colonies in Cuba and Puerto Rico (Secunda and Moran, 2007, p. 14); Britain dominated regional trade and investment, while Germany, France and the Netherlands also provided competition. The only nation that the US held the majority of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) in was Mexico, with approximately US$200 million (Davis and Cull, 1994, p. 81). This was approximately one third of all US foreign

[16] In 1895 Richard Olny, influenced by Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Mahan, asserted to Britain that "the US is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." (Perkins, 1964, p. 161.) While Britain did not appreciate the effect of this memorandum in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, it was a clear message of US intentions to challenge British naval and mercantile hegemony in the Americas.

capital in 1897. Mexico became the precedent for informal colonisation in the late nineteenth century. The pro-US dictator, Porfirio Díaz, ruled Mexico both formally and informally from 1876, after US rail magnate James Stillman funded the Díaz military coup, until 1910 (O'Brien, 2009, p. 201). The US sought similar influence throughout the Caribbean Basin, attempting to eliminate the formal colonial control that hindered the open door policy in order to increase their own presence in the region. While there were certainly political and security motivations, US DFI in Latin America increased from US$308 million in 1898 to US$753 million in 1908 (Davis and Cull, 1994, p. 81). This section demonstrates how the US first established a dominant stance in Latin America, beginning in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.

The Cuban rebels resisted Spanish tyranny for decades, and welcomed US assistance (Tone, 2006, p. 58). The Cuban exile, José Martí, foresaw the conditions of Cuba's informal imperial subjugation to the US during his time in Díaz's Mexico (Turton, 1986, p. 65). He correctly warned that the US would interfere in the Cuban Revolution against Spain. The sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, on February 15 1898, provided US President William McKinley with the pretext to attack Spain (Secunda and Moran, 2007, p. 15). Ninety per cent of Americans supported the war effort under the slogan "Remember the Maine: to hell with Spain" (Morgan, 2003, p. 277). Members of the "yellow press," including William Hearst, advocated war with Spain from 1897 (Hillstrom and Hillstrom-Collier, 2012, p. 42). This led to public support for the intervention. The Spanish-American War also solidified nationalism in the US, which had been deficient since the Civil War (Secunda and Moran, 2007, p. 22). The revolutionary leader Laureano Gómez declared, "the enemy has departed," prior to the US invasion in June (Pérez, 1992 p. 154). Nevertheless, the US initiated an economic and political protectorate upon Cuba, under the Platt Amendment of 1903, in addition to seizing Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The "benefits of North American rule" from 1899 until 1903 "were North American" (Pérez, 1992, p. 167). US companies including the United Fruit Company (UFCo), the Cuba Company, the American Sugar Refining Company and Pennsylvania Steel hurriedly purchased every productive Cuban

industry (Pérez, 1992, pp. 167-170). The US began its imperial expansion at the expense of a nationalist movement modelled on its own revolutionary ideology.[17]

With the 'Pearl of the Antilles' under US control, its expansion into the Caribbean continued through the monopolisation of trans-continental trade through the construction of an isthmian canal. In 1900, the French owner of the New Panama Canal Company (NPCC), Philippe Bunau-Varilla, possessed the exclusive rights to the Central American isthmus' narrowest point, Panama (Yarbrough, 2012, p. 181). Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French designer of the Suez Canal, had abandoned construction in 1889 after eleven years and the deaths of 20,000 labourers. Bunau-Varilla sought to recoup a portion of the company's investment by selling its rights to the US government in 1900 (LaFeber, 1989, p. 17). However, the US government favoured construction in Nicaragua. Bunau-Varilla then hired influential Wall Street lawyer William Cromwell, for a fee of US$500,000, to lobby Congress to move the canal project to Panama (Mowry, 1958, p. 152). Cromwell paid Senator Mark Hannah US$60,000 to spread the fear of Nicaraguan volcanic activity, thereby ensuring the success of the Panama solution. The Roosevelt government offered the NPCC US$40 million for their contracts and the Colombian government US$10 million and US$250,000 annually to own and operate the "Canal Zone" in Panama (Mowry, 1958, p. 152). The Colombian President Rafael Reyes, however, demanded greater remuneration for the Canal Zone. In response, Roosevelt urged the Panamanians to secede from Colombia. When revolt ensued in 1903, Roosevelt sent the USS Nashville to blockade the region, which was only accessible by sea, from Colombian reinforcements (Yarbrough, 2012, p. 185). The independent Panamanian state was then free to negotiate with the US over the canal. However, it never did; "the treaty that no Panamanian signed" was written solely between Bunau-Varilla of the NPCC and the US State Department (Lafeber, 1989, p. 32). It ensured US sovereignty over the Canal Zone for the original fee offered to Colombia. In addition, the Panamanian government was reduced to the status of unofficial protectorate, with no army of its own. By 1903 the US had a possession in the Caribbean to defend; its policy needed to reflect this reality.

[17] The Cuban revolutionary and scholar, José Martí, predicted this point. Martí's critique of US imperialism became the focal point of all revolutionary thought in Cuba throughout the twentieth century (Turton, 1986, p. 63).

The expansion of US trade and investment throughout the Caribbean necessitated a more assertive foreign policy. The onset of the twentieth century oversaw the most dramatic shift in US foreign policy in its short history. In 1900 McKinley received US$115 million from Congress to construct military bases and an industrialised navy (Ginger, 1965, p. 250). The combination of military expansion, the transoceanic canal and increasing US trade and investment meant the Caribbean had the potential to become an 'American Lake'. However, continuing European trade, investment and naval presence temporarily obstructed Washington's advance. In the 1904 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt offered a far-reaching corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Whereas Monroe's primary concern had been the avoidance of re-colonisation of European empires, Roosevelt sought to bring all the nations of the Caribbean into the American economic and political sphere. Roosevelt (1904) sought the expansion of US political and economic control in "every country washed by the Caribbean Sea." He saw the interests of the regions as "identical" as they possessed "great natural riches" that would bring "prosperity" to the region (Roosevelt, 1904). However, those nations that continued to defy the Monroe Doctrine by maintaining their relationships with European trade and investment, through their "impotence" would be subject to "international police powers" (Roosevelt, 1904). These police powers took a variety of forms as they were both directed at European gunships, in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, and, under President William Howard Taft, at Latin American leaders who did not submit to US demands (McBeth, 2001, pp. 85-88; Kinzer, 2007, pp. 56-77). The expansion of informal trade protectionism and formal military occupations, as well as private capitalist interference, firmly established the Caribbean as an American lake under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The Roosevelt Corollary had a practical application upon the relatively weak nations of the Caribbean. Many were dependent on the export of primary products such as indigo, coffee, sugar and bananas to generate tariff revenue. However, the expansion of the export economy demanded capital investment, specifically in rail, which required external funding through loans (Woodward, 1985, p. 178). The conditions of these debts left many states in an irresolvable economic position. In 1906 Honduras accrued a debt of US$124 million to European financiers, with meagre annual tariff revenue of US$1.6 million (LaFeber,

1984, p. 32). European gunships were active in the Caribbean in the early twentieth century, seeking to reclaim the capital they had lent (McBeth, 2001, p. 85). The US sought to end European loans to these weak Latin American governments. On the surface this was to prevent European military intervention, however it also secured for US capitalists a controlling stake in the treasuries of Latin America. The first case of economic protectionism followed the European bombardment of Caracas in 1902 (McBeth, 2001, p. 85).[18] Civil conflict had burdened Venezuela with significant European debt, yet Cipriano Castro refused to repay the debt of his predecessors, which motivated European intervention (McBeth, 2001, p. 88). To offset European aggression, Roosevelt established a US protectionist plan in 1903. US administrators were employed to recover 30 per cent of customs revenue to service debts, while US financiers refinanced the Venezuelan government (Mowry, 1958, p. 157). A similar situation occurred in the Dominican Republic, where the 1903 Customhouse Agreement ensured that 45 per cent of revenue would be committed to service its national debt (Curry, 1979, p. 12). The American Kuhn Loeb and Company bought the national debt in 1905 (Curry, 1979, p. 15). By installing US private citizens in the customhouses of both Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, the US was able to commit these nations to 'reciprocal' trade, which advantaged US businesses. Furthermore, US investment also focussed upon resource extraction.[19] The US also re-occupied Cuba from 1906 until 1909 to protect US investment (Millet, 1968, pp. 72-97). Informal economic protectionism served to extend the reach of Washington's financial conquistadors in the first years of the twentieth century.

The Latin American, specifically Central American, nations that opposed US capitalist monopolisation faced a new threat. Roosevelt's warning that the US would exercise "international police powers" was realised under the 'gunboat diplomacy' of his successor, Howard Taft (T Roosevelt, 1904; Scholes and Scholes, 1970, pp. 40-42). While Roosevelt had targeted irresponsible regimes that incurred European intervention in the Caribbean, Taft targeted those governments whose policies ran counter to US business interests (Scholes and Scholes, 1970, pp. 49-59). This stance led the US to overthrow the sovereign governments of

[18] The bombardment and blockade of Caracas was led by the navies of Germany, Britain and Italy (McBeth, 2001, p. 85).

[19] In the Dominican Republic, infrastructure was constructed to increase sugar exports (Curry, 1979, p. 24). In Venezuela, oil exploration became increasingly important (Bucheli and Aguiler. 2010, p. 364).

Nicaragua and Honduras during 1911. The Honduran President Miguel Davila inherited an onerous economic position. The US government proposed a 'recovery plan' in 1907. The plan required the sale of fertile Honduran land to US fruit companies, primarily Sam Zemmurray's Cuyamel Fruit, to pay off the country's debt (Kinzer, 2007, p. 58; MacCameron, 1983, p. 3). The plan would effectively make Honduras a plantation state and its people indentured subjects of a foreign power. Davila and the Honduran Congress refused and in response, Taft urged Zemmuray to initiate a coup, installing the former dictator Manuel Bonilla (Scholes and Scholes, 1970, p. 65). Zemmuray hired Soldier of Fortune Lee Christmas and other US mercenaries to stage the coup (Kinzer, 2007, p. 60). The US navy provided safe passage for the conspirators to overthrow the meagre Honduran military. Bonilla accepted the reorganisation of national debt with US financiers, and sold off Honduran land to meet the payments (Karnes, 1978, p. 44). In Nicaragua, the President José Santos Zelaya had run a responsible government since 1895. Large investment from German and Italian coffee planters gave Nicaragua a rising level of national prosperity (Bermann, 1986, p. 153). The US timber magnate, George Emery, was given the contracts to extract lumber from the rich mahogany region of the Mosquito Coast. Zelaya demanded that two trees be planted for each taken and a serviceable railway constructed in the region (Bermann, 1986, p. 155). Emery's contracts were terminated when neither of these conditions was met. The US citizens in the Bluefields region protested Zelaya's actions. The US invaded Nicaragua to replace Zelaya with a more compliant leader in 1911; this was followed by nine separate US military interventions in Nicaragua (Crawley, 2007, p. 9). US imperialism in the Caribbean in the early twentieth century was demonstrated by its actions in Nicaragua and Honduras.[20]

The Imperial Dilemma

The US approached Latin America as if it was a stagnant region that could be easily manipulated and controlled. However, Latin American society included a variety of organised segments that would impede US imperial ambitions. These included peasants, urban industrial unions and the burgeoning social democratic movement. This led to an evolution in the national life of many Latin American

[20] Ironically, many of Taft's policies were institutionalized and extended by his 'liberal' successor, Woodrow Wilson. Wilson expanded military intervention to Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915-1916 (Notter, 1965, pp. 284-291).

republics. The first group to consider are the Latin American peasants. Private US businesses were evolving several Caribbean nations into plantation states. The expansion of corporate and foreign sugar, coffee and banana production in the first decade of the twentieth century conflicted with the traditional way of life of many Mayan peasants in Mexico and Central America (Baraclogh and Domike, 1970, pp. 50-55). While indigenous peasants had continually revolted against Spanish colonial rule, their movements remained largely unorganised and localised, and lacking ideological foundations. The expansion of export agriculture further impeded traditional life. The implementation of rail technology, by British and US companies, opened up more of the region to extractive production (Carrol, 1970, pp. 107-115).[21] This brought the region's peasants into conflict with the centralised state. Additionally, it brought geographically isolated people together on plantations as tribal lands were annexed to create large *haciendas.*

While land was desired, the labour of indigenous peasants was the greater goal. Monoculture production was only profitable through cheap pliable Indigenous labour. The region's caudillos began determining this relationship from the late nineteenth century (Barraclogh and Domike, 1970, p. 50).[22] Since this expansion, the peasants of Latin America have had one central concern – land reform.[23] The first large, organised movement for land reform occurred in Morales, Southern Mexico (Huizer, 1970, pp. 375-378). The peasant armies of Emiliano Zapata came into conflict with both the local *haciendos* and the dictator Porfirio Díaz over land tenure and labour conditions on their *haciendas* (Rolls, 2011, p. 14; Huizer, 1970, p. 378); following a decade of oligarchic land seizure from agricultural communities. The conflict predated the Mexican Revolution in the Southern Mexico, with incidences of violence recorded between 1904 and 1910 (Rolls, 2011, pp. 16-28). Zapata was an indigenous Mexican who wanted the occupied land of the *haciendas* returned to the 'Indians' for communal farming (Huizer, 1970, p. 376). While his direct political influence was against the Morales oligarchy, his wider influence would determine the direction of the Mexican Revolution (Gilly, 1983, pp. 162-170). Zapata gave his support to liberal politicians

[21] The expansion of British coffee plantations in Guatemala during the 1890s exemplifies this point (McCrary, 1983, p. 18).
[22] This expanded during the twentieth century. The implementation of the 1934 Vagrancy Law in Guatemala made it illegal for an indigenous peasant to avoid plantation work (Greib, 1979, p. 34).
[23] Land reform has been the central issue for peasant movements throughout the twentieth century. Social democrats also adopted this platform to gain the support of peasants throughout the period.

in local and national elections, in return for commitments on land reform (Rolls, 2011, p. 31). This was the basis of his alliance with Francisco Madero in 1910. Zapata continued to struggle for the Morales peasantry throughout the protracted Mexican Revolution. Moreover, the struggles of indigenous peasants challenged the expansion of capitalist development in rural Latin America, in which they were in danger of losing their land and their subsequent way of life.

A similar threat was emerging in Latin America's urban landscape. The expansion of organised trade unions in the first two decades of the twentieth century changed the relationship between labour and capital. Unionism grew more slowly in Latin America than in North America because of its relative isolation from European ideologies (Alexander, 2009, pp. 1-5). Nevertheless, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, skilled workers in several Latin American nations established mutual aid societies and 'guilds' (Alexander, 2009, pp. 1-10). Mass immigration, especially to Argentina, witnessed the slow introduction of European ideologies of labour agitation, including unionism, anarchism and syndicalism (Shaffer, 2010, p. 273).[24] In Argentina, European anarchists dominated the urban labour movement. It was seen as the "port of entry for radical ideologies from Europe due to high levels of immigration" (Laforcade, 2010, p. 327). This led to the rise of the Argentine radical movement (Horowitz, 1999, p. 25). In Chile, a broader class organisation emerged. The Great Chilean Worker's Federation (FOCH) was established in 1909 (Loveman, 1987, p. 130). The largest Latin American union at the time, FOCH recruited 40,000, primarily bureaucratic, members in fifteen cities (Loveman, 1987, p. 131). Much of the FOCH leadership identified with socialism after the 1920s.[25] An anarcho-syndicalist ideology was instituted in Peru during the early twentieth century (Hirsch, 2010, pp. 228-233). Peru staged the first Latin American 'General Strike' in Lima in January 1919 (Hirsch, 2010, p. 233). Urban workers sought to reform labour laws instituting a minimum wage and six day week. During the 1920s, the leadership of labour was divided between socialists and *'Apristas'* both of whom had broader agendas (Bollinger, 1987, p. 308; Stein, 1980, p. 129). Finally, in Mexico anarchist unions

[24] Anarchist groups were less concerned by national boundaries than other progressive nationalists, and so connections between anarchist groups across different states were more evident. For example, the Americans of the International Workers of the World (IWW) assisted anarchist groups in Mexico (Shaffer, 2010, p. 273).

[25] This was due to popular outrage over declining living standards in Chile throughout the 1920s (Loveman, 1987, p. 131).

were extremely active during the Porfirian era. They staged 125 strikes from 1905 until 1910, primarily over labour conditions (Anderson, 1987, p. 517). Mexico's unions, through their alliance with Venustiano Carranza in 1914, won significant concessions after the revolution (Gilly, 1983, pp. 161-167).[26] The fight for minimum conditions challenged the profitability of domestic and foreign manufacturing firms in Latin America. It also threatened the control of the oligarchy over Latin American politics.

Although much of Latin America had been dominated by a landed oligarchy since its independence, a series of intellectual Euro-American ideals took root within the region. The European Enlightenment directly influenced the new ideas of liberalism, justice and democracy. Such notions, for instance, appeared in Uruguay at the start of the twentieth century. However, unlike most reform in Latin America, change came from above. The Presidency of José Batlle y Ordóñez brought significant changes to Uruguay during his second presidential term from 1911 until 1915 (Ameringer, 2009, pp. 27-38). Voting rights were extended to all literate citizens, while social programs such as education, health and minimum labour conditions were legislated (Roade, 1987, p. 707; Di Tella, 2004, pp. 38-43).[27] Batlle y Ordóñez's legacy was the most stable democracy in the region throughout this period. It also demonstrated the potential for democratic reform in the region. In Argentina, from 1911, all literate males over the age of eighteen were invited to vote (Rock, 1986, p. 189). This gave rise to new directions in Argentinean politics. The former Radical Civic Union (UCR) leader Hipólito Yrigoyen was elected President in 1916 (Di Tella, 2004, pp. 44-47). This was the first example of a non-oligarchic politician leading a Latin American nation. Yrigoyen's interaction with capital, labour and foreign business interests were fundamentally different to the methods of previous governments (Di Tella, 2004, p. 47). In Peru, the student leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre campaigned for democratic action. The general strike of 1919 led to an alliance between Lima's workers and the student union (Graham, 1992, pp. 22-24). In 1922 Haya opened the "Popular University" to educate factory and mine labourers in reading, writing, general mathematics and health (Stein, 1980, p. 140). The dictator Augusto Leguía feared Haya's 'leftist' movement and exiled the future *Aprista* leader to Mexico in

[26] Specifically through the 1917 Mexican Constitution.
[27] Uruguay was also the first Latin American state to grant female suffrage in 1927 (Roade, 1987, p. 714).

1924 (Nazal, 1988, p. 22; Graham, 1992, p. 27). Despite the move towards democracy in Latin America, its outcomes were modest. Moreover, full representative democracy was not achieved in this era.[28]

All of these social movements culminated in the 'multiclass' Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920. Since its emphatic defeat in the Mexican-American War, Mexico had experienced increasing US influence. By 1911 the US owned 223,000 mines, 40 per cent of Mexican agricultural land and had over US$1.2 billion of DFI (Bernstein, 1965, p. 75; Cohen, 1987, p. 64; Calvert, 1968, p. 19). Its leader, Porfirio Díaz, had been in power since 1876. Díaz and the Mexican oligarchy embraced US technical investment, at the expense of Mexico's peasants, unions, republicans and democratic proponents (Hart, 1987, p. 110). Popular pressure led to the election of 1910. It was apparent, however, that the liberal oligarch Francisco Madero was set to win over Díaz. Accordingly, Díaz cancelled the elections (Hart, 1987, p. 240). This decision was rejected by many sectors of Mexican society. Madero sought alliances with the Constitutionalists of the North, the *Zapatista* peasant armies of the South, the anarchist industrial unions and the revolutionaries in the north, led by Pancho Villa (Gilly, 1983, p. 153). Together, they removed Díaz in 1911. Madero soon lost the support of many revolutionary factions with his reluctance to support land reform led to the withdrawal of Zapata and Villa from his alliance (Rolls, 2011, p. 38). Madero also alienated the industrial unions. With chaos ensuing, the Porfirian general Victoriano Huerta overthrew Madero in February 1913 (Tannenbaum, 1967, p. 163). Huerta also sought to eliminate the resistance of Zapata and Villa. However, the peasant armies drove the military back to Mexico City during 1914 (Rolls, 2011, p. 110). Villa, Zapata and thousands of rebel peasants controlled Mexico City during the winter of 1914-1915 (Gilly, 1983, p. 162). The final struggles of the revolution were between previous allies. The Constitutionalist Army of Carranza and Álvaro Obregón, hereafter, sought to control the direction of the revolution. While an alliance was formed between Zapata and Carranza was achieved during 1915-1916, Villa was not included in the arrangement (Gilly, 1983, p. 184). Despite its obvious complexities, the Mexican Revolution permanently changed Mexico's social structure. Power shifted from the oligarchy to a broad multiclass coalition of bourgeoisie, union and peasant interests that dominated Mexican politics for over fifty years.

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[28] With the sole exception of Uruguay.

While the US feared the consequences of the Mexican Revolution, most American leaders failed to grasp its motivations. President Taft's appointed ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, supported Huerta's assassination of Madero in order to halt the revolution (Schoultz, 1998, p. 214). However, the new Democratic President Woodrow Wilson rejected this stance. He dismissed the ambassador and was antagonistic towards Huerta (Hart, 1987, p. 253). This led to the misguided 1914 invasion of Veracruz, which inadvertently reinvigorated the revolution (Tannenbaum, 1968, p. 165). The US again invaded Mexico in March 1916, to assassinate Villa in retaliation for the deaths of 17 US citizens killed during a train heist (Gilly, 1983, p. 223). The forces of Mexico, which had not approved the US mission, drove its troops back north of the Rio Grande by January 2, 1917 (Gilly, 1983, p. 223).

The US was correct to fear the Mexican Revolution. It was antithetic to US interests in Mexico in every way, as it challenged US trade and investment in the country (González, 2002, p. 110). The Mexican Constitution of January 31, 1917 ensured basic civil, judicial, and democratic rights to all Mexican citizens regardless of race. Yet its two most significant articles were direct results of the 'multiclass' alliance of the revolution. Article 27 (1917), written to secure Zapata's support, was a radical land reform law that policed foreign-owned land and subsoil rights. It asserted that the government could expropriate all Mexican land held by foreign corporations (Mexican Constitution, 1917). This included the land of large oil and mineral companies. Its purpose was to break up the foreign *haciendas* to improve the lives of Mexico's agrarian population. Article 123 (1917) was the labour code promised to the industrial unions. It established minimum working standards. Together, these reforms targeted foreigners who had monopolised Mexican industry, mining and agriculture in the decades preceding the revolution. As a result, these reforms primarily targeted North Americans.

In Defence of Life and Property

The US possessed significant capital investment in Central America and the Caribbean by 1920. US foreign policy under the Republican administrations of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover focused on returning the US to "normalcy" (Schales, 2013, p. 196). They also committed their governments to the "protect American life and property" abroad (Bermann, 1986, p. 163). Simply put, the Republicans

would protect and promote US trade and investment abroad. This meant returning the US to pro-capitalist domestic and foreign policy in the aftermath of WWI However, this stance faced many obstacles. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution bolstered the credibility of communism as a movement (Leffler, 1994, p. 3). At the same time, the short-lived 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic further exacerbated a fear of communist expansion (Leffler, 1994, p. 7). As an economic doctrine, communism posed a threat to US global economic expansion, as it would seize the productive forces of capital. President Wilson declared that "Bolshevism represented the antithesis of everything" he believed in (Leffler, 1994, p. 12). Despite no detailed knowledge of the doctrine, or of events in Russia, American politicians "would brand their enemies as communists" from this period on (Leffler, 1994, p. 15). The origins of anti-communism as a pretext preceded the international Cold War that followed WWII. These accusations date back to the Red Scare of 1919-1922 (Weiner, 2012, pp. 27-33). Labour strikes and cases of political violence within the US exacerbated the fear of communism during 1919 (Ceplair, 2011, pp. 19-25). Similar fears were felt across Latin America.

From 1919 to 1921 communist parties were established in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico and Chile (Alexander, 1963, pp. 93, 136, 154, 177, 319). Their membership evolved out of anarchist groups, organised labour and socialist organisations (Aguilar, 1968, pp. 8-11). However, Latin American communism developed slowly. Its place at the Communist International, prior to 1928, was within the "Latin" bureau along with France, Spain and Portugal (Cabellero, 1986, p. 27). Membership remained very low during the 1920s.[29] Ceplair (2011) reasons, "the communist threat on which anti-communism was based [in the US] could not be measured or, in cases, even substantiated" (p. 19). Events that were not directed by communists could evoke anti-communist fear, even without any factual evidence. For example, significant union activity during 1919-1920 was a far greater threat (Alexander, 2009, pp. 41-47). The unions rallied for better urban working conditions with often disastrous consequences. The 1919 strikes in Argentina, for example, are remembered for the "tragic week" in which conflict between the military and workers cost approximately one hundred lives (Haas, 1987, p. 19). In Colombia, unionism also spread to *campesino* labourers on UFCo plantations (Toman, 1987, p. 182). These conflicts were the first indication of the

[29] By 1928, Brazil had 2,000 members, Argentina had 1,200 and Mexico had 1,000 (Aguilar, 1968, p. 11).

approaching civil war between the impoverished people and the oligarchic classes in Latin America. The threat to oligarchic control inevitably imperilled US interests in Latin America during the 1920s.

From 1919 to 1929 the US experienced a 70 per cent increase in industrial output (Cohen, 1987, p. 18). The rapid industrialisation of export commodity industries, such as those producing automobiles, electronics and light consumer goods, was fuelled by global demand (Wilson, 1971, p. 8). The US' economic relationship with Latin America was vital to this expansion. US influence, led by private investment, was pivotal in creating new markets within South America. However, the economic relationship between the US and Latin America, established between 1898 and 1920, was threatened by events in Mexico. The 1917 constitution held the power to regulate all US business interests in Mexico. This challenged US access the Mexican resources, including oil. It also challenged their access to Mexico's markets. This 'revolution' had the potential to undermine the American empire in the Caribbean if replicated across the region; accordingly, Washington sought to contain its influence (Adler, 1965, p. 96). When Obregón and Warren Harding assumed their respective presidencies, in 1920 and 1921, this bilateral relationship was at an impasse. For US Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, the priority was "the safeguarding of property rights against confiscation" (Blasier, 1976, p. 116). The US argued that the 'retroactivity clause' in the constitution was illegal (Blasier, 1976, pp. 116-119). While it still had revolutionary aims, the Mexican Civil War left the government in need of revenue. To appease Washington, Obregón imposed a 25 per cent tax on the export profits of US companies over the full and immediate expropriation of oil reserves (Blasier, 1976, p. 117). Hughes accepted this agreement and the tensions were temporarily eased. The 1924 election of Elías Calles to the Mexican Presidency, however, rejuvenated the revolutionary attitude (Blasier, 1976, p. 120). While there was no cooperation between Mexico and the USSR,[30] conservative leaders in the US dubbed this the beginning of a "Soviet Mexico" (Blasier, 1976, p. 120). There were loud calls for a US invasion to establish a Díaz-style regime. Instead, the new US president, Calvin Coolidge, established an economic treaty to avert war (Schlaes, 2013, p. 392). US companies were granted further access to Mexican resources in exchange for increased revenues to the Mexican government (Blasier, 1976; Adler, 1965, p.

[30] They did, however, establish diplomatic ties in 1927.

105). Moreover, US policy successfully contained the Mexican Revolution during the 1920s.

In addition to defending trade and investment abroad, the US advocated their rapid expansion. During the 1920s US businesses expanded their influence in agriculture, resource extraction, infrastructure and material exports. The main agricultural products imported into the US from Latin America were sugar, coffee and bananas (Safford, 1995, pp. 121-125; Chapman, 2007, p. 52). These three commodities defined the political economies of a dozen Latin American states.[31] The largest landowner in Latin America was the UFCo (Chapman, 2007, pp. 55-60). The UFCo monopolised production, transport and infrastructure in Honduras and Guatemala (Chapman, 2007, p. 56). It made federal governments subservient to their demands. The mineral wealth of Latin America's resources was also sought by a variety of foreign companies. By 1918 the US accounted for 87 per cent of Chilean copper exports (O'Brien, 2009, p. 205). The Guggenheims' American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCo) also initiated large-scale mineral extraction in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (O'Brien, 2009, pp. 197-205). The most significant regional commodity in the 1920s, however, was oil. As demand expanded during the decade, US oil companies, such as Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ), sought new unexploited reserves (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 361). The setback of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 sent SONJ further south. Significant oil deposits were discovered in Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela during the 1920s (Bucheli and Aguilera, 2010, pp. 362- 370). By 1930, SONJ had become one of the leading oil exporters in South America. The sale of infrastructure to Latin America was also very profitable, and ensured further American influence. In the nineteenth century, US companies focused on rail. Pioneers, such as Minor Cooper Keith and James Stillman, sought to sell the technology to every Caribbean nation (Woodward, 1985, pp. 177-182; O'Brien, 2009, p. 201). However, these men also built successful enterprises through their actions. This in turn motivated an increased desire for communications, roads for cars and trucks, electricity, irrigation and aviation. The expansion of the International Telegraph and Telephone Company (ITT), Ford Motors, General Electric and Pan American Airlines to Latin America during the 1920s increased commercial contact between the two continents (Fejes, 1986, p. 23; Newton, 1978, p. 141).

[31] Specifically those nations of Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America.

The US also promoted the export of their industrial goods in a number of ways during the 1920s. This included the development of military protectorates, economic protectorates, foreign economic policy and marketing. The US occupied Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama for varying periods between 1898 and 1935 (Crawley, 2007, pp. 8-9). These occupations aided US trade through reciprocal agreements with the interim governments creating long term dependency (Cohen, 1987, pp. 4-17). US financiers were granted control of the customs houses of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela and US economic advisors could promote bilateral trading agreements. The Edge Act of 1919 allowed US banks to operate in foreign nations (Cohen, 1987, pp. 4-17); this meant that US financiers could now compete with Europeans operating in Latin America. These banks extended loans to Latin American countries that were purchasing US-manufactured goods. This enterprise was so successful that it was incorporated into national policy in the 1930s through the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank (Gellman, 1979, p. 161). Finally, the expansion of US media and popular culture to Latin America further promoted US products abroad. By 1930, the Associated Press (AP) and United Press (UP) owned twenty-five Latin American newspapers, which assisted in the marketing of US goods (Fejes, 1986, p. 18). The expansion of radio broadcasting and Hollywood movies amongst the region's wealthy inhabitants further bolstered this strategy. US exports dominated within the Caribbean region. The US' geographic proximity to markets, in addition to the industrial efficiency of its companies, gave the US a prime position to market their goods to Latin America. Prior to the 1930s, however, the US had not gained market dominance in the more significant economies of South America (Steward, 1975, pp. 1-15). Nevertheless, these US corporations were creating an informal empire in parts of Latin America, which further fuelled the expansion of the US industrial economy.

The 1920s witnessed an expansion of US economic and political influence in the Caribbean. The Mexican Revolution had been contained, the US military was in control of the Panama Canal, an increasing number of states were dependent on monocultural exports to the US and European investment in Central America and the Caribbean was limited to coffee and sugar plantations. However anti-US sentiment was rising in one of Washington's informal colonies. Nicaragua had suffered under US military protection since Zelaya was deposed in 1911 (Bermann,

1986, p. 157). In July 1927 Augusto César Sandino declared war on the occupying US marine force (McPherson, 2003, p. 16). According to Sandino, the conservative president Adolfo Díaz was illegitimate and supported by the US (Bermann, 1986, p. 192). While other liberal generals, such as José Moncada, rallied to declare Juan Sacasa as the constitutional president, Sandino sought to end the US occupation by force. Sandino's peasant army operated in the hills near the Honduran border. His forces utilised traditional strategies used by local bandits against the US marines (Bermann, 1986, p. 201). As Sandino lacked external sources of ammunition, this allowed the struggle to be prolonged. Despite US accusations, Sandino was not aligned to communists or reliant on the Comintern. Interventionists within the US demanded that Sandino be stopped and Nicaragua returned to its correct place in the region. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg argued that Sandino represented the struggle against "American Imperialism" in its attempt towards "the successful development of the international revolutionary movement in the new world" (Wood, 1961, p. 20). Moreover, Sandino was seen as the greatest threat to US imperial expansion in the Caribbean. The potential of Sandino's movement was limited to a small peasant army, and represented the only physical challenge to US 'life and property' in the Caribbean. However, several factors called into question the stability of America's imperial presence in the Caribbean at the close of the 1920s.

An Unsustainable Empire

Despite the advance of US trade and investment from 1898 until 1930, the US was not dominant throughout Latin America. In South America, US corporations were forced to compete with Europeans for trade and investment opportunities. For instance, while Venezuela possesses the largest oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere, SONJ was forced to share its ownership of them with Royal Dutch Shell (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 365).[32] This was also true of Mexico's oil reserves (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 357). Britain too invested heavily in infrastructure. Despite attempts by Americans, such as William Wheelwright to build US owned infrastructure, British firms had constructed the majority of Argentine rail (Fifer, 1991, p. 77). Furthermore, Britain monopolised the telegraph and telephone services of Eastern South America (Fejes, 1986, p. 23).

[32] Predominately British owned by the 1920s.

European financiers were also dominant in South America. British, German, French and Italian banks operated in the commercial centres of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Santiago, while US institutions lagged behind (Cohen, 1987, p. 23). Germany was also the largest ammunitions exporter to South America in the 1920s and early 1930s (Green, 1971, p. 22). German ammunitions were viewed as superior to Anglo-American ones, and the armies of Argentina and Chile brought in German advisors to train their troops (Green, 1971, p. 37). This posed a significant threat to regional solidarity. However, by far the biggest obstacle to US dominance in Latin America was trade. Corporations in the US were importing unprecedented amounts of raw materials. At the same time, independent South American states were not importing sufficient capital or consumer goods from the US to fund US imports. By the late 1920s, the US had a balance of payments crisis with South America (Wilson, 1971, p. 169) It therefore required increased trade with the large South American economies. However its actions in the Caribbean inhibited its relationship with those significant markets.

Anti-American sentiments also limited US trade and investment in Latin America. The future Secretary of State, Cordell Hull (1948a) asserted, "the United States has pursued policies towards some of the Latin American nations" which has led to "prejudice and feeling throughout Central and South America against our country…" (p. 308).[33] The immediate threat of US invasion from regional military outposts [34] dominated inter-American diplomacy as the Great Depression approached. Anti-Americanism was also directly influenced by the actions of US businesses operating in Latin America. Washington's aggressive actions towards Latin American governments, communities and labour forces came to be seen as characteristic of their motivations in the region. Yet Washington never exercised control over the actions of Asarco, SONJ or the UFCo prior to 1930; these businesses actually extended their influence within Latin America under private capitalist interest. This often damaged US relations with Latin America, which in turn damaged broader US trade and investment. In 1928 the consequence of these actions became apparent in both Colombia and the US. The massacre of workers by government forces in Magdalena of 1928 galvanised anti-American opinions in Colombia (Bucheli, 2005, p. 132). Since the early twentieth century US trade and

[33] Hull listed events in Mexico, Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and Cuba as instances of US actions harming US regional interests (Hull, 1948a, p. 308).
[34] Such as Guantanamo Bay and the Panama Canal Zone.

investment had prospered in Colombia; its wealth of resources, agricultural land, pliable government and cheap labour force made it the ideal location for American investment. However, in the 1920s the UFCo's hold on the Atlantic Coast region of Magdalena came under question. The banana workers began protesting for higher wages, better conditions and, most significantly, permanent contracts (Bucheli, 2005, p. 128. In 1928 the workers staged a regional strike in the Plaza Cenega (Bucheli, 2005, p. 132). The conservative government of Miguel Mendez turned the army on the protestors. Varying historical accounts have placed the death toll at between 47 and several hundred (Bucheli, 2005, p. 132; Braun, 1985, p. 57). Nevertheless, after the massacre, Colombians – including the young bourgeois reformer Jorge Eliécer Gaitán – developed strong anti-American opinions that were to proliferate throughout the region in the early 1930s (Braun, 1985, p. 57).

By 1933, the stage was set for a 'Cold War' in Latin America. The US sought to extend its Caribbean experiments to greater Latin America. However, the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Chile expressed great reservations about that extension. Meanwhile, those governments, and individuals, under the influence of Washington sought to reclaim economic and political independence. The global stock market collapse of 1929, and the subsequent Great Depression presented both challenges and opportunities for the US in Latin America. While many Latin Americans blamed the US for the Great Depression, it offered the opportunity to revise policies without altering the basic objectives of US trade and investment abroad (Gellman, 1973, p. 5). In 1823 Monroe had stated "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [Latin America], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power" (Monroe, 1823). However, by 1930 no European power sought such control. Moreover, the mythical Monroe Doctrine had been undermined by several factors: the free choice of sovereign states; free and liberal trade by Europeans; and the poor reputation of "American Imperialism" (Kellogg, cited in Wood, 1961, p. 20). Now, the only state attempting to "control" the "destiny" of Latin American states was the US. This led to an unstable relationship with much of the region in which the US took on an Imperial role. US foreign policy in Latin America required a fundamental shift during the 1930s in order to regain its influence in Latin America and fulfil the central tenet of the Monroe Doctrine. Fortunately for the US, global economic and

political conditions were to provide Washington with the opportunity to achieve their goals.

Conflicting Visions: Latin American Nationalism and the 'Good Neighbour Policy'

This chapter will redefine the parameters of the 'Cold War' in Latin America by examining the belligerents in that struggle. Doing so will also necessitate a redefinition of the time period under consideration. It is asserted that the 'Cold War' in Latin America originated during the Great Depression of the early 1930s. It contends that two conflicting visions for Latin America emerged during this time period. The broad social democratic movement active throughout many Latin American republics during the 1930s proposed the first. They sought to emulate the social democratic and multiclass policies of the Mexican Revolution and the American New Deal in an attempt to regulate capitalism within their individual nations (González, 2002, pp. 222-250; Biles, 1991, p. 11). This chapter will provide a detailed explanation of the emergent social democratic movement. It will also outline the peripheral role of, and limitations to, regional communism. In doing so, it will provide a comparison of the size and scope of social democracy when compared to communism. The second vision for Latin America was defined by the US. Through its desire for Latin American resources and markets, in the context of the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt dramatically restructured American foreign policy towards Latin America. Roosevelt distanced himself from his predecessors' imperial actions. The Good Neighbour Policy facilitated the expansion of US trade and investment through "reciprocity" (Steward, 1975, pp. 1-8). Accordingly, it outlined both the political and economic aspects of Washington's vision for Latin America. This would define the US vision for Latin America within its long-term sphere of influence. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of 'Good Neighbourism' through an analysis of multilateralism from 1936 until 1941. It will assert that America's political and economic expansion into Latin America between 1933 and 1941 was successful. However, it came at the expense of regional democratic movements; thereby initiating its 'Cold War' in Latin America.

Social Democracy

Much of Latin America experienced widespread class conflict during the 1930s. This was caused by several factors, which included: the economic effects of the Great Depression; the evolution of regional production methods; the failure of

the oligarchs to incorporate the masses into democratic political processes; and the proliferating ideals of social democracy. An examination of the social democratic movement in the early 1930s is crucial to understand the nature of the Cold War in Latin America. Many scholars have pointed out ideological connections between the parties striving for social democracy. González (2002) defines Cárdenas' political strategy in terms of "radical social policies," "economic nationalism" and sovereignty from foreign capital (pp. 222-235). Stein (1980) identifies the *Aprista* platform through "nationalism," "anti-Imperialism" and "social security" (pp. 162-163). Ameringer (2000) cites Eduardo Chibás in identifying the *Auténtico* platform as "nationalism, socialism and anti-Imperialism" (p. 44). Hellinger (1991) defines the AD philosophy as "nationalisation," "social reform" and unity against "imperialist finance" (p. 51). These social democratic parties did not base their platforms on a standing ideology. Rather, they advanced policies necessary to procure the support of the masses. Braun (1985) argues that Gaitán's interpretation of the Colombian "social problem" fits into this analysis (p. 60). Like his regional colleagues, Gaitán advocated government intervention into the Colombian market economy. This section will argue that these parties, and leaders, were creating a movement which posed a threat to the standing oligarchic position, supported by the US, in Latin America. It will explain the philosophy of social democracy before explaining the effects of each movement on their individual nations.

Social democracy was distinct from radical ideologies such as communism, socialism or anarchism. It emphasised the basic rights of the individual through a strong state infrastructure (Meyer, 2007, pp. 1-7). Unlike communism, there was no central body to dictate 'social democratic' policies until the Socialist International of the 1950s (Vasconi and Martell, 1993, p. 100). While somewhat disorganised, Latin American social democrats were clearly defined from the liberal and conservative 'democrats' within the 'oligarchic' governments. The key distinction revolved around the concept of 'liberty', or 'freedom.' For liberal democrats, 'freedom' meant a small government that allowed the capitalist land-owning class to prosper (Vasconi and Martell, 1993, p. 110). Any action made to regulate property ownership or its relationship to labour was seen as an affront to 'freedom.' Inasmuch, the sole purpose of the state was to ensure freedom of action within the economy. For social democrats, the relationship between the state,

capital and the population was more complex. They saw “a self-sustaining society” as having to “protect labour from the vicissitudes of the market” and to ensure the collective well being of all members of society (Meyer, 2007, p. 16). Hence, the government was responsible for the freedoms of all members of their society. A state with endemic inequality, in their opinion, was not truly democratic. The conflict between liberal and social democracy was evident, through the demonisation of the latter, throughout many Latin American states during the 1930s.

Latin American social democrats sought to limit the effects of monopoly capitalism through taxation, regulation and social welfare, which included education, healthcare and basic social security (Meyer, 2007, pp. 43-47). These policies were necessary to limit inequality within their societies and to safeguard democracy from those forms of coercive rule that have been common in Latin American history. This made the social democratic message widely appealing: in states dominated by monopolistic industries, usually agrarian or resource extraction; in societies with extreme income inequality; and in societies under authoritarian rule. These broad appeals to the masses have drawn comparisons between social democracy and populism. Di Tella (2004) defines populism as “a political movement based on a mobilised but not yet autonomously organized popular sector” led by an elite, or elites (p. 90). That is, a charismatic leader (often from the military) who can develop a “personalised link” with that “popular sector” through appeals to their social welfare (Di Tella, 2004, p. 90). This was done in Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, as military leaders sought alliances with the lower classes against the established oligarchic position. While the outcome and rhetoric were similar, the motivations of military populists differed from those of social democrats.[35] This chapter will explore the origins of the social democratic movement within the Mexican Revolution and its proliferation in Peru, Venezuela, Cuba and Colombia during the 1930s. While this movement grew in significance during and after WWII, it is important to understand its origins and limitations during this period.

The ‘multiclass’ Mexican Revolution set the precedent for the social democratic movement of the 1930s. The Mexican constitution of 1917 established

[35] While the distinction is important at this stage, as the thesis progresses it will become evident that Washington viewed these two groups in a similar light as the threat posed to US trade and investment was consistent between the groups.

the primary ideological framework of the 'democratic left' during the early Latin American Cold War. Its emphasis on suffrage, political and economic sovereignty, labour reform, land reform and social services proliferated throughout many nations during the 1930s and 1940s (Mexican Constitution, 1917). However, one theorist alone did not develop these ideas as it was contextually specific and could not be easily translated to non-Latin American environments. The Mexican governments from 1920 to 1934 had only enacted limited pragmatic reform to appease their revolutionary allies (Dwyer, 1998, p. 496). The influence, and threats, of both the US and the old oligarchy prevented the full implementation of economic and land reform (Dwyer, 1998, p. 497). Furthermore, the land that had been expropriated was largely granted in regions of severe revolutionary violence (González, 2002, p. 232)[36] When Lázaro Cárdenas was elected Mexican president in 1934; the revolution was at an impasse. Cárdenas reinvigorated it through a focus on education, healthcare and, most significantly, land reform (Basurto, 1999, p. 76). He sought to utilise communal farms, called '*ejidos,*' to alleviate rural poverty and Mexico's dependence on imported foodstuffs (González, 2002, p. 233). He also established the National Bank of Ejido Credit to allow peasants capital to develop their land (González, 2002, p. 235). This brought Cárdenas into conflict with Mexican *hacienda* owners and US corporations such as the Standard Fruit Company (SF) (Karnes, 1978, p. 160).[37] Cárdenas' revolutionary stance made him a popular figure in Mexico. Revolutionary communities exiled from several Latin American republics, and who had settled in Mexico, helped to further the influence of the Mexican Revolution. For example, Haya de la Torre worked as a secretary for Education Minister José Vasconcelos while in exile from Peru between 1926 and 1928 (Stein, 1980, p. 148). Accordingly, Mexico was the centre of 'revolutionary' activity during the 1930s and 1940s.

The Mexican Revolution directly influenced the democratic parties in Peru, Venezuela and Cuba (Di Tella, 2004, p .22). Haya de la Torre formed the Peruvian *Apristas* as a revolutionary party prior to its formal establishment in 1924. To Haya's long-term detriment, he relied solely on the relationship between activists and workers that had been established in the early 1920s (Stein, 1980, p. 129). By focusing on these he neglected other sectors of society, costing the *Apristas* an

[36] For example, in the Mexican state of Morales.
[37] However, he did not come into conflict with the Roosevelt administration. This point will be explained below.

electoral majority. Nevertheless, the *Apristas* were allowed to contest the 1930 election in Peru (Graham, 1992, p. 35). Their ambitious program was put to the people. The *Apristas* advocated: anti-imperialism; unity with other Latin American democrats; nationalisation of key industries; internationalisation of the Panama Canal; and solidarity with all oppressed people of the world (Stein, 1980, p. 162). As this "maximum program" did not however garner mass appeal, a more pragmatic "minimum program" was developed (Stein, 1980, p. 163). This program included: ending corruption; establishing a large state bureaucracy; nationalisation of foreign mining and oil; separation of Church and state; and a plethora of social programs (Stein, 1980, pp. 163-164). The *Aprista* campaign focussed on the Lima unions, while ignoring professionals, the indigenous peasantry and mine workers (Nazal, 1988, p. 28). Haya de la Torre lost the 1930 election. While he claimed electoral fraud, such accusations were never verified (Graham, 1992, p. 35). Nevertheless, the roots of Peruvian social democracy were laid in the early 1930s.

Venezuela endured the tyranny of military rule for the first 45 years of the twentieth century (Lombardi, 1982, pp. 190-240). However, a movement for democracy began in 1928. Rómulo Betancourt was born into a wealthy agrarian family. He studied in Caracas and joined the student union (Hellinger, 1986, p. 45). The democratic strikes of 1928 brought Betancourt to national prominence as he rose to the leadership circle after mass arrests of student activists (Alexander, 1982, p. 39). In 1929 the student organisation joined young army officers, staging an unsuccessful coup against Laureano Gómez. Betancourt later argued that 1929 was "action for the point of action" (Hellinger, 1986, p. 49). While exiled in Costa Rica, Betancourt was sympathetic to the ideas of the Costa Rican Communist Party and later during the early 1930s edited their newspaper (Alexander, 1982, p. 69). However he claimed "none of us who later founded the AD political party…ever became active members of political groups subordinate to the Third International" (Hellinger, 1986, p. 49).[38] In fact Betancourt, and AD, identified Roosevelt's New Deal as a source of inspiration. Betancourt stated, "the New Deal as a philosophy of state involvement in the economy is consistent with our own plans for Venezuela" (as cited in, Hellinger, 1986, p. 57). AD's political program included: universal

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[38] Betancourt's claim, repeated by Hellinger (1986, p. 49), is evidenced by his pro-capitalist policies while in office from 1945-1948. However, it is likely that some peripheral members of AD worked with communist groups during the 1930s, as Betancourt had done in Costa Rica.

suffrage; higher taxes on oil profits; anti-fascism; import substitution industrialisation; land reform; social services; and labour reform (Hellinger, 1986, p. 54). AD was significantly more successful than the Peruvian *Apristas* throughout its history, as Betancourt actively sought the participation of the rural working class (Alexander, 1982, p. 241). By 1936, AD and Betancourt actively worked against communism, who were seen to be running a competing Venezuelan underground (Alexander, 1982, pp. 129-134). The AD underground was domestically persecuted until its 1945 re-emergence (Ellner, 1987, p. 727).

Cuba had been under the informal rule of the US since the 1903 Platt Amendment. The US had the power to intervene in Cuban politics, and to grant pro-US leaders political legitimacy (Pérez, 1992, p. 165). However, the Great Depression escalated Cuban discontent with its autocratic President Gerardo Machado (Gellman, 1973, p. 2). Cuba's economic situation was dire during the Depression as the decrease in world sugar prices fell from 2c per pound in 1929 to 0.57c per pound in 1932, leading to an economic crisis (Steward, 1975, p. 91).[39] Discontent was targeted at the Machado government as widespread violence in Havana in August and September 1933 saw Machado lose the confidence of his military generals. The university had been the centre of revolutionary thought since the protests of 1927 (Aguilar, 1972, p. 107). The young military leader Fulgencio Batista approached the university rebels to propose replacing Machado with civilian officials (Aguilar, 1972, p. 115). The September 10 Revolution, of 1933, brought Dr Ramón Grau San Martín to the interim presidency (Farber, 1976, p. 39). Like other social democrats, Grau had been persecuted and exiled by the Machado regime and his popularity stemmed from his comprehension of the social problems in Cuba (Farber, 1976, pp. 31-34). The social platform of the university movement, known as the *'Auténtico* Revolution', included: the abrogation of the Platt Amendment; universal suffrage; dismissal and prosecution of Machado officials; reorganisation of the judiciary and bureaucracy; and the reconstruction of the Cuban economy through diversification (Farber, 1976, p. 41). Grau faced criticism from virtually every sector (Aguilar, 1972, p. 176). The Marxist left criticised his bourgeois reforms and took an independent line (Aguilar, 1968, p. 25). The conservatives saw his decrees as too radical and potentially dangerous (Farber, 1976, p. 40). The military were concerned by his popularity with the

[39] This was partly caused by US policy, as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 limited sugar cane imports from several Caribbean states, favouring sugar-beet production in the US.

masses. The greatest opposition came from the US, however. While Sumner Welles advocated US intervention to remove Grau in late 1933, the pragmatism of Hull proved more successful (Gellman, 1973, p. 5). By destroying confidence in his government within the army the Grau government was condemned to failure. In January 1934 Batista removed Grau and the brief period of social democracy in Cuba was replaced by military rule (Farber, 1976, p. 45).

The example of Colombia demonstrates the challenge of reforming a system from within. Colombia did not undergo a revolution in the 1930s. Rather, the increased prestige of the "left-liberal" ideology reformed Colombian politics (Green, 2003, pp. 29-44). The emergence of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán challenged the existing order. Colombia's political history concerns two parties of similar class origins, the Conservative and Liberal Parties as these factions fought a series of wars during the nineteenth century, culminating in The War of One Thousand Days ending in 1902 (Safford and Palacious, 2002, p. 250). From 1902 until 1930 the Conservative Party were unopposed in power. After the dramatic events of the Magdalena massacre of 1928 the Liberals saw the opportunity to take power (Bucheli, 2005, p. 98; Colman, 2008, p. 6). Gaitán was another middle-class intellectual. He had studied law in Bogotá and won a state sponsored scholarship to pursue his work in Philosophical Positivism in Rome from 1925 (Braun, 1985, p. 56). He had studied under, and was influenced by, Enrico Ferri, while developing a detailed examination of the class problem within Colombia (Green, 2003, p. 48). He asserted that the "social problem" in Colombia was not that of capital, but of the "inequity" in capital's relationship with the worker (Gaitán in Braun, 1985, p. 60). If capital could be regulated to interact with labour equitably then there "would be no social problem" (Gaitán in Braun, 1985, p. 60). Gaitán's attacks on the Conservative Party over Magdalena won him an invitation to join the Liberal Party in 1930. The future president, Alfonso López, commented that "Gaitán defended the rights of the poor without first asking the permission of the rich" (in Braun, 1985, p. 60). To Gaitán's frustration, however, the Liberal Party, including López, were 'the rich' (Green, 2003, pp. 72-76). Although Gaitán was a talented politician, he failed to gain significant influence within the party. Gaitán asserted that the Liberals had failed the Colombian people between 1930 and 1934 and, in 1934, also asserted that the two parties held the same policies (Braun, 1985, p. 64). Gaitán sought to form an independent movement, known as the *Unión Nacional*

Izquierdista Revolucionaria (UNIR) from 1934 until 1936, without widespread success (Green, 2003, p. 75).[40] López then brought Gaitán back to the Liberals in 1936 as Bogotá's Mayor (Randall, 1992, p. 166). From there, Gaitán would continue his rise through Colombian politics.

Social democracy had threatened the interests of the US in Latin America for several reasons. Firstly, it jeopardised foreign, including US, capital operating in every Latin American republic. The expansion of US capital investment into Latin America required minimal regulation of commodity, production and labour markets. Each of the Latin American social democratic movements sought to regulate these markets. The most direct threat emanated from expropriations of land and subsoil rights in Mexico (Mexican Constitution, 1917).[41] However, the mere possibility of regulation posed a direct threat. American trade and investment had spread through the Caribbean Basin during times of weakness and compliance (Cohen, 1987, pp. 1-10). If Latin America were to be comprised of a series of strong independent nations, the advance of American capital would be slowed and modified. Additionally, US businesses in Latin America required a steady supply of cheap pliable labour. The governments' support of the industrial union and peasant movements posed a direct threat to US extractive, agrarian, service and manufacturing businesses operating in Latin America (Di Tella, 2004, p. 90). Secondly, the exercise of economic sovereignty made Latin America a less attractive trading destination. Governments that were willing to protect local industries through tariff policies stood in opposition to US expansion in the region. Finally, the prospect of a politically independent, yet cohesive, bloc of independent Latin American states not subservient to US demands posed a threat to US strategic interests in an evolving world. With World War II approaching, the creation of a hemispheric alliance was an imperative for the US (Francis, 1977, pp. 1-4). Independent states would be less compliant in this endeavour. From 1930 the US confronted the problem of a changing Latin America. This threat was not from communism, but by the forces of social democracy against compliant oligarchs.

[40] The UNIR faced several handicaps from the onset. Most significant was the recruitment of literate and politically active citizens who were not aligned to the two hegemonic parties. Gaitán failed in this task during the 1930s (Green, 2003, p. 77).
[41] The expropriation of Mexican oil will be explored in the following chapter.

Communism in Latin America

In contrast to the popular support for social democracy, communism grew slowly during the 1930s (Poppino, 1963, pp. 82-88). The cause of Latin American communism's relative weakness can be explored through a survey of its growth from 1930 until 1935. This requires several further considerations. Firstly, one must identify the Latin American communist parties. In addition to the parties of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay that existed in 1921, parties were formed in: Cuba in 1924; El Salvador in 1925; Ecuador in 1929; Costa Rica in 1929; Peru in 1929; Colombia in 1930; Haiti in 1930; and Venezuela in 1935 (Alexander, 1963, pp. 270, 366, 384, 223, 237, 246, 254, 296). Additionally, small communist intellectual groups emerged in: Bolivia from 1923; Panama from 1925; and Nicaragua from 1927 (Alexander, 1963, pp. 213, 392, 378). The minimal numbers of communists in Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic were neither organised nor officially recognised (Alexander, 1963, pp. 149, 372, 253, 299). Secondly, these groups were extremely small during the 1920s and 1930s. The Comintern estimated that in 1928 the Argentine party was the largest with 2,000 members (Aguilar, 1968, p. 11). In Brazil there were 1,200 party members, and Mexico had 1,000 (Aguilar, 1968, p. 11). Every other party had significantly less members than this (Alexander, 1963, p. 11). Thirdly, while the size of the party does not automatically relegate Latin American communism to irrelevancy, the success, or lack therein, of the communists' actions demonstrates their primary obstacles. Latin America's first significant mention by the International Communist Congress concerned Sandino's guerrilla war of 1927-1933 (Caballero, 1986, p. 84). However, Sandino was not a communist (Bermann, 1986, p. 192). Communist insurrections had significantly less direction and success. For example, the tragic insurrection of 1932 in El Salvador demonstrated the willingness of the peasantry to attack the oligarchy to reclaim their land (Lindo-Fuentes, Chang and Martínez, 2007, pp. 22-44). However, the communists could not offer the peasantry direction, leadership or ammunition for their struggle leading to the massacre of 30,000 indigenous peasants (Lindo-Fuentes, Chang and Martínez, 2007, pp. 22-44). The ease with which Getúlio Vargas pre-emptively overcame the 1935 attempted insurrection of Luís Carlos Prestes demonstrated the profound weakness of this regional communist movement in the 1930s (Dulles, 1973, p. 530). Prestes later lamented the mistake of "starting the

insurrection when [his] strength in the working class was still weak and when the labour peasant alliance was practically non-existent" (as cited in Dulles, 1973, p. 530). The preconditions for revolution were not evident in Latin America during the 1930s.

The fourth consideration is the adherence of Latin American communist parties to the directives of the Comintern. The origins of Latin American communism underwent three distinct phases that echoed the six stages of international communism between 1919 and 1943 (Herman, 1974, pp. 1-27). Those six international phases were characterised by: Lenin's vision of a global proletarian revolution from 1919-1920; Trotsky's proliferation of communist discourse through the party apparatus from 1921-1927; Stalin's purging of the communist movement between 1928 and 1935; the development of popular fronts in response to the threat of fascism in 1935-1939; the anti-imperialism of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939-1941; and finally the WWII collaboration with the West (Herman, 1974, pp. 3-25). This pattern was simplified in Latin America. From 1920 until 1928 orthodox Marxists sought to expand their influence in the region (Caballero, 1986, pp. 26-37). During this period, communists competed for members with anarchists, socialists, and other progressive forces, such as social democratic ones (Cabellero, 1986, pp. 26-37). Accordingly, the Latin American communist parties formed and were slowly admitted to the Communist International. No Latin American was present at the First International in 1919, while only three representatives, from Mexico, attended the Second International in 1920 (Herman, 1974, p. 61). When the anticipated revolution in Europe failed to eventuate, the Comintern focused on developing parties globally (Herman, 1974, p. 16).

In this context, Latin American communism emerged. Communism failed to advance or apply Marxist theory or practice applicable to the Latin American context, which was more rural than Europe. The communists' theoretical position underestimated the significance of the national bourgeoisie's and the social democrats' quests for reform. From 1928 until 1935 the Latin American communists adhered to the "hard-line," purging moderates, socialists and anarchists from their organisations (Aguilar, 1968, p. 20). This "hard-line" policy represented a misunderstanding and miscalculation of regional politics.[42] They

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[42] And an obvious misinterpretation of Marxist theory on national revolution.

saw socialists, anarchists and social democrats greater competitors than the ruling dictators and oligarchies. Accordingly, the communists waged war against the progressive forces for ascendancy in any potential revolution (Poppino, 1963, pp. 15). They undermined and condemned democracy to promote their position, and purged their membership to ensure ideological purity (Herman, 1974, p. 18). The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 identified the threat of European fascism and the need for collaboration with aligned democratic forces globally (Aguilar, 1968, p. 28). Accordingly, from 1935 until the conclusion of World War II the Latin American communists sought to generate popular front alliances (Caballero, 1986, pp. 120-123). From 1935, the communists saw democracy and progress as a prerequisite for revolution. Yet their previous actions alienated them from many potential alliances. Moreover, their adherence to the directives of the Comintern rendered Latin American communism largely irrelevant during the 1930s.

The fifth consideration is the penetration of communism within the respective Latin American labour movements. During the 1920s and 1930s, the communists competed for control of the labour movement with the anarchists, socialists, and progressive populist forces (Alexander, 2009, pp. 41-56).[43] Their participation in the union movement ebbed throughout the various Comintern directives. The chief antagonist for the communists was the Red International of Labour Unions, referred to as the Profintern (Alexander, 2009, p. 44). While in Europe the Profintern supported 'red' unionism, in Latin America it was forced to "bore from within" (Alexander, 2009, p. 42).[44] When communists began asserting themselves in the early 1920s, their hostility surprised the anarchists and socialists, who had expected collaboration. After the Stalinist 'hard-line' of 1928, pro-communist unions isolated themselves further from non-communist organisations (Caballero, 1986, pp. 44-46). The small communist leadership believed that workers would naturally be drawn to 'communist' unions and therefore began establishing their own ideologically pure unions. This prophecy was never fulfilled. In 1927, regional unionists commemorating the anniversary of the revolution in Russia established the communist *Confederación Sindical Latino*

[43] Such as the Peruvian *Apristas*.

[44] Communist unions struggled to recruit due to the limited penetration of their doctrine in Latin American societies. Accordingly, they sought to recruit from within legitimate, non-communist unions where possible.

Americana (CSLA) (Alexander, 2009, p. 49). Small unions in Chile, Cuba and Argentina joined the CSLA during its inception, with delegations from fifteen states attending their first Congress in Montevideo, Uruguay (Alexander, 2009, p. 52). Most unions represented were relatively small. After the declaration of the Popular Front in 1935, the CSLA was free to act independently. Consequently, membership could include other anti-fascist entities. However, after 1938 the majority of Latin American labour conformed to the non-communist Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), run by the Mexican Vicente Lombardo Toledano (Anderson, 1987, p. 520). CTAL called for the dissolution of communist unions into more heterogeneous ones that would serve the interests of all workers (Anderson, 1987, p. 520). Despite the dissolution of the majority of communist unions during World War II, the relevance of the communist movement in the unions continued.

The sixth consideration is the inclusion of the Latin American communists in alliances with other progressive forces. Chile provides the only successful example of a Popular Front government, which contained communists, in Latin American history. The narrative of Chilean politics permanently changed between June and October 1932 (Drake, 1978, pp. 71-76). The coup to remove the dictator Ibáñez instilled a socialist tradition into Chilean politics, removing the old dichotomy of liberals versus conservatives that had characterised many of Latin America's political systems. Radical and Socialist Parties were founded to contest the national elections (Loveman, 2001, p. 213). The so-called 'Socialist Republic' was not truly Marxist as it relied on the distribution of income rather than wealth (Drake, 1978, p. 76). Moreover, it based itself on progressive ideals similar to those of the American New Deal, preceding Cardenas in Mexico. The Moscow-orientated Communist Party opposed the 'Socialist Republic' as reactionary (Drake, 1978, p. 80). While the 'Socialist Republic' failed after four months, however, it left a legacy for reform in Chile. From 1935 the communists approached the Radical Party in an attempt to form a Popular Front under a radical presidential candidate. Given the nature of the alliance the socialists, in order to remain relevant, were also forced to join. They reasoned that their competition for leftist votes would continue to ensure power to the oligarchic parties. It is crucial to note that the Popular Front was a multi-party alliance rather than a multi-ideology party. The leadership of the Popular Front remained with the middle-class Radical Party throughout the alliance (Loveman, 2001, p. 285). Nevertheless, the Chilean Communist Party was

the most successful in the region, as it was able to present its ideology as a legitimate democratic force through its participation in the Popular Front from 1935.[45]

The final consideration is anti-communism. The US had opposed communism globally since 1917 (Leffler, 1994, pp. 6-15). It was antithetical to their foreign economic policy. However, many other factors were also antithetical to their foreign trading policy. This made communism a ready expedient prior to the Cold War. For example Kellogg claimed in 1927 that "the Bolshevist leaders [in Mexico have] set up as one of their fundamental tasks the destruction of what they term American imperialism as a necessary prerequisite to the successful development of the international revolutionary movement in the new world", to motivate US intervention (Wood, 1961, p. 20). The Mexican government was described as 'Bolshevist' for granting support to Nicaraguan rebels. Neither the Mexican government nor Augusto Sandino's rebel army were 'Bolshevik' (Bermann, 1986, p. 188). However, it provided a rationale for immediate military action in Nicaragua. In this mould a series of Latin American leaders used anti-communism to legitimize their alignments with the US. Grau was characterised as a Marxist by both the Cuban military and Sumner Welles. This was used as justification for the military coup of January 1934 (Aguilar, 1972, p. 132). Martínez massacred 30,000 indigenous peasants in 1932 under the pretext of anti-communism (Lindo-Fuentes, Chang and Martínez, 2007, pp. 22-44). While communist antagonism certainly led to the peasant revolt, it was neither the only nor the most important factor. Nevertheless, Martínez did not incur international condemnation for his actions. Both the *Apristas* of Peru and AD of Venezuela were labelled as communists during the 1930s to justify their continued repression and persecution (Stein 1980, p. 1 72). For example, the US ambassador to Peru, Fred Dearing, referred to the *Apristas* as "the reddest of the red" and "under the influence of Moscow" (Stein, 1980, p. 172). Moreover, the US and its conservative Latin American allies initiated the anti-communist pretext prior to the official onset of the European 'Cold War' with the Soviet Union. Anti-communism was significant in justifying regional repression during the 1930s. It was also less direct than forms of 'gun-boat diplomacy.'

[45] While it can be argued that the Popular Front achieved little for the Chilean communists, their increased exposure and legitimacy within national politics added to the prestige of regional communism.

Good Neighborism

Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (GNP) is regarded as a significant departure from the 'gunboat diplomacy' of his predecessors. However, the motivations for this departure are often misunderstood. The GNP was not an extension of the domestic liberalism of the New Deal abroad. Black (1988) asserts, "the main impact of the good neighbour policy seemed to be the reaffirmation of the United States' faith in its own virtues" (p. 61). Gellman (1979) argues that the Good Neighbour was an accidental label given to Roosevelt's foreign policy (p. 1). Despite the lack of "a precise definition… it had enormous popular appeal and recognition" (Gellman, 1979, p. 1). Therefore, the GNP could be "separated into its components": of diplomacy, economic expansion and collective security measures (Gellman, 1979, p. 1). However the economic aspects took on greater significance in the context of the Great Depression. Moreover, the GNP was the economic arm of the domestic political New Deal. The recovery of the US domestic economy required the expansion of American commerce throughout the region. Green (1971) writes that "the [GNP] sprang directly from a realisation that simple tinkering with the international economy would not get the country out of depression" (p. 19). A long-term economic strategy was required. This in turn required a diplomatic policy to counter the effects of anti-Americanism. To do so, the United States adopted the role of moral leader of the hemisphere. Grandin (2010) identifies "the Good Neighbour Policy [as] the model for the European and Asian alliance system, providing a blueprint for America's empire by invitation" (p. 4). Moreover, the political motivations for the GNP were economic; there was no idealistic principal underpinning it. Hence, one can only judge the success, or failure, of the GNP in economic terms. This section will detail the political actions that allowed for this economic advance.

The 1929 market collapse and subsequent Great Depression had a profound effect on the US economy. In the first four years of the Depression the real value of US exports declined by 78 precent (Steward, 1975, p. 2). The global nature of the crisis forced nations in Europe, Asia and South America to increase their barriers to trade. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act constructed further barriers (Gellman, 1979, p. 7). Domestically, approximately 5,000 banks defaulted and over 13 million unskilled American workers lost their jobs (Biles, 1991, p. 11). This represented

unemployment for one in four American workers (Biles, 1991, p. 11). In 1933, Roosevelt inherited a US government on the brink of collapse. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull (1948a), argued that the developed nations must cooperate to increase “freer trade” (p. 174). Roosevelt’s evolved New Deal economic program sought to drag the US out of depression (Biles, 1991, p. 96). Initial actions focused on social welfare; however the increase of US export markets was also of central importance to the program (Biles, 1991, pp. 99-110). Given the division of world economics into spheres of influence, Latin America became an ideal target for increased American trade.[46] The 1929 Stock Market Crash also had a profound effect on the way the US interacted with Latin America. Before Roosevelt’s administration, the US had been autocratic in their relations with Latin America. The military occupations imposed upon several Caribbean states evoked memories of European colonialism in the larger nationalistic states of South America. American involvement in the Mexican Revolution in the 1920s was known throughout South America (Cohen, 1987, pp. 64-68). Significantly, its diplomacy with Cuba, which suffered under the Platt Amendment, and to Panama, which leased the ‘Canal Zone’ to the US, was seen as autocratic and imperious (Pérez, 1992, p. 167; Lafeber, 1989, p. 31). Washington’s support for US corporations in Latin American provoked resentment (Bucheli, 2005, p. 84). As most Latin American governments dealt with these large US corporations, this was a major grievance in their collective relationship with the US. This deep-seated, and multifaceted anti-Americanism prevented any realisation of the US’ vision for Latin America. To combat these challenges, FDR established a foreign policy based on ‘Good Neighbourism’ to serve US objectives in Latin America.

The US sought to form a strong Pan-American alliance through the implementation of ‘Good Neighbourism’. In his inaugural address on March 4 1933, Roosevelt alluded stated, “I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour” (FD Roosevelt, 1933). He sought to fulfil US global commitments while respecting “the rights” of other nations (FD Roosevelt, 1933). Given the severity of the domestic situation, it is unsurprising that only fleeting comments were given regarding foreign policy in his inaugural address. However, his acceptance that “we now realise…our interdependence on each other,” reflects the global position of his administration (FD Roosevelt, 1933). US policy toward Latin

[46] Hull’s (1948a) failure to avoid regionalism at the London Economic Conference of 1933, motivated this renewed interest in Latin America (p. 320).

America had been extremely autocratic during the early twentieth century. In addition to assembling a team of 'New Dealers' at home, FDR sought to encourage a reform of policy abroad. This reform was of imperative to the domestic economic situation. For example, in 1929 Wall Street lawyer and future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, commented that the US "must finance [its] exports by loaning" capital to Latin America, otherwise US goods will be "rotting in [American] warehouses as unusable surplus" (in Williams, 1972, p. 127). This theory was cemented in the establishment of the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) under FDR (Gellman, 1979, p. 161). To ensure growth in the US industrial economy, it required exports to Latin America. To establish this new 'Good Neighbour Policy,' FDR appointed Cordell Hull, who stated that the "political line-up" follows the "economic line-up", Secretary of State (in Williams, 1972, p. 240). Hull's economic background indicated the direction US policy would take in the region.

In December 1933 the United States unilaterally renounced interventionism in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo (Gellman, 1979, p. 29). Hull pledged that a state had no "right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another" (Gellman, 1979, p. 29; Inter-American States, 1933). After three decades of 'gunboat diplomacy,' the US committed to dismantling its semi-formal empire in Latin America. In 1934 the Platt Amendment was repealed, giving Cuba its first political independence in four centuries (Wood, 1961, p. 120).[47] In 1935 US marines were withdrawn from Haiti, ending three decades of permanent military occupation in the Caribbean (Renda, 2001, p. 310). In 1934 the amendments in the Panamanian constitution, which made it an informal protectorate, were removed (LaFeber, 1989, p. 68). Additionally, the price paid by the US to Panama to lease the Canal Zone increased from US$250,000 to US$430,000 annually (LaFeber, 1989, p. 68). Roosevelt gave away the territorial gains of his predecessors, as he asserted the significance of trade and investment over a territorial empire. During the early 1930s, trade and investment from Germany, Italy and Britain increased, especially in Argentina, Uruguay and Southern Brazil. Peterson (1964) asserted that the German "drive for minds, markets and materials of Latin America [during the 1930s], raised the old spectre of European interventionism" (p. 389). Accordingly, under Roosevelt "the Monroe doctrine [was elevated] to the status of a principle accepted by all American states," which justified intervention against

[47] However, by 1934 Cuba was under the control of the pro-US dictator Fulgencio Batista.

extra-hemispheric threats, such as German and eventually Soviet Communism (Peterson, 1964, p. 389). The US committed itself to winning the battle with Germany for "minds, markets and materials" in Latin America during the 1930s (in Peterson, 1964, p. 389). Roosevelt's Good Neighbourism was a pivotal strategy towards the creation of an inter-American community built upon US interests.

The majority of Latin American republics accepted the rhetoric of Good Neighbourism. However, the US retained several ways to control the small Latin American states. Firstly, the Latin American region owed US$1.5 billion in defaulted government bonds to American banks and financiers (Steward, 1975, p. 7). A decrease in tariff earnings meant that these states could not repay this debt. Tariff earnings declined between 1929 and 1933 due to a 68 per cent decrease in exports to the US, in addition to a significant reduction in the real value of raw materials (Steward, 1975, p. 8). The Latin American states that owed the US for defaulted capital could have their economies controlled. Washington also used the recognition of unconstitutional governments as leverage for reciprocal trade agreements. Without international recognition, Latin American states could not borrow from either American or international institutions, which left them unable to run their governments. This strategy of non-recognition was used twice in the first year of FDR's presidency. The effect on the Cuban Grau government has already been demonstrated. Additionally, non-recognition was used against the Nicaraguan President, Juan Sacasa who had previously been allied to Sandino and sought to confront US economic policy (Crawley, 2007, p. 30; Bermann, 1986, p. 182). Military governments that received US recognition replaced both Sacasa and Grau. The 1923 Washington Convention had outlawed unconstitutional governments (Adler, 1965, p. 199). However, 'non-intervention' overrode that convention. Swift diplomatic recognition by Washington was given to unconstitutional governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic in the first years of the Good Neighbour Policy (Lafeber, 1984, pp. 67-79). Despite Washington's decline in direct imperial policies, it still held the power to control the direction of many Latin American governments to the advantage of US interests.

Selfish Reciprocity

The Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs Act (RTTA) was a major step towards US global economic leadership. Steward (1975) describes it as "the reversal of the trend toward economic nationalism" (p. 7). Cordell Hull had advocated this action since 1916, as he foresaw "a stable world-order of liberal-capitalist internationalism" (Steward, 1975, p. 7). Steward (1975) continues by describing the RTTA as "the internationally coordinated restoration of commerce, shipping, and industry through liberalised trade measures" (p. 11). The RTTA has not been granted significant academic attention because of the accepted narrative of WWII ending the Great Depression. However, the economic history of the US between 1934 and 1970 was underpinned by Hull's vision for a globalised economy. This phase of RTA agreements focussed on Latin America. It attempted to increase the role of US trade and investment with complimentary economies in the region. As Bauer (1963) argues, "the philosophy of the RTA became the bipartisan cornerstone of American foreign economic policy during and after WWII" (p. 26). Grandin (2010) extends this argument to state that "this economic expansion into Latin America" became "the keystones of the New Deal state for the next three decades: liberalism at home and internationalism abroad" (p. 36). Hull had successfully initiated the Open Door policy in Latin America as a blueprint for the, decolonised post-World War II, world through the RTTA of the GNP. This section will detail how this occurred.

Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbourism' facilitated the most fundamental shift in the history of American foreign economic policy. The stock market collapse of 1929 led to declining global trade. World trade contracted from US$68 billion in 1929, to US$23 billion in 1934 (Tasca, 1938, p. 4). Washington's declining share of world trade was even more significant, with a 78 per cent decline in the real value of US exports over this period (Steward, 1975, p. 2). The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 compounded the effects of the Great Depression. Bauer (1963) describes the legislation as "a triumph of rampant protectionism" (p. 23). This was a constant theme in American economic history throughout the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The US sought to limit imports of products that could compete with domestic production (Davis and Cull, 1994, pp. 65-90). The debate between free trade and protectionism dated back to the 1890s, when the US was transitioning from an agricultural to industrial exporter (Davis and

Cull, 1994, pp. 65-90). However, several factors were different in the 1890s to the 1930s. Firstly, the increase in competition for industrial markets had divided the world into economic spheres of influence. Systems such as British "imperial preference" meant that the US could not export industrial goods to the colonies of European powers (Judd, 1996, p. 316). This closed off much of the world to US exporters. Secondly, the nature of US production had changed. During the 1920s the industrial output of US factories increased by 70 per cent (Cohen, 1987, p. 18). This made the industrial manufacturing sector more important to the US economy than the agricultural sector, which sought to protect prices by limiting agricultural imports. These two facts were not recognised by the Hoover administration in 1930. Accordingly, they increased the barriers to trade with disastrous effects upon the domestic US economy.

Washington's economic sphere of influence was very small in 1930. It included the Caribbean and Central American states that had either been directly controlled by the US military or indirectly controlled by significant capital investment in productive industries (Cohen, 1987, pp. 28-50). However it did not extend to the large economies of South America. The US did not control regional trade and investment in 1934. In 1913 the US held approximately 30 per cent of Latin America trade, and one-fifth of its exports travelled south (Gilderhus, 1986, p. 5). While this increased to approximately 40 per cent in 1930, the relationship was hindered by two facts (Steward, 1975, p. 4). Firstly, the vast majority of US trade was with the Caribbean, meaning figures in the major economies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile were much lower. Within South America the major European economic powers were Britain followed by Germany (Friedman, 2003, p. 84; Kolko, 1968, p. 485). Germany sent trade missions to many Latin American nations in 1934, shortly after the rise of Hitler (Friedman, 2003, p. 84). Secondly, while the US demanded tropical goods, it could not sell its industrial goods within the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the US had an ongoing structural balance of payments crisis with South America that had never been addressed (Steward, 1975, p. 5). The US installed the RTTA in June 1934 to combat its weaknesses in the region. The RTTA allowed the President, and his advisors, to directly decrease tariffs on imports to the US where beneficial treaties of reciprocity could be arranged. In the first seven years, Roosevelt signed 1,000 decrees hat facilitated the resurgence of US exports (Bauer, 1963, p. 26). While the Republican Party, and

their agricultural supporters, in 1934 described the RTTA as creeping socialism, the concept of reciprocity became the bipartisan cornerstone of American foreign economic policy after WWII (Bauer, 1963, p. 26).

Despite its perceived weakness in South America, the US had several mechanisms to coerce states into reciprocity. These mechanisms included the new institutional pan-Americanism, leniency on defaulted bonds and recognition for unconstitutional governments. To exemplify these points, this thesis will utilise the example of Colombia. During the Great Depression 85 per cent of Latin bonds defaulted (Wilson, 1971, p. 170). While the US did not hold the majority of bonds throughout South America, in those nations in which it did it had an advantage. The two primary examples were Chile, which defaulted on US$300 million to US citizens, and Colombia, which defaulted on US$130 million to US citizens (Francis, 1977, p. 11; Randall, 1992, p. 111). The Colombian example is particularly revealing, as it demonstrates a direct correlation between the problems of both investment and trade policy. It was also the first state to sign a RTTA with the US. In 1933 Colombia exported US$47 million worth of goods, primarily coffee, to the US, yet they only imported US$14 million worth (Steward, 1975, p. 68). Colombia had restrictive trade policies, as they sought to develop basic industry in Bogotá. Colombia also received significant DFI from Germany, specifically in the areas of transport and aviation (Newton, 1978, p. 26). Also, the US had no tariff on coffee, since it was not domestically produced. These factors accounted for the substantial balance of payments deficit. The Colombians understandably opposed the signing of the RTA. The importation of cheap US manufactured goods would threaten thousands of industrial jobs in Bogotá (Randall, 1992, p. 150). Cordell Hull made two threats to achieve the RTA with Colombia. While the limitation on foreign capital for the Colombian government was significant, it was the threat of an excise tariff on Colombian coffee that ensured the RTA was signed (Osterling, 1989, p. 80). Hull ensured a RTA agreement that served US interests at the expense of Colombian ones.

The other major mechanism used to coerce Latin American nations into RTA agreements was the recognition of unconstitutional governments. US Secretary of State Charles Hughes had repudiated unconstitutional governments in the Americas during the Washington conferences of 1923. He had argued that a lack of "self-determination which makes for wars and places obstacles in the way

of all plans for keeping the peace" (as cited in Williams, 1972, p. 130). During the 1930s, however, constitutional governments posed a greater threat to the implementation of RTAs. For Hull, the "economic line-up" would follow the "political line-up" (as cited in Williams, 1972, p. 240). Pragmatic economic agreements were more important than idealism. This is best evidenced through the RTA signed with the Guatemalan government of Jorge Ubico. In 1929, despite three decades of capital investment by US corporations, the US still did not control the majority of Guatemalan trade (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 77). Its largest market for coffee in 1929 was Germany, which purchased 40 per cent of all Guatemalan exports (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 77). US corporations had a significant presence in Guatemala (Chapman, 2007, pp. 61-71). They included: the United Fruit Company (UFCo), which monopolised rail, land and trade throughout Guatemala; General Electric; Grace Company; and Citibank (Grieb, 1979, p. 68). However their actions, especially those of the UFCo, motivated anti-Americanism, which increased available trading opportunities for German, Italian and British firms. The Guatemalan political situation was more significant to the achievement of the RTA than the power of the US economy. In 1936 Ubico sought to transform his 'elected' government into a permanent dictatorship (Grieb, 1979, p. 48). Washington warned that it would only grant recognition to Ubico's unconstitutional government if a RTA were formed. The agreement was concluded in 1936 at the expense of Guatemalan economic ties to Germany, whose share of Guatemala's exports decreased to 11 per cent by 1939. By 1944 Guatemala was completely dependent upon the US to absorb 92 per cent of all its exports (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, p. 17). The success in Guatemala contributed to RTAs and recognition for unconstitutional governments in El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Cuba. Hence, majority of RTAs were with dictatorships undermining the philosophy of the GNP.

Between 1934 and 1940 the US signed twelve RTAs in Latin America. This was a definitive factor in the creation of hemispheric unity leading into WWII. However, it also demonstrated the divergent interests of Latin America and the US during the 1930s. The reciprocal agreements did not benefit the US and Latin American states equally. The RTA was a great success for the US. It was one of the key mechanisms that contributed to the revival of the US industrial economy. The depression clearly demonstrated that the American economy was dependent upon

foreign markets for its industrial goods. The division of the globe into economic spheres of influence meant that South America became Washington's only option to expand its exports. While this was a slow process that required the closing of European markets to raw materials during WWII, the US began its emergence to regional economic leadership through RTAs with large economies such as Brazil and Chile (Steward, 1975, pp. 261-290). Yet RTAs placed limitations upon Latin American states. Despite the political factors that condemned much of the region to autocracy, the RTAs had economic implications for those countries. The RTAs represented conditions opposite to those economic circumstances that had allowed the US to transition from raw material production to industry during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (Davis and Cull, 1994, pp. 5-11). Rather, the US was creating dependencies throughout Latin America. It was also undercutting the ability of Latin American countries to receive a fair price for their commodities through international competition. This was especially evident in regard to Central American coffee. By alienating the small isthmian economies from European markets, the US enjoyed greater autonomy over price levers for raw commodities. It also increased its role in distribution. However, the most significant impact of the RTAs was the effect on regional manufacturing. By removing the economic lever of the tariff, South American governments lost the ability to protect emerging industries from cheap US goods (Bauer, 1963, p. 21). Hence, the US was not creating circumstances for the Latin American governments to emulate their own economic success; rather, they were seeking to reproduce previous formal and informal imperial bonds that were being phased out of the region.

Multilateralism and Monroe

The alignment of political and economic priorities between the hemispheres, under President Roosevelt, brought the vast majority of Latin Americans into each of Hull's "political" and "economic" line-ups (Hull, as cited in Williams, 1972, p. 240). This process accelerated as the war approached between 1933 and 1939. The Monroe Doctrine had become an alliance against extra-hemispheric aggression. Accordingly, it required a level of multilateralism that exceeded anything that had been achieved in Latin America up to that point. Pan-Americanism was also promoted by increased US-ownership of the short-wave

broadcasting industry (Fejes, 1986, p. 118). Support for the US in their battle for "minds, materials and markets" against the Germans was ensured by a new, more positive, perception of the US (as cited in Peterson, 1964, p. 389). In an attempt to create hemispheric solidarity, the Inter-American States convened in 1936 in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Fejes, 1986, p. 67). This conference demonstrated a renewed faith in American foreign policy. Roosevelt was revered throughout the region for his domestic New Deal and foreign Good Neighbour Policy. Hull sought a binding inter-American alliance in 1936 to ensure hemispheric solidarity and security against European aggression. Seventeen of the twenty republics supported this resolution. Only Argentina, Chile and Mexico opposed. Hull again sought to establish a "regional league of nations" during the 1938 conference in Lima, Peru (Lamas, as cited in Wood, 1961, p. 17). Argentina was the only country to vote against the binding security resolution, which would have seen the hemisphere committed to war following the Pearl Harbor attack. Nevertheless, the transition of Washington's image in Latin America between 1933 and 1938 was an astounding success. The one weakness was relations with Argentina during this period.

Argentina was isolated from the economic line-up during the 1930s as its economy competed with the US (Tulchin, 1989, p. 35). They produced similar exports competing for the same markets in both Latin America and Europe. Argentina was the nation most directly impacted by Smoot-Hawley in 1930, as its exports to the US decreased from $US117 million in 1929 to under $US16 million in 1933 (Steward, 1975, p. 177). This contributed to urban unemployment (Horowitz, 1999, p. 27). It was the only nation to approach the US for an RTA to which Hull refused (Steward, 1975, p. 177). As a result, Argentina reluctantly signed itself into the British economic empire, under the Roca-Runciman Agreement in 1933 (Peterson, 1964, p. 381). Argentina's disdain for Washington's political and economic policies in South America promoted rampant nationalism during the 1930s (Tulchin, 1989, p. 35). Many believed in Argentine regional leadership and objected to American regional impositions. This was evident at both the Buenos Aires and Lima conferences. In 1936, Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas argued that increased regionalism challenged national sovereignty and that the new American 'Good Neighbourism' had a responsibility to national sovereignty in every field (Peterson, 1964, p. 392). This argument was echoed in

1938. Argentina downgraded the "Declaration of Lima" to a non-binding security pledge (Inter American States, 1938). While many saw Argentina's actions as a result of their desire to see a Nazi victory, one must carefully consider Argentina's position (F.D. Roosevelt, as cited in Kimble, 1989, p. 23). Commitment to regional security would have directly impacted Argentina in two ways. Firstly, it would place Argentina in a precarious economic position. In 1938 the Argentine economy was completely dependent upon agricultural exports to Britain, Germany and Italy (Tulchin, 1989, pp. 48-50). By committing to regionalism, at the expense of its trading partners, the Argentines were vulnerable to economic collapse. Secondly, the Argentines did not believe that the US had the capacity to protect it, or Chile, from foreign attacks (Francis, 1977, p. 108). Their isolation from US vital interests in the Caribbean would expose Argentina, should it be legally required to declare war on Germany. Hence, Argentina's decision was based on nationalism and pragmatism, rather than any alliance with a foreign power.

Despite Argentina's reservations, the inevitability of global war became more evident during 1938-1939. Japan's undeclared war upon China had expanded from Manchuria into Chinese territory during 1937 (Smith, 2007, p. 61). This closed export markets throughout much of northern Asia while regional exports into Europe were also being threatened by fascist expansion (Friedman, 2003, p. 87). Moreover, the Western Hemisphere was becoming increasingly isolated from global trade between 1936 and 1939. This made the continents interdependent. This interdependence was recognised by Sumner Welles, who declared the US would "assure [Latin America] that [it] was in a position to defend [Latin America] from all aggression from whatever source it may arise, and [wished that Latin America would be] prepared to join with fellow democracies of the New World" to prevent any attack on the region (in Gellman, 1979, p. 74). While threats to Latin American security were limited to sporadic attacks on Brazilian shipping, the US' commitment to regional defence was significant (Child, 1980, p. 11). The US sought to extend its security personnel to all of Latin America, and to bolster Latin American forces to fight under US command. For Latin America, assurance for the region depended on a Latin American declaration of war should the US be attacked (Child, 1980, p. 18). Continental mobilisation would have been required to respond to the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941. Latin Americans, primarily Argentina and Chile, rejected the US' conditions. The 1938

Declaration of Lima was not a formal unilateral security alliance. Instead it expressed a desire to "defend the peace of the continent" (Inter-American States, 1938). The US could not dictate regional politics in 1939; however, the experience of WWII would again change inter-American diplomacy.

Taking Their Share: The Democratic Revolution in Latin America

Latin America's progressive forces claimed a decisive victory in the 'Cold War' between 1941 and 1948. Ten dictatorial governments fell to democratic advocates during this period. This left only five military regimes out of the twenty Latin American republics that existed in early 1948.[48] While social gains were limited and short-lived in Haiti, El Salvador and Honduras, social democratic governments were established in Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru and Costa Rica (Ameringer, 2009, pp. 130-170). Additionally, elections in Brazil and Argentina consolidated the populist opposition to US domination of the Western Hemisphere (Rapoport, 1992, p. 117; Bethal, 1992, p. 45). A democratic revolution swept over Latin America during this period. While these individual revolutions were disparate and subject to a variety of political economic conditions, the chronological pattern cannot be ignored. These revolutions challenged Washington's leadership of the hemisphere as independent political and economic policies throughout Latin America threatened the dominant position the US had gained during the previous decade. This chapter will establish the setting for the impending crisis of 1948. Its primary objective, however, is to demonstrate the cause of this democratic revolution by; tracing the origins of an independent and democratic philosophy developed in Mexico under the leadership of Lázaro Cárdenas; explaining the Latin America's contribution to the Allied victory in WWII will be explained; revealing that the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter inspired democratic elements throughout the hemisphere; exploring the disparate democratic revolutions; offering a critique of US policy under the auspices of 'Bradenism'; and finally, explaining why these democratic revolutions negatively impacted US foreign policy in Latin America. In doing so, this chapter will explain why a 'Cold War' in Latin America became central to US interests by 1948.

The Beginning of Mexico's Independence

Economic nationalism was a prerequisite for social democratic revolutions in Latin America. The underdevelopment of most regional republics necessitated economic sovereignty to meet the goals of development and social reform. In 1950, Raúl Prebisch and the ECLA argued that "in an unregulated international market system the gains from trade are biased in favour of the advanced industrial

[48] These regimes included Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay.

countries [and] inhibit industrial development at the periphery" (as cited in Overbeek, 1999, p. 570). Mexico subsequently initiated a program of economic nationalism. According to González (2002), Cárdenas initiated "an agenda" of "agrarian reform, socialistic education and economic nationalism" (p. 223). This economic nationalism focussed on land and resource redistribution. The most notorious example of Mexico's program was the expropriation of the oil companies in 1938. Dwyer (1998) suggests that the expropriation of US$102 million worth of agricultural land had even more of an impact on US commerce than the oil seizures. Cárdenas revitalised the Mexican Revolution through a course of independent political and economic developments (Dwyer, 1998, pp. 495-510). The precedent of the Mexican Revolution posed the most fundamental threat to US interests in Latin America throughout the following decade. This pro-capitalist, nationalist economic philosophy laid the foundation for the social democratic economic reforms following WWII. This section details the proliferation of economic nationalism and the threat posed to US interests in Latin America.

From 1938 Cárdenas turned his attention from land reform to resource expropriation (González, 2002, p. 246). Cárdenas was more progressive than Elías Calles, his predecessor. This divergence from the party line made Cárdenas dependent upon popular support (Levy and Szekley, 1974, p. 37). Cárdenas sought to win the support of the peasants and labourers, and was determined to fulfil the promise of the Mexican Revolution on land reform. "State imposed agrarian reform" expropriated large tracts of arable land from wealthy oligarchs and US capitalists, such as the Standard Fruit Company (González, 2002, p. 233; Karnes, 1978, p. 162). This land was redistributed to collective peasant groups known as *ejidas* (González, 2002, p. 214). Cárdenas won popular support through granting agrarian credits to self-reliant peasant communities. Through his support for the claims of oil workers, who demanded job security after substantial layoffs, Cárdenas was supporting labour. When the oil companies refused to negotiate with him, he threatened expropriation under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution (González, 2002, p. 246). As the oil companies to refused to yield to union demands, Cárdenas in 1938 expropriated the holdings of Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) and Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ). Cárdenas argued that "the petroleum expropriation marks the beginning of our independence" (in Britton, 2006, p. 50). The oil companies demanded US intervention, which was supported by Cordell

Hull. Roosevelt, however, saw this as the Good Neighbour's greatest test, and refused to sacrifice regional trade policy for the "oil men" (Pike, 1995, p. 193).

The challenge posed by Cárdenas was greater than the direct cost to the oil companies. Cárdenas set the precedent for other Latin American nations. Foreign ownership of resources had hindered development in Latin America since the onset of the twentieth century. While foreign ownership of mineral resources was at the forefront of the debate in Latin America, foreign ownership of land was equally important. During this period, nationalist oil policies were adopted by Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. In 1937 the nationalist military regime of Bolivia demanded compensation from SONJ for the war it had initiated against RDS and Paraguay over disputed territory in the Amazonian Chaco region (Whitehead, 2003, p. 122). When the company refused, Bolivia confiscated its property (Whitehead, 2003, p. 123).[49] In Venezuela, the military government bowed to constant nationalist pressure to obtain a larger percentage of oil revenue (Bucheli and Aguilera, 2010, p. 365). The 1943 Hydrocarbons Act ensured that half of all oil profits accrued went to the Venezuelan government. In Colombia the state opened a national oil company to compete with SONJ as a move towards nationalisation (Bucheli and Aguilera, 2010, p. 368). However, that nation's history inhibited its capacity to develop that industry.[50] Other resource-rich nations also began demanding fairer prices for their commodities. The Popular Front in Chile sought to regulate copper prices to increase national revenues during and after WWII (Barnard, 1992, p. 67). Land reform was enacted in Guatemala, Venezuela and informally in Colombia. Moreover, the potential assault on US DFI was implemented through the policies of Cárdenas in reviving aspects of the Mexican Revolution.

While during the 1930s most of Latin America looked towards Mexican commodity control, Cárdenas also began developing Mexico's industry (Schneider, 2004, p. 63). Industrialisation was vital to the economic development of Mexico and other Latin American economies. According to Schneider (2004), "the decade of the 1930s in Mexico was a pivotal period of economic crisis, political reorganisation and changing development strategies" (p. 63). Moreover, the Cárdenas regime sought to use domestic corporatist elements to rebuild Mexican

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[49] Bolivian oil was nationalized between 1937 and 1956. However, the minimal production and export of the commodity limited the economic gains to the Bolivian government.

[50] Particularly the decade-long civil war, '*La Violencia*,' which began in 1948.

industry emphasising national interest. In the context of the Depression and approaching war, this meant the reconstruction of Mexico's capacity to produce processed goods for the domestic market (Gereffi and Wyman, 1990, p. 307). During the 1950s this industrialisation process became known as Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). Between 1929 and 1950 Mexico decreased its portion of imports in consumer goods from 35.2 per cent to 6.9 per cent (Gerffi and Wyman, 1990, p. 307). This decrease allowed for a greater investment in heavy industry during this period. Mexico set the example of domestic industrialisation between 1936 and 1945 (Schneider, 2004, pp. 63-65). Several nations emulated this successes by producing consumer goods such as textiles, processed foods and alcohol, and retaining foreign currency domestically after the war (Prebisch in Overbeek, 1989, p. 570). The foreign currency would then be reserved for capital goods such as automobiles, agricultural machinery and industrial equipment, to improve the efficiency of the economy. The growth of the domestic market would increase the profitability of these industries, creating more urban jobs and leading to the creation of cosmopolitan cities through internal migration. However, ISI was only possible in certain economic conditions. As ISI required large initial outlays, including investment and worker training, it was far less efficient than foreign imports. ISI could thus only exist with substantial government support through either subsidies or significant tariff barriers to competitive foreign goods (Prebisch in Overbeek, 1989, p. 571). The mobilisation of European and North American economies towards the war effort allowed for the temporary establishment of ISI.

The Good Neighbour Policy allowed for this limited economic development in the parts of Latin America deemed non-essential to the war effort. This was evident in Roosevelt's handling of Mexico's oil expropriation. Roosevelt had appointed his liberal and advisor, Josephus Daniels as ambassador to Mexico (Gerber, 1983, p, 274). Daniels was sympathetic to the goals of the Mexican Revolution and sought to contain Hull's aggressive response to the crisis by working directly with the President (Pike, 1995, p. 193). Daniels withheld Hull's critique of Cárdenas on the President's order (Pike, 1995, p. 193). The British government demanded that Roosevelt "deal with those communists down there" in Mexico, in order to protect British investment (Pike, 1995, p. 193). According to Cárdenas, the British Empire "was sick and with a weak soul" (as cited in González,

2002, p. 250). The oil companies launched a vicious anti-communist propaganda campaign against Mexico (Pike, 1995, p. 193). However, herein lies the strategy of the GNP in Latin America. Roosevelt understood that US interests revolved around access to raw materials, rather than ownership of a select few.[51] If the US imposed economic sanctions upon Mexico, Mexico would increase trade with Japan and Germany, especially in the oil industry. This would be detrimental to the US' position in WWII. Roosevelt was pragmatic, rather than philanthropic, towards Mexico. To appease business and guarantee wartime oil supplies, the US organised contracts to buy Mexican oil at a favourable price and ensure limited compensation to the companies involved (Pike, 1995, p. 196). Moreover, the GNP concerned national interest, and such goodwill contributed to the national interest. President Roosevelt stated, "that is a new approach that I am talking about to these South American things…Give them a share. They think they are just as good as we are, and many of them are" (as cited in Gellman, 1979, p. 157). As WWII approached, Latin Americans questioned just what this share would constitute. However, the goodwill generated by Roosevelt had convinced the majority of Latin Americans that the US would support the advances made by revolutionary Mexico. This also convinced most Latin Americans to support the Allied war effort from 1941.

Fighting Fascism Abroad

By the end of 1939 both Europe and Asia were at war. As of that year, isolationist policies prevented Washington's entry into foreign conflicts (Jenkins, 2003, p. 107). Roosevelt's primary fear was an invasion of the Western Hemisphere (Child, 1980, p. 19).[52] The US sought to convene the American states in Panama City in 1939 in an attempt to establish a large neutrality zone around the Western Hemisphere (Child, 1980, p. 27). This would allow the US Navy access to Latin American ports and ensure the termination of Axis involvement and trade in the Western Hemisphere. The war also impacted Latin America as the rise of Germany alerted Roosevelt to the possibility of German seizure of the Caribbean colonies of the Netherlands, France, and even Britain (Bratzel, 2007, p. 1). The US sought permission to invade these territories should Germany defeat the Europeans. The motions at Panama largely failed, however, as Argentina and other states did not believe the Axis powers would invade Latin America (Francis, 1977,

[51] In addition to trade and political influence.
[52] This thesis will only focus on those aspects of WWII that directly influenced Latin America.

p. 167). The Nazi advance into France caused the US to convene the inter-American states again in Havana in 1940 (Child, 1980, p. 19). Sumner Welles brought monetary incentives to the Havana conference; the lending capacity of the EXIM Bank more than tripled to US$700 million (Gellman, 1979, p. 162). Priority was given to military build-up in the hemisphere. The war also distanced Latin American countries from their traditional markets in Europe. Simply put, the onset of WWII had a drastic effect on every Latin American state. While Argentina, Brazil and Chile[53] boycotted the Havana resolution, a sufficient majority of states supported US leadership at the onset of WWII. This loyalty was based on several factors, including hemispheric defence, economic dislocation and perceived ideological coherence.[54]

From 1936 until 1945 the US expressed their concerns about hemispheric defence. This was a direct response to fascist infiltration in Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Friedman, 2003, pp. 13-46). The threat seemed especially real in Argentina, which continued to trade with the Axis powers throughout the war – albeit at a declining rate (Scheinin, 2007, p. 188). Despite the views of pro-Axis leaders in Argentina and Brazil, neither government chose Germany over the US (Scheinin, 2007, p. 186; Smith, 2007, p. 144). History has demonstrated that much of the anxiety regarding the Axis threat was falsified by British intelligence (Friedman, 2003, pp. 58-59). However, the viability of this Pan-American alliance was not assured in 1941. The US moved to create a mechanism for hemispheric defence against the threat of Axis aggression. Brazil was the lynchpin of the inter-American alliance. It possessed the large under-inhabited north-eastern 'bulge' of South America, which was the closest point to Axis-occupied Africa. Brazil leveraged its cooperation for financial aid, which was directed towards foreign minister Osvaldo Aranha's aggressive economic agenda in Brazil (Smith, 2007, p. 153). This aid cemented the alliance and allowed the US to patrol the hemisphere. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US joined the war. Nine Latin American republics declared war on the Axis after Pearl Harbor (Hull, 1948b, 1139). Their motives for war were determined by "geography, internal politics, intra-Latin American relations, economic factors, history, and a host of other variables" (Bratzel, 2007, p. 8). In early 1942 the inter-American states convened in Rio de

[53] In 1940, these three states still held close ties with Germany. Additionally, they were sceptical of Washington's ability to defend the hemisphere in any international conflict.
[54] Ideological coherence was demonstrated through the Atlantic Charter.

Janeiro to consult on wartime policies (Child, 1980, p. 28). In Rio, the US demonstrated that there was a significant threat to the hemisphere. Accordingly, 18 of the 20 sovereign Latin American states severed relations with the Axis. They were also encouraged to monitor fascist activity at home. Only Brazil and Mexico committed troops to WWII, aiding in the invasion of Italy in 1943(Child, 1980, p. 48). More significantly, during WWII hemispheric defences were bolstered. For the US, Latin America's role in WWII was to defend itself from foreign aggression, thereby allowing US troops to fight in Europe. The limitation of Latin forces meant that 100,000 US troops were stationed in the region throughout the war (Child, 1980, p. 21). Jesse Jones of the State Department remarked, "we shall thus have for the first time the ammunition to deal with South America" (Gellman, 1979, p. 162). The two abstainers, Argentina and Chile, eventually succumbed to inter-American pressure after the Axis defeat became inevitable.

Its economic dislocation from Europe defined Latin America's role in the allied victory in WWII. The region experienced a structural readjustment to service the US war economy (FEAC, 1943, pp. 3-7).[55] The US prioritised this adjustment because of the decrease of access to the economies of Eurasia (FEAC, 1943, pp. 8-11, 94-98). In November 1939 the US, represented by Welles, established the Financial and Economic Advisory Committee (FEAC) (FEAC, 1943, pp. 3-7). The FEAC and the War Resources Board controlled the political economies of most Latin American states throughout WWII. The FEAC's stated intention was to "provide long-term solutions to increase inter-American trade and seek ways to stimulate Latin American growth" (Gellman, 1979, p. 157). However, "no long-term planning was given serious consideration" (Gellman, 1979, p. 167). The FEAC was designed to absorb excess Latin exports formally destined for Europe. The US gave special priority to essential war materials, to keep them out of Axis hands. The other significant element was keeping Latin American states as primary exporters. By committing to the purchase of goods, the US maintained the existing political-economic structure of the hemisphere. According to Henry Wallace,[56] this

[55]The data in this paragraph comes from the handbook of the Financial and Economic Advisory Committee (FEAC) published by the US government in 1943. This extensive handbook outlines collaborative economic activities between the US and several Latin American states. Resolutions concluded between 1939 and 1943 included price controls and quotas on primary goods, organizational principals and transportation needs. Moreover, this highlights the economic collaboration of the hemisphere and several sacrifices made by the smaller hemispheric republics.
[56] Wallace was the US Secretary for Agriculture. In that position, he sought to maintain markets for US agricultural produce in the Western Hemisphere.

dependency should be further enhanced through the establishment of more complimentary trade. In 1939 Latin America only provided US$16 million of the US$236 million of "tropical imports" (Gellman, 1979, p. 157). The US Congress committed US$500,000 to research technologies to create goods, such as rubber, in Latin America (Gellman, 1979, p. 158).

During WWII Latin America postponed its possible economic diversification in order to assist the US war economy. The production of cash crops and the extraction of minerals temporarily enriched the oligarchic classes. This situation was temporary, however. Many Latin American states were committed to an Allied victory in order to receive their share of development aid as a reward for their economic contribution after the war (FEAC, 1943, p. 9).[57] The US was poised to become the global hegemon, and the Latin Americans believed a close relationship with the US would grant them a better position in the world order. The years 1945-1948 revealed this was not the US' intention. Wallace remarked:

> It is a rather disturbing thought that we in the United States can maintain a deep interest in Latin America only so long as we think we have something to gain by it. I hope…during the next few years that Latin America will feel that we are really her friend and not merely a friend for expedient purposes in time of great need (in Gellman, 1979, p. 198).

Wallace's wish would not be fulfilled as WWII increased Latin American dependency upon the US; it was never intended to drag Latin America out of poverty in the process. The Latin Americans were forced to look elsewhere for 'their share'.

Roosevelt and his chief advisor, Sumner Welles, had changed the dimension of this 'Cold War' for a brief moment in 1941. Roosevelt argued that the visions of US expansionists and Latin American social democrats were, at last, compatible. However, the realities of the Atlantic Charter demonstrated that this was never the case. It was designed to convince the occupied people of Europe and Asia that the US-led system would offer self-determination (O'Sullivan, 2008, p. 47). Yet Latin Americans were never the targets. The Atlantic Charter justified US global leadership under the auspices of a moral crusade (O'Sullivan, 2008, p. 51). The US

[57] Specifically, the US committed to design "a broader inter-American system of inter-American cooperative organization in trade and industrial matters, and to propose credit measures and other measures of assistance which may be immediately necessary in the fields of economics, finance, money, and foreign exchange" (FEAC, 1943, p. 9). Moreover, the FEAC made future commitments to economic leaders in Latin America.

sought to attain global moral leadership through its professed commitment to democracy, human rights and economic development. The US, through Welles, claimed to be an unwilling participant in WWII, and had fought only for the betterment of human kind (O'Sullivan, 2008, p. 51). This propaganda allowed the US to establish a new global political and economic order following the war. It was to be based on the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt's Four Freedoms speech, which was a naked appeal to the oppressed peoples of the world. It laid out a society that was beneficial to those peoples living under fascism, communism and European imperialism. It promoted self-determination and an end to exploitation between nations. Roosevelt declared the aims of the Allies to be humanitarian. The first "freedom" included the independence of speech and the press (FD Roosevelt, 1941). This would appeal to all oppressed people as it gave way to political activism in the developing world. The second "freedom" was of religion (FD Roosevelt, 1941). The third "freedom" guaranteed against "want" (FD Roosevelt, 1941). The impoverished people of the colonial and semi-colonial[58] world saw this as a guarantee of economic development. The fourth, and most significant "freedom" was from "fear" (FD Roosevelt, 1941). The US committed to ending dictatorial rule over the globe. While history has found these claims to be propaganda, they were very powerful in convincing states to join a new world order of liberal democracy and free-trade economics.

The US government did not design this new world order. Rather, it was outlined by the private organisation known as the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) (Parmar, 2004, p. 151). Preceding WWII, "the [CFR] saw the purpose of post-war planning as the creation of an international economic and political order dominated by the United States" (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 141). The CFR's membership was intertwined with US State Department membership, which included Sumner Welles, Hamilton Fish and Adolf Berle (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 59-65). While not a CFR member, Secretary of State Hull supported the expansion of US global economic leadership (Parmar, 2004, p. 120). Its membership also included influential economists, executives and intellectuals (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 31-34). It sought to define the future of American imperialism by asserting that the US economy was not self-sufficient, and could not sustain a superior quality of life for its citizens without global markets and resources. Given the dominance of

[58] This term defines those nations under the influence of Euro-American capitalism, outside of formal political control. It might apply to many Latin American states (Aguilar, 1968, p. 18).

the Germans in Europe, the CFR sought to integrate other areas of the world economy into a US-led political economic bloc. Resource-rich Latin America was to be the centre of this bloc. However, Latin America did not yet have sufficient internal markets to support the US industrial economy. The CFR sought to integrate the British Empire and Asia into their “Grand Area” (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 126). This meant war with Japan and in order to wage war, a degree of idealism was necessary. CFR recommendations shaped the State Department’s conception of war; the CFR was known to FDR as “my post-war advisors” (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 122). However, these post-war advisors were primarily concerned with propaganda. Their aims in 1941-42 were to convince the American people to fight WWII, and to leave the international community puzzled by its actual reasons for war. The organisation asserted that the: “formulation of a statement of war aims for propaganda purposes is very different from formulation of one defining the true national interest” (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 162). The Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms served this purpose.

The US claimed to fight the war for moral reasons. They declared that Nazism and Japanese militarism were ‘evil’ and that the US had a moral obligation to end them. The reality was otherwise. While the American people, and soldiers, were at war for those reasons, the aims of its leading diplomats did not fulfil this rhetoric. The protracted decline of the British and French empires in the inter-war period posed created a void in global leadership (Kolko, 1968, pp. 484-490). Three modern forces sought to usurp the leadership of the declining imperial powers. Along with modern US capitalism came German Nazism and Soviet Communism. The US sought to compete with these ideologies to confirm its role as global leader. The CFR’s vision of the post-war economic system is quite revealing of US foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the war. The CFR divided the world into economic regions. Within this division of regions came a vision of permanent division of labour. The CFR argued that the tropical economies of the world were to remain resource producers (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 167). Along with most of Latin America, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and Africa were seen as dependent economies to be controlled by Western powers. The industrial regions of Europe and North-East Asia were seen as industrial manufacturers. These CFR plans were largely initiated after WWII; Europe and North-East Asia were given large development funds, while Latin America remained

underdeveloped. The objective of the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms Speech was to conceal the economic aims of US foreign policy behind its moral crusade. This was one of the most successful utilisations of propaganda in US history.

Fighting Fascism at Home

Latin America's brief experiments in democracy have been cautiously connected by experts of this period. In their edited collection, Bethell and Roxborough (1992) assert, "despite differences in political regime… there [were] striking similarities in the experience of the majority of the republics" between 1944 and 1948 (p. 1). Ameringer (1996) also states that "the democratising trends of World War II accelerated the pressure for change in the Caribbean" (p. 1). Ameringer (1996) goes on to assert that these changes "were more evolutionary than revolutionary," as the decentralisation of economic power during World War I led to the gradual decentralisation of political power in the ensuing decades (p. 1). The political and economic factors that motivated the anti-authoritarian movements were unique in each state. However, the leaders of several of those movements held a common ideological convictions for social democracy. The preeminent source on the Venezuelan '*trienio*', Robert Alexander (1982), identifies the conversion of Betancourt's 1945 coup "into a process of fundamentally changing the political, economic, and social structures of Venezuela" (p. 224). Gleijes (1990) defines the Guatemalan 'ten years of spring' as "an attempt to break the power of a foreign enclave that threatened the country's sovereignty". Ameringer (2000) defines *Auténtico* rule under Grau as a force for "nationalism, socialism, and anti-Imperialism" (p. 44). Haworth (1992) defines the democratic experience in Peru as "herald[ing] an era of freedom for popular political organisation…economic restructuring and social change" (p. 170). Finally, Green (2003) defines the movement for Gaitánism in Colombia as a "pronounced intellectual tradition" of the "home grown left" (p. 205). While each movement faced different obstacles, their objective was the same: to transform their republics into modern social democratic states that could effectively compete in the world capitalist economy by utilising the full potential of their population. This section will document the attempts of the Latin American people to take their share of the post-WWII freedoms of "victorious democracy" (Morales, as cited in Ameringer, 1974, p. 53).

The reciprocal arrangements of the 1930s had formed police states in Central America and the Caribbean. The long-term dictators included the Guatemalan Jorge Ubico (1934-1944), the El Salvadoran Maximiliano Martínez (1931-1944), the Honduran Carías Andino (1933-1949), the Nicaraguan Anastasio Somoza (1936-1956), the Cuban Fulgencio Batista (1934-1944), and the Dominican Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961) (Black, 1988, p. 61; Ameringer, 2000, pp. 9-22). Less formal military rule was also conducted in Panama and Haiti (LaFeber, 1989, pp. 85-100; Trouillot, 1990, pp. 102-106). The only regional nation with a somewhat democratic system was Costa Rica; however, with limited suffrage, the political economy was tightly controlled by a landed oligarchy (Cruz, 1992, pp. 280-285). In 1944 conservative military leaders, many of whom resembled European fascists, dominated Central America and the Caribbean (Arévalo, 1963, p. 35). The Guatemalan president, Juan José Arévalo (1963) asserted that the "Nazism of Central and South America was intrinsic with [the] Police-State rulers, ideologically and in practice" (p. 35). Citizens of the region enjoyed few of the freedoms enunciated by President Roosevelt (Arévalo, 1963,pp. 30-39). However, Roosevelt's promises in part motivated the regional change that came to threaten US dominance. Betancourt stated the Roosevelt "gave hope to the oppressed people of Latin America" (as cited in Ameringer, 1974, p. 52). The region's social democrats were in exile (Ameringer, 1974, pp. 24-49). Circumstances, however, brought them into the political fold once again.

The movement for democracy in Central America emerged in 1944. It began in San Salvador in March 1944 (Parkman, 1988 p. 34). The "strike of the fallen arms" was a non-violent protest conducted by 10,000 students, which led to the military's removal of Martínez in favour of a more progressive general (Parkman, 1988, p. 35). Later, in May 1944, protests of Honduran unionists led to violent clashes with the military (MacCameron, 1983, p. 17). While the vocal demands for the removal of Andino failed until 1949, an immediate compromise was made in the meeting of union wage demands. In June 1944 Guatemalan *campesinos* staged a general strike of over 100,000 workers against Ubico's murder of dissident schoolteachers (Greib, 1979, p. 272). Guillermo Toriello proudly read Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter to a vociferous audience in June 1944, demanding Ubico's resignation (Ameringer, 1974, p. 52). While democracy failed in El Salvador and Honduras, Guatemalan resolve ensured its success. The fraudulent Guatemalan

Presidential elections of September 1944, which resembled those in El Salvador, resulted in the defeat of exiled Professor Arévalo to Ubico's Chief Lieutenant Ponce Vaides by 45,000 to 3,000 votes in a nation of approximately three million (Greib, 1979, p. 277).[59] When the result was publicised in October, three young military officers – Francisco Arana, Jacobo Árbenz and Jorge Toriello – shot and mortally wounded Vaides (Greib, 1979, p. 279). The October revolutionaries called for elections in January 1945, expanding suffrage to all literate males (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 35). Arévalo won the 1945 election in a landslide (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 35). The new Guatemalan constitution of 1945 made its citizens as politically 'free' as members of the 'first world.' However, the alleviation of severe rural poverty was more important to Guatemalans than political rights. The relationship between capital and labour required revision. In 1947, Arévalo passed a sweeping labour code that established a minimum wage and a 48-hour working week (Gleijes, 1991, p. 51). Guatemala's largest employers, including the (UFCo), protested this decision. Guatemala had emulated the Mexican Revolution and sought to extend this influence to its neighbours.

Long-term conservative oligarchic-military alliances also ruled the resource-rich nations of Peru and Venezuela, and the plantation economy of Cuba. 1945 brought sweeping change to Lima (Haworth, 1992, p. 177). The government of Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was challenged by widespread strikes against industrial working conditions. Haya de la Torre saw his opportunity to obtain power for his *Aprista* party (Haworth, 1992, p. 176). The workers demanded fundamental reforms, yet the oligarchs refused them. The weakness of Haya's '*Aprismo,*' however, was in its failure to form cross-class alliances (Klaren, 2000, p. 289). While Haya enjoyed cult status in Lima, the vast majority of Peruvians lived outside the capital. In those areas, the Liberals maintained the working-class vote (Klaren, 2000, pp. 289-295). Accordingly, the southern Liberals, led by José Luis Bustamante, committed to fulfilling much of the *Aprista* program in exchange for the presidential nomination. Unfortunately for those who "saw [APRA] as a vehicle for anti-Imperialism, agrarian reform and economic planning," Haya's political difficulties meant that APRA did not "initiate any such program" during this period (Betrum, 1995, p. 427).

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[59] A mere 1.6 per cent of the population voted in 1944. This indicates the exclusionary nature of Guatemalan oligarchic politics.

Tyrants throughout the twentieth century had ruled Venezuela. Political unrest in Caracas culminated in an AD-initiated coup d'état that led to general elections in 1946 (Ellner, 1992, p. 147). The AD leader, Betancourt, prioritised the renegotiation of oil profits to fulfil his social agenda. In the face of heavy popular pressure, the Hydrocarbon Act, which ensured Venezuela half of oil 'profits,' was initiated in 1943. Betancourt and his successor, Rómulo Gallegos, established a national oil company, which would eventually lead to the expropriation of the industry (Bucheli and Aguilera, 2010, p. 365). In Cuba, after a decade of Batista's rule,[60] the tyrant was defeated in free elections by the *Auténtico* candidate Ramón Grau (Ameringer, 2000, p. 16). The return to civilian rule was directly motivated by the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter. While the *Auténticos* possessed an idealistic social policy, the nature of the plantation economy limited their success during their eight-year rule (Ameringer, 2000, pp. 25-60). Civilian rule was returning to the region.

Latin America's social democrats shared a vision for Latin America. They also shared a collective disdain for the region's military dictators. Together they formed a regional alliance, known as the Caribbean Legion, in 1947. The US State Department described the legion as "one of the principal causes of unrest and instability in the Caribbean" (Gleijes, 1989, p. 134). The Caribbean Legion was composed of former and current political exiles of the Caribbean dictatorships. Among its members were: Presidents Arévalo and Betancourt; politicians Haya de le Torre and Gaitán; and rebel exiles including José Figueres and Juan Bosch (Gleijes, 1989, p. 135). The Legion was not a formal political bloc of nations. Rather, it was an alliance against fascism in Latin America, intended to fulfil the Atlantic Charter of the late President Roosevelt. By 1947, democracy was spreading throughout the Caribbean. Two long-term regimes, however, stood firm in the face of change. The Nicaraguan Somoza and the Dominican Trujillo regimes were targeted. Arévalo funded the failed invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947,[61] among other ambitious attempts to restore self-determination (Gleijes, 1989, p. 142). He gave supplied arms, purchased from Argentina's Juan Perón, to both Nicaraguan and Dominican exiles (Gleijes, 1989, p. 142). While these raids were thwarted by the military, in Costa Rica a small force, led by Figueres, took

[60] Four of which (1940-1944) were constitutional.
[61] A young Fidel Castro was among the volunteers for the Dominican invasion.

power from the oligarchic government (Cruz, 1992, p. 297). Figueres pragmatically left the Legion once in power, yielding to US demands (Ameringer, 1978, p. 65).

From 1944 until 1948 social democracy flourished throughout the Caribbean Basin. The governments of Guatemala, Cuba, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Peru were fundamentally changed. Additionally, ideals of social democracy were evident within the intellectual circles of El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Colombia. These social democratic 'revolutions' and 'evolutions' were far less radical than either the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 or the Cuban Revolution of 1959. However, its leaders were pragmatically committed to reform. They were capitalists who supported most forms of private property.[62] They sought to use their nation's resources to fulfil the necessary social and economic programs promised to their respective citizens. Yet these leaders inherited nations that were severely underdeveloped. While the Venezuelan oil seizures could potentially provide the necessary capital to fund development, the other nations of the region did not have that luxury (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 366). For those nations, their only significant resources were land and labour, and they sought to fully utilise both. Across the region, an emphasis was placed on education, healthcare, social security and employment opportunities (Stein, 1980, p. 162; Alexander, 1982, p. 235; Ameringer, 2000, p. 33). They sought to bring more of the *campesinos* into productive economic activities. For the majority of the *campesinos*, however, this meant additional agricultural labour. By producing food on expropriated government land, their dependency would diminish. For the industrial labourers, it meant more employment in ISI production and higher remuneration for their labour (Drake, 1989, p. 75). By reducing the need for imports and regulating foreign capital, many of these new democratic governments sought to slowly develop their internal economies. These actions were not radical, but rather pragmatic steps to improve the lives of their citizens.

Bradenism

These shifts towards democracy were made possible because the US State Department's approach had evolved during WWII. The resignation of Cordell Hull in 1944 led to the appointment of George Stettinius as Secretary of State (Gellman, 1995, p. 372). Additionally, purges of the Latin American division of the State

[62] Opposition to private property primarily targeted 'monopoly capital.' The obvious examples are foreign resource ownership and wasteful land monopolization.

Department during WWII led to the replacement of Sumner Welles with Nelson Rockefeller (Gellman, 1995, p. 372). Diplomats with little Latin American experience filled the division. Of especial significance was the appointment of Spruille Braden. As Ambassador to Argentina in 1945 he waged a political war against the national revolution and the emergence of "Peronism" (Braden, 1971, p. 316). Braden (1971) considered its government as "pro Nazi" (p. 316). While 'Bradenism' is often the focus of anti-US critique, it was in fact a brief historical period in which democratic action was favoured over dictatorships, as fascism was considered the greatest threat to American regional interests. According to Ameringer (1996), "Braden was a firm believer in positive action to attain the goal of democracy in the Americas" (p. 11). The US adhered to the rhetoric of its Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms in order to reduce fascist influence under Braden. To secure the global moral leadership that it desired,[63] Washington accepted and often supported the spontaneous democratic revolutions emerging in Latin America. It also had to promote its alliance with the USSR with communists given additional freedoms, and diplomatic ties between Latin American states and the Soviet Union were promoted (Cabellero, 1986, pp. 138). From 1941-1945 Hitler was the enemy; the US was at war with fascism. While the US made no effort to remove the extreme right-wing dictatorships in the Dominican Republic or Nicaragua, it did take the opportunity to undermine its two largest economic obstacles in Getúlio Vargas and Juan Domingo Perón. Bradenism sought to install democratic and free-market values to Latin America without relying directly on military force. These same two leaders were targeted a decade later for their perceived 'communism' demonstrating the fluidity of American propaganda and the continuity of its actual objectives.

Argentina remained neutral during WWII. Its dependence upon grain and meat exports to Europe meant that a declaration of support for either side would significantly damage its domestic economy (Tulchin, 1989, p. 35). Argentina exported significant amounts of goods to Britain, Spain and Italy throughout most of the war. It also feared for its security under wartime conditions (Francis, 1979, p. 108); Argentina's relative isolation to the remainder of the hemisphere made it an obvious target for Nazi aggression in the aftermath of an Argentine declaration

[63]Especially prior to the signing of the OAS Charter in April 1948.

of war.[64] In October 1943, the conservative military dictatorship of Ramón Castillo was replaced by the nationalist military dictatorships of Pedro Ramírez and Edelmiro Farrell (Rock, 1986, p. 251). The nationalists were extremely hostile to foreign influence, and openly supported semi-fascist policies of corporatism and populism (Rapoport, 1992, pp. 107-110). From within this group of nationalist military leaders, Perón emerged as a populist force from within the military (Horowitz, 1999, p. 29). As Secretariat for Labour and Welfare, Perón sought to drastically improve the lives of the lower classes (Horowitz, 1999, p. 29). Perón was not however a humanitarian; rather, he was a populist and a pragmatist. He gave concessions to win support. By doing so, however, his nationalist government made powerful enemies within the oligarchic and manufacturing classes through their taxation and tariff policies (Rapoport, 1992, p. 114). Perón sought protection from the industrial unions. In order to court the working class, Farrell and Perón offered: a 20 per cent reduction in rural rents; lower tram fares; nationalised vital services; and nationalised grain production to reduce food prices (Rock, 1986, p. 250). Perón emerged as the popular choice to lead Argentina in 1946.

Brazil was the most important nation for US security policy during WWII. The US focussed on an alliance with Brazil committed to hemispheric defence in 1940-41. Its leader, Getúlio Vargas had staged the 'Revolution of 1930 and was a military strongman who persecuted opponents (Levine, 1970, p. 5). For example, in 1935 Vargas destroyed Brazilian communism and the arrested its leader, Prestes (Bethel, 1992, p. 37). The 'Estado Novo' demanded absolute control over capital, labour and the political process (Conniff, 1999b, 47). Vargas was also heavily influenced by progressive economists, such as Aranha, who revived the Brazilian economy through industrial development, the restructure of Brazilian debt and regulatory controls (Bethel, 1992, p. 39; Dulles, 1967, p. 210). Vargas believed:

> A balanced economy no longer allow[ed] privileged classes to enjoy a monopoly of comfort and benefit…The state, therefore, should assume the obligation of organising the productive forces, to provide people with all that is necessary for the collective welfare (in Dulles, 1967, 2010, p. 138).

While US business interests opposed Vargas' planned economic system, in 1941 the approaching war relegated economic concerns to the margins. The German

[64] This factor also accounted for Chilean neutrality until US victories in the Pacific ensured its safety in 1943.

threat, Vargas asserted, would challenge the industrial capacity of the Western Hemisphere. Vargas gave his full military support to the Allies in exchange for an EXIM loan of US$45 million, to construct heavy industry (Gellman, 1979, p. 187). The ability to produce steel independently[65] allowed Vargas to accelerate his program of internal industrialisation, limiting its dependence upon foreign imports. This industrialisation was also popular with the Brazilian working class (Conniff, 1999a, p. 49). Vargas posed a similar economic threat to US trade and investment as Perón; however, Brazil was an important WWII ally and treated as such.

Bradenism sought to remove the dictatorships of Argentina and Brazil. The US falsely believed that democratic governments would be more pliable with regards to trade, investment and diplomacy. In 1945-46 the enemy was still fascism. As such, these two governments required special attention. In Argentina, Peron's social policies had made him extremely popular amongst the working class (Rapoport, 1992, p. 109). However, a coalition of forces was seeking to work against the former military general and elections were called for February 1946 (Rapoport, 1992, p. 116). The coalition of conservatives, liberals, radicals and communists possessed ample resources to destroy Perón's image (Dorm, 2006, p. 63). Perón was not expected to win in 1946 as all of the major parties opposed his leadership (Horowitz, 1999, p 33). Political sabotage of Perón's policies was prevalent in the lead up to the election. Seeing an opportunity to remove nationalist rule, Truman sent Braden to Buenos Aires in late 1945 (Dorm, 2006, p. 63). Braden, a man described by Dean Acheson as "the only bull to carry his own China shop," brought together the coalition and issued a propaganda 'Blue Book' designed to decrease Perón's popularity (G. Smith, 1994, p. 57; Dorm, 2006, p. 63). However, when the Argentinean people discovered this, the election was perceived as Perón versus Braden. The emerging *Partido Laborista*, which was modelled on the British Labor Party, and held similarities to the social democratic parties in the Caribbean, supported Perón, envisaging the type of social change witnessed in Western Europe (Horowitz, 1999, p. 33). This support was crucial to Perón as he went on to win the election and in the following years developed an anti-US economic policy.

[65] Bearing in mind that Brazil is a large iron ore producer.

At the end of WWII, Vargas prepared for democratic elections in Brazil. He had continued his rule unconstitutionally throughout WWII by claiming emergency wartime measures (Bethel, 1992, p. 43). However, by early 1944 the calls for his removal became louder within Brazil. In April 1944 the NY Times announced "Vargas Promises Brazil Democracy" (García, 1944). This was done for a local and international audience, and the State Department had grown weary of this promise. During 1944 an alliance of significant politicians emerged demanding elections in Brazil. They included old oligarchic elements, as well as progressives such as Aranha (Bethell, 1992, p. 45). In January 1945 Adolf A. Berle, a new dealer close to the Roosevelt administration, was sent to Brazil to oversee the democratic transition (Dulles, 1967, p. 257). Like Braden, Berle met with opponents of the Vargas regime, including communists, on several occasions (Dulles, 1967, p. 257). Vargas also softened his approach to 'subversives' such as the communist Prestes (Bethell, 1992, p. 47). Following his release from prison, Prestes and Berle met on several occasions to discuss the elections. Prestes believed he had the loyalty of the working class; during 1945, however, it became apparent that Vargas was still influential (Aguilar, 1968, p. 34). The two major parties in the 1945 elections were the Social Democratic Party (PSD), who promoted Eurico Gaspar Dutra, and the National Democratic Union (UDN) (Bethell, 1992, p. 44). Vargas endorsed Dutra, who won easily. Dutra committed to following the social and economic policies of Vargas, in addition to restoring democratic values and civility (Dulles, 1967, p. 261). In practice, however, Dutra drew closer to the US as he closed the Brazilian National Coffee Department in addition to opening up Brazil to free American trade (Bethel, 1992, p. 63). His commitment to labour was undermined by poor economic conditions, which impacted his presidency. Moreover, 'Bradenism' worked in Brazil. The US committed to a democratic government who in reciprocation adhered to its demands. However, the unregulated push towards democracy throughout the region meant this political policy was terminated after 1946.

A Democratic Latin America

Democracy came to Latin America in a variety of ways. It is not necessary to label disparate movements under a single category. Nevertheless, the period between 1944 and 1948 saw the rapid expansion of self-determination throughout

Latin America. This in turn resulted in the increased importance of mass participation in politics for the first time in the region's history. The two main factors driving the push towards democracy in Latin America were social democracy and the populism of the ex-*caudillos,* with the support of social democratic groups. The social democrats originated from the upper and middle classes of society. They were intellectuals who sought to use the idealism of democracy and liberalism to improve their nation-states. The key tenets of social democracy were nationalism, political and economic sovereignty, anti-imperialism, moderate economic development, labour reform, land reform and social development through education, healthcare and social security. These policies were a direct response to their support base amongst the rural and urban poor. This strategy was developed during the Mexican Revolution and expanded in Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, and Costa Rica during this period. The policies of military populism appeared similar to social democracy as manifested in Argentina and Brazil. However, their direct application was vastly different. The populists drew their support from the rural and urban poor by making token gestures to those classes; it was done, however, for political survival rather than as an ideological mission. While the lives of the masses improved, it came at a cost. In 1944, only Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia and Costa Rica could reasonably be considered democratic. In four short years the nations of Cuba, Guatemala, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Argentina extended suffrage, fulfilling one part of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter. In these nations the Latin Americans took 'their share' of the freedoms won through their participation in WWII.

This 'share' came at the expense of US trade and investment. It remained unclear, after his death in April 1945, what Franklin Roosevelt meant by Latin America's post-war 'share' (Jenkins, 2003, p. 166). However, given the political economy of the region, it is unlikely that a 'Marshall Plan' style proposal was ever considered. It is more likely that Roosevelt was promising political and social parity to the developed world, as evidenced by the position of Berle and Braden. Regardless of Roosevelt's intentions through this statement, Latin America interpreted its share as evident within both the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms. Hence, it was assumed that the US would give continuing support to Latin American democracy at all costs. Yet Latin American democracy was detrimental to US trade and investment in the region in numerous ways. Firstly,

the generation of Latin American social democrats and military populists that emerged during 1944-1948 espoused economic development and sovereignty from foreign powers and corporations. Autonomy over natural resources threatened US control of Latin American resources, as well as corporate profits. Secondly, the commitment to organised labour threatened the profitability of US corporations producing mineral, agricultural and manufacturing goods in Latin America. For example, the Guatemalan Labour Code of 1947 established a minimum wage four times higher than that paid by the UFCo, to ensure a living wage for peasants. Finally, land reform threatened the dependency of monoculture economies. Land reform, as executed in Mexico during the 1930s, posed a significant threat to US food exports throughout Latin America. Moreover, this democratic revolution challenged the relationship between the US and Latin America.

The US was handicapped by the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter. It could not oppose democratic regimes in Latin America with landmark diplomatic agreements approaching in 1947-1948.[66] However Latin American democracy was seen to be a serious impediment to US objectives in the region. These goals had been set out in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, were reiterated by George Kennan in 1950 and continued to operate into the modern era. The US demanded the monopolisation of Latin American resources and markets and sought impose political and military influence to achieve these goals. Latin America was an important region to the US in the post-war global economy, but it could not achieve its full objectives whilst within the US sphere of influence. Agricultural independence and industrialisation required the protection of markets from foreign influence. The independence of Latin America required the domestic control of the region's resources, including oil. Sovereignty required insulation from foreign influence. Most significantly, democracy meant a fundamental change in the social, political, economic and cultural life of Latin America. The period of 1944-1948 was an impasse in Latin American political history. This impasse directly affected the US' political, economic and military future in the region. George Marshall travelled to Bogotá in March 1948 but these problems remained unresolved (Randall, 1979, p. 188). In 1948, the direction of US policy towards Latin America was unclear. With an undefined enemy Washington could not wage

[66] These diplomatic agreements included the 1947 Rio Pact and the 1948 creation of the Organisation of American States (G. Smith, 1994, pp. 61-69).

a war against a Latin American region simply taking its share of wartime spoils through democratic revolution and independent economic policies. However, during 1947 and 1948 the communist enemy was to become clearly defined.

Defining the Enemy: Colombia's *Bogotázo* and the Pan-American Alliance

This thesis has thus far demonstrated the presence of a 'Cold War' between Latin America's social progressives and US global policy. While distinct patterns have defined periods of this struggle, they were until 1948 bilateral rather than multilateral. In 1948 this situation changed. The assassinations of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and the subsequent *Bogotázo*, brought a new definable enemy to Latin America in the form of communism (Braun, 1985, p. 134). US Secretary of State George Marshall's calculated creation of an anti-communist pretext, in the wake of the *Bogotázo*, lent credibility to the next two decades of communist characterisation. In doing so, Marshall changed the nature, and eventual outcome, of the longstanding 'Cold War' between Latin America's social classes. This chapter will begin by examining the communist movement, as it existed in the mid- to late-1940s. This will demonstrate the minimal Soviet 'threat' to Latin America. It will also explain the initiation of the global Cold War between the US and USSR and Latin America's role within that struggle. The chapter will re-examine the cause and consequences of Gaitán's death and Marshall's anti-communist accusations. Accordingly, it will explain how the events of April 1948 altered the nature of the Latin American 'Cold War.' Finally, this chapter will also demonstrate the connection between Marshall's actions and the anti-Democratic events of 1948-1952.

Enemies of the State

The wartime collaboration between the USSR and the US increased the prestige of global communism. The May 1943 dissolution of the Comintern was seen as an abandonment of the Soviet policy of world revolution (Caballero, 1986, p. 146). While the US believed "connections are generally…[existent] between Soviet diplomatic missions and local communist groups," the US encouraged diplomatic ties as a demonstration of wartime unity (Gaddis, 1972, pp. 51-52). Fulgencio Batista was encouraged to include Cuban communists in his government as further evidence of acceptance of diplomatic ties with the USSR (Ameringer, 2000, p. 13). Several free Latin American political parties were established in this period, allowing the establishment of regional communism. US policy did not immediately change at the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. The US communists

continued to operate under the direction of the Earl Browder (Ryan, 1997, pp. 232-238). Browder utilised the temporary US-USSR and his support of the Roosevelt administration and raise the prestige of communism. Between 1944 and 1945, the peak membership of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) was 100,000 (Ryan, 1997, p. 2). This pragmatism was increasingly influential for Latin American communists, who often followed the lead of Browder (Ryan, 1997, p. 186). The Latin American communists supported the Allied campaign against the Axis. This was because it served their "loyalty" to the USSR (Ryan, 1997, p. 186.) This led to a temporary détente in which the US did not actively prevent Latin American communism between 1945 and 1947. Its larger challenge was its relations with the new democratic governments who sought to realign their dependent relationships to Washington, which was isolated from anti-communism until the late 1940s. The number of communists increased from 100,000 to approximately 400,000 between 1940 and 1947 (P. Smith, 2000, p. 128). This must be kept in context, however. The approximate population of Latin America in the late 1940s was 180,000,000 (Brea, 2003, p. 6). Communists represented 0.22 per cent of the Latin American population at their peak. While they were not an immediate threat to US interests in Latin America, they were numerically large and vocally loud–enough to inspire fear within the international community.

A survey of regional communism from 1945 to 1948 demonstrates that communism did exist in Latin America. Yet its impact was extremely limited. The most significant national communist movement was in Brazil. Following the release of Luís Carlos Prestes from federal prison in 1944[67], the communists rallied a claimed membership of 150,000, competed in national elections and offered a perceived challenge to the populism of Vargas (Poppino, 1963, p. 135, 231). In Uruguay, communists worked within the democratic system to some success, possessing a small membership of approximately 50,000 (Alexander, 1963, p. 131). While Argentina formed the first Communist Party in 1919, and also possessed the largest membership during the 1920s, membership declined during the 1940s (Aguilar, 1968, p. 10). While lacking in numbers, Chile possessed the strongest regional Communist Party as it routinely commanded ten per cent of the Chilean electoral vote (Drake, 1978, p. 178). In Colombia the party possessed less than 4,000 members (Coleman, 2008, p. 52). The divisions of Venezuelan

[67] At the behest of the American diplomat Adolph Berle.

communists between "red" and "black" leadership reduced the party to irrelevance during the brief democratic period (Alexander, 1963, pp. 262-270). The Cuban communists thrived during the Batista period as their membership grew to an estimated 150,000 in 1944 (Alexander, 1963, p 285). Mexican communism only had 13,000 members in 1946, well under the requirements to form an electoral political party (Levy and Szelky, 1987, p. 39). In tiny Guatemala, fifty 'communists', including exiled members of Arevalo's the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR) government formed the Democratic Vanguard in 1947 (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, p. 44). This evolved into the Guatemalan Communist Party in 1949, with a peak membership of 4,000 in the early 1950s (Schneider, 1955, p. 318). The communists were not able to command a significant proportion of Latin American society.

There were a number of factors that inhibited the expansion of Latin American communism. Firstly, the communists were directly competing with populists and democrats. The Argentinean communists worked with Braden's Democratic Front against Perón in 1946 (Dorm, 2006, p. 63). The Brazilian communists fought the popular appeal of Vargas' Social Democratic Party (Poppino, 1963, p. 114). Gaitánism overwhelmed the Colombian Communists (Green, 2003, p. 205). The Venezuelans and Peruvians could not compete with AD and the *Apristas* (Alexander, 1982, pp. 233-234; Graham, 1992, p. 35). The Mexican communists were up against with the popular revolutionary party (Alexander, 1963, pp. 339-345). The Guatemalans could not overcome the appeal of the PAR governments of Arevalo and Arbenz (Gleijes 1991, p. 278). Communism became insignificant to the geopolitical climate by the late 1940s. Furthermore, the fear of these populists led many communists into ill-advised alliances with the region's dictators. In defiance of the 1935 Comintern objective of the Popular Front (PF), the Cuban communists worked against Ramón Grau's *Auténticos* (Ameringer, 2000, p. 13).

The greatest factor, however, was the failure of the communists to identify their goals with those of the industrial unions and the illiterate *campesinos*. Communist ideology meant little without practical reforms to improve people's lives. Marx's ideas are relevant within a European context while their relevance to Latin America was less evident. This failure stems from the class origins of many

communists and the underdeveloped state of most Latin American economies.[68] The overwhelming majority of communists were literate, which made them the minority in every Latin American state except Argentina and Uruguay (Poppino, 1963, p. 98). The core leadership was largely university trained, often through foreign elite institutions (Poppino, 1963, p. 98). Moreover, the communists were idealists from the higher classes of society who did not grasp how to court membership from below. Many did not see this as necessary during the 1940s.

In certain cases communists followed the 1935 directive and formed popular fronts. These were democratic movements that raised the prestige of many competing ideologies. The best example of a Latin American PF government was in Chile from 1935 to 1948. This governmental era saw an alliance between communists, Socialists and the Radical Party, who were the dominant member (Drake, 1978, p. 174). Each of the PF presidents came from the Radical Party; however the communists, who commanded approximately 10 per cent of the primary vote, were influential in cabinet positions. The PF began to disintegrate between 1945 and 1948 for a number of reasons. The Socialist Party became fractious, which significantly reduced their percentage of the vote and after 1946 brought oligarchic liberals into the PF (Drake, 1978, p. 273). The Liberals introduced a free-trade economic policy that hurt the working class. Per-capita income declined in this period as the Radicals became increasingly conservative, distancing themselves from their former allies (Drake, 1978, p. 284). This alienated the communists from their ideals. The municipal elections of 1947 saw a rapid increase in the popularity of communism. The communists received 17 per cent of the vote (Drake, 1978, p. 287). In working class, especially mining, electorates, this was much higher (Drake, 1978, p. 287). The popularity of communism, however, caused its demise in 1948. To protect its electoral future and economic philosophy, Gabriel Videla's Radical government crushed communism, in a move to appease the business community (Loveman, 2001, p. 220). The success of electoral communism demonstrated the popular desire for change. The Socialist Party's demise, between 1946 and 1950, left a void for the communists to fill (Drake, 1978, p. 272). Chileans demanded change, but were less

[68] The means of production were different in Latin America to that of Europe. While this did not automatically reduce communism to irrelevancy, it posed a difficult challenge. The Latin American communists were forced to reinterpret European Marxism to fit their various societies. Herein was the challenge for Latin American Marxists: to distinguish between Marxist theory and the actual application of communism in Latin America.

concerned with the means by which this might be achieved. However, the Videla government ended the communist threat in 1948. Moreover, the demise of the Popular Front further condemned Latin American communism to irrelevancy.

The Cold War and the National Security State

The wartime collaboration between the US and the USSR was a military success (Martel, 1979, pp. 25-56). They combined to defeat the dual threats of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. During this time, the US provided substantial assistance to the USSR through Lend-Lease (Martel, 1979, pp. 25-56). However, despite their coalition, a coming conflict was evident (Kolko, 1968, p. 485). WWII was primarily a struggle for geopolitical influence in which the Soviets ensured their political dominance throughout Eastern Europe on their march to Berlin (Roberts, 2006, pp. 298-305). Those nations that bordered Russia were seen as pivotal to the continuation of Russia's ideological experiment with communism and its long-term security (Gorliski and Khlevniuk, 2004, p. 70). Similarly, the Allies consolidated their influence in the Mediterranean (Gaddis, 2005, p. 29). The US decision to attack North Africa and Italy, prior to opening the second front in June 1944, was strategic (Hull, 1948b, p. 1127). It sought, with Britain, the monopolisation of intercontinental trade through the Suez Canal (Hull, 1948b, p. 1127). The US called for a second, Soviet, front in Asia, following the fall of Berlin in April 1945 (De Santis, 1980, p. 155). However, Lend-Lease was terminated in April 1945 (Martel, 1979, pp. 94-97). This indicated the end of the US-USSR alliance. Furthermore, the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki pre-empted the Soviet arrival, ensuring the Americans a wider sphere of influence (De Santis, 1980, p. 156). The Cold War was the logical continuation of this geo-political struggle for global influence between the two remaining superpowers. It required the division of the globe into political and economic "spheres of influence" (De Santis, 1980, p. 131). Each economic system sought to demonise the other as monolithic, imperialistic and set on world domination. Throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe, anti-capitalist propaganda was prevalent (Roberts, 2006, pp. 305-330). This ensured the largely peaceful transition to communist rule in many nations.[69] In the West, communism was denounced. George Kennan's (1946) infamous 'X' article in *Foreign Affairs* provided a vision of a Soviet-

[69] While in other cases Soviet military forces were used, most notably Hungary in 1956 (Kirov, 1999, p. 137).

dominated Europe.[70] Churchill's warning of an "iron-curtain" drew comparisons to the militarism of Nazi Germany (Gaddis, 1972, p. 199). Reports of the spread of "red fascism" necessitated an aggressive foreign policy from Washington (Schmitz, 1999, p. 240). The two ideologies were antithetical to one other, and destined for conflict.

President Franklin Roosevelt had envisaged the United Nations (UN) as a global forum for the preservation of peace (De Santis, 1980, p. 81). An idealist by nature, Roosevelt believed in the Wilsonian "liberal-internationalist" culture of American policy, which promoted the universal extension of American values in "free-trade, political democracy, and the rule of law" (De Santis, 1980, p. 199). The UN was the forum to ensure the proliferation of these. The UN also sought to maintain Washington's globalist stance in the post-war world (Meisler, 2011, p. 3). The collapse of the League of Nations (LoN) had led to WWII, which demonstrated the importance of US global leadership to ensure global peace and economic stability (Meisler, 2011, p. 4). The rapid decolonisation of Europe would provide lucrative opportunities to US traders and investors. The only significant threat to this expansion was the communism of the USSR. The Soviets needed to be contained through US and UN security policy. The Security Council was composed of the victors of WWII, four nations of which were capitalist (Gaddis, 1972, p. 226). Russia's initial optimism about the global forum was crushed during preliminary talks between newly inaugurated President Harry Truman and Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (Freeland, 1985, p. 31). Truman's demands upon Russia's administration of Poland not only defied promises made by Roosevelt; they revealed the underlying intentions of the UN (Gaddis, 1972, p. 204). The UN was designed by the US to condemn Soviet policy within its sphere of influence, while no criticism, or even discussion of US policy in its many spheres was deemed relevant.[71] The UN represented the globalisation of US political, social and economic ideals. Nations who did not conform to these ideals would incur criticism.

After WWII the US ascended to global military dominance. The pre-war isolationist policies of the US had allowed it to maintain a small military with a

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[70] The *Foreign Affairs* magazine was the mouthpiece of the aforementioned CFR (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 44).

[71] For example, Jacobo Árbenz's letters to the UN during the US-led invasion of Guatemala were ignored on the initiative advice of the US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge (Gleijes, 1991).

sustainable annual budget. In 1929 the US had a standing army of 185,000 and an annual military budget of US$500 million (Ambrose, 1971, p. 3). Their purpose was defence from external enemies. By 1971 it possessed a standing army of 1,517,000 troops[72] stationed in 119 different countries, security alliances with forty-eight nations and an annual military budget of US$80 billion (Ambrose, 1971, p. 4). The purpose of these was global defence against both internal and external enemies. This proliferation in military power had required an overhaul of the military bureaucracy under Truman. On July 26, 1947, the National Security Act reorganised US defence and created the largest permanent military force in global history (Hogan, 1998, p. 66). The separate Army, Navy and Intelligence departments were brought under the uniform Department of Defence (DOD) (Zegart, 1999, p. 58). The Secretary of Defence was only one facet of the newly formed National Security Council (NSC) (Zegart, 1999, p. 54). The NSC became responsible for all foreign policy decisions (Hogan, 1998, p. 66). Within the NSC were the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of State, the Defence Secretary and various other departmental heads (Zegart, 1999, p. 63). The NSC took the responsibility for forming foreign policy independently from the US Congress. Following the July 1947 National Security Act, the US set up security treaties over the globe. In 1947, the Rio Pact was forged between the American states (G. Smith p. 58). In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed (Pogue, 1989, p. 325). Similar arrangements took place in Asia and the Pacific. Through its vast networks, the NSC sent US military personnel, equipment and funds to every corner of the globe to ensure the widest possible defence against both internal and external enemies.

The extension of US global military influence, and the autonomy of the NSC, also allowed it to establish the largest intelligence organisation in US history. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coordinated foreign intelligence with every ally, and on every enemy during the Cold War (Weiner, 2007). However, economic circumstances were threatening the docility of America's allies in Europe. The war-torn nations were vulnerable to the promises of communists**.** By 1947 the US was forced to act in Europe, specifically in Greece and Turkey, to maintain the dominance of capitalism on the continent (Pisani, 1991, p. 60). Foreign aid was also used to promote US political and economic interests in Europe. According to

[72] This represents an increase of 486 per cent after adjustment for population growth (Ambrose, 1972; Population Statistics)

Pisani (1991), the Marshall Plan was an effective tool of propaganda (p. 66). The European Marshall Plan was the single greatest act of aid in human history, as the US committed US$13.015 billion in economic and technical assistance to European nations (Mee, 1984, p. 258). However, the line between economic assistance and military intervention was blurred in both Greece and Turkey. The US funded the anti-communists' political campaigns to ensure their success (Mee, 1984, pp. 38-49). In addition, they provided aid to demonstrate the superiority of the capitalist system in these nations. The policies in Greece and Turkey were so successful they were extended to the remainder of Europe**.** Foreign aid bought influence on the continent, but it was offered conditionally. It depended upon European nations buying US goods, committing to representative democracy and implementing free-market policies (Mee, 1984, pp. 250-290). However, it was not successful in extending the capitalist system beyond the iron curtain. Molotov forbade Eastern European states from taking Marshall Aid (Roberts, 2006, p. 317). The Marshall Plan divided Europe, initiating a permanent position of Cold War (Vyshinski as cited in Roberts, 2006, p. 317). Additionally, 5 per cent of Congress-approved Marshall Aid was funnelled to the CIA to support resistance movements in Eastern Europe (Weiner, 2007, p. 28). Marshall explained that "they wanted to be able to act quickly in an emergency" (as cited in Pisani, 1991, p. 68).

The Cold War and the Regional Security System

Latin America is generally viewed as a peripheral part of US Cold War policy in the years preceding the Cuban Revolution. However, Washington began manoeuvring to defend the Western Hemisphere from Soviet aggression during and immediately after WWII. Its role in the US-led capitalist security system was ensured between 1945 and 1948. Pach (1991) argues that WWII Lend-Lease was a mechanism the JCS used to achieve "the standardisation of hemispheric military establishments…thus ensuring the orientation of Latin America towards the United States" (p. 41). This also applied to personnel training. Gill (2004) indicates that the estrangement of military relations between Latin America and Europe during WWII allowed for the effective US monopolisation of leadership (p. 62). This leadership was institutionalised in 1946 (Gill, 2004, p. 62). Child (1980) sees the "early Cold War period [as] one of consolidation of codification" of the inter-American military system (p. 72). That is, the US attempted to extend the WWII

alliances, by continuing and expanding: arms sales, exclusive rights to military assistance, personnel training and, above all, a political alliance to institutionalise this inter-American military system. Smith (1994) sees the 1947 Rio Pact as the logical extension of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (p. 52). Moreover, the US took the opportunity provided by WWII to increase its control over Latin America. This was unprecedented in regional history. This section will detail the development of the inter-American military system, and the way it served US economic interests.

In March 1945 the inter-American community descended upon the ancient Mayan City of Chapultepec (Child, 1980, p. 71). The conference at Chapultepec had three aims: to return Argentina to the community of American nations; to establish a regional organisation; and to receive guarantees that Roosevelt's promised "share" would come in the form of industrial assistance at the war's end (Gellman, 1979, p. 157). Argentina's wartime belligerence had isolated it from the US and the international community (Tulchin, 1989, p. 55). The USSR demanded that the UN be exclusively comprised of wartime victors (Dallin, 1962, p. 58). Argentina was coerced into an eleventh-hour declaration of war against the Axis (Peterson, 1964, p. 441). This token gesture ensured that Argentina could join both the UN and the proposed OAS. By 1945 the outcome of the war was assured, as was the economic superiority of the US in the post-war economy. Latin America had only played a limited role in the physical victory, yet its loyalty in trade had been significant. By allowing the US monopoly rights to their commodities, the Latin American nations had played a large role in the industrial output of the Allied war machine. Additionally, they sacrificed immediate development for long-term commitments. By focussing their energies on resource extraction, the nations of the Latin America delayed industrialisation at a time when ISI development was proving quite possible. This sacrifice was made by virtually every nation, and it had been made under false pretences. However, they remained patient. While they received no aid in 1945, many Latin American leaders remained optimistic that when the OAS was formed, remuneration would be forthcoming.[73]

WWII witnessed unprecedented military engagement between the US and Latin America. The continental mobilisation against the duel threats of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan allowed the US the most extensive access to Latin

[73] Only 2.1 per cent of US global aid went to Latin America in the ten years after WWII (Beisner, 2006, p. 571). Aid to the twenty Latin American republics amounted to less than that granted to Luxemburg and Belgium (Beisner, 2006, p. 571).

America's military in its history (Child, 1980, pp. 11-48). Latin America was significant to US security during WWII on three fronts: the region's productive capacity of raw materials; the region's increased its ability to protect itself from external threats; and that it gave vocal support to US moral leadership of the war effort. Each of these areas would remain significant in the post-war economic climate. The US was maintaining a permanent wartime economy (Pach, 1991, p. 8).[74] The production of raw materials has already been discussed in detail. However, given the US' determination to continue a permanent war economy, its reliance on Latin American goods would be maintained and eventually increased. The ability of US corporations to extract resources at very low costs was a central security aim of the US. During WWII the US supported the increasing military capacity of Latin America in three ways: financial assistance, arms sales and personnel training (Child, 1980, pp. 11-48). Each of these was continued into the Cold War era (Pach, 1991, p. 8). In 1949, wartime military assistance was evolved into the Military Assistance Program (MAP) (Pach, 1991, p. 215). Prior to WWII the US had only a small share of military sales to Latin America (Child, 1980, p. 18). However, the US replaced Germany as the primary arms supplier to Latin America, through the Lend-Lease policy of WWII (Child, 1980, p. 48). The process was accelerated after the war, with US manufacturers ensuring virtual monopoly conditions. In addition to arms sales, the US also sought to dominate military training during WWII (Gill, 2004, p. 63). During WII the US sent attachés to most Latin American countries (Child, 1980, p. 19). The US also sought to continue this process into the Cold War. Accordingly, the US established the Latin American Ground School (LAGS) in 1946 (Gill, 2004, p. 63).

Support for US moral leadership at international forums was significant. During WWII, the US had committed to both the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. The UN adopted these ideals. Following 1945, the Latin American nations also supported these ideals and continued to condemn any system that opposed them (Whitaker, 1964, p. 172). In the Cold War context, this meant the USSR. The dominating ideology of the UN threatened the significance of regional organisations (Slater, 1969, p. 30); this in turn imperilled the inter-American relationship. According to former Secretary of State Hull, "there will no longer be the need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of

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[74] President Eisenhower would later refer to this as the 'Military-Industrial Complex'

the special arrangements which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests" (as cited in G. Smith, 1994, p. 41). By 1945, however, the geopolitical climate had changed. Regionalism became the priority of the US at the UN (Schwartzberg, 2003, p. 68). The Latin American voting bloc was significant at the UN, as they comprised twenty of the fifty foundational UN members (Whitaker, 1964, p. 170). Their support of US moral global leadership made them valuable allies. Articles 51-54 of the UN Charter undermined Hull's vision by allowing the formation for regional organisations (G. Smith, 1994, p. 54). The US and the USSR were able to maintain their respective spheres of influence through political, military and economic alliances. The Latin American delegations vociferously supported these resolutions (Whitaker, 1964, p. 177). They foresaw the OAS as a mechanism for economic development, and regionalism as a guarantee of financial assistance (Pogue, 1989, p. 384). While this was not the uniform view in Washington, Marshall wanted a regional organisation to protect American interests (Pogue, 1989, p. 383).

The US sought to cement its influence in Latin America in two forms: protection against 'external' enemies and protection against 'internal' threats to US regional interests. The 1947 Rio Pact was the most extensive inter-American military alliance in history (Child, 1980, p. 71). The official 'Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance' (1947) effectively brought the entire Western Hemisphere into the US security zone. It was the regional reinforcement of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. While the Rio Pact was extensive, its necessity was questionable. The only viable threat to hemispheric defence, the USSR, was primarily concerned with security in Eurasia (Roberts, 2006, pp. 303-310). With the exception of Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, Latin American leaders had ended diplomacy with the USSR (Prizel, 1992, p. 2). The other component, the OAS, was a forum to discuss political and economic developments in the region (Schwartzberg, 2003, p. 85). Although both the US and the Latin Americans saw the importance of a regional economic alliance, their visions of its purpose were quite different. While Latin America foresaw significant technical assistance from the US, the US sought to maintain the economic status quo through its UN agencies.[75] The conference in March and April 1948 saw the US dictate economic terms (Pogue, 1989, p. 386). There the Secretary of State declared that there would be "no Marshall Plan for

[75] This will be explained in the following chapter.

Latin America" (Coleman, 2008, p. 54). To quell the region's outrage, Marshall gained congressional approval to increase the EXIM lending capacity by US$500 million (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). However, many Latin American leaders were reluctant to link their political futures to Washington without a significant economic commitment (Baulac, 1948). Fortunately for Marshall, the *Bogotázo* would recast the political dialogue of the OAS.

April 9, 1948

Gaitán is a polarising figure within the literature on Colombian political history. Fidel Castro (2007) indicated that "Gaitán represented hope and development for Colombia (p. 98). The US National Security Council (1953) labelled Gaitán an "impractical idealist"; while the FBI (1946) labelled him a "demagogue". It is these polarised views that make Gaitán an intriguing historical figure. Herbert Braun (1985) and John Green (2003) authored the two best-conceived political biographical accounts of Gaitán and the movement he epitomised. Green (2003) highlights "otherworldly" allure of *Gaitánismo* (p. 203). He notes that in the province of Bolívar, "all the campesinos have a portrait of Gaitán in their homes, and daily tend it with a mystique that approaches adoration" (Green, 2003, p. 203). Braun (1985) saw Gaitán's downfall as "inevitable" (p. 134). He argues, "he was too dangerous and too feared by the leaders of both parties" (Braun, 1985, p. 134). More significant than his cult status, however, was the movement that he spawned. Green (2003) asserts, "by 1944 it was clear that *Gaitánismo* represented a pronounced intellectual tradition in Colombia that may be referred as a home grown left" (p. 205). This home grown left espoused similar maximum and minimum programs to social democratic parties in neighbouring Peru and Venezuela. Gaitán's growing independence from the Colombian Liberal Party increased the allure of both the man and *Gaitánismo.* This section will explore this movement and the events that led to Gaitán's death and the subsequent *Bogotázo*.

Gaitán was a significant reformer in Colombian politics. Like most social democrats, he sought an independent path in his early career (Braun, 1985, p. 59). However, in the late 1930s and early 1940s he became a pivotal part of the ruling Liberal Party. Gaitán ensured that the Liberals maintained the support of the newly enfranchised working class. As Bogotá Mayor and Colombian Minister for Labour,

Gaitán forged a sympathetic relationship with the industrial working class (Green, 2003, p. 96). He was the popular choice for President in 1946 (Braun, 1985, p. 134). However, the Liberal Party betrayed Gaitán. Realising the consequences of his social policies, the oligarchic Liberal Party endorsed Gabriel Turbay for President instead (Osterling, 1989, p. 85). Gaitán ran independently. Realising the division, the Conservative Party, who had not competed in an election since 1930, promoted Ospina Pérez in the final weeks before the election. Pérez won with roughly 38 per cent of the vote (Osterling, 1989, p. 85). The change of presidency in 1946 sparked the initial stages of '*La Violencia*' in rural Colombia (Rolden, 2002, pp. 60-68). The peasants, who had been given legal temporary residence upon vacant oligarchic land by the Liberal government, were forcibly evicted by paramilitary groups, forcing them into *hacienda* labour on coffee plantations (Osterling, 1989, pp. 86-87). As conditions worsened, Gaitán's popularity increased. Those who stood to lose badly under Gaitán "conceded that he would have become president" in the 1950 election (Braun, 1985, p. 201). Gaitán represented a monumental shift in political and economic power in Colombia.

Colombian society has historically been divided on ideological grounds (Stafford and Palacious, 2002, pp. 239-280). While previous conflicts had been between the two oligarchic political parties, the promises of social equality made by Gaitán, as well as others, had changed the social dynamics (Randall, 1992, pp. 110-120). Between the 1946 election and Gaitán's death, the dynamics of old party alliances permanently altered. The parties had conspired to defeat Gaitán (Braun, 1985, p. 115). Yet the people wanted him to be president. The democratic options were now between the oligarchs and the *'Gaitánistas.'* Gaitán's social policies sought to make Colombian society more equitable. According to the extensive research of the US State Department (1947), the *Gaitánista's* national social program included: freedom of speech, freedom of press, more democratically elected positions, separation of politics and capital, wage reform, price controls on basic consumer goods, universal primary education and obligatory social security. These programs would have limited the mechanisms that ensured permanent class division by promoting social mobility. Both oligarchic parties sought to maintain control of the export economy (Green, 2003, p. 159). The reliance on coffee exports enriched a select few while it impoverished the nation. Gaitán's economic policies sought to modernise the Colombian economy. Those policies included: control and

regulation of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI), customs reform, tax revision, nationalisation of breweries, nationalisation of public works and large-scale unionism (SD Anonymous, 1947). These reforms sought to make Colombia less dependent upon foreign trade. But perhaps most importantly, Gaitán would not have been as pliable to US demands as oligarch leaders in Colombia.

On April 9 1948 Juan Roa Sierra shot and mortally wounded Gaitán outside his Bogotá office (Braun, 1985, p 134). The official story, which initially followed, stated that Sierra was the nephew of a man convicted by Gaitán's law firm (Randall, 1992, p. 193). However, further investigation questioned this rather innocuous assumption. After firing the shots, Sierra took refuge in a local pharmacy. As the crowd began to multiply, Sierra spoke to a sole policeman. In response to the policeman's request to "tell me who ordered you to kill, for you are going to be lynched by the *pueblo,*" Sierra replied, "Oh *senõr*…the powerful things I cannot tell you" (Braun, 1985, p. 135). Within fifty minutes of the assault both men were dead and Bogotá was left on the brink of civil war. The true motivation for Gaitán's death remains unresolved. While some have asserted US complicity, Herbert Braun's (1985) analysis of "his death [as] inevitable" is the most penetrating (p. 135). Gaitán "was too dangerous and too feared by both parties" (Braun, 1985, p. 135). While Gaitán certainly posed a threat to US interests in Colombia, the threat posed to the local oligarchy was far greater. However, the case arguing American previous knowledge of the attack and subsequent protests is compelling. The human rights lawyer Paul Wolf (2004), in attempting to account for the origins of the Colombian Civil War, took both the CIA and FBI to court for defiance of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). While the court ruled in his favour, many documents pertinent to Gaitán were omitted or concealed (Wolf, 2004). It is extremely unlikely that the CIA or FBI killed Gaitán.[76] However, their prior knowledge would have given them the opportunity to plan their post-*Bogotázo* reaction in advance.

The Colombian *Bogotázo* was a violent protest that cost fourteen hundred lives in forty-eight hours (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). It was a direct response to

[76] Some sources have claimed CIA complicity in Gaitán's death. While this is feasible, the direct threat posed to the Colombian oligarchy by Gaitán outweighed that to the US. Additionally, the CIA were criticized for their ignorance of Colombian affairs in the wake of the *Bogotázo*. Therefore, this thesis has concluded that the Colombian oligarchy is responsible for Gaitán's assassination and the subsequent *Bogotázo*. US involvement was far more significant in the propaganda that followed the *Bogotázo* than the event itself.

Gaitán's assassination. Those who witnessed Gaitán's death quickly mobilised the masses by spreading the message "they have killed Gaitán" (Braun, 1985, p. 135). The ambiguity of the word "they" led to uncontrolled violence throughout the city. The mob's first action was to lynch Sierra inside the pharmacy. This small group of followers then dragged Sierra's mutilated corpse outside and began marching towards the centre of Bogotá (Green, 2003, p. 261). As word spread, the crowd grew larger. Within two hours the mob had grown to approximately 200,000. The protesters assumed "they" – those who had killed Gaitán – were the conservative government of Ospina Pérez (Braun, 1985, p. 135). Accordingly, their march headed to the Presidential palace. Civil order quickly declined as the Bogotá police were amongst Gaitán's most loyal supporters, and they too joined the march (Braun, 1985, p. 138). Liberal politicians unsuccessfully sought to moderate the rage. The military were prepared at the presidential palace. They aggressively suppressed the protest, killing those who would not leave (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). The following forty-eight hours saw aggressive street battles between Gaitán loyalists and the Colombian military (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). The *Bogotázo* was the catalyst for the rapid expansion of the Colombian Civil War, *La Violencia*. It gave an urban theatre to a rural civil war. *La Violencia* lasted ten additional years, caused 200,000 deaths and resulted in a conservative coalition of oligarchic rule in 1958 (Rolden, 2002, p. 73, 220). The the *Bogotázo* was not a communist conspiracy, as there is insufficient evidence of communist involvement and it did not serve the interests of communists (Alexander, 1963, p. 251). While there were young nationalists, including Fidel Castro, in Bogotá protesting the formation of the OAS, their role in the *Bogotázo* was extremely peripheral (Tunzelman, 2011, p. 40).[77] The *Bogotázo* was a spontaneous reaction to the assassination of Gaitán directed at those perceived as responsible.

US intelligence did not believe that Gaitán or his followers were affiliated with international communism. However, the FBI (1946) and State Department (1947) were aware, and cautious, of the effects of Gaitánism on the Colombian political system. The FBI was responsible for regional intelligence during WWII and the early Cold War period (Darling, 1990; Gellman, 1979). Prior to the initiation of the CIA in 1947, the FBI had vast regional networks. Its director, J. Edgar Hoover (1945), identified the "threat" of Gaitán and his "manifestation"

[77] While Castro stole arms in Bogotá, he sought refuge in the Cuban embassy when fighting became too severe (Tunzelman, 2011, p. 40).

prior to the May 1946 elections. While linking Gaitán to European fascists, Hoover (1945) argued, "collaboration between the *Gaitánistas* and the communists has been terminated". Further FBI documents reveal that the *Gaitánistas* had persecuted communists in rural Colombia in competition for *campesino* support (FBI, 1946). State Department informer Joseph Ray (1947) indicated that Gaitán "was the worst enemy of communism". The FBI (1946) and the State Department (1947) both compiled summaries of the political history and policy of Gaitán's movement. No document argues that Gaitán was a communist or under the influence of communism. In the immediate aftermath of the *Bogotázo*, the CIA claimed not to know of Gaitán's movement or the motivation for civil unrest (Darling, 1990).[78] This symbolised a failure for the newly instituted CIA. Nevertheless, Marshall's State Department was fully aware of Gaitán, Gaitánism and the origins of the *Bogotázo*. In the five days prior to Marshall's accusation of Soviet interference he was in contact with Willard Baulac, the US ambassador to Colombia, who possessed this intelligence (Pogue, 1989, p. 387). Baulac saw communists and "left-liberals" as synonymous (Pogue, 1989, p. 387). Furthermore, he and Marshall concluded that 'communists' were responsible for the Colombian *Bogotázo*, despite the evidence provided by their staff. The consequence was a continental civil war far greater than *La Violencia*.

Despite the intelligence of the US State Department, Marshall used the violence of the *Bogotázo* to initiate the Cold War in Latin America. The Secretary of the State was in Bogotá attending the first meeting of the OAS (Pogue, 1989, p. 382). During the violence, Marshall sat solemnly in a hotel room as many of his fellow delegates sought a panicked evacuation (Pogue, 1989, p. 387). Marshall saw the events in Bogotá as "concrete evidence…of the vitality of hemispheric communism and the need to ensure security against it" (Randall, 1992, p. 189). As the violence subsided, on April 14 Marshall ordered the delegates to return to work. Addressing them, Marshall stated:

> This situation must not be judged on a local basis, however tragic the immediate results to the Colombian people…It is the same definite pattern to events which provoked strikes in France and Italy… In actions we take here…we must keep clearly in mind that this is a world affair – not merely a Colombian or Latin American [one] (cited in, Randall, 1992, p. 193).

[78] If this were the case they would not hesitate to release their documents to Paul Wolf.

Marshall made direct and intentional reference to the global Cold War. He internationalised the conflict. His comment demonstrated the violence of 'communism' to the region's oligarchs, which motivated compliance regarding US anti-communist policies in the region. The Latin American Cold War was also sold to the international community. The New York Times' (1948) front cover on April 15 read: "Marshall Blames Reds in Colombia; Secretary Tells Conferees That World Communism Set Off Revolt in Country". Marshall intentionally fabricated the relationship between the *Bogotázo* and the international Cold War to further US interests in Latin America.

The Conservative Colombian President Ospina Pérez echoed Marshall's accusation. Events in Bogotá exacerbated Colombia's Civil War (Rolden, 2002, p. 75). Many peasants had rallied to the promises of a Gaitán-led Colombia (Green, 2003, p. 266). Gaitán's social program had promised to drastically improve their livelihood, despite his reluctance to promote permanent land redistribution (Green, 2003, pp. 115-145). His death fuelled the violence in rural Colombia for two reasons. Firstly, the peasants protested more actively immediately after the *Bogotázo* (Rolden, 2002, p. 73). Secondly, and more significantly, the conflict between landlords and peasants was reframed within the global struggle of the Cold War. Pérez "pointed to popular insurrections in certain towns as incontrovertible evidence of a larger predicted communist plot to seize control of Colombia" (Rolden, 2002, p. 68). Moreover, Pérez furthered Marshall's claim of urban communism within the *Bogotázo* to define all class struggle in Colombia as a communist insurrection. The conflict over rural land was older than Colombian independence, dating back to the days of the conquistadors. As part of the global Cold War, however, it would require military intervention. Pérez sent the military to those rural departments with peasant unrest, predicating the massacre of peasant 'armies' throughout Colombia (Randall, 1992, p. 73, 196). Peasants who had illegally squatted on oligarchs' lands in protest were viewed as 'insurgents'. The perceived threat of communism in rural Colombia justified the systematic genocide of the indigenous population. Those who remained became increasingly docile in the face of oligarchic demands.

Regional anti-communism

"Congressmen, columnists and patriots of the press" clearly identified the *Bogotázo* as an aggressive policy of the USSR (Darling, 1990, p. 240). A broad anti-communist coalition in Latin America became a security priority of the US in the aftermath of the *Bogotázo*. This thesis, however, will demonstrate that the *Bogotázo* did not motivate the anti-communist declaration of April 1948. Anti-communism in Latin America was a long-term policy objective that predated the violence in Bogota. On April 8 Ambassador Baulac (1948) held preliminary discussions with Colombia's foreign minister Laureano Gómez regarding the potential anti-communist declaration of the OAS. While Gómez enthusiastically supported Washington's position, he identified a number of reservations held by the Latin American delegations in Bogotá (Baulac, 1948). Gómez identified several progressive governments who would immediately condemn an anti-communist declaration as interventionism (Baulac, 1948). For example, the Guatemalan Juan Arévalo and the Venezuelan Rómulo Betancourt led nations that were experiencing political freedom for the first time. A foreign power dictating the eradication of a peripheral movement would not be acceptable to them. Another reservation he identified was economic (Baulac, 1948). Latin America's goals in Bogotá were distinct from Washington's. The Latin American governments sought economic assistance in return for far-reaching diplomatic support (Pogue, 1989, p. 386). The Chilean and Uruguayan delegations also expressed their reservations against US-led intervention of any kind (Gómez as cited in Baulac, 1948). According to Gómez, they sought to modify the target of the declaration to the USSR specifically, rather than communism generally (as cited in Baulac, 1948). However, this was the exact distinction the NSC sought to undermine. The USSR was an external enemy with no power to invade the Americas. Communism, on the other hand, could be interpreted in many ways, which made it the ideal enemy. The Latin Americans required visual evidence of the communist threat, which the *Bogotázo* provided.

The OAS signatories condemned international communism for its 'role' in the *Bogotázo*. A document entitled 'The Menace of communism' condemned any organisation operating in the Western hemisphere that was antithetical to US interests (OAS as cited in Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 193). It stated,

> By its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency the political activity of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, which rests on two undeniable postulates: the dignity of man as an individual and the sovereignty of the nation as a state (OAS as cited in Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 193).

This declaration sought to outlaw the region's communist parties. While many nations outlawed communism prior to the Bogotázo for domestic reasons, full eradication was expected after this document. The OAS also committed to condemn the USSR at the UN. Any government who "suppressed political and civil rights" was to earn the condemnation of the OAS at the UN (OAS as cited in Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 194). In order to ensure unanimous support, an increase in the "standard of living" was set as a goal in the war against communism (OAS in Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 194). Yet no practical measures were proposed or carried out. The final commitment imposed upon the OAS members was the "full exchange of information" regarding indigenous communist organisations (OAS as cited in Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 194).

Latin American diplomats attempted to distance themselves from US intelligence during WWII. The pervasiveness of the FBI undermined their concept of national security and sovereignty. Additionally, domestic Latin American issues had no potential to threaten the security of the global hegemon. Accordingly, Latin American affairs served no 'security' purpose against an external enemy. The CIA inherited a difficult intelligence landscape (Weiner, 2007, pp. 3-15). Despite Washington's problems with the USSR, the states of Latin America protested against the foreign surveillance of their domestic politics as both irrelevant and intrusive upon their sovereignty (Baulac, 1948; Pogue, 1989, p. 385). However, many in Latin America did not grasp that the US was not protecting itself from external enemies; rather, it was protecting its sphere of influence from internal enemies of its own interests. In this respect, intelligence was the most powerful weapon in its arsenal. By guaranteeing a "full exchange of information," the CIA was given full access to Latin America intelligence for the first time (Holden and Zolov, 2000, p. 194; Weiner, 2007, p. 65). Communism was the pretext that justified this. Firstly, the CIA could force Latin Americans to outlaw communist parties and extradite its leaders. Secondly, the CIA could monitor the actions and

policies of governments and political parties, which would report directly to the NSC, of which the CIA director is a member, on which leaders were the most desirable in individual nations. Thirdly, the CIA could provide support to preferred political movements and leaders, leading to the dozens of the military coups which define the Cold War in Latin America. Finally, the CIA could eventually act unilaterally, with "plausible deniability" of US action, to eliminate unsavoury political actors (Greenberg, 2007, p. 692). While it took several years for the CIA to become fully operational, its access to Latin American politics would not have been as extensive without the Colombian *Bogotázo* and the corresponding anti-communist declaration.

The Cold War

The Latin American Cold War theatre was isolated from the global struggle between communism and capitalism.[79] Rather, the Cold War in Latin America was a continental civil war between the region's social classes. From 1941-1948 the lower classes were winning, and authoritarianism was in decline. Social reform was prioritised throughout the hemisphere with populism also increasing, along with self-determination. Political leaders were utilising the forces of the masses to consolidate democratic rule. In most cases, the unions became stronger (Greenfield and Maram, 1987, pp. 3-15). Revolutionary Mexico had set the precedent for resource and land reform to the detriment of foreign capital. The oligarchy was receding; while it remained economically powerful, it reluctantly forfeited much of its political power. A new modern Latin America was envisaged. The populist leaders relied upon US promises of support and economic assistance; however, when this support was refused, the region reached an impasse. It could continue its development projects independently, at the expense of US trade and investment, or it could withdraw promises of development from the *campesinos* and return to oligarchic and militaristic control. Each nation's response to this impasse was unique. Despite this the US adopted a universal policy, supporting the region-wide regression of social reform and economic development in pursuit of American economic interests during the Cold War. Those nations who defied the US were labelled, to varying degrees, as communist. The US chose the side of regress over progress in the Cold War to ensure its regional interests remained

[79] Until at least 1961.

secure. Its pretext was communism. However, as the case of the *Bogotázo* demonstrates, this was a purposeful distortion of events.

This thesis has thus far demonstrated the origins of the 'Cold War' in Latin America. The Colombian *Bogotázo* changed the nature of that struggle, and Marshall's declaration regionalised and globalized the 'Cold War.' This led to a rapid re-evaluation of US foreign policy towards Latin America between 1948 and 1950. By supporting oligarchic regression over social democracy and other progressive movements, the US gained several advantages. The Cold War also permanently altered the notion of 'national security'. Traditional wars had focussed upon external political enemies. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine had sought to discourage French and Russian re-colonisation of independent Latin America (May, 1975, p. 211). The 1895 Fish Memorandum had sought to prevent the colonies of weak European powers passing into the hands of powerful European states (Perkins, 1966, p. 25). The Roosevelt (1904) Corollary had sought to prevent European aggression from defaulting against Latin American states. The 1938 Declaration of Lima had stated that an attack on one American state would be retaliated against by all American states (Inter-American States, 1938). However, after WWII there were no credible threats to American territorial integrity. The primary focus of US 'security' became internal Latin American politics. While the pretext was communism, the reality was quite different. The creation of a permanent wartime economy made the subjugation of Latin America a national priority. It required passivity in regard to resource extraction, military relations and diplomatic support (Kennan, 1950). The expansion of intelligence, military training, military funding and arms sales made many Latin American states appendages of US imperial policy. The army was not built up to protect against a foreign threat; it was bolstered to ensure that 'internal enemies' were monitored, persecuted and demonised. All persons antithetical to US imperial policy were labelled as communists.

The Miller Doctrine: The Conservative Counter-Revolution in Latin America

This chapter explains how an expanded Cold War theatre was imposed upon Latin America between 1948 and 1952. The anti-communist pretext was installed through the declaration of the OAS in 1948. Over the next four years, the Truman administration reconfigured US foreign policy to confront 'communism' in Latin America. George Kennan (1950), Louis Halle (1950) and Francis Truslow were influential in the development of, what would come to be known as, the 'Miller Doctrine' (Truslow as cited in Schmitz, 1999, p. 156). In 1950, US Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G Miller asserted, "we today consider any attempt to extend the communist system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," further authorising, "certain protective measures" (G Smith, 1994, p. 71-72). Miller had deconstructed Hull's 1933 non-interventionist policy by 1950, the effects of which are evident throughout the Latin American Cold War. This chapter will analyse the nature of this policy shift. It will also seek to explain the relationship between Latin American governments promoting economic nationalism and the US. In doing so, it will examine the political-economic relationship between the two visions for the hemisphere. This chapter will then detail the conservative military coups in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba, Haiti and Paraguay. It will argue that each of these occurred as a result of the anti-communist pretext and Washington's policy reversals under the 'Miller Doctrine.' Finally, this chapter will present its conclusions on the causes of anti-communism in Latin America. It will argue that the US sought to keep Latin America as a dependent appendage of the global capitalist economy in the service of the Cold War against the USSR.

Anti-communism and US Policy Development

US domestic and foreign policy was defined by anti-communism during the second Truman administration. Steinberg (1984) argues that the purge of the US State Department created "a mental straightjacket" that dictated all facets of foreign policy (p. 59). He continues that the "unfolding of the loyalty program…served to maintain the generalised atmosphere of fear" in the US State Department (Steinberg, 1984, p. 59). Boyle (2005) asserts that "the deep fears and anxieties of America in the Cold War created the irrationality of the Red Scare" (p.

21). The chronological association between the domestic red scare and the regression of US State Department policy towards Latin America is not a coincidence. The US State Department changed between 1947 and 1952. Its members were forced to commit their steadfast loyalty to the US in the face of the McCarthyite witch-hunt. The liberalism that Schwartzberg (2003) claims defines the early Cold War Latin American bureau was reversed. Anti-communism superseded pro-Democratic sentiments in the Latin American bureau. The replacement of Braden with the corporate lawyer, Miller, exemplifies this point. Anti-communism was confirmed as hemispheric policy by 1949. Arévalo (1963) claims that anti-communism is "more than a doctrine, more than a political theory, it wears the garb of a practical tool…a barricade to hold back social progress…" (p. 36). This is confirmed by Niblo (2006), who identified the concept of the "communist line" in US critique of economic nationalism in Latin America (p. 231). This section will detail the evolution of American foreign policy towards Latin America during the second Truman administration, and the development of anti-communism as an international discourse.

One cannot percieve US anti-communist policies towards Latin America without taking into account the context of US domestic politics. The perceived failures of the Truman administration to contain communism in Eurasia radicalised the US Republican Party (Belfrage, 1989, p. 117). The perceived 'loss' of China was seen as a result of weakness and subversion within the US State Department. To combat these incorrect charges, Truman attacked the far left of US politics, demanding "unswerving loyalty to the United States" (Steinberg, 1984, p. 27). In late 1947 the FBI targeted US communists and progressives, including the influential New Dealer Henry Wallace (Steinberg, 1984, p. 27). Steinberg (1984) argues:

> The paradox of the communist issue during the Cold War was that American communists were almost universally defined as representing no danger to the United States, but their presence was used to fabricate a sufficient hysteria to create an American mental straight jacket on both domestic and foreign policy (p. 59).

The membership of the CPUSA had peaked during WWII under the leadership of Browder, who effectively collaborated with members of the Roosevelt administration (Ryan, 1997, p. 232). As World War turned to Cold War, the

relevance of the communists decreased within American politics. Despite this reality, the Republicans continued their attacks on Truman's handling of the Cold War (Belfrage, 1989, p. 119). Truman began dismantling the American communist movement through mass deportations and police action (Steinberg, 1984, p. 51). However, this was not enough to quell public fear. In 1950 the Republicans swept anti-communist paranoia through both houses of Congress (Belfrage, 1989, p. 137). Wisconsin Senator George McCarthy was a vociferous critic of the Truman administration (Schrecker, 1998, p. 241). His anti-communist witch-hunt of both political and civilian agencies and individuals led to the institutionalisation of anti-communism in both domestic and foreign policy (Schrecker, 1998, pp240-265).

Domestic politics directly influenced the US State Department. Washington's priorities were given precedence over the reality of the situation in Latin America. In response to the perceived 'threat' of global communism, Truman defined his foreign policy as the "support [of] free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" (Freeland, 1985, p. 85). Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent the European expert George Kennan to examine the potential of communism in Latin America in 1950 (Beisner, 2006, p. 571). Kennan's appointment demonstrates the structural weakness of the US' approach to Latin America. By assuming a correlation between the European conflict and events in Latin America, the US was neglecting Latin America's actual place in the world. Kennan admitted, in his 1948 study of global communism, that he had omitted Latin America due to an ignorance of the area (as cited in G. Smith, 1984, p. 68). Kennan was a 'Cold Warrior' who had served as ambassador to the USSR; his understanding of Latin American politics was negligible. His first trip to Latin America occurred in 1950. There, he found substantial differences between European and Latin American radicals. He stated "most people who go by the name communist in Latin America are a somewhat different species than in Europe" (Kennan, 1950). While he suggested that communism was a serious manifestation, "anti-Americanism" seemed a larger threat to US interests than communism (Kennan, 1950). He recognised that Latin American poverty generated the greatest revolutionary potential and recommended substantial humanitarian aid to improve the image of the US in Latin America. Despite his findings, which suggested only a limited threat to hemispheric security from communism, Kennan

(1950) proposed a realist approach to Latin American diplomacy in 1950. He saw the vital interests of the US in Latin America, as many had before him.

Kennan defined US interests in Latin America and the policies that had to be employed to ensure them. Firstly, he identified the significance of anti-communism to US moral leadership. Kennan stated that

> People will not be inclined to believe that communist penetration bears serious dangers for them, as long as there are no tangible evidence in that direction…[and that]…if the countries of Latin America should come to be generally dominated by an outlook which views our country as the root of all evil and sees salvation only in the destruction of our power…[the American global political program]… could not be successful (Kennan, 1950).

Kennan saw communism as only one facet of Washington's hemispheric challenge. Secondly, he (1950) argued that trade was central to US interests in Latin America. He admitted that many of the corporate practices of US capitalists were detrimental to certain national political economies and the US' image in general. However, it is significant that in this classified document Kennan (1950) also stated "no one must ever admit it". Kennan suggested that the State Department should regulate those foreign business that motivate anti-American sentiments. Thirdly, he insisted that US companies should monopolise Latin American commodities to starve the Soviets of vital raw materials. To achieve these three goals, Kennan (1950) advised Truman to "create…incentives which will impel the governments and societies of the Latin American countries to resist communist pressures". As a result, the US significantly increased their financial and military support of unconstitutional governments who staunchly opposed communism.

To explain this contradiction, the SD official Louis Halle supported Kennan's "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine" (Y, 1950, pp. 565-580). As Kennan had done in 1946, Halle wrote anonymously to the influential *Foreign Affairs* journal in 1950 under the pseudonym "y". The 'y' telegram supported Kennan's assertions through an examination of Latin American politics. Halle publicised US support for dictatorial regimes by arguing that Latin American countries were not ready for democracy (Y, 1950, p. 578). Halle examined the rise of radicalism, particularly communism, within democratic states. According to Halle

> The ferment of new ideas – ideas of economic and social democracy, ideas emphasising emancipating from the United States among other sources – contributes to [Latin American] instability, as it also does to their progress (Y, 1950, p. 578).

Until the Latin Americans could operate a political system that deemphasised economic and social democracy, the US should cease to promote civilian rule. For Halle, security and "stability" were more important than Wilsonian idealism promoting liberal and social democracy (Y, 1950, p. 579). Halle's view was supported by Policy Planning staff member Francis Truslow, who made a distinction between "a dictatorship such as [Anastasio] Somoza's, which involves autocratic rule and totalitarianism, which we define as autocratic rule plus total absolute control of economic life, as for example communism" (as cited in Schmitz, 1999, p. 156). Halle and Truslow explicitly gave their support to authoritarian rule in their struggle against Latin American communism. Given the consensus in 1950 that communism was a legitimate enemy, the US gave preference over authoritarian regimes to democratic ones.

Truman entrusted this radical evolution in foreign policy to Miller (Schwartzberg, 2003, p. 196). Miller sought to undermine all legacies of the Good Neighbour Policy of 1933 by refuting the Montevideo treaty on non-intervention (Schwartzberg, 2003, p. 198).[80] By 1950, internal and external threats to Latin American security were blurred. According to Miller, the use of 'collective force' to combat communists "far from representing intervention…is the alternate to intervention" (Lafeber, 1984, p. 437). The 'Miller Doctrine' committed the US to protecting the status quo in Latin America. Through sufficient anti-communist propaganda the US could intervene in any sovereign state that challenged its political, economic or military dominance in Latin America. Additionally, the US expanded the Military Assistance Program (MAP) during the second Truman presidency (Pach, 1991, pp. 29-34). The MAP gave favourable EXIM loans to military regimes in alliance with Washington (Pach, 1991, p. 51). During the program's first five years Nicaragua received more funding than any other nation in Latin America (Gill, 2006, p. 72). The US was actively undermining the conditions for democratic rule in Latin America through its anti-communist policies.

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[80] Schwartzberg (2003) asserts that this was the result of Miller's "pessimism" about the longevity of Latin American democracy (p. 198).

Many Latin American governments attempted to prove their anti-communist commitment following the Colombian *Bogotázo* of 1948. Between 1947 and 1955 the majority of regional Communist Parties were banned. Brazil's 1947 banning of the Prestes Communist Party preceded the *Bogotázo* (Levine, 1998, p. 76). In many countries political freedoms were so limited that the pre-1948 ban on communism was a concession to the US with no practical application.[81] However, the Colombian *Bogotázo* created an unprecedented level of anti-communist paranoia that led to regional bans. In Chile, where the communists had significant electoral appeal, the US and its oligarchic allies feared communist influence, especially amongst industrial unions. The 1948 "Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy" outlawed Chilean communism for almost a decade (Drake, 1978, pp. 287-289). The Cuban democratic government of Carlos Prío also outlawed communism in 1950 (Ameringer, 2000, p. 119). This action enraged progressive *Auténtico* politicians such as Eddy Chibás (Castro, 2007, p. 101). The violent overthrow of governments in Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala and Argentina led to the eradication of the communist parties in those countries (Schmitz, 1999, pp. 155-170). The only major Latin American nations to avoid a complete ban on communists were Mexico and Uruguay (Alexander, 1963, p. 146, 340). By late 1955, official Communist Parties and groups had been virtually eradicated in Latin America. Its members were forced underground until conditions changed in the late 1950s. However, anti-communism continued to serve a purpose for the US. It motivated an evolution in the political, economic and military relationship between the continents.

The US and Latin American Economic Nationalism

The CFR determined Latin America's role in the world economy during WWII (Shoup and Minter, 1977, pp. 158-166). Marshall consolidated this in 1948 (Pogue, 1989, p. 386). This role, however, stood in direct conflict with the US wartime rhetoric of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. The US did not overtly reveal its economic intentions at the regional forums. Rather, it set about achieving its goals in individual states by removing barriers to trade and inhibitors to foreign investment and handicapping industrialisation, which directly competed with US exports. Essentially, the US sought to keep Latin American nations in a relationship

[81] Most notably Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.

of dependency, without control of their economic output (So, 1990, p. 90). The US ensured itself access to vital raw materials and markets for industrial output while retaining its significantly positive terms of trade with the region. This was made possible through the official doctrine of anti-communism. In its dealings with Mexico, the US,

> Inadvertently revealed the real importance of the communist Party in Mexico by shifting their reports from party activity to what they called the communist line, that is to say any radical ideas they disapproved of (Niblo, 2001, p. 284).

Economic development is a prerequisite to social reform in the developing world. However, economic development in Latin America disadvantaged US private and public interests. Many 'radical' ideas that came to be defined as the 'communist line' were pragmatic development strategies implemented by the US during the nineteenth century and the Great Depression in the 1930s. Economic nationalism was adopted by both social democrats and left-base populists in the post-WWII years, to the protestations of the US.

The three primary forms of economic nationalism prevalent from 1938 until 1948 were commodity control, labour control and market control. All three were detrimental to the US economy and liberal-internationalist policy. Commodity control involved: the expropriation of foreign-owned mineral reserves; the predetermination of economic activities through government-initiated industrial or agrarian development; and price manipulation through government control of commodities, such as coffee. These actions were directly witnessed in Brazil under Vargas, in Venezuela under Betancourt and in Argentina under Perón (Alexander, 1982, pp. 257-258; Bourne, 1974, p. 166; Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, pp. 366-370). Commodity control returned economic sovereignty to Latin American states and was labelled as 'communist by the US. This level of economic independence set a dangerous regional precedent. Labour control involved the improvement of working conditions in domestic and foreign-owned industries. Mexico set the precedent of a modern 'labour code' within its 1917 constitution. After WWII, many other Latin American leaders sought to offer increased wages and conditions in exchange for electoral support. Modern Labour codes were implemented in Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina between 1945 and 1948 (Grow, 2008, p. 11; Dulles, 1967, p. 284; Rock, 1986, p. 259). The populist

leaders of Argentina and Brazil also increased the minimum wage on multiple occasions to garner increased electoral support. This conformed to the US conception of the 'communist line' as workers received a higher proportion of national income. Market control involved the regulation of commodities entering the domestic markets. This involved close collaboration between state and private sectors, and was most prominent in Mexico and Argentina (Schneider, 2004, p. 69, 177). Both nations attempted to expand their economies through the consumption of domestically produced goods. This decreased their participation in the global capitalist economy, again conforming to the notion of the 'communist line' (in Niblo, 2006, p. 284). Economic nationalism challenged US trade and investment in Latin America through its efforts to improve the lives of its citizens, while anti-communism justified the US' prolonged struggle against it.

The US established global institutions to ensure its pre-eminence following WWII. These US institutions stood in direct conflict to the economic theories of the Bretton Woods Conference and its chief theoretician Lord Milton Keynes (James, 1996, p. 45). Keynes foresaw a world economy that ensured maximum employment in every nation (James, 1996, p. 41). To ensure this, he suggested a global economy based on thirty key resources, including oil, gold, other mineral extracts and agricultural products (Raffner and Singer, 2001, p. 5). The creation of a fixed value for all goods would stabilise the exporting economies of the developing world (Raffner and Singer, 2001, p. 5). Nations could plan their export output – for example of sugar and coffee – on the assumption of a fixed price for commodities. The US resisted this plan as it imposed regulation on an unrestricted 'free' global economy. As the US had triumphed in WWII, it possessed a free hand in designing the post-war global economy through the institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development[82] and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (James, 1999, pp. 41-53). Each played, and plays, a role in the maintenance of US ideology within the world economic system. The IMF regulates currency and holds at its core the US dollar (Eichengreen, 2007 p. 11). All currencies are valued in relation to the US dollar, which became the global currency after WWII.[83] The IMF discourages inflationary economic policies that threaten trade (Bandow, 1992, p.

[82] Later known as the World Bank (WB) (Bandow, 1992, p. 17).
[83] The US dollar gradually replaced gold as the fixed global currency after WWII (Eichengreen, 2007, p. 11).

21). As most development policies require at least a modest devaluation of the currency, the IMF was designed to maintain the status quo of economic relations. At its core, the IMF and the WB were “mutually complementary” as they assisted states with a “short-term balance of payments” and the “longer-term flow of credit” (James, 1996, p. 47). The WB is modelled on the US EXIM bank (Raffner and Singer, 1999, p. 3). It is designed to encourage ‘development’ programs that do not challenge international trade. Only nations with ‘responsible’ free market economies are eligible, ensuring the pliability of the developing world. The GATT is designed to promote global free trade (Freeland, 1985, p. 33). While tariffs were still significant throughout the Cold War, the purpose of the GATT was to create a world without trading barriers**.** The US set about creating a global Open Door Policy as the victor of WWII. As it was the most developed nation on earth, the US stood to gain the most from the system.

Economic policy was the key agenda at the Bogotá conference of 1948 (Coleman, 2008, p. 54). The US had recognised the Latin American desire for development assistance prior to the conference (Marshall as cited in Pogue, 1989, p. 383). US wartime rhetoric indicated that this assistance would be provided (Roosevelt as cited in Gellman, 1979, p. 157). If Latin America sought to develop they would be reliant upon a European-style loan program, however, George Marshall announced in Bogotá that there would be “no Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere” (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). He continued, “European recovery…was a prerequisite for Latin American development and the United States only had the resources for one Marshall Plan” (Coleman, 2008, p. 55). While the US provided a modest increase in EXIM capacity, Marshall’s words were quite revealing (Pogue, 1989, p. 386). By stating that industrial development in Europe was beneficial for Latin America, Marshall was reasserting Latin America’s role in the global capitalist economy. Essentially, Marshall was suggesting that an economic boom in the industrial economies of the North Atlantic would facilitate increased import-export exchange for Latin America’s raw material-producing economies. Marshall, and his colleagues, determined that Latin America was to remain a raw material-producing appendage of the global capitalist economy. The global economic institutions lacked a mechanism to normalise global commodity prices. While coffee remained at US88c per pound in 1953-4, the rapid decrease to US36c per pound in 1958 demonstrated the vulnerability of Latin American states

(Dulles, 1967, p. 315). Industrialisation, especially ISI, could shelter Latin Americans from the full effect of this crisis. As many states were dependent upon foreign food, their currency exchange was exhausted prior to any capital investment (Prebisch as cited in So, 1990, pp. 93-94).

To ensure regional dependency on US-manufactured goods, the US attempted to isolate Argentina from inter-American trade (Rock, 1986, p. 265). As the war ended, the Americans resumed their commercial offensive in Latin America and purposely undercut Argentine markets in Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. According to Rock (1986), "in some cases the Americans re-entered the Latin American markets with the deliberate aim…of destroying Argentina's commerce" (p. 265). With a lack of export revenues, Argentina struggled to fulfil its social commitments, and was forced to return to grain and meat exports to Western Europe in the 1950s (Rock, 1983, p. 161). This dependency upon export commodities inhibited Latin America's ability to develop independently. Commodity prices declined due to decolonisation. The expansion of US trade and investment into Asia, the Middle East and Africa created increased competition, which further undermined commodity prices. By 1950 Latin America's significance in the world capitalist economy had decreased. Nevertheless, the US sought to maintain its relationship with the hemisphere, at little expense to itself.

The final crisis for Latin American economic of this era concerned investment and capital flight. The Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch first confronted the problem when commissioned by the United Nations to lead their Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (Whitaker, 1964, p. 191). The ECLA was responsible for devising strategies to improve the economic conditions of the Western hemisphere. For Prebisch, the fundamental obstacle to economic development in Latin America countries was their declining terms of trade with the developed world (as cited in Overbeek, 1999, p. 571). Along with the German economist Hans Singer, Prebisch developed a theoretical framework to explain the economic problems of the "global south" (Raffner and Singer, 2001, p. 17). Prebisch demonstrated that the price of raw materials has historically declined in relation to that of industrial goods (as cited in Overbeek, 1999, p. 571). Accordingly, economic policies that promote further primary commodity production are detrimental to Latin America's economic prosperity. The region is forced to create larger quantities of goods to earn foreign exchange sufficient to

purchase necessary capital equipment. Additionally, the mechanisation of modern industry in the North Atlantic meant that less labour was required to produce more profitable goods, compared to Latin America's stagnated production techniques. This explained the continuing disparity of wealth between nations in terms of international division of labour. Without the policies espoused by its economic nationalists, Latin America was forfeiting the opportunity to be included as developed members of the modern world economy. This contradiction between popular demands and US economic policy contributed to the regional regression of the anti-communist pretext.

The Regional Regression

The anti-communist pretext led to a continental war against social democracy. The US did not directly stage this war. However, it facilitated the conflict through its diplomatic and economic stance. After the Colombian *Bogotázo* the inter-American community witnessed US Cold War diplomacy. Whereas the brief period of 'Bradenism' had discouraged military coups against democrats, the US developed new Cold War objectives, as broadly outlined by the Kennan Corollary (1950). The primary aim was anti-communism. The destruction of communist, and non-communist progressives became reasonable justification for a military coup. Perceived anti-communist policies were an essential task for Latin American leaders to undermine this military threat. Social democratic parties and politicians were labelled as communists and persecuted in the wake of military coups.[84] The US also sought to control the political loyalties of the region. Diplomatic support for unconstitutional governments was expedient to achieving hegemony. The US attempted to standardise military "weapons, doctrine and training" (Child, 1980, p. 73). This made military dictators valuable allies. The US also sought to re-establish Latin American political and economic dependency that had been temporarily threatened by the democratic surge of 1944-1948. Moreover, the US motivated this regional regression through its diplomatic policies, which saw military coups in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba, Paraguay and Haiti between 1948 and 1954.[85]

[84] Pérez Jiménez labeled the AD "a sectarian minority with a foreign ideology" in 1950 (as cited in Szulc, 1959, p. 280). Similarly, Manuel Odría claimed his government would "eliminate the sectarian menace," by which he meant APRA (as cited in Szulc, 1959, p. 184).

[85] The cases of Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala are unique and, accordingly, will be treated with greater depth in Chapter 6.

The Colombian *Bogotázo* motivated this regional regression. It also had direct consequences for Colombian politics. Although the assassination of Gaitán and the subsequent *Bogotázo* did not cause a change in government, it did indicate a departure from civilian rule in Colombia. Engulfed by the Civil War *La Violencia*, the Colombian President Ospina Pérez initiated martial law in April 1949 (Szulc, 1959, p. 222). Pérez also dissolved the Colombian national congress, and began ruling by decree (Szulc, 1959, p. 222). *La Violencia* had several aspects, but the most significant was the war over land. During the long reign of the Liberal Party concessions were granted to tenant farmers to produce food independently (Osterling, 1989, p. 85). However, the post-WWII surge in coffee prices made labour a valuable commodity (Coleman, 2008, p. 65). Following the 1946 election the Conservatives forced peasants off the land and into *hacienda* coffee production (Rolden, 2002, p. 15). When the peasants resisted, they were met by the Colombian military and armed regional militias known as 'paramilitarties' (Rolden, 2002, p. 71). After 1948 this conflict escalated. The peasants formed insurgent groups to hold on to the land, while the paramilitaries massacred peasants who resisted. Pérez' failed policies had emboldened the insurgents, who were beginning to receive vocal support from the communists. Accordingly, the US gave tacit support to the Colombian General Rojas Pinilla to take power in 1953 (Szulc, 1959, p. 223). The Pinilla dictatorship sent US-trained and funded military units into the countryside to destroy peasant insurgencies thought to be 'communist' (Alexander, 1963, p. 252). When the peasants retaliated, the accusations of communism increased. Colombia waged a war on its own citizens during *La Violencia* (Villar and Cottle, 2011, p. 24). This was justified through domestic and international policies of anti-communism.

The brief democratic period in Venezuela witnessed rapid progress. Venezuela is distinct in Latin America for its oil wealth. The oil programs of Betancourt and Gallegos generated income that had the means to establish social security and basic infrastructure (Alexander, 1982, pp. 265-266). However the oligarchy, along with American and British oil companies, feared oil expropriation (Boue, 1993, p. 12). Hence, support was given to a coup in November 1948. According to one of its chief conspirers, Pérez Jiménez, the military acted "to prevent the creation of a new oligarchy…a sectarian minority with a failed ideology (Szulc, 1959, p. 280). Jiménez asserted that AD's policies were communistic and

were opposed by the majority of Venezuelans. Prior to the 1948 coup, Venezuelan communism was irrelevant, and its small membership could not compete with that of AD (Alexander, 1963, p. 257). Nevertheless, the military assumed power in 1948 and Jiménez rose to the leadership in 1950 (Alexander, 1982, p. 321). The contradiction of US policy towards Latin America is highlighted by its actions in Venezuela. From 1948 the 'Gestapo like' secret police eradicated AD (Szulc, 1959, p. 250). Its leaders fled to Costa Rica and Mexico. Venezuelans existed in a state of terror for eight years. Social security was also eradicated during this period. Tragically, Venezuela was one of the few nations globally to suffer a decrease in childhood literacy during the 1950s (Szulc, 1959, p. 252). Throughout this period Venezuela exported 6.185 million barrels of oil, primarily to the US (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 366). Yet none of this revenue was sown back into the nation. In fact Jiménez's pilfering of the economy, in addition to wasteful spending, meant that in 1958 Venezuela owed foreign creditors US$500 million (Szulc, 1959, p. 251). He also signed long-term oil contracts, which handicapped his post-1958 successors (Bucheli and Aguilar, 2010, p. 366). For these achievements Jiménez was awarded the US Legion of Merit in 1954, for his struggles against a 'communist' threat which never existed (Rabe, 1988, p. 39).

The military also moved against the Peruvian government in October 1948 under the leadership of Manuel Odría (Betrum, 1995, p. 437). The crisis caused by a decline in resource prices undermined the political coalition between Bustamante and the *Apristas* (Klaren, 2000, p. 299). Bustamante could no longer fund social programs demanded by Haya de la Torre. The April disintegration of the *Aprista* coalition was followed in October by accusations of communist infiltration of the social democratic party(Klaren, 2000, p. 298). APRA's omission from Peruvian politics was followed by mass union demonstrations (Klaren, 2000, p. 298). The unrest of October 1948 caused "the moneyed aristocracy [to turn] to Odría as if he was their saviour" (Szulc, 1959, p. 161). In power, Odría described the *Apristas* as "communists in disguise" and his mission "was to save the country from *Aprista* plots and political poisoning by leftists" (Szulc, 1959, p. 180). From November 1948 the Odría regime arrested and imprisoned *Apristas*, communists, unionists and social activists, many of who 'disappeared'. Odría "kept the ghosts of APRA's menace alive" by exaggerating their influence within the Bustamante government and blaming them for the economic crisis (Szulc, 1959, p. 191). The

death penalty was initiated for the ambiguous crime of "political terrorism" in 1950 (Betrum, 1995, p. 437). From November 1949 Odría opened the Peruvian economy to increased foreign investment and trade, which spurred a temporary boom in employment, especially in mining. Meanwhile, the unions were undermined and real wages plummeted (Betrum, 1995, p. 387). Odría's handling of the economy was, however, not as compliant as Jiménez' in Venezuela, often refusing US demands over currency manipulation (Betrum, 1995, p. 387). Odría's war against '*Aprismo*', interpreted as anti-communism, also won him a US Legion of Merit award in 1953.

Cuba's economic situation had limited the gains of its two democratic presidents. Although Ramón Grau had easily won the presidency in 1944, he did not control the Legislative Congress (Ameringer, 2000, p. 24). As a result, the *Auténticos* were forced to rule by decree. Cuba was "locked in a straight jacket economy dictated by sugar" (Ameringer, 2000, p. 19). Grau dismissed free trade, as it served larger nations while punishing smaller ones. Accordingly, Grau sought to regulate the sugar producers to ensure maximum benefit to the Cuban economy (Ameringer, 2000, p. 28). Unfortunately, an upsurge in US sugar beet production after WWII limited US imports of cane sugar from Cuba and Brazil. Consequently, the Cuban economy declined in the late 1940s (Ameringer, 2000, pp. 28-91). Nevertheless, under Grau political freedoms were at their greatest in Cuban history. The media was free and the elections were honest (Ameringer, 2000, p. 25). Cuba also received criticism for harbouring Juan Bosch's Dominican exile group prior to the Caribbean Legion invasion of 1947 (Gleijes, 1989, p. 136). In 1948 Carlos Prío was elected President (Ameringer, 2000, p. 105). He governed over a period of greater US influence. Prío banned the Communist Party in 1948, and did very little to control the economy. This drew him criticism from both the left and the right. Disappointed with the direction of the *Auténtico* government, Eddy Chibás formed the *Ortodoxo* party in 1947 (Harnecker, 1987, p. 3). He claimed "Grau had abandoned the ideas and programs of the PRC-A – nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism" (Ameringer, 2000, p. 44). The *Ortodoxos* pressured the *Auténticos* into reform. Chibás killed himself in 1952 in the lead-up to the Batista coup (Harnecker, 1987, p. 5). Fidel Castro continued his mission in later periods. As the *Auténticos* did not control the military, both Presidents were vulnerable to US and oligarchic opinions. Fulgencio Batista remained in full

military control. The Batista regime brought stability, persecuted democrats, and ensured Cuba's place within the OAS. Batista's second term lasted seven years. It has been suggested that without Batista's tyranny, the 26th July movement would not have brought the unique brand of socialism to Latin America that was established under Fidel Castro.

While the examples of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Cuba are especially significant to this thesis, it also important to note that the regional regression also spread to Haiti and Paraguay during this period. In Paraguay Alfredo Stroessner staged a coup in 1954 (Lewis, 1980, p. 73). Paraguay had been historically led by strongmen. An oligarchy of 534 landowners controlled 73.5 per cent of Paraguay's arable land (Lewis, 1980, p. 9). Meanwhile, the majority of the population of 1.3 million lived on less than US$200 per month (Lewis, 1980, p. 9). Paraguay was lacking in infrastructure. Exiles in Argentina sought to bring democracy to Paraguay in the early 1950s. However, the strength of the military rendered this task impossible. Stroessner's authoritarian rule lasted over forty years, the longest in Latin America (Lewis, 1980, pp. 73-222). In 1950 Colonel Paul Magloire overthrew the fragile democratic government of Haiti (Trouillot, 1990, p. 143). The US and the OAS had sided with the Dominican Trujillo regime over Haiti's harbouring of Caribbean Legion fighters in 1947 (Gleijes, 1989, p. 144). This further undermined the weak government and motivated Magloire's coup. By 1954, democracy was a scarce political system in Latin America. Further support was granted to the standing dictatorships of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic (Child, 1980, p. 104). Nicaragua in particular drew close to the US through its opposition to the Caribbean Legion in the late 1940s (Gleijes, 1989, p. 141; Gill, 2006, p. 72). This regional regression in political, economic and social life in Latin America was precipitated by anti-communism. An increase of MAP funding for unconstitutional governments and a focus on internal subversives ensured the longevity of authoritarian rule in Latin America. These governments were far more compliant than their social democratic predecessors. US policy succeeded in its aims from 1948-1954.

The US and Latin American Democracy

Only eight democratic governments represented Latin America at the Caracas conference of the time of the OAS in May 1954. They represented Mexico,

Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala.[86] However, too many of these states possessed independent economic thoughts for the American Eisenhower administration. The US was willing to remove democratic governments that challenged its regional interests. By 1953, it had set its sights upon Perón's Argentina, Vargas' Brazil, and above all, Árbenz' Guatemala (NSC, 1953; Rabe, 1988, p. 32).[87] However, the US did not attack every democratic government in Latin America. It did not need to. The US was not opposed to democracy; rather, it was opposed to sovereign economic and political development that threatened its vital interests. If democratic governments posed no challenge to the interests of the US, then no action was necessary. This was the case in the early 1950s in Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile. The Mexican Revolution under Miguel Alemán, from 1946 became increasingly conservative (Schnieder, 2004, p. 64). Economic development was turned back under Alemán's social reform. He considered Cárdenas' *ejidos* (collective farms) as socialistic and abandoned them (Basturo, 1999, p. 77). Alemán encouraged increased DFI in defiance of the 1917 Constitution, which forbade majority foreign control of Mexican businesses (Schnieder, 2004, p. 64). US investors aided in the development of a new corporatist class in Mexico, and interpersonal ties between US capitalists and former revolutionaries led to the creation of a new, often corrupt, bourgeoisie (Niblo, 2006, p. 197). Alemán also decreased tariffs. During this period of economic growth, real wages fell and class divisions grew (Niblo, 2006, p. 206). However, Mexico had placated US demands, which protected it in the immediate future. After José Figueres came to power he moderated his views towards the United States. He relinquished political power in 1951, ensuring continued democratic rule (Ameringer, 1978, p. 71). Figueres remained as a vocal critic of US policies and ardent supporter of the philosophical New Deal. The successful removal of the communists from the Chilean Popular Front led to improved relations between the US and Chile (Drake, 1978, p. 291). The Radicals distanced themselves from the Socialists, who diminished their connections with the social democratic parties in Peru and Venezuela (Drake, 1978, p. 291).[88]

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[86] The Costa Rican government declined to attend the conference in protest of its location in Caracas, Venezuela.

[87] The conflict between these regimes and the US State Department will be explained in the next chapter.

[88] However, the minority Socialist Party, increasingly under the control of Salvador Allende, continued to promote regional solidarity with social democratic leaders (Drake, 1978, p. 279).

Moreover, the US did not oppose democracy. It opposed unregulated economic reform and development in Latin America that challenged its vital interests. Those democracies that submitted to Washington's leadership were granted continuing support.

The only state that witnessed a democratic revolution during this period was the landlocked nation of Bolivia. The Bolivian Movement of the National Revolution (MNR), led by Paz Estenssoro had existed in exile since the coup of 1946 (Malloy, 1970, p. 127). The MNR philosophy was social democratic, while also populist (Klein, 1982, p. 220). The Peruvian *Apristas,* along with the Argentinian *Perónistas*, closely influenced Estenssoro. While in exile between 1946 and 1952, the MNR remained influential within the union movement (Alexander, 2009, p. 102). MNR-led strikes were continually broken up by the military in the late 1940s (Alexander, 2009, p. 120). Outraged, the nation's workers demanded free elections. The government submitted to elections, but limited suffrage to 106,000 of the population of three million, on the basis of property ownership (Malloy, 1970, p. 152). Even in these circumstances, the MNR prevailed with a small majority (Malloy, 1970, p. 152). The military government then cancelled the elections, describing events as "not a coup, but an assumption by the military of its duty to protect democracy and freedom from a combined communist Nazi menace" (Malloy, 1970, p. 154). After weeks of violence in La Paz, the military retreated, handing power to Paz in 1952. The US had not sought to not control events in Bolivia, where it had few economic interests. However, after the MNR's success, US diplomatic and economic activity increased to secure Bolivia's rich oil reserves (Rabe, 1988). Paz was an acceptable leader to Washington as he supported Washington's economic policy.

The eradication of democratic action increased the revolutionary momentum of Latin America. The erosion of democratic rule and populist reform had left the masses with no political outlets to vent their frustrations. It became inevitable that revolutionary fronts would develop to combat this widespread tyranny. The longest insurgency of the early Cold War period occurred in Colombia (Leech, 2011, pp. 7-17). The organised resistance to government paramilitary terror in the countryside is well documented (Leech, 2011, p. 13). However, the moment with the longest historical repercussions occurred in Cuba. The attack on the Moncada Barracks was launched on July 26, 1953, the 100th anniversary of José

Martí's birth (Pérez, 2011, p. 237). Fidel Castro (2007) sought to stage a calculated attack on Batista's army to acquire arms and inspire a revolution against Batista's rule. Castro was not a communist in 1953 (p. 91). He was well versed in leftist literature, however he possessed no alliance with either Moscow or the Cuban Communist Party, which had been outlawed in 1950 but operated with relative immunity in Batista's Havana (Alexander, 1963, p. 293). It was not an attack for Socialism; rather, it was attack against tyranny. Castro (2007) sought to continue the revolutionary tradition of Cuba (p. 91). Martí had committed his life to ending Spanish colonialism. Grau had struggled against US domination before moderating his ideas. Chibás had called for a new Cuba prior to his death and Batista's coup (Harnecker, 1987, p. 14). Hence, the July 26 movement was the "revolutionary apparatus of Chibás' followers" (Harnecker, 1987, p. 14). In 1953 Castro was not extraordinary, despite his leadership of this movement. On July 26, 1953, 160 poorly armed and organised student activists took on the Cuban army and lost (Harnecker, 1987, p. 17). Castro's Moncada cadre was exiled to Mexico the following year (Castro, 2007, p. 150). Nevertheless, in 1953 the roots of the Cuban Revolution had been laid.

The Causes of anti-communism in Latin America

This thesis has demonstrated the nature of the 'Cold War' in Latin America from 1933 until 1952. The continued power of the oligarchy was essential to US interests in Latin America. Unlike the European empires, the US did not desire direct control of colonies. Colonialism is expensive and motivates civilian unrest. Rather, the oligarchy ensured that the status quo was retained within Latin American societies. This situation was mutually beneficial, as the oligarchs' power was protected by the US. This status quo included: the maintenance of internal social and political structures; the maintenance of internal economic structures; the maintenance of international economic relations; and the continuation of subservient diplomatic relations to the US. While the US did not directly involve itself in the internal politics of Latin American states, it vehemently opposed states that supported what it termed "the communist line" (cited in, Niblo, 2006, p. 284). Governments who took this economic position included regional populists and social democrats. Governments in this category became vulnerable to military coups. Whether the national militaries believed Washington's communist

accusations is irrelevant. They could be confident of US support if they maintained 'oligarchic' rule in their state. This explains the sudden anti-communist military regression of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Anti-communism was designed to eradicate social reform and economic development in Latin America through diplomatic support for military governments, negotiation with willing democracies and, in 1954, through direct intervention. All three had the same goal.

Anti-communism motivated an anti-democratic purge from 1948 until 1955. More significantly, it removed from virtually every Latin American citizen the opportunity to progress. The progressive era in Latin American history ended as a result of anti-communist actions between 1948 and 1955. The remainder of this thesis deals with the larger consequences of anti-communism in Latin America. These include: imposed autocracy; economic dependency; radicalisation of social democrats; the emergence of a legitimate Marxist left; and uncontrolled violence. However it is important to note the social consequences of anti-communism in Latin America. In the immediate aftermath of WWII the vast majority of society was brought into the political process. Appeals were made to the masses that committed to progress in education, healthcare, infrastructure, labour relations, manufacturing, housing, sanitation, and agricultural reform. After 3-10 years of their implementation, these progressive initiatives were taken away.[89] There were several consequences: the destruction of unions; increased income and wealth disparity; decreasing real wages; continuing illiteracy; continuing preventable deaths; continuing agricultural exploitation; and the disenfranchisement of the working class. Moreover, while this thesis deals with the grand strategies of the US, and the implementation of these strategies in Latin America, the social costs of anti-communism were extensive.

[89] The length of progressive rule differed in individual states.

The Effects of Anti-communism

The South American Problem: Eisenhower Confronts 'Communism' in Latin America.

Anti-communism was cemented as US policy in Latin America between 1950 and 1952. However, it masked other machinations of US continental policy. The outcomes of anti-communism in Latin America therefore echoed those of the US' imperial domination of the Caribbean in the early twentieth century. The remainder of this thesis will explore the effects of anti-communism on inter-American diplomacy from 1953 until 1965. The pivotal themes of this section will be: the disconnect between anti-communist rhetoric and the realities of Latin American history; the preference for military rule over democracy as a "defence" against "communism"; the implementation of regional free-trade economics leading to the eradication of economic nationalism; the inevitable radicalization of former democratic elements in several Latin American states in response to anti-communism; the creation and continuation of a legitimate Marxist presence in Cuba; and the evolution of external and internal forms of warfare throughout the region as the doctrine of counter-insurgency took hold. This chapter will focus upon the autocracy imposed forcibly on Guatemala and Argentina, and the demise of Vargas in Brazil. The NSC policy document 144/1 targeted those members of the democratic left, including social democrats and the military populists, for their "commitment to change" (NSC, 1953). The NSC (1953) argued that this commitment led to radicalization within their societies, and that "immature" economic policies challenged vital US interests in the hemisphere. NSC 144/1 targeted several former social democratic governments;[90] however, the three that remained were Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina. Hence, this chapter will focus upon US policy in those nations.

[90] These included Cárdenas' Mexico, which was moderated by the 1950s, Grau's Cuba, Betancourt's Venezuela, Haya's Peru and Gaitán in Colombia, all of which were under totalitarian rule by the end of 1953.

Eisenhower's Latin America

The 1952 presidential election was handed to the Republicans by the anti-communist paranoia of the McCarthyite crusade within Congress (Ambrose, 1984, p. 35). Joseph McCarthy had accused the Democrats of being "soft" on communism, thereby allowing the "loss" of China in 1949, and of the nuclear monopoly, as well as increasing anti-American activity in the Middle East and Latin America (Boyle, 2005, pp. 37-41). Despite Truman's actions, China had become communist under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union had developed nuclear capabilities (Gaddis, 2005, pp. 37-39). However, the vast majority of criticism exploited the paranoia that had infiltrated US political discourse between 1950 and 1952 (Belfrage, 1989, pp. 117-130). Truman's policy of containment aggressively defended US global interests from Soviet expansionism, to the extent of waging war in Korea (Hogan, 1998, pp. 41-66). In spite of this, the promises of the presidential hopeful, Dwight David Eisenhower, to "roll-back" communism fed the rhetorical myth that Truman's government somehow welcomed communist advances globally (Boyle, 2005, p. 40). Eisenhower had been a four-star General in WWII and understood the realities of the USSR's pragmatic foreign policy better than most in Washington. He knew that any aggression in Eastern Europe would initiate the third world war in a generation. Hence, his assertions that he would "roll-back" communism were false, designed for domestic consumption or directed towards the third world (Boyle, 2005, p. 39). Eisenhower easily won the Presidential election of 1952 with the support of the McCarthyites (Ambrose, 1984, p. 35). Once in office, Eisenhower chose conservative realists to surround him. John Foster Dulles, who had been a corporate lawyer for Sullivan and Cromwell, in addition to working in policy development for the CFR, was chosen as Secretary of State (Tye, 1998, p. 176). His brother, Allen Dulles, was appointed head of the CIA (Weiner, 2007, p. 101). George Humphrey was made Treasury Secretary (Ambrose, 1984, p. 39). Together this team sought to promote fiscal responsibility, US trade and investment abroad, loyalty and nationalism at home, and military supremacy over the USSR. However, their promise to 'roll-back' communism led to the increased military involvement of the US in the third world.

Eisenhower sought to institutionalise Truman's anti-communist policies towards Latin America. The NSC convened in March 1953 to covertly address US priorities in the Western Hemisphere. The NSC (1953) argued "there is a trend in

Latin America toward nationalistic regimes maintained in large part by appeals to the masses of the population" (p. 6). These governments posed a significant challenge to US policy in the region. Those governments reliant on popular manifestations routinely served nationalist principals over private capitalist interests. The NSC went on to state "the growth of nationalism is facilitated by historic anti-US prejudices and exploited by the communists" (NSC, 1953, p. 7). This was an acknowledgement that historical nationalism and anti-imperialism preceded a communist threat in Latin America. NSC 144/1 sought to utilise the Cold War anti-communist pretext, developed under Truman, to condemn the nationalist position in Latin America. The policy aims of NSC (1953) 144/1 included: hemispheric solidarity under US leadership; orderly and pragmatic economic development motivated by private capitalist sources; defence from foreign threats; the collective elimination of communism; the defence of strategic resources throughout the continent; and the centralisation of Latin American military forces under US leadership (pp. 7-8). It declared "the ultimate standardisation of Latin American military organisation, training, doctrine and equipment along US lines" as the ultimate aim of US military policy in Latin America (NSC, 1953, p. 10). The US prioritised military assistance over military action. NSC 144/1 targeted Truman's Military Assistance Program (MAP) for expansion. It stated,

> In determining the extent of US assistance and support to particular American states, [the US will take] into consideration their willingness and ability to cooperate with the United States in achieving common objectives (NSC, 1953, p. 9).

These "common objectives" were not fully explained in NSC 144/1 (NSC, 1953, p. 9). However, the large amount of aid afforded to the Nicaraguan regime over neighbouring Costa Rica indicated the preference for stability over democracy (Gill, 2004, p. 72).

The South American Problem

This thesis will focus on the nature of the 'South American problem' by first examining the military populist regimes in Brazil and Argentina, and the factors that contributed to their downfall. Perónism was a powerful ideology in Argentina. It proposed socialist outcomes within a nationalist, capitalist framework. However,

the most significant element was the hold Perónism had within the union movement. James (1988) argues that Perónism had the "capacity to absorb, appropriate, and neutralise, the symbols of older class traditions" in order to maintain a hegemonic grip over the working class (p. 35). The Argentine working class was overwhelmingly nationalist. Its members demanded a combative foreign policy and a domestic reform agenda designed to limit class-based inequalities (James, 1988, p. 35). McGuire (1997) reasons that Perón's support was based on "his dispensation of legal and organisational support to unions and of material and symbolic benefits to workers" (p. 52). More significant, however, was the level of Personalism. McGuire (1997) claims, "Perónism revolved from the outset around Perón himself, rather than the doctrines or policies for which he stood" (p. 54). This made Perónism far more dangerous to US interests. The populism of Getúlio Vargas posed Washington with a similar dilemma. Bourne (1974) demonstrates that the final Vargas administration, from 1951-1954, adopted a Perónistic form of Populism (p. 177). This was demonstrated through hostility to US economic policy, industrial wage increases and inflammatory national addresses appealing to the masses (Bourne, 1974, pp. 177-190). This section will demonstrate the threat posed to US interests by these two military populists. The subsequent section will outline Washington's role in their demise.

NSC 144/1 identified a specific "South America Problem" (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 29). It stated that

> Cardenás in Mexico, Árevalo in Guatemala, Figueres in Costa Rica, Gaitán in Colombia, Betancourt in Venezuela, Haya de la Torre in Peru, Ibanez in Chile, Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, Grau in Cuba, all achieved their political power by promising change. [Yet, many were] immature and impractical idealists [who] not only [were] inadequately trained to conduct government business efficiently but also lack[ed] the disposition to combat extremists within their ranks, including communists (NSC, 1953, p. 21).

For Eisenhower, "the time to deal with the South America problem [was] now" (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 29). The NSC listed problematic leaders who operated social democratic and populist governments and a nationalist economy. Perón and Vargas were military populists. Their offerings to the broad working classes were designed to procure electoral support. They were placed in the same category as

social democratic leaders such as Cárdenas, Arévalo, Figueres, Gaitán, Betancourt, Grau and Haya de la Torre, who focused primarily upon the welfare of the masses. This thesis has demonstrated that this link was not based on any actual existing communist threat. The NSC did not directly state that these governments were 'communist'; rather it was a fear of 'nationalism' and the perceived 'communist line'. Nationalism in Latin America encouraged governments with differing ideologies to privilege national sovereignty over foreign economic and political influence. Moreover, the "South American problem" was a regional unwillingness to adhere to US globalist policy (in Rabe, 1988, p. 29). Much of this 'problem' was solved by the Truman administration. This section will focus on the nationalism of Argentina and Brazil, before turning to Guatemala.

The Argentine government of Juan Domingo Perón posed the biggest obstacle to US hegemony in Latin America between 1946 and 1955. Argentinean public opinion was swayed by an anti-American propaganda campaign, which according to Robert Alexander (1979) was even more extensive than that in the USSR (p. 69). Perón's desire for regional leadership brought him into conflict with Washington (Rock, 1986, p. 275). Perón's economic policies concerned American diplomats as he ambitiously sought to change the role of Argentina in the global capitalist economy. The establishment of state export monopolies of meat and grain was central to this goal. Perón siphoned profits off from the agricultural economy to "stimulate the industrialisation of the country" (Alexander, 1979, p. 64). He also limited "the control of foreign interests over the functioning of the economy" through the nationalisation of key industries (Alexander, 1979, p. 64). By 1951, due to the relative decline of the British Empire, the US had become the largest foreign investor in Argentina. To prevent US hegemony in the Southern Cone, Perón sought to form trading relations with Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia (Dulles, 1967, p. 317). As Argentina was the most advanced industrial nation in the region, Perón competed with US firms for raw materials in nations such as Bolivia and Paraguay. While agreements were signed with both nations in 1952, the economic implications were minimal. At the 1948 Bogotá conference, Perón optimistically proposed that Argentina fill the void left by Washington's refusal to offer stimulus loans (Alexander, 1979, p. 71). Perón sought to be the regional economic power at the expense of Washington, to the advantage of nationalism in the Americas. This caused his conflict with Washington.

In Brazil, Getúlio Vargas initiated a nationalistic economic policy during his second presidency, from 1951 until 1954. The centre of this plan was government control over foreign investment, much of which was American. Upon assuming the presidency, Vargas claimed that foreign capitalists had been "bleeding" Brazil through excessive remittance (Bourne, 1974, p. 165). Presidential Decree 30363 set a maximum profit remittance of 8 per cent of initial investment annually and a maximum investment remittance of 20 per cent of initial investment annually (SD, February 20, 1953). Vargas sided with labour against foreign capital, as he was reliant upon the working class. His labour policy reflected this reality as it drastically increased the minimum wage in 1952 and again in 1954 (Bourne, 1974, p. 171). This led to widespread inflation, which also disadvantaged army officers who did not receive broad wage increases (Dulles, 1967, p. 307). Throughout 1952 and 1953 the US State Department demanded that Vargas change his economic position. The Truman administration sought to redirect Brazilian economic policy through increased EXIM loans made in order to have Vargas limit his control over foreign capital, especially in the oil industry. US$120 million of new loans were made in 1952 (SD, May 1952). Vargas accepted this overture and softened his stance, yet he continued to defy IMF directives by controlling coffee exports and running duel currencies. As the world's largest producer of coffee, Brazil sought to command a fair international price (Bourne, 1974, p. 169). In June 1954 Vargas increased the price of Brazilian coffee on the Wall Street exchange and, as a result, Brazilian coffee was boycotted. In 1954 Brazil sold one-sixth of its 1953 quantity (Bourne, 1974, pp. 169-183). Increased supply from Asia and Africa decreased Brazil's power over international coffee prices. The duel currency system discriminated against foreign imports as it made domestically produced consumer goods affordable to the working class. In 1953, the IMF demanded that Vargas devalue the Cruzeiro (SD, February 1953). Vargas refused, fearing the effect on real wages. Vargas' unwillingness to accept free-market economics caused a continual divide in US-Brazilian relations during his tenure.

Containing "the South American Problem" through anti-communism

Anti-communism dominated the foreign policy of Eisenhower and Dulles. Anti-communist intervention, as exhibited in Guatemala, was not the only tool in the new administration's arsenal. Interventions are costly. They also compound the effects of broad-scale anti-Americanism throughout the region. More

importantly, Brazil and Argentina were not Guatemala. They were developing nations with large populations. A Guatemala-style invasion was not practical in either scenario as it would expose American interference. The "South America problem" was one of economic nationalism, rather than a problem of communism (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 29). These governments were denied substantial US aid and followed an independent economic policies detrimental to US interests. The first solution to the "South American problem" was moderation through economic assistance (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 29). In Chile and Bolivia, Washington's policies went no further than this. When this tactic was employed in both Argentina and Brazil it emboldened the nationalists. Washington labelled the opposition to US economic assistance and intervention "communist" or "leftist ultra-nationalism" (SD, December 1953). The emergence of radical critique to the left of Perón and Vargas concerned the US; however, it also provided an opportunity in propaganda. The second solution to the "South American problem" was to accept[91] the reality of a conservative military coup. While Vargas' martyrdom prevented this in Brazil, his death still led to a greater role for the conservatives and the military in the operation of the economy in the subsequent years (Dulles, 1970, pp. 3-8). The final solution was the physical force exhibited in Guatemala. Moreover, anti-communist paranoia allowed Washington to dispose of three vociferous critics in Latin America. While the means were extremely different, the aim was the same – to solve the "South American problem…now" (Eisenhower, as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 28).

Moderation through economic assistance brought Bolivia and Chile in line with Washington's economic philosophy between 1953 and 1955. The MNR Revolution of 1953 brought a social democratic government to Bolivia, one of the most underdeveloped nations in the region (Klein, 1992, p. 234). The first action of the Paz Estenssoro government was to nationalise the tin industry (Klein, 1992, pp. 231-234). As local capitalists owned this industry, Paz's actions did not adversely affect US interests. The US had under US$10 million invested in Bolivia (Rabe, 1988, p. 79). Hence, US pragmatism in tin expropriation led to enlarged participation in oil exploitation and exploration (Klein, 1992, pp. 234-240). Governments of all persuasions had opposed US oil investment since the 1937 confiscation. Nevertheless, Bolivia was desperate for foreign aid. As Paz was

[91] And often enthusiastically condone.

focused upon internal development, including land reform, he was eager to procure US loans in exchange for access to Bolivian oil (Klein, 1992, pp. 234-240). Between 1953 and 1961 Bolivia received US$192.5 million in economic aid (Rabe, 1988, p. 77). This aid had obvious conditions attached surrounding the protection of the capitalist economy specifically focused on oil extraction. Denationalisation occurred in 1956, allowing the same US corporations that had been expelled in 1937 access to substantial oil reserves. The former military populist Ibáñez returned to power in Chile in 1952 (Loveman, 2001, p. 222). He had won that year's presidential elections with the support of the socialists and his promise to denounce the Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy, which re-legalised the Communist Party (Loveman, 2001, p. 222). Ibáñez inherited an economy suffering hyperinflation. In 1954 the official inflation rate reached 71 per cent (Loveman, 2001, p. 223). Ibáñez chose to adopt the US free trade philosophy and American advisors were sent to Chile to deregulate the economy (Rabe, 1988, p. 80). This hurt real wages, however, by the late 1950s it had eased inflation. Ibáñez' choice to accept US aid ensured his alliance and dependence upon Washington throughout the 1950s. [92]

The US committed to undermining the economic philosophy of Vargas by any means necessary. In January 1952 the US Ambassador Herschel Johnson asked Edward Miller - "if it had ever occurred [that] Vargas might not be able to finish his term?" (SD, January 1952). This followed meetings with influential Brazilian conservatives. Johnson also characterised Vargas and the Labor Party as detrimental to the US position in Brazil due to their "scepticism" of US motivations (SD, March 1952). After this cable the US began linking communism to the nationalist left. Johnson argued, "certain influences [communism] on the President have not been exaggerated" (SD, May, 1952). He asserted that Vargas and the Finance Minister Horácio Lafer were under domestic communist influence, which motivated their economic philosophy (SD, May, 1952). The introduction of João Goulart to the Cabinet deepened Washington's suspicions. This view was extended in December 1953. The National Intelligence Estimate argued, "Vargas might abandon his conservative connections and seek to establish a labour-leftist regime" (SD, December, 1953). It continued by asserting that the army would

[92] However, fomenting discontent would lay the platform for Allende's ascendency over the coming decades.

depose this form of government. The report stated that the army and the conservatives were hostile to Vargas because of his "indifference" towards communism (SD, December, 1953). Regarding Vargas' signature economic package, the report claimed, "Brazilian ultra-nationalists, abetted by the communists, have secured the passage of a law prohibiting the participation of foreign capital" (SD, December, 1953). The report dictated the US approach to Vargas. The US did not utilise unilateral action against Vargas as the Brazilian military were already in the process of executing a coup beneficial to US interests, with its own pretext already in place. On August 5, 1954, the conservative journalist Carlos Lacerda was wounded in an attack attributed to Vargas (Bourne, 1974, p. 185). From this moment the military were determined to overthrow Vargas, and by August 23 it was inevitable. Vargas was urged to resign by all around him (Bourne, 1974, p. 189). To prevent the state falling into the hands of the military, Vargas took his life at 07:30 on August 24 (Bourne, 1974, p. 195). The government passed to the Vice President Café Filho and the coup was averted. During his short presidency, Filho was more accommodating to foreign investment, but allowed democratic election of Juscelino Kubitschek in 1956 (Dulles, 1970, pp. 4-12).

Despite Perón's ambitions, the Argentine Revolution faced several problems following his re-election in 1951. The death of his wife Eva distanced Perón from the masses (Rock, 1993, p. 167). His inability to communicate his philosophy to the Argentine people emboldened conservative and military figures. More significant, though, were Perón's economic dilemmas. Argentina's failure to procure foreign markets for agricultural excess was the direct result of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the reserves of foreign exchange dwindled by 1951 (Alexander, 1979, p. 101). Argentina's traditional markets for meat and grain in Europe had largely been replaced by Brazilian and American production. In addition, Argentina's inability to efficiently extract and utilise domestic oil and coal reserves meant that Perón was reliant on foreign energy (Alexander, 1979, p. 102). 1953 was a turning point. The revolution had failed to meet its objectives, and Perón was forced to compromise. He accepted large EXIM loans from the US (Rabe, 1988, p. 85). He also invited Standard Oil of California to exploit Argentine oil reserves (Alexander, 1979, p. 101). This angered nationalists and leftists in Argentina. Perón was caught between two positions. According to the US State

Department account in 1954, "Perón now dominates Argentina more completely than ever before" (SD, March, 1954). They felt that "Perón has sometimes adopted policies advocated by the communists," but was not himself a communist (SD, March, 1954). They argued that if his current pro-US policies proved unsuccessful or unpopular then "Perón would probably revert to a demagogic internal policy and antagonistic foreign policy" which would "result in some increase in communist influence" (SD, March, 1954). They also foresaw that "in the event of Perón's demise the Army would probably have the predominant voice in the choice of his successor" (SD, March, 1954). Perón had polarised Argentine politics. The Nationalists to his left decried the increased US influence, while the conservatives demanded more rapid change. The final defeat for Perón was his break with the Church in 1955 (Alexander, 1979, p. 104). The military overthrew Perón on September 16, 1955 (Potash, 1980, p. 214). Perón surrendered to save the destruction of Buenos Aires. In the aftermath of the coup the army stepped up foreign investment and alienated the role of labour in national political discourse.

The Threat of Guatemala

Peter Boyle (2005) suggests "Guatemala provides the worst example of failure on Eisenhower's part to differentiate between nationalist reform and communist subversion" (p. 54). However, such a differentiation was evident to the NSC and the CIA in 1953, hence, the threat of Guatemala emanated from a source other than that of 'communism.' Schlesinger and Kinzer (1982) highlight the role of the UFCo in the overthrow of the Árbenz regime (p. 108). By identifying the interconnections between the top administrators of the Eisenhower government and the UFCo, they assert that the US corruptly condemned the Guatemalan government to serve private capitalist interests. Many historians have accepted this narrative. However, several political scientists have gone beyond this conclusion to assert the structural dependency challenged by Árbenz. Gleijes (1990) has highlighted the economic ramifications of economic diversification under Árbenz (pp. 167-171). Aybar de Soto (1978) argues that the US overthrew Árbenz to maintain regional economic dependence on American exports (pp. 150-176). Grandin (2010) reasons that Árbenz's attempt "to implement a New Deal-style economic program to modernise and humanise Guatemala…[was] was unacceptable…from Washington's early 1950s point of view" (pp. 42-43). This

section will identify the cause of the US coup in June 1954. It will explain the significant departure from the rhetoric and the reality of the situation in Guatemala.

Eisenhower's foreign policy focused on Guatemala during 1953-1954. The small Central American republic demonstrated the potential of social democracy and modest economic development to Latin America (Gleijes, 1991, pp. 145-170). The US sought to eliminate the Árbenz Guatemalan government by claiming extensive communist infiltration within the democratic administrations of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. While most scholars accept that Árbenz was not a communist, this thesis will also demonstrate the threat posed by the social democratic position. Like the other countries of Central America, Guatemala possessed a plantation economy. 68.1 per cent of the population worked in agriculture, the vast majority of these workers within the coffee and banana industries (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 150). Despite its agricultural commitment, Guatemala could not produce enough staple foodstuffs to feed its population of approximately 3 million during the late 1940s (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 182). Rather, it imported corn and wheat from the US, who provided 79 per cent of all imports and absorbed 92 per cent of all exports in 1944 (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, p. 17). Guatemala's feudal property system excluded 97.9 per cent of the population from sustainable ownership (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 150). The Creole oligarchy monopolised land to ensure cheap labour on coffee populations. The nation's largest employer, the UFCo, emulated this land tenure pattern (Chapman, 2007, pp. 56-64). The UFCo monopolised arable land to ensure the dependency of the workforce on wage labour.

The presidential election of 1951 demonstrated a significant departure from the moderate economic policies of Arévalo. The greatest achievement of Arévalo's presidency had been the Labour Code of 1947, which increased the minimum wage by 200 per cent (Grow, 2008, p. 11). Arévalo did not attack the established classes that prevented large-scale reform in Guatemala. His main departure from the US State Department was over the continuing legalisation of communism (Beisner, 2006, p. 578). This pragmatism was promoted by realism. Arévalo survived twenty-five attempted domestic insurrections during his six-year presidency (Immerman, 1982, p. 57). He was cautious not to provoke "the hidden force against himself and the revolution" (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 86).

Árbenz emerged as the popular candidate for the 1951 presidential election. A former soldier, he had been one of the young generals responsible for the October Revolution of 1944 (Greib, 1979, p. 272). Árbenz was characterised as a communist for several reasons. The US asserted that Árbenz's wife, the Salvadorian María Cristina Vilanova, was a communist sympathiser (Immerman, 1982, p. 62). They asserted that Vilanova's leftist friends had been influential in obtaining for Árbenz the PAR nomination in 1950. It was also asserted that Árbenz had returned such favours by granting government positions to communists. While the conservative historian Ronald Schneider (1958) claimed that 85 per cent of the National Agrarian Department were 'communists', only a handful of communists were present in the department (p. 38; Alexander, 1963, p. 360). The majority were reformers who used leftist language.[93]

The Guatemalan communists did not challenge Arévalo's leadership of the PAR or Árbenz's election campaign. Rather, they exited the PAR, forming the "Democratic Vanguard" in 1947 and the Guatemalan Communist Party (CPG) in 1951 (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, p. 44). The leading communists in this era were José Manuel Fortuny, who defected from the PAR, and Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, who emerged from the union movement (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, pp. 46-50). Three Communist Party members, including Gutiérrez, were elected to the 54 seat Guatemalan Congress in 1951 (LaCharité, Kennedy and Thienal, 1964, p. 62). Fortuny was not elected. Gutiérrez was an active communist, visiting East Berlin for the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1952 (Alexander, 1963, p. 356). While several CPG members visited the Eastern Bloc, reciprocal visits were rare. CPG membership peaked in 1954 at 4,000 (CIA 1953; Alexander, 1963, p. 360). The main obstacle to communist advancement was the popularity of Árbenz and the PAR. The CPG program failed to take root, as it was too ideological for a largely illiterate nation that was concerned with basic necessities. The communists instead pragmatically participated in the democratic process, as they had done on a much larger scale in Chile a decade earlier. To assert that three communists controlled the Árbenz government is illogical. The PAR held a majority in Congress and could implement their program without communist approval.

[93] The former US Ambassador to Guatemala identified all progressives as communists with the help of his infamous "duck test." If bureaucrats spoke and looked like communists, the Ambassador asserted, then they must be communists. Factual evidence was irrelevant (Beals, 1963, p. 265).

Nevertheless, their participation, and Arévalo and Árbenz's reluctance to omit them, led to conflict with the US.

The Árbenz reform program centred upon the land reform legislation Decree 900. When Árbenz assumed the presidency in 1951, 10.1 per cent of arable land was under cultivation (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 150). Guatemala lacked significant mineral wealth, making arable land the most valuable national commodity. The power of the Creole oligarchy was a consequence of land monopolisation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1951, 2.1 per cent of Guatemalans owned 72.2 per cent of arable land (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 150). The vast majority of this land was organised into '*latifundias,*' large plantations with workforces producing export commodities (Chapman, 2007, p. 56). Decree 900 expropriated large amounts of idle land from Guatemala's largest landowners. Árbenz stated intention was to "eradicate feudal property in rural areas and to develop capitalist methods of production" (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 52). It did not challenge productive agrarian industries that contributed to the economy, including that of the UFCo. Árbenz sought to harness the productive labour of the workforce to advance Guatemala's agrarian economy, building upon and complimenting the export economy. He sought to do this without negatively impacting those industries already operating in Guatemala. Decree 900 was intended to purchase the excess fallow land of Guatemala and redistribute it to the peasants (Brocket, 1988, pp. 97-104). Despite the protests of landholders, the first 14 months witnessed an agrarian revolution; 20 per cent of the nation's arable land was redistributed to 24 per cent of the population (Brocket, 1988, p. 102). While the National Agrarian Department was targeted for dysfunction and corruption, the speed of Guatemalan land reform was phenomenal.

Decree 900 significantly altered the political economy of Guatemala. It decreased the dependency of the labour force on plantation agriculture. Decree 900 also altered Guatemala's relationship to the US. The production of staple foodstuffs increased significantly following its implementation. During the May-June 1954 economic embargo, Guatemala independently produced many staple foodstuffs, a testament to the land redistribution policies (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 182). Decree 900 was also symbolically against US monopolisation, as it reclaimed 178,000 acres of UFCo land that lay idle (McCann, 1976, p. 49). Árbenz allowed the UFCo to maintain ample land to ensure crop rotations (McCann, 1976, p. 49). The

UFCo protested this action vociferously. Guatemala purchased expropriated land based on their taxable value in government bonds. As the UFCo had avoided taxation for over five decades, the land was valued at US$525,000 (McCann, 1976, p. 49). The UFCo claimed that this land was worth in excess of US$16.5 million, and that this fee must be paid immediately in cash (McCann, 1976, p. 49). The UFCo lodged its grievance with the US State Department (McCann, 1976, p. 50). While the UFCo had few friends in the Truman administration, the emergence of the Eisenhower administration elevated their complaint to a matter of national importance. Connections with the UFCo proliferated throughout the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower was a personal friend of the UFCo Public Relations Director Edmund Whitman, and employed his wife Anne as his secretary (McCann, 1976, p. 58). John Foster Dulles worked for Sullivan and Cromwell, who handled the UFCo's legal issues (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 108). Allen Dulles served on the board of directors for the Schroeder Bank, which handled UFCo finances (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 108). Under-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John Moors Cabot, and UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were both from prestigious Boston families that held large interests in the UFCo (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 108). At this point the US State Department's and the UFCo's interests began to overlap.

Land was not the only impediment to Guatemalan development. Guatemala was also dependent upon US companies for transport, electricity, financial services and export exchange, which made the Guatemalan government susceptible to foreign economic warfare. The World Bank report of 1951 highlighted Guatemala's economic dependence upon US corporations and advised the Árbenz regime to establish domestic competition in the fields of transport, the ports and energy production (cited in Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 165). The internal transport of Guatemala was controlled by two US firms, the International Railways of Central American (IRCA) and Grace Lines (Greib, 1979, p. 69). The IRCA was a subsidiary of the UFCo and controlled the vast majority of Guatemalan rail (Chapman, 2007, p. 56). This monopolisation prevented the affordable internal distribution of goods and persons as US interests were routinely prioritised. The UFCo also owned Guatemala's only deep-water port, Puerto Barrios (Chapman, 2007, p. 56).[94] It effectively controlled Guatemalan import-export exchange in the Caribbean.

[94] Purchased by the UFCo in 1907.

Furthermore, energy production was monopolised by the US General Electric Company (Immerman, 1982, p. 53). Guatemala was unable to control energy distribution. The lack of government revenue impeded its economic development. With negligible tariff earnings, and no income tax, the Árbenz government was powerless to fulfil its electoral promises regarding health, education and infrastructure. Árbenz was not able to expropriate US holdings or motivate domestic competition. Accordingly, Árbenz developed a pragmatic nationalistic platform to improve the Guatemalan economy.

Árbenz faced several obstacles during his presidency. He sought to develop a modern "capitalist state" through advanced economic development (in Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 52). His first manoeuvre was the construction of the deep-water Puerto Tomás. Árbenz commissioned the US company Morrison Knudsen to construct this port in 1953 at a cost of US$4.8 million (Gleijes, 1991, p. 166). Árbenz also advocated a 700-mile network of paved roads and motor vehicles to replace the monopolised rail system (Gleijes, 1991, p. 167). Árbenz initiated the construction of the link between Guatemala City and Puerto Tomás. He also began construction on a large hydroelectric plant. The 28,000-kilowatt plant in Juras, Escuintla, was estimated to cost US$6 million (Gleijes, 1991, p. 166). This plant sought to decrease consumer electricity costs and oil dependency. The final tenet of Árbenz's reform program was the establishment of Guatemala's first income tax. The progressive income tax was approved by the Congress on June 7, 1954 and would have gone into effect on July 1, 1954 (Gleijes, 1991, p. 168). Árbenz attempted to create a more self-sufficient capitalist economy to improve the lives of Guatemalans. The reforms were less radical than the New Deal, the Mexican Revolution, or post-War policies in Western Europe. Despite the protestations of the US corporations, Guatemala's reforms posed a miniscule threat to the broader US economy. It was one of a dozen dependent plantation economies in the Western Hemisphere. As Árbenz stated, the precedent of Guatemalan development was the true threat to US interests (as cited in Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 199). Independent nationalist economic development was discouraged by the US and IMF. Development, it was argued, could only come about through reduced regulation and increased private investment (NSC 1953, pp. 12-17). If several nations could develop without US assistance and begin to alter their place in the global capitalist economy, the position of the US in the

Western Hemisphere would diminish. Accordingly, Árbenz had to go. The US would use all necessary means to ensure his demise.

Removing Árbenz Through Anti-communism

While historians have demonstrated that the Guatemalan President was not a communist, for the US Ambassador John Peurifoy "he would certainly do until one came along" (cited in, Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1991, p. 138). Dean Acheson was unwilling to undermine a democratically elected government to demonstrate Washington's Cold War credentials; however, Eisenhower's administration planned their campaign in Guatemala during 1953. The American propaganda campaign in Guatemala faced several challenges. No evidence of significant communist infiltration had emerged anywhere in the hemisphere (CIA, November 1953).[95] The US' position in the UN required its actions to be justified to its allies. The US sought to utilise the CIA's new operational capabilities to "plausibly deny" its involvement in Guatemala (Greenberg, 2007, p. 692). NSC 144/1 designated Guatemala an enemy of US interests in the Caribbean in March 1953. By September 1953 Allen Dulles had composed a detailed plan to remove Árbenz, both cheaply and quietly (CIA). The CIA (September 1953) identified four components to the US mission. Firstly, the US had to convince the world that Guatemala – and Árbenz – was communist, and as such, a threat to the security of the 'free world'. Secondly, the US had to demonstrate that Árbenz' economic reforms were a failure and that the people of Guatemala were ready to oust their government (CIA, September 1953). Thirdly, the US needed to prove that communism was a direct threat to the entire hemisphere (CIA, September 1953). Finally, the US needed to execute the coup with minimal direct involvement or capital investment (CIA, September 1953). The CIA asserted that should these objectives be fulfilled, the US would be viewed as an idle observer in a civil conflict that reinstalled a pro-US dictator to the region. Unfortunately, little of the CIA's plan ran smoothly.

The US State Department successfully accused Árbenz of communist sympathy during 1953 and 1954. The CIA's plan called for "the collection of evidence, fabrication of same, [to] be attended to accordingly" (CIA, September 1953, p. 7). This demonstrates that the CIA knew the Árbenz regime was not

[95] Although it had been successfully falsified on several occasions, such as with the Colombian *Bogotázo*.

communist. Fortunately for its director, Allen Dulles, the UFCo had waged a propaganda war against the Guatemalan Revolution since the late 1940s (Tye, 1998, pp. 156-170). The UFCo's public relations director, Edward Bernays, had warned the US government of the effects of nationalist anti-Americanism since the rise of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran (Tye, 1998, p. 167).[96] Bernays used his connections with the US media[97] to pursue his agenda (Tye, 1998, p. 168). He wrote dozens of articles for the major papers that he called "fillers", which were published, often unedited (Tye, 1998, p. 168). His propaganda war dramatically increased after Arbenz's election. Bernays paid the influential conservative Republican John Clements US$35,000 to produce and distribute the "report on Guatemala" to 800 leading conservatives in 1951 (Chapman, 2007, p. 129). The report claimed, "communism had already gained a foothold in Guatemala [and that] the next objective of Árbenz and his regime was to seize the Panama Canal" (Clements in Tye, 1998, p. 176). Bernays led a press tour to Guatemala in 1952 to demonstrate the threat posed by communism to US business (Tye, 1998, p. 170). While the UFCo could not convince the Democrats to invade Guatemala, their alliance with the Republicans was inevitable. In reality, however, it was a relationship of convenience. The resultant alliance meant that the UFCo on behalf of the US State Department and CIA waged the propaganda war. Regardless of motivation, all of their interests were served by Bernays' actions.

The US waged economic warfare against Árbenz from the late 1940s (Aybar de Soto, 1978, pp. 79-94). This process was accelerated under Eisenhower. The first tenet of the economic warfare was the arms embargo, in place since 1948 (Blum, 2004, p. 73). The Guatemalan government, unable to manufacture arms internally, looked elsewhere. Initially, Arévalo bought large amounts of arms from the Argentine Juan Perón (Ameringer, 2000, p. 50). However, after the failed Caribbean Legion invasion of Santo Domingo, Argentina ceased arms shipments (Gleijes, 1989, p. 142). With the invasion clearly imminent, Árbenz reached out to the Eastern Bloc (Immerman, 1982, p. 155). Árbenz had no concrete contacts in the Bloc. In his one brief conversation with Joseph Stalin, Stalin requested a

[96] Who the CIA also overthrew under false anti-Communist accusation in 1953.

[97] Specifically with the NY Times, whose director Arthur Hays Sulzberger was related to Bernays' wife. CIA records also reveal a dialogue between Sulzberger and Allen Dulles from late 1953. Examples of the NY Times anti-Árbenz agenda include: 'Guatemala Exiles in anti-Red fight; Group in Mexico unites to undermine Árbenz and land reform' (June 22, 1952); and 'Ideas of Red Held Ruling Guatemala; Ideologies wear a nationalistic cloak but observers see a Kremlin program' (May 21, 1952).

shipment of bananas as a sign of goodwill. Árbenz was forced to reply that the UFCo owned the bananas and he had no power to market them in Russia (Chapman, 2007, p. 146). Nevertheless, he acquired out-dated arms from Czechoslovakia in May 1954. The CIA was aware of the cargo of the Swedish freighter Alfheim (Immerman, 1982, p. 155). This transaction further condemned the Árbenz regime. The CIA (September, 1953) also sought to sabotage foreign exchange by discriminating against Guatemalan coffee. The irony was that the US actions propelled Decree 900 to national importance. Without the ability to import food, the role of the peasant in the economy increased significantly (Aybar de Soto, 1978, p. 182).

Diplomatic warfare also reached its pinnacle under Eisenhower. The US characterised events in Guatemala as requiring the multilateral action of the OAS. The CIA had encouraged the State Department to fabricate evidence where necessary to win overwhelming support (CIA, September 1953). The May 1954 meeting in Caracas eventuated in an idealistic debate between the Guatemalan foreign minister Guillermo Toriello and John Foster Dulles. Toriello argued

> The plan of national liberation being carried out with firmness by my government has necessarily affected the privileges of the foreign enterprises that are impeding the progress and economic development of the country…They wanted to find a ready expedient to maintain the economic dependence of the American Republics and suppress the legitimate desires of their people, cataloguing as communism every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive and liberal reforms (as cited in Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, pp. 144-145).

Despite Toriello receiving a standing ovation at the OAS, . Dulles viewed these as the words of a desperate communist. He argued, “anyone travelling in the interests of communism is in fact part of the whole subversive program of international communism” (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 50; Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 145). A combination of fear, ideological allegiances, and monetary promises ended the debate in Caracas. The OAS decided Árbenz was a communist and that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American states by the international communist movement…would constitute a threat to the entire

hemisphere and would require appropriate action" (OAS, 1954). The OAS condemned Árbenz in May 1954.[98]

The paramilitary campaign against Árbenz was not a 'covert action'. The CIA armed, planned, funded and executed the coup against Guatemala in 1954. The US chose Colonel Castillo Armas to lead the coup (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 92).[99] The NY Times described Armas as a "stupid man" (cited in, Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 70). He was a loyal subject of Francisco Arana, who had been killed by Árbenz loyalists in 1949 for planning a coup against Arévalo (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 70). Armas also attempted a coup in 1950 and evaded execution by escaping a Guatemala City jail. The CIA had been working with Armas since the thwarted PB Fortune of 1952. PB Success began in June 1954 (Immerman, 1982, p. 159). The invading force of a few hundred Armas loyalists were stopped just inside the Southern border with Honduras was underprepared.[100] CIA propaganda attempted to convince the nation of the coming invasion through radio and leaflets (Grow, 2008, p. 1). However, the army remained loyal to Árbenz. By June 15 the coup had failed. Realising the costs of defeat, Allen Dulles requested additional military support. Under presidential orders, the US began bombing Guatemala City on June 20, 1954 (Immerman, 1982, p. 163). The city was defenceless since Árbenz had mistakenly grounded his air force because of fears of espionage (Immerman, 1982, p. 165). Árbenz's last attempt to save his government was peaceful. He requested UN observers to Guatemala to witness the US war against his democratic government. Initially the UN was open to this. The delegations of France, Britain, Lebanon, Denmark, New Zealand and the USSR supported the action (Rabe, 1988, p. 55). Lodge was instructed to use the first ever US veto should the resolution go through (Rabe, 1988, p. 55). If the UN had allowed the US aggression against Guatemala, its moral global and regional positions would face serious criticism. Fortunately, Britain and France were dependent upon US aid and support to sustain their empires. Eisenhower threatened his two greatest allies to stay out of Latin America. They did. With this last effort defeated, Árbenz, believing that the war was against him and not his revolution, resigned on June 27, 1954 (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 199).

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[98] The Latin American vote was 16-3-1. Mexico and Argentina abstained. Costa Rica refused to send a delegation. Guatemala's was the only negative vote.
[99] The CIA gave Armas the code name RUFUS.
[100] Taking refuge in a Catholic church.

Guatemala's tragic twentieth century history began on June 27, 1954. Following Árbenz's resignation, 200,000 peasants were murdered and over 1,000,000 internal refugees were created between 1954 and 1990 (Grow, 2008, p. 26). Árbenz left the presidency to his revolutionary colleague Carlos Enrique Díaz. Díaz allowed Árbenz to address the nation before leaving. In his address, Árbenz blamed the fruit company for his demise. However, "the fear that the example of Guatemala would be followed by other Latin American countries" was greater in Washington than in the UFCo headquarters in Boston (Árbenz cited in, Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, pp. 199-200). Castillo Armas was promoted to President by the end of July. He revoked Decree 900 and returned all land to the UFCo (Immerman, 1982, p. 177). He ended development programs and returned Guatemala to IMF policy. Armas' 1957 assassination brought more corrupt military leaders to power and the US continued to provide military aid to ensure that no renewed revolutionary activity would be possible (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982, p. 232; Brocket, 1988, p. 107). Guatemala effectively became a police state. In 1963 the US President's brother, Milton Eisenhower, remarked, "we breathed in relief when forces favouring democracy restored Guatemala to its normal place in the American family of nations" (in Cook, 1981, p. 218). By 1963 corruption had decayed Guatemala. Attempts by Arévalo to return to the political fray in 1962 had been vehemently opposed by the US. Guatemala did not elect another government until 1995 (Kinzer, 1995, p. 129). The insanity of the age was now evident. US policy supporting repression was called "democracy"; social democratic governments were called "communist" and even "totalitarian". Any lack of real outrage over Guatemala from within the US or the region motivated Eisenhower to go further, and successive administrations to continue this path.[101] Historians have characterised Guatemala as a Cold War anomaly, in which the corruption of the UFCo convinced the US to invade a democratic government. However, this Cold War conspiracy did not end in Guatemala; it was just the beginning.

The Implications of Caracas

The Caracas conference indicated the first serious departure from the 1933 treaty of Montevideo. Any government following "the communist Line" required "appropriate action" to reinstall pro-US regimes on behalf of the hemisphere

[101] When protesters in Lima and Caracas ridiculed US action in Guatemala in 1958, they too were seen as communists.

(Niblo, 2006, p. 284; OAS, 1954). Interventionism was again an acceptable part of US policy. The last bulwark of the social democratic revolutionary period was José Figueres Ferrer. The Costa Rican President had witnessed the demise of his social democratic allies throughout Latin America. The central tenet of Figueres' mission was the eradication of regional dictatorships (Ameringer, 1978, p. 64). By the time of the Caracas conference of 1954, 12 of the 20 Latin American Republics were under authoritarian rule (Rabe, 1988, p. 53). After the coups against Árbenz and Perón in 1954 and 1955 respectively, Costa Rica's was one of just six democratic governments in Latin America. Figueres represented the significant minority in Latin America in the mid-1950s. Washington's decision to hold the May 1954 meeting of the OAS in Caracas, Venezuela, was insulting to Figueres. The Venezuelan leader, Pérez Jiménez, had ruthlessly dismantled the Democratic Action party of Rómulo Betancourt, who was living in exile in Costa Rica (Szulc, 1959, p. 250). US policy towards anti-communist dictators under Eisenhower was also alarming for Figueres. Jiménez and Peru's Manuel Odría were awarded the US Legion of Merit for their repression of internal democratic elements under the auspices of anti-communism. The contradictions of US regional policy motivated Figueres to boycott the 1954 meeting of the OAS. The Mexican delegation also questioned US hostility towards Guatemala. They argued that Guatemala's actions were significantly less radical than their revolutionary actions in the 1930s, and stated that social revolutions were necessary for the development of Latin America (Padilla, as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 52). No other significant protestations were heard at Caracas.

The first consequence of the anti-communist pretext was realised. Latin America was now subject to imposed authoritarianism in order to "defend" the region from the perceived threat of communism (OAS, 1954). Although the relationship between democracy and dictatorship deviated during the final thirty-five years of the early Cold War, US policy favoured the dictatorial option throughout. The increased significance of MAP and the standardisation of military doctrine, training and equipment meant that many Latin American armies became extensions of US regional policy during the Cold War (Gill, 2004, pp. 59-73; NSC, 1953). This chapter has demonstrated how, and why, the next stage of the anti-democratic purge was realised. The demise of Árbenz, Vargas and Perón signalled an end to regional popular sovereignty. It also revealed the lengths that the US

would go to destroy anti-American democratic governments. However, the most revealing element of this first manifestation of the anti-communist pretext was the distance between rhetoric and reality. The enunciations of Milton Eisenhower, celebrating the US' role in re-establishing 'democratic' rule under Castillo Armas in 1954, demonstrated the most dangerous aspect of the anti-communist pretext – the complete denial of evidence in the enacting of foreign policy (Cook, 1981, p. 218). Guatemala, unfortunately, was not an isolated event, but a powerful testing ground for US policy in the Latin American Cold War. This first consequence, forced authoritarianism in Latin America, was not an end in and of itself. Rather, it was a means to the greater goals of US imperial policy.

'People Cannot Spit on Foreign Policy': The Radicalisation of Social Democracy in Latin America

José Figueres Ferrer was invited to address the US Congress on June 9, 1958, and asked to explain the motivation of protesters in Lima, Peru, and Caracas, Venezuela, who had violently attacked, and ultimately spat upon, US Vice President Richard Milhous Nixon (Ameringer, 1978, p. 145). When Figueres addressed the US Congress in 1958, he was asked to explain the Latin American opinion of US regional policy (in Ameringer, 1978, p. 145). He also identified the fatuity of Washington's anti-communist posture that confronted every aspect of Latin American politics. In 1955, 14 of the original 20 OAS members were controlled militarily. Figueres concluded his lengthy remarks by stating, "when one of your lawmakers calls [US political-economic policy in Latin America] collaboration to fight communism, 180 million Latin Americans feel the need to spit" (as cited in Ameringer, 1978, p. 146). This chapter will focus on two further consequences of anti-communism in Latin America. The first was the alternate vision for economic development known as Operation Pan America (OPA). The 1955 Rio economic conference indicated that large-scale development assistance would not be forthcoming. Hence, the Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek developed the outline for a regional economic alliance and development bank. The next consequence was the movements against regional militarism. Between 1956 and 1961 the military regimes of Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia and Cuba fell. Additionally, the dictators of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic were assassinated in the same era. This provided the social democrats with the opportunity to reclaim political leadership and to challenge the US position. However, the cross-class alliances involved in the removal of authoritarianism included many different political groups. The radical elements of these alliances were evident during Nixon's 1958 trip to Latin America. Hence, the ageing social democrats were forced to negotiate power in differing ways following the fall of totalitarianism in their nations.

No Marshall Plan for Latin America

This section will detail the moment when Latin Americans realised that US economic support was not forthcoming. This is a significant moment in inter-American relations as it informs several key Cold War events, including: the

popular response to imposed authoritarianism; the development of a radical nationalist left, best evidenced in Cuba; anti-American demonstrations towards Vice President Nixon; and the attempts to create the OPA, which preceded and was distinct from the Alliance for Progress. Eisenhower's foreign economic policy is usually viewed as short sighted. Zoumaras (1987) asserts, "Eisenhower's compunction to proceed cautiously on free-trade legislation and his readiness to cut economic assistance grants did not bode well for the United States-Latin American relations" (p. 159). Rabe (1999) demonstrates Dulles' reluctance to contribute to Latin American development (p. 95). He also documents the critiques of economists and politicians (pp. 85-91). This emphasis on free-trade economics compounded the dependency of Latin American nations. By 1955 many leading economists, including Oswaldo Aranha and Raúl Prebisch, accepted this fact. The Prebisch Singer Thesis (PST), developed at this time, argues "that there is a tendency for the results of technical progress to be retained in the richer countries" while the peripheral nations stagnate (Raffner and Singer, 2001, p. 18). These ideas were prevalent amongst Latin American nationalists at this historical moment. Economic conditions were worsening in many Latin American countries due to declining values of agricultural exports. Hence the critique of US free-trade principals, and Latin American hesitance to commit foreign economic aid was revealing. This section will detail the events of the 1955 Rio Economic Conference. Later in the chapter, the outcome in Brazil and Argentina will be explained.

The 1955 OAS Rio Economic Conference was the first such meeting in history. The Latin Americans had called for the meeting since their 1945 resolution at Chapultepec (Smith, 1994, p. 44). Dulles committed to the conference in May 1954 in an attempt to secure support for the US condemnation of Guatemala (Rabe, 1988, p. 50). Despite regional optimisms, Dulles claimed "an economic treaty [was] not necessary to further [US] objectives in Latin America" (as cited in Rabe 1988, p. 95). NSC 144/1 stated US economic policy in Latin America as

> Encouraging Latin American governments to recognise that the bulk of capital required for development can best be supplied by private enterprise…[and the] reduction of trade barriers under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program... (NSC, 1953 p. 10-11).

It also promoted the use of domestic capital to promote 'development' (NSC, 1953). This relied upon private capitalist initiatives that contributed to the capital

drain of the hemisphere. Neither Eisenhower, nor Dulles, believed it necessary to provide the scope of development assistance proposed by the Latin Americans. This position was broadly unpopular (Rabe, 1988, p. 95). However, that did not matter. Subservient dictators ruled the majority of Latin America. The US economic agenda was passed without a thought for the approximately 180 million inhabitants of the region. Nevertheless, Under-Secretary of State John Moors Cabot "worried about the vast disparities of wealth in Latin America, with the upper classes exercising an almost feudal control" (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 78). As fiscal conservatism dominated the Eisenhower administration, Humphrey advised that corporate lawyer Henry Holland replace Cabot in 1955 (Ambrose, 1984, p. 194). From that year, Holland oversaw a rapid decline in EXIM loans to Latin American leaders (Rabe, 1988, p. 69).

The 1955 Rio Economic Conference once again witnessed the collision of two conflicting economic philosophies. While the US' position remained dominant, the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch posed a conflicting vision (Raffner and Singer, 2001, p. 17). Prebisch, and the ECLA, identified three steps to prevent economic calamity in Latin America. Firstly, Latin America needed to absorb US$1 billion annually to counter the effect of capital drain caused by excessive profit remittance to foreign companies (Rabe, 1988, p. 75). Secondly, Latin America required immediate economic diversification to limit consumer imports (Prebisch, as cited in Dreir, 1963, p. 26). Finally, Latin America needed price stabilisation for key export commodities in order to receive a secure price for its goods (Prebisch cited in, Dreir, 1963, p. 26). These policies were broadly defined as "developmentalism," and were in conflict with US economic policy (Sikkink, 1992, pp. 32-35). Dulles did not travel to Rio with congressional approval for increased aid. Rather, he sought to institutionalise the economic policies of NSC 144/1. Rabe's (1988) analysis of US regional aid under Eisenhower demonstrates this. In 1958 Latin America received US$113.5 million in economic assistance[102]: 54 per cent of that was military assistance; 35 per cent was granted to US companies operating in Latin America; and the final 11 per cent was economic aid afforded to Guatemala, Bolivia and Haiti (Rabe, 1988, p. 79). In Guatemala and Haiti this aid strengthened the position of allied dictators. In Bolivia the humanitarian aid assisted the reconstruction of Bolivia's export economy, especially in oil (Klein,

[102] 5.4 per cent of Washington's global commitment.

1992, p. 239). Nevertheless, the US had the numbers to fulfil its self-interested economic policies. Dulles noted privately, "[it] was sometimes a bit embarrassing to win votes by a margin of one, along with the despots of the region" (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 75). While Dulles and Humphrey considered Rio an astounding success, the State Department's Latin American specialist, Roy Rubottom, considered it "one of the worst failures of any conference we've ever had" (in Rabe, 1988, p. 79).

US economic policy in Latin America was self-interested. While this was both pragmatic and inevitable, the divergence between US rhetoric and policy is the fundamental point. While the US outlined a development policy reliant on the injection of private capital, its fiscal, tariff and development policies directly contradicted the rhetoric. All three of Washington's economic agendas in Rio sought to further open Latin America to free-trade economics. However, the Latin Americans could not challenge US development policy individually or collectively. Given that only six governments represented the Latin American people at Rio, US economic philosophy became OAS economic policy (Schmitz, 1999, p. 196). The Latin American governments who had expected more from Rio "were deeply disappointed [as] they had been waiting ten years to discuss economic cooperation with the United States" (Rabe, 1988, p. 88). The Brazilian delegation, led by João Carlos Muniz explained

> During World War II, Latin Americans had believed that the vast resources of the United States were going to be brought to bear on wide and rapid economic development in Latin America- but since the war there has been an intense process of disillusionment throughout Latin America (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 89).

After a decade, it became clear that several governments required independence from US and IMF economic policy. This was highlighted by the contradictions of free-market economics within exporting nations. During the 1950s, the Korean commodity price boom ended and the index prices of key mineral and agricultural exports, including coffee, wheat, corn, tin, cotton, sisal, zinc, nitrates and sugar, decreased significantly (Rabe, 1988, p. 73). This situation was further exacerbated by the re-inclusion of Africa and Asia within the US economic sphere. As more nations became democratic between 1955 and 1958, the US' free-trade position would be vocally critiqued.

Decline in Dictators, 1955-1958

The struggle against authoritarianism in Latin America lasted between three and ten years in those nations affected by the anti-communist purges of the late 1940s. In the case of Nicaragua, it had existed for over twenty years (Crawley, 1979, pp. 15-70). The nature of those struggles led to the emergence of cross-class alliances in several Latin American countries. These alliances were composed of social democrats, liberal and conservative constitutionalists, and the Marxist left. However, the most dramatic occurrence was the emergence of militant groups to the left of the old social democratic leaders in Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia and Bolivia (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 30). The power vacuum left by the authoritarian regimes forced these ideologically distinct groups into what Ames (1987) refers to as "survival coalitions" (p. 7). Ames goes on to state that "multiclass coalitions are common" in Latin America (Ames, 1987, p. 7). However, "coalitions form more easily among political actors with shared interests," and defections from the coalition are common when "resources, in the form of control over programs, are transferred to the new recruits" (Ames, 1987, p. 37). This occurred in the case mentioned above. The domestic and foreign political pressures exerted upon the social democratic and Liberal leaders moved them into coalitions with Conservative and corporatist elements. In these cases, their former allies defected from the coalition and become the most dangerous elements in the political landscape, due to their ability to siphon off mass support within the under-represented public. This led to the downfall of democratic rule in Cuba, Peru and Bolivia between 1959 and 1964 (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, pp. 30-37). In Colombia, the new coalition between Liberals, Conservatives and foreign interests withstood the leftist attack, while in Venezuela; the Betancourt regime allied itself with rural democratic groups to combat the eventual "*fidelista*" threat (Alexander, 1982, p. 489). This section will detail the decline of dictators and the emergence of multiclass alliances in several Latin American states. It will continue by examining the response to Nixon's 1958 trip to Latin America.

On September 20 1956 Rigoberto López Pérez shot Anastasio Somoza García in the Nicaraguan town of León (Crawley, 1979, p. 116). Somoza's personal guard killed Pérez instantly. In his last testimony to his mother, Pérez said

> I have always been involved in everything concerned with attacking the dismal regime, which rules over our fatherland. In view of the fact that all attempts at making Nicaragua once again a free country, without stain or dishonour, have failed…I have decided to try to be the person who will begin the end of this tyranny…This is not a sacrifice but a duty I have been able to fulfil (as cited in Crawley, 1979, p. 115).

Despite the efforts of Eisenhower's personal physician, Somoza died nine days later (Crawley, 1979, p. 116). The US ambassador, Thomas Whelan, called Pérez's actions a "communist conspiracy hatched in El Salvador" (in Crawley, 1979, p. 116). Whelan sought to prevent further revolutionary and pro-democratic activities by gaining the approval of the Nicaraguan Congress to install Luis Somoza as president the following day (Crawley, 1979, p. 117). Pérez' actions had failed. The military received increased funding from the US. Anti-communism saw the persecution of moderate opponents of the government. Many liberals, including the now elderly Emiliano Chamorro, were arrested as they attempted to flee Nicaragua, despite there being "no visible connection with left-wing conspiratorial activity" (Crawley, 1979, p. 118). While efforts to remove the military government of Nicaragua failed, they foreshadowed comparable events throughout the region.

In 1956 Manuel Odría forfeited his military government in the midst of a political crisis. The crisis began in late 1954 when Odría reduced his persecution of the *Apristas*, allowing Haya to leave Peru (Klaren, 1978, p. 306). In 1956 the military crushed an industrial strike over conditions in silver mining operations (Arévalo, 1963, p. 46). Progressive military officers protested their role in this event. The military moved against Odría "in protest of [its] oppressive role" upon society (Bertrum, 1995, p. 439). While Odría survived these crises he sought an exit from the presidency in late 1956, giving APRA de-facto recognition (Szulc, 1959, p. 204). The deal made between Haya de la Torre and Odría gave APRA full legislative recognition from 1961, in return for *Aprista* endorsement for the 1956 Presidential candidate Hernando de Lavalle (Bertrum, 1995, p. 449). Many of Haya's supporters interpreted this 'deal' as a betrayal. Accordingly, Haya and the *Apristas* lost significant support within the organised labour movement. Haya responded by shifting his support to the independent candidate Manuel Prado, who won the election with 45 per cent of the popular vote (Bertrum, 1995, p. 447).

Although APRA was legalised in 1961, continuing military intervention in Peruvian politics handicapped its direct role.

By 1958, Colombia had suffered ten years of brutal civil war. The political parties who had ceded control to the Colombian military sought to reclaim power in that year. During this time the moderate left were targeted as communists and persecuted accordingly. The nature of the paramilitary conflict led to the radicalisation of the rural peasantry (Leech, 2011, p. 12). This war, which was theoretically between the two major parties, left the country debilitated for a decade. Realising these consequences, the two parties sought to end the war through the formation of a National Front government. Alfonzo López Pumarejo suggested that the Liberal Party should endorse the Conservative presidential candidate in order to end military control in Colombia (Hartlyn, 1998, p. 61). In March 1957 the two political parties formed the "joint manifesto of the Liberal and Conservative Parties" (Hartlyn, 1998, p. 57). On April 8 1958, the National Front nominated the Conservative Guillermo León Valencia as the candidate for the May elections (Hartlyn, 1998, p. 67). On May 1 1958, Rojas Pinilla detained Valencia to prevent the elections taking place (Szulc, 1959, p. 239). On May 2 students and workers began protesting in Bogotá (Szulc, 1959, p. 241). The military killed approximately 20 rioters between the third and fifth of May (Szulc, 1959, p. 241). On May 5 the Church condemned Pinilla (Szulc, 1959, p. 242). On May 7 the military bombarded rioters seeking refuge in a Bogotá church with teargas. On May 9 the military moved against Pinilla, scheduling elections for August 7 (Hartlyn, 1998, p. 70). Alberto Lleras was subsequently elected President (Randall, 1992, p. 219). While the military were removed, the ruling oligarchy still controlled Colombia politics.

Argentina also initiated a path towards democratisation during 1958. However, the military regimes of Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Eugenio Arumburu sought to do this without allowing Perónist influences into the process (Potash, 1980, pp. 249-265). This became an insurmountable task due to Perón's enduring significance which posed an increasingly militant Perónist opposition. In June 1957, José Valle launched a Perónist-inspired attack on the La Plata army barracks (Potash, 1980, p. 232). While unsuccessful, it indicated the lingering unrest in Argentina. The July 1957 constituent elections also demonstrated the strength of Perónism (Potash, 1980, p. 255). 24.3 per cent of votes cast were left blank upon

the instructions of Perónist leaders (Potash, 1980, p. 255). This indicated that Perónism commanded approximately one-quarter of the Argentine electorate. The Presidential nominees took the situation seriously. The Radical nominee, Arturo Frondizi, sought Perónist endorsement in the process of democratisation (Szusterman, 1993, p. 64). To achieve this endorsement he sent Rogelio Frigerio to Caracas on January 3, 1958, to meet with Perón (Potash, 1980, p. 265). Perón made several demands in return for support for the Presidential election (Szusterman, 1993, p. 66). Perón demanded the return of Perónist economic policy and democratic liberalization to allow his followers to peacefully participate in the electoral system. On February 10 Perón encouraged his supporters to vote for Frondizi (Szusterman, 1993, p. 70). Frondizi also won the support of the small communist movement (Potash, 1990, p. 271). Frondizi won the 1958 election in a landslide (Szusterman, 1993, p. 71). However, the military handicapped his rule. Hence, many of Frondizi's promises to Perón were vetoed by the military, effectively undermining the coalition.

On January 22 1958 the Venezuelan despot Pérez Jiménez was forced to flee Caracas by a militant general strike (Alexander, 1964, p. 50). The movement against Jiménez began in May 1957, however the resistance had been building for years (Alexander, 1964, p. 47). The human rights abuses carried out by Pedro Estrada's secret police and the continuing poverty of the Venezuelan population motivated revolutionary resistance (Alexander, 1982, p. 326). Then, in May 1957, the Catholic Church withdrew their support for the military regime. In December 1957 Jiménez ordered a plebiscite which asked the Venezuelan people: "should General Marcos Pérez Jiménez continue as President of the Republic during the next Presidential term?" (Alexander, 1964, p. 49). State employees were forced to vote yes (Szulc, 1959, p. 319). The vote was not secret; it was enforced by the military to ensure total compliance. According to the historian Robert Alexander (1964), "from the day of the vote, the regime was harassed by street demonstrations, plots and disturbances, ending, only a few weeks after the plebiscite, in the fall of the dictatorship" (p. 49). On January 22, 1958, a Revolutionary Junta replaced Jiménez and committed to presidential elections (Szulc, 1959, p. 327). While the military was purged of pro-Jiménez elements, the military still undermined the junta in July and September (Alexander, 1964, p. 52). Several progressive elements supported the actions against Jiménez. The 1958

elections were extremely tightly contested. *Acción Democrática* and Rómulo Betancourt resumed leadership of Venezuela in 1959 (Alexander, 1982, p. 466). Betancourt narrowly defeated both the Christian Left Copei Party and the Socialist-dominated Democratic Republican Party. The "Betancourt Doctrine" survived, with Venezuela remaining democratic throughout the remainder of Cold War (Rabe, 1988, p. 105).

This period of democratisation offered mixed results. Venezuela can be considered a success in implementing social democracy. The return of Rómulo Betancourt brought with it a renewed emphasis on economic development, oil nationalisation and social justice (Alexander, 1982, pp449-475). The reorganised regimes of Brazil and Argentina also brought a focus on 'developmentalism' (Alexander, 1991, p. 279; Szusterman, 1993, p. 75). These policies sought to rapidly develop economic output to the benefit of society more widely. Both nations were, however, significantly hampered by their militaries throughout this process. While Colombia and Peru reinitiated representative governments during this period, they remained bound by oligarchic rule (Hartlyn, 1998, pp. 113-120; Klaren, 1978, pp. 315-318). Dictators were executed without the attainment of democracy in Nicaragua in 1956 and in the Dominican Republic in 1961[103] (Crawley, 1979, p. 116; Rabe, 1999, p. 39). Additionally, elections were held in Haiti and Honduras during 1957 (Truillot, 1990, p. 148; MacCameron, 1983, p. 79). In Haiti the corrupt regime of François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier replaced the dictatorship of Paul Magloire (Truillot, 1990, p. 148). In Honduras, the moderate Ramón Villeda Morales was elected (MacCameron, 1983, p. 79). Finally, in Cuba, the revolution of Fidel Castro sought instant and radical change. Moreover, the late 1950s witnessed a resounding surge towards 'democratic ideals' against the right-wing dictatorships. Yet the regimes of the late 1950s offered far less hope to the people of Latin America than those of the 1940s had done. Many social democratic leaders lost their positions of dominance within the progressive movement. While Betancourt's success was resounding in regional areas, the margin was far closer in Caracas. In many cases this new path would be more radical than social democracy, as was evidenced in Cuba from 1959.

[103] This incident was actually supported by the US. It will be detailed within Chapter 9.

Multi-Class Alliances

The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 served as the first example of a multi-class revolution, often regarded as "coalition" building. Multi-class alliances were developed throughout Latin America to defeat dictatorial enemies. These alliances challenged the class relationships of several Latin American states. Since the mid-1930s a generation of revolutionaries had controlled widespread popular support. The pinnacle of this revolutionary movement was the brief democratic spring that followed WWII. However, with the decline of social democracy, and the perceived failures of populism, the people turned to other organisations for support. The middle-class social democrats were accused of significant mismanagement and corruption and this was considered the cause of their downfall. The radical economic philosophies of the populists in Brazil and Argentina were seen as the cause of economic turmoil in those republics. Conservative military coalitions sought to dismantle those philosophies. The political alliances sought by older revolutionary movements lacked central control. Organised labour was both less disciplined and less committed to a single ideology (Alexander, 2009, pp. 120-135). Furthermore, the omission of workers and peasants from political outlets led to radicalisation in several states. This section will focus on these emerging cross-class alliances formed throughout Latin America from 1955-1958, the effect of which was the radicalisation of the old social democratic states.

The allegiances of organised labour were significant in both Brazil and Argentina. Anti-communism witnessed the reorganisation of the labour movement during the 1950s (Alexander, 2009, pp. 120-126). The destruction of socialist- and communist-affiliated organisations in the early 1950s left a void that was filled by the Regional Organisation of Workers (ORIT) (Alexander, 2009, p. 120). While ORIT encompassed several ideological and nationalist sentiments, it stood firm on the issue of dictatorial regimes. Its leader Luis Alberto Monge affirmed that

> The Latin American dictatorships…are the product of the action of the oligarchic and plutocratic groups, sometimes in coalition with international capitalism, for the purposes of maintaining their position of dominance over the majority, necessary to maintain their position of economic and social privileges…The struggle of the trade union movement against the

dictators must continue until they are liquidated (as cited in Alexander, 2009, pp. 122-123).

Moreover, the unions of Latin America were central to dismantling the dictatorships. The difficulty in defining these union groups is their diverse ideological views. Organised labour was particularly influential in Argentina and Brazil. In Brazil, Kubitschek drew upon popular enthusiasm for nationalist economic development to benefit the nation's largest unions (Alexander, 1991, p. 251). In Argentina, Frondizi required the support of the *Perónista*-led union movement through popular appeals for anti-imperialist national development (Alexander, 1979, p. 171). Hence, Kubitschek and Frondizi came to power by ensuring a continuation of their predecessors' policies and by resisting military rule. This was a reflection of union values rather than personal leadership.

Radicals benefitted from greater freedom within these broad revolutionary alliances. This included the revival of the dormant communist movement, especially evident in Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela. Colombian politicians excluded revolutionary forces, and the left-liberals, from the political sphere in 1958. These revolutionaries had fought the government's paramilitaries throughout the *La Violencia* (Leech, 2011, p. 8). With Gaitán's death and the moderation of the Liberal party, there was no political voice for the nation's peasants (Leech, 2011, p. 8). In this climate, the Colombian Communist Party's prestige increased. In 1959, the US estimated that the communists had trained 10,000 peasant insurgents (Leech, 2011, p. 14). The exclusion of peasant interests from the Colombian National Front, even after their significant role in overthrowing the military regime, was the direct motivation for the establishment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the 1960s (Villar and Cottle, 2011, p. 25). The failures of the PRC-A to reclaim power from Batista's military regime emboldened Fidel Castro during the 1950s. Castro's 26th of July Movement gained momentum by drawing support away from the social democratic leaders. A renewed emphasis on agrarian affairs further enflamed the situation. The Bolivian MNR also lost the support of its left wing in the late 1950s (Prados Salmon, 1987, p. 12). Juan Lechín opposed the economic treaties between Hernán Siles' regime and the US (Prados Salmon, 1987, p. 12). By 1960 the US were actively involved in Bolivian politics. They labelled Lechín and the MNR left as "internal subversives" and ostracized them from national politics (Prados

Salmon, 1987, p. 12). The schism of the Venezuelan *Acción Democrática* Party in 1960 also demonstrated the revolutionary potential of the region. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) opposed the government of Rómulo Betancourt (Ewell, 1984). Moreover, a new left was emerging outside of the control of the social democrats. The periods of dictatorship made people of Latin American republics desperate. Under these conditions radicals, including Marxists thrived. The dictatorial periods were responsible for this increased radicalisation, the extent of which became clear during 1958.[104]

The Nixon Trip

The US did not grasp the enormity of political change in Latin America between 1955 and 1958. They reasoned that economic interests could dictate their policies in the region and that any emerging Latin American regime could be controlled through political, economic and, if necessary, military means. However, the situation was different for Latin Americans. The 1958 protest provided the US State Department with insight into the position of the Latin American majority. However, at this historical moment, the US remained blinded by anti-communist paranoia. When Eisenhower asked Nixon (1978) to lead a goodwill tour throughout Latin America, following the Argentine presidential inauguration, he expected it to be "the most boring trip [he] had ever taken" (p. 186). According to Nixon's (1978) memoirs, "the CIA warned that although the Communist Party had been officially suppressed in most South American countries, [the Vice President] might have to face occasional demonstrations" (p. 186). In Argentina, the military effectively suppressed the Perónist opposition, allowing Nixon a relatively quiet time in Buenos Aires (Potash, 1980, p. 230). The military that removed Perón in 1955 labelled the Perónist opposition as communists in order to justify their omission from the political process. Nixon viewed all critiques of US policy in Latin America as communist propaganda. Latin American military leaders who were indoctrinated to anti-communism reinforced this view. In Lima and Caracas, however, Nixon witnessed the full force of this opposition.

In Lima the demonstrations grew more vocal and violent. Peruvian officials warned Nixon not to go to San Marcos University, fearing a direct confrontation at the spiritual home of *Aprismo* (Stein, 1980, pp. 129-136). Haya de la Torre had

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[104] The long-term effects of these 'insurgent' groups will be examined in Chapter 10.

organised the student union's collaboration with the working class within the University. During the 1948-1956 persecution of adherence of *Aprismo*, San Marcos had been targeted by Odría's military, with several students detained on suspicion of 'communism' (Klaren, 2000, p. 239). The San Marcos student union was hostile to militarism and the foreign policy of the US in Latin America. As Nixon's (1978) motorcade approached San Marcos on May 8, 1958, the crowds could be heard across several blocks shouting "Fuera (go home) Nixon" and "Muera (death to) Nixon" (Nixon, 1978, p. 287). Nixon (1978) approached the crowds and declared, "I want to talk to you, why are you afraid of the truth" (p. 188). A barrage of projectiles, primarily stones, met Nixon as he approached the crowd (Raymont, 2005, p. 104). One projectile injured a secret service officer, who forced Nixon back to the motorcade (Nixon, 1978, p. 288). Nixon sought the refuge of his Lima hotel, yet demonstrators blocked his entrance, with one spitting at the Vice President (Nixon, 1978, p. 288). US media coverage of the Lima protests, however, undermined Nixon's characterisation of the protesters as communists. According to the New York Times (May, 1958), "the event cannot simply be dismissed as communist inspired. This is a mistake that is too often made in Latin American affairs." However, the Eisenhower administration ignored such advice.

Nixon then travelled from Lima to Bogotá (Raymont, 2005, p. 104). After ten years of civil war the military was able to repress any civilian opposition in Colombia. However, the CIA began warning of protests organised for Caracas (Nixon, 1978, p. 185). The CIA advised Nixon (1978) not to enter Venezuela. Nixon (1978) defied their warning and flew to Caracas on May 13, 1958 (p. 186). An estimated 5,000 demonstrators awaited him at Caracas airport (Alexander, 1982, p. 406). As Nixon exited his aircraft, meeting with the provisional military junta, the demonstrators began throwing projectiles and spitting at him (Alexander, 1982, p. 407). The incident was overwhelming for all involved. The Americans hurriedly entered a motorcade destined for the US embassy in central Caracas. En route, the Venezuelan foreign minister explained to Nixon that,

> The Venezuelan people have been without freedom so long that they tend now to express themselves more vigorously…we do not want anything that would be interpreted as a suppression of freedom… (as cited in Nixon, 1978, p. 190).

To which Nixon replied, “if your government does not have the guts [to suppress mob activity] there will soon be no freedom for anyone in Venezuela” (Nixon, 1978, p. 190). Nixon was suggesting that the protestors were communists, and that the military must suppress them to avoid violent revolution. As the motorcade travelled to the US embassy a large group of protesters blockaded the main route (Alexander, 1982, p. 407; Nixon, 1978, p. 191). The motorcade drew to a halt. While it was stopped, the cars were kicked, shaken, stoned and pummelled (Nixon, 1978, p. 191). This was horrifying for both Nixon and his wife Nancy. After twelve minutes the driver of the lead car took the desperate option of forcing his way through the large crowd. The entire motorcade arrived at the embassy safe. However, the ordeal had a significant impact on America’s relationship with South America.

Nixon was irate at the US embassy. He met with the head of the military junta, Wolfgang Larrazábal. As he chastised the Venezuelan leader, he demanded that the car not be kept the embassy as physical evidence of the events that had transpired. Nixon stated

> It’s time that [Latin America] sees some graphic evidence of what communism really is… The men and women who had led the riots could not be loyal to their country because their first loyalty was to the international communist conspiracy… Those mobs were communist led communists, and they have no devotion to freedom at all (Nixon, 1978, p. 191)

Upon learning of the events in Caracas, Eisenhower contemplated an invasion to rescue the Vice President. He stationed four naval divisions in nearby Puerto Rico to be prepared for military intervention (Rabe, 1988, p. 102). However, the military junta controlled the situation. It declared martial law throughout Caracas. In an act of symbolism, Nixon left Caracas via the same road he had been attacked on (Alexander, 1982, p. 408). This time, however, the streets were empty. The thick haze of tear gas indicated why (Alexander, 1982, p. 408). The Venezuelan junta was attempting to prove its anti-communist credentials to the US to ward off any threat of US action in reprisal for the events in Caracas. In many ways it was successful as the elections scheduled for late 1958 occurred as planned. However, the gesture came at the population’s expense.

The US struggled to grasp the motivations of the residents of Lima and Caracas. Nixon's anti-communist paranoia was compounded by his experiences in May 1958. For Nixon (1978), there was no doubt that the Soviet Union had incited the protest against him. This predetermined view of events that overlooked evidence was consistent with the policies of the Eisenhower administration. However, the US Congress was concerned by the events of May 1958. Democratic Congressman Charles Porter invited Figueres to help understand why these protests had occurred (Ameringer, 1978, p. 146). Figueres testified before the Inter-American Affairs Sub-Committee on June 9, 1958. In consultation with his close ally and personal friend Betancourt, Figueres sought utilise the events in Caracas to re-determine the direction of US policy in Latin America. Figueres stated

> I deplore that the people of Latin America…have spit upon a worthy public officer…[However,] I must speak frankly because… the situation demands it: the people cannot spit at a foreign policy…. But when they have exhausted all other means of trying to make themselves understood, the only thing left to do is spitting… (as cited in Ameringer, 1978, pp. 146-147).

Figueres asserted that Latin Americans had been demanding a change to US policy since WWII. The Latin American people had only met intransigence and indifference in return. The people were tired and lacked options. Hence they turned to anger, and the action of spitting upon US foreign policy.

Figueres continued with an indictment of the US' foreign policy towards Latin America since WWII. His first critique was over US policy towards dictators, stating "you have made certain investments in the American dictatorships" (in Ameringer, 1978, pp. 147). Anti-democratic US policies were a result of the imperial system, rather than an aim in and of itself. Figueres also addressed US policy regarding human rights and economics. In a critique of US indifference to human rights in Latin America, Figueres said, "when American boys have been dying, your mourning has been our mourning. When our people die you speak of investments" (in Ameringer, 1978 pp. 146). He questioned the dehumanised pragmatism of US policy in Latin America. He continued by critiquing the US economic policy that condemned much of the region, stating "we want to be paid a fair price…when we provide a product needed by another country" (as cited in Ameringer, 1978, pp. 147-148). According to Figueres, that fair price was "enough

to live, to raise our own capital and to carry on with our own development" (in Ameringer, 1978, pp. 147). Figueres' testimony echoed the structure of Roosevelt's 1941 Four Freedoms Speech. This was done to demonstrate the purposeful denial of any of those freedoms to the vast majority of the Latin American citizenry. Figueres was offering Washington the opportunity to redevelop their Latin American policy. However, to Eisenhower, no severe threat was posed by the events of 1958. Additional support for military regimes could continue to safeguard US regional interests. Figueres' insightful testimony was lost as a footnote in history due to Eisenhower's failure to act on his suggestions.

Kubitschek's Operation Pan-America

Operation Pan-America was an attempt to pursue policies of economic nationalism to improve the quality of life of individuals in Latin America. OPA was not intended to be like a Marshall Plan directed by the US. It was a domestic economic reform package reliant upon foreign capital investment. Its replacement by the AFP accounts for its limited place within Latin American historiography. However, the literature of 'developmentalism' in Latin America offers insight into the motivation of OPA. According to Szusterman (1993), the economic philosophy of 'developmentalism' was the creation of self-sustaining growth in multilayered industry not dependent on foreign exports (pp. 75-80). Argentines, including Prebisch, Perón, and Frondizi, believed that significant capital investment was required to establish this level of industrialisation (Szusterman, 1993, pp. 79-90). Without capital injections the state is dependent upon export for foreign exchange and foreign energy reserves. Sikkink (1992) furthers this point by stating that developmentalism was "based on the belief that industrialisation was necessary for development" (p. 32). She continues

> The interrelated policy components …characterised developmentalism: (1) intense vertical [ISI]… (2) Rapid capital accumulation [through] foreign, private and public sources; (3) state involvement to channel initiative into priority areas (Sikkink, 1992, p. 33.)

Moreover, OPA was Kubitschek's attempt to utilise growing Cold War tensions to demand a complete overhaul of Washington's economic strategy towards Latin America. He sought US support for his vision of developmentalism, however, this

was directly opposed to the US liberal philosophy of trade expansionism. This section will detail the Brazilian attempt to create OPA.

Juscelino Kubitschek sought to evolve inter-American relations in the aftermath of the 1958 protests. He attempted to demonstrate the need for immediate capitalist development. In a private letter to Eisenhower, Kubitschek claimed that the Caracas protests were the "product of years of neglect" (Alexander, 1991, p. 109). Kubitschek saw Caracas as pivotal as he exaggerated the communist menace to place Brazilian development within the context of the Cold War. This was a calculated move where he claimed that the "continued economic development of the Western Hemisphere is vital to the winning of the Cold War" and that no military would protect the region should "the great masses in Latin America continue in poverty and disease" (Alexander, 1991, p. 280). In his attempts to persuade Eisenhower into granting significant economic assistance, Kubitschek worked closely with the Argentine Frondizi, the Colombian Lleras and the Peruvian Manuel Prado (Sikkink, 1992, p. 140). A revolutionary left threatened these four governments. However, each lacked the necessary capital to appeal to the masses. Kubitschek acknowledged that social progress and economic development require capital and that the US was the major creditor to the region. They proposed Operation Pan-America in 1958 (Alexander, 1991, p. 286). OPA was an economic alliance that required significant economic assistance from the US. The Latin Americans sought to acquire this assistance by demonstrating the threat of poverty to hemispheric security.

OPA was an ambitious investment program proposed by Kubitschek. However, the US had little intention of negotiating. Kubitschek's vision for OPA was

> Obtaining a level of living per-capita, which permits the beginning of a process of a cumulative and autonomous growth with local resources, to a satisfactory level, without brusque or institutional alterations (Alexander, 1991, p. 288).

Kubitschek stated that Brazil alone required an investment of US$3.5 billion (Alexander, 1991, p. 289). Dulles disagreed. According to Kubitschek, "Foster Dulles showed himself as a tenacious arguer, intransigent, almost incapable of reaching agreement. He put forth his points of view, and from there was no way out" (cited in, Alexander, 1991, p. 281). It was no coincidence that the US and

Dulles opposed OPA. Kubitschek proposed a revolution in US-Latin American relations. He sought significant commodity price reform. If Brazil received a higher price for coffee, US corporations would lose profit. Additionally, the Brazilians would need to commit less labour to coffee production to meet the demands of foreign exchange. Brazil also sought US aid to construct industries that would compete with US exports. The creation of moderate to heavy industrialisation would limit Brazil's dependence on US capital goods. Finally, the production and accumulation of Brazilian capital would give the nation economic autonomy. This would allow Brazilian capital to replace US investment in the domestic economy. Brazil's economy would be free to operate without regard for US industrial and military needs. Kubitschek asked the US to forfeit their economic dominance of Brazil. Beyond this, he sought to extend this economic revolution to greater Latin America. Kubitschek was correct in his claim that substantial US investment was required to improve the lives of all Latin Americans. However, he was incorrect in assuming that this improvement was vital to US interests.

Eisenhower's intransigence led to a resurgence of economic nationalism in Brazil and Argentina known as "developmentalism" (Sikkink, 1992, pp. 105-121, 132-14). Kubitschek promised "fifty years' progress in five" (Sikkink, 1992, p. 134). From 1956 he set about achieving a "targets program" emphasising "a monetary and budget program, an exchange reform, and an investment plan. His plan centred on the expansion of the energy, transport and manufacturing industries in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Sikkink, 1992, pp. 132-140). Kubitschek's most ambitious development plan was the new capital, Brasília. The construction of this city meant significant investment in transport and communications to service it. Kubitschek adopted an independent tariff and fiscal policy, and broke ties with the IMF over currency policy (Sikkink, 1992, p. 142). The IMF encouraged austerity and the end of developmentalism in order to curb inflation (Sikkink, 1992, p. 142). Decreasing coffee prices limited Brazil's capital reserves. The Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch also supported policies of developmentalism (Sikkink, 1992, p. 252). Developmentalism was also partially adopted by Frondizi, who declared after the 1958 election:

> Our triumph will be a great step forward in the struggle against colonialist imperialism and native oligarchies who throughout the continent have

> always blocked national development and the fraternity of the people of the Americas (Sikkink, 1992, p. 85).

In his first year, Frondizi also established a "targets program" (Sikkink, 1992, p. 111). He sought to rapidly expand the Argentine economy through private capitalist investment in both resource extraction and industrial manufacturing. Frondizi and Kubitschek sought to enlarge their economies rapidly. They did so without direct support from the US.

Eisenhower's intransigence towards Latin American affairs was motivated by a doctrine of military supremacy. He began his second term by adopting NSC directive 5613/1, which stated

> If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet Bloc close ties of such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital national interests, be prepared to diminish government economic and financial cooperation with that country and take any other political, economic, or military actions deemed appropriate (as cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 91).

Eisenhower's administration refused to accept any change to its hegemonic relationship with Latin America. This approach defied the realities of the relationship. Ten anti-communist dictatorships fell during Eisenhower's second term. J. F. Dulles commented, "if we carry out our theory too rigidly the practical result would be that many friendly governments would collapse and communism would take over" (Rabe, 1988, p. 107). The conservative Secretary of State acknowledged the changing role of Latin America in the face of revolutionary anti-Americanism. In 1959 Christian Herter replaced him due to declining health (Schoultz, 2009, p. 105). Between 1955 and 1959 regional military assistance was increased from US$54 million to US$160 million (Rabe, 1988, p. 107). Dulles' warning was not headed. Eisenhower continued to govern via his central philosophy. His refusal to participate in OPA was fuelled by a belief that regional security was best served through alliances with conservative, and often despotic, regimes. In 1959 a small group of revolutionaries in Cuba permanently altered Washington's view of Latin America. Fidel Castro goaded Washington into an aggressive re-evaluation of its policies towards a continent that it had dominated just four years earlier. The prolonged radicalisation of Latin American politics from 1955-1959, in addition to the Cuban Revolution, brought about this change.

The Cuban Revolution: Castro, the New Left and the Confirmation of Pretext

The Cuban Revolution is often seen as the 'origin' of the Cold War in Latin America. In many ways it was. Fidel Castro invited the USSR to participate in Cuban political, economic and military affairs, bringing the Western Hemisphere to the precipice of disaster in October 1962. This was the first conflict between the US and the USSR in Latin America. However, this thesis adopts a more critical approach to the concept of the 'Cold War' in Latin America. In this mould, it views the Cuban Revolution of 1956-1959 as the logical evolution of the intellectual tradition of social democracy in Latin America. The revolution was not fought for the interests of the USSR. It was fought for the interests of the Cuban people and the revolutionary cadre, led by Fidel Castro. The 26th of July movement (M26) espoused the philosophy of José Martí, whose ideas had underpinned Cuban political thought since its independence from Spain (Benjamin, 1990, p. 143). Martí's ideas had influenced the PRC-A regimes of Grau and Prío, but more significantly the *Ortodoxo* politician Eduardo Chibás (Ameringer, 2000, p. 45). Chibás' philosophy, and the experience of the armed struggle, influenced Castro's revolutionary ideas and shaped his political program. This chapter will explain the political, economic and philosophical motivations of Castro and the Cuban Revolution. It will also examine the position of Castroism within Latin American political thought to demonstrate Castro's gradual divergence from the social democratic tradition. Furthermore, it will argue that the revolution was radicalised between 1959 and 1963 by the actions of both the US and the USSR. While the US sought to remove Castro, his position became useful to its stance on Latin America. Castro confirmed those accusations of communism that US officials had been directing at Latin American leaders for thirty years. By establishing a nationalist-socialist regime, and eventually allying Cuba to Soviet interests, Castro provided Washington with the justification to increase its political and economic grip upon Latin America in the wake of the revolution.

Cuba and the Origins of 'Castroism'

Political theorists have debated the ideological orientation of the Cuban Revolution since 1959. However, no conclusive definition of Castroism has emerged. Leading Cold War historians have viewed the distinction between

Castroism and communism as trivial, given Castro's eventual admission into the Soviet camp. Attempting to fit the narrative of the global Cold War, the Preeminent Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis (2007) called the Cuban Revolution "a Marxist-Leninist insurgency" (p. 75). Citing Soviet sources, Gaddis' simplification is typical of American Cold War historiography. However, Castroism was distinct from Soviet inspired communist insurgencies elsewhere in the world. The Communist Parties of Latin America were orientated towards Moscow and pragmatically waited for revolutionary conditions to emerge in their individual republics (Aguilar, 1968, pp. 42-58). The Soviets doubted Castro's allegiance to Marxism (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 295). Meanwhile Castro, and those regional insurgents who followed his doctrine, promoted a political and economic philosophy in line with the social democratic movement, despite their more radical tactics. However, they aggressively fought for those programs that previous constitutional governments had failed to deliver. Aguilar (1988) presents the most useful analysis: Cuban Marxism "is merely a repertoire of slogans serving to organise various interests, most of them completely remote from those which Marxism originally identified itself" (p. 140). Moreover, Castroism pragmatically utilised Marxist rhetoric in applying reforms that were not initially 'revolutionary', but were demanded by the bulk of the population. The rhetoric rather than the policies, afforded his regime the support of the USSR, in light of the inevitable aggression from the US. Sánchez (1967) offers the most detailed analysis of Castroism. He summarised its characteristics as: "exceptional powers and qualities" of the leader; economic dependence on an external source; and a commitment to "revolutionary duties" in the hemisphere (pp. 214-215). He asserts that Castroism was unique from communism. This section will trace the ideological origins of Fidel Castro and Castroism.

Fidel Castro was born into considerable wealth. His family, of Spanish heritage, owned significant property in the sugarcane region of Southern Cuba (Skierka, 2004, p. 5). He was afforded the luxury of a private boarding school education and progressed to Havana University in 1945 (Skierka, 2004, p. 11). The administration of the *Auténtico* Grau lacked the willingness to enact radical, or even nationalist, economic policies, leaving the Cuban electorate dissatisfied (Ameringer, 2000, p. 41). Castro arrived at maturity during a unique time in Cuban history. The political system was freer than at any time in the past (Ameringer,

2000, p. 66-87). However, leftist fervour was growing as a response to the alleged incompetence and corruption of the civilian government. During this time, Castro entered student politics while studying Law. An average student, Castro became more interested in politics than his education. In 1946 he delivered a speech that condemned both US imperialism and the failures of the Grau government, raising his national profile (Skierka, 2004, p. 24). Castro became increasingly involved in regional democratic action. He joined the failed 1947 Caribbean Legion invasion of the Dominican Republic (Tunzelman, 2011, p. 38). He also attended the 1948 Bogotá conference of the OAS, which saw the death of Gaitán and the subsequent *Bogotázo* (Tunzelman, 2011, p. 40). He was involved in the anti-US protest movement, but took refuge once the violence increased. The origins of *Castroism* lie within the ideological progression of the young Fidel Castro. By 1947 he had chosen his political and philosophical path, as a young *Ortodoxo* and a follower of the politician Eduardo Chibás.

Chibás was a member of the anti-Machado resistance and an active advocate of the *Auténtico* program for Cuba (Benjamin, 1990, p. 141). He was elected to the Cuban Congress in 1940, where he remained until his death (Skierka, 2004, p. 25). However, Chibás grew frustrated with the inability of Grau to enact reform. On May 11 1947, Chibás declared the establishment of the *Ortodoxos* as "he claimed that Grau had abandoned the ideas and programs of the PRC-A" (Ameringer, 2000, p. 41). Chibás unsuccessfully ran for the Cuban Presidency in 1948 (Ameringer, 2000, p. 84). He was prominent primarily as a radio host, and his weekly broadcast had a loyal following throughout Cuba. During those broadcasts, he routinely accused the government of both corruption and intransigence (Ameringer, 2000, p. 37). Cuba moved quickly to the right under the presidency of Carlos Prío. Chibás claimed that the *Auténticos* abandoned their ideological commitment to the Cuban people. Benjamin (1990) notes "under the charismatic leadership of Eduardo Chibás, the *Ortodoxos* held together in growing tension the forces of moderate political reform and those of political purification" (p. 141). In fact, support for the *Ortodoxos* grew significantly between 1947 and 1951 (Tunzelman, 2011, pp. 38-44). Fidel Castro was an *Ortodoxo*. He later formed the *Ortodoxo* Radical Action (ARO) group within Chibás' movement (Ameringer, 2000, p. 39). Castro considered himself the "intellectual descendent" of Chibás, and prepared for the 1952 elections, in which he sought a Congressional seat

(Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 38). However, Castro's life took an unexpected turn in August 1951. Chibás had caught wind of a plan to overthrow the constitutional government to prevent what he perceived as likely *Ortodoxo* victories in key offices. To create maximum political impact, Chibás committed suicide on air on August 5, 1951 (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 38). This was followed by Batista's coup in early 1952. In that year, all constitutional options were taken away from Castro and the *Ortodoxos*.

A small group of revolutionaries set about returning Cuba to constitutional government and fulfilling the *Ortodoxo* vision for Cuba. Following the failed attack on the Moncada barracks Castro laid out his revolutionary philosophy. Benjamin (1990) asserts that "the thesis of 'history will absolve me' followed the moral reformism of Eduardo Chibás and drew inspiration from the utopian egalitarianism of José Martí" (p. 143). Castro cited Chibás' forewarning of Batista's military despotism within his 1953 speech. He then laid out four revolutionary 'laws' that "would have" come into effect if Moncada had succeeded (Castro, 1953). They included: the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution; extensive land reform; fairer distribution of profits to industrial and agricultural workers, by way of wages; and the expropriation of properties attained through government fraud (Castro, 1953). He continued to state that he possessed majority support in Cuba and that "history will absolve" his actions (Castro, 1953). The revolution, until 1959, was fought by the Cuban people for these revolutionary principals built upon the *Auténtico* and *Ortodoxo* platforms of "nationalism, socialism and anti-Imperialism" (Grau, as cited in Ameringer, 2000, p. 44). It was extremely important that Castro's message was consistent and appealing to the majority of the Cuban people. A communist revolution would have lacked that appeal.

Castro's ideological relationship to 'communism' has been scrutinised given the outcome of the revolution. Castro committed to Marxism-Leninism following the revolution in December 1961 (Aguilar, 1988, p. 147). He did so to procure Soviet economic and military assistance against the aggression of the US. Nevertheless, this ideological orientation is the defining legacy of the Cuban Revolution. There is no evidence to indicate that Castro was a communist prior to 1959. The Cuban Revolution did not follow 'Leninist' strategy, as power was handed back to conservatives for much of 1959 (Ratliff, 1976, p. 33). The Cuban people were not indoctrinated towards socialism or Marxism until 1961, nor did

the Castro cadre make any public proclamation of Marxism until then. However, given that Marxism is an ideology, there is no way to prove that it did not influence Castro's thinking prior to the revolutionary victory. All that can conclusively be said is that Castroism is unique, and a result of Fidel's ideological progression between 1945 and 1961. The Cuban communists did not directly influence him (Sánchez, 1967, p. 26). Castro opposed the sedentary nature of their organisation, and the *Ortodoxos* competed and were successful in obtaining members (Pérez-Stable, 2012, pp. 72-80). The small group of 37,000 predominately middle-class professionals collaborated with the Batista dictatorship and publicly condemned both the Moncada assault and the Sierra Maestra campaign (Sánchez, 1967, p. 39). They were the only progressives omitted from the pact of Caracas in 1958 and Castro also tightly monitored their actions in the early revolutionary period (Sánchez, 1967, p. 28). Moreover, Castroism and communism were distinct. Castro's Marxism "has been generally limited to vague declarations or sporadic quotes often aimed at justifying pragmatic political decisions" (Aguilera, 1988, p. 140). His version of Marxism was designed to procure the necessary amount of domestic and foreign support for his revolution to ensure its longevity. While it eventually evolved to a form of communism, it was due to political factors, and does not demonstrate the ideological development of Fidel Castro or his movement.

Castro's political philosophy was influenced by Cuba's political and economic situation under Fulgencio Batista. He looked to the indentured agricultural population as the key to his revolution. More so than any other Latin American nation, Cuba was an economic satellite of the US. Under Batista, "Americans owned forty per cent of the Cuban sugar industry, eighty per cent of Cuban utilities [and] ninety per cent of Cuban mining" (Beschloss, 1991, p. 88). The Cuban economy was completely dependent on sugar sales to the US, however, the significant decrease in world sugar prices between 1955 and 1958 left Cubans increasingly impoverished (Pérez, 2011, p. 226). This poverty was felt disproportionately in rural areas. The top 20 per cent of Cubans, primarily urban professionals, took 62 per cent of the national income (Pérez, 2011, p. 229). This figure accounts for the average annual wage of US$374, which was second in the region behind that of oil-rich Venezuela (Pérez, 2011, p. 225). The importation of US$777 of US consumer goods affected the real purchasing power of the Cuban

people (Pérez, 2011, p. 225). Meanwhile, "nearly 60 per cent of the total labour force languished permanently in conditions between unemployment and underemployment," due to the seasonal nature of the sugar economy (Pérez, 2011, p. 227). Cubans wanted to replace Batista. However, the urban opposition was unable, and unwilling, to wage a long-term war against the well-trained and armed Cuban army. Hence, rural poverty became the greatest source of revolutionary ferment in Cuba. Without government intervention, this poverty was set to increase. Between 1956 and 1958 150,000 Cubans reached working age, while only 8,000 urban jobs were created (Pérez, 2011, p. 228). Accordingly, the children of rural peasants would mature into rural peasants. The PRC-A, while ideologically committed, never enacted meaningful land reform in Cuba (Ameringer, 2000, pp. 24-56). These factors made revolution in rural Cuba inevitable.

The Sierra Maestra

The Sierra Maestra was unique in Latin American history. It was the first successful rural insurgency to overthrow a government. Under Castro's leadership, the M26 abandoned the constitutional road in favour of a violent rural insurgency. Wickham-Crowley (1992) argues "Guerrilla movements do not begin among the peasants in the countryside, but among urban-based intellectuals" (30). Castro, however, chose the rural community to stage his revolution. He saw the *campesino* population to be most susceptible to his revolutionary ideals. Wickham-Crowley (1991) has attributed the rise of rural insurrections to "a breakdown of...centralised state authority" in the Sierra Maestra and surrounding regions (p. 35). The peasantry were betrayed by the state. The army, often inadvertently, had committed atrocities against the rural population, which allowed the revolutionary cadre to establish informal rule in the Sierra Maestra. The support for the rebels was based on "promises of land reform" and monetary rewards (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 35). This support was vital, as the revolutionary cadre was extremely small making it dependent on peasant support. Moreover, while this form of revolution does not begin in rural areas, peasants nurture it. That is, they are convinced by the rhetoric of the leader – that their lives will improve after the revolution. Cuba was the first Latin American example of such a movement. This section will explain the military and political program of the Cuban M26 through its eventual victory in January 1959.

Latin America had a longstanding tradition of social democratic and populist revolutions against authoritarian regimes. These primarily occurred either within the military or amongst urban elites in capital cities. While the Cuban Revolution represented a unique strategy, the class origins of the leading cadre were consistent with other anti-dictatorial movements in Latin America during the twentieth century (Aguilar, 1988, pp. 140-144). It is also consistent with the 1933 anti-Machado movement that was quickly stifled by the military. No civilian movement can permanently protect itself from the military without the physical support of the great majority of the people. Even with that support, the revolutionary leaders must be willing to utilise that support by arming the citizenry. Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's observations of Árbenz's downfall in Guatemala indicated the perils of the constitutional road (Ratliff, 1976, p. 27). Guevara's experience in Guatemala convinced him "that the struggle against the oligarchic system and the main enemy, Yankee imperialism, must be an armed one, supported by the people" (as cited in Blum, 2004, p. 82). Moreover, the Cuban Revolution was a significant departure from the moderate social democratic revolutions. It was also distinct from 'communism,' which had taken the constitutional road until this point (Aguilar, 1988, p. 140). The Cuban Popular Socialist Party (PSP) criticised the Moncada assault as a "desperate action which may be regarded as an adventure..," asserting that such action could "lead only to failure" (Harnecker, 1987, p. 16). Moreover, the Sierra Maestra strategy was unique in Latin American history. Batista's conventional army and police force were ill-equipped to counter this new form of 'insurgency' (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 37).

Castro attempted to land a small revolutionary army in the Sierra Maestra in Southern Cuba. His revolutionary cadre would procure additional rural support through revolutionary propaganda, financial incentives, education and Guevara's ability as a medical doctor (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 41). The revolutionaries had significant financial backing from sympathetic wealthy Cubans, urban Cuban anti-Batista politicians, Cuban expatriates throughout the Western Hemisphere and members of the social democratic movement, including Betancourt and Figueres (Ameringer, 1978, p. 149). The Granma departed from Mexico in November 1956, taking 82 Cuban exiles to Playa Las Coloradas (Sweig, 2002, p. 13). The landing was a disaster, as it missed the beach and the rebels were forced

to make their way through mangrove swamps (Sweig, 2002, p. 14). Batista's troops were onsite to prevent the majority of rebels from reaching the Sierra Maestra. Approximately 20 of the 82 participants survived to continue the revolution. Significantly, the survivors included the Castro brothers, Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. Once in the Sierra, the rebels had to regroup. They had lost the majority of their equipment, supplies and Guevara's asthma medication (Sweig, 2002, p. 14). Over the following months the rebels integrated their movement into rural communities and began the task of overthrowing the authoritarian Batista regime.

The expansion of the Cuban Revolution was dependent on popular support in Cuba. The small revolutionary cadre was poorly armed and lacked basic provisions. It needed to expand and strengthen for the Cuban Revolution to succeed. However, by January 1957 most Cubans outside of the Sierra Maestra believed that Castro was dead (Depalma, 2006, p. 33). Castro sought to expand his revolution through propaganda. Given that his revolution was dependent on national and international support, Castro reached out to the New York Times journalist Herbert Matthews to propagandise the revolution (Depalma, 2006, p. 67). Matthews travelled to Havana in February, completing significant background work prior to his arranged meeting with Castro. Fidel Castro "controlled the setting, the timing, and to a large extent the content of the interview" (Depalma, 2006, p. 77). His supporters took Matthews into the Sierra Maestra. From there, the interview was carefully staged. Light was limited, the aura of threat was exaggerated, and the power of the revolutionary cadre was overstated (Depalma, 2006, p. 81). Castro confidently told Matthews that his movement had total support in Cuba and that they were well-equipped to defeat Batista and to create an effective government. He also stated that his movement espoused "nationalism" and "was angry with the United States for continuing to support Batista" (Castro, as cited in Depalma, 2006, p. 86). The world knew Fidel Castro's name from February 1957. While this was an exaggerated version of Castro, the myth was more significant to the revolution than any realities on the ground as continuing support was dependent on the viability of the M26 as an opposition force. The spectre of strength created more supporters in urban areas and procured more foreign financial support.

The Cuban Revolution gained momentum during 1957. As the revolutionaries' message of liberation began resonating with the poor, it expanded to several thousand in late 1957. However, this regional struggle could not succeed in isolation. The M26 were dependent upon support from urban revolutionaries, in addition to foreign assistance. The rebels required resources and ammunition to defeat Batista's army. Guevara acknowledged the support of the urban revolutionary "*Ilano*" group towards the rural guerrillas (Sweig, 2002, p. 4). One of the leading theoreticians of the *Ilano* was Frank País, who was killed in August 1957 by Batista's troops (Benjamin, 1990, p. 147). País viewed the aim of the revolution as

> To remove, demolish and destroy the colonialist system that still reigns, to do away with the bureaucracy, eliminate superfluous mechanisms, extracting true values and…[to] introduce the values of modern philosophical currents that currently prevail in the world (as cited in Sweig, 2002, p. 12).

País and the Ilano had links within the PRC-A and other moderate anti-Batista groups (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 38). They raised money inside Cuba to pay for ammunition for the guerrillas. They also had foreign connections within Latin America and within the US. Former President Prío committed US$50,000 to the revolution in 1956 (Tunzelman, 2011, p. 71). The former Costa Rican president José Figueres personally raised US$70,000 towards the Cuban Revolution (Ameringer, 1978, p. 147). Additional support was procured from Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and liberal organisations in the US (Goldenberg, 1965, pp. 180-199). Batista feared this expansion and launched Operation Verano in June 1958 (Benjamin, 1990, p. 153). After two months, Castro's forces prevailed (Pérez, 2011, p. 234). By this time all progressives were allied under the July 1958 Pact of Caracas (Pérez, 2011, p. 234). The PSP was not in this alliance until late 1958. Castro asserted his dominance over the revolutionary process in Cuba and would control the peace.

By late 1958, victory for the rebels was inevitable. Batista's military claimed that 90 per cent of Cubans supported Castro's aims (Pérez, 2011, p. 236). By October, the CIA (1959) and State Department acknowledged that Batista would be overthrown. However, they feared a government led by Castro. They sought to co-opt the revolutionary process. State Department official William Pawley urged

Batista "to capitulate to a caretaker government unfriendly to [Batista], but satisfactory to [the US], whom [Washington] could immediately recognise and give military assistance to in order to ensure Fidel Castro does not come to power" (Pérez, 2011, p. 235). By instilling a conservative 'democrat,' the US attempted to avoid the force of a revolutionary government. While they acknowledged the need for democracy, they hoped there would be no progressive reform in regard to agriculture, economics or international relations (Benjamin, 1990, p. 152). Batista refused to leave. The struggle continued. Conditions in Havana worsened. The three revolutionary fronts of Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro and Ernesto Guevara advanced quickly (Pérez-Stable, 2012, p. 66). On January 1 1959 Batista fled Cuba via the Dominican Republic, taking US$424 million from the national reserve to impoverish the incoming government (Lamrani, 2013, p. 18). Guevara arrived in Havana on January 2, and Castro followed on January 8 (Pérez-Stable, 2012, p. 67). To avoid the condemnation of the US, Castro had appointed the "fiercely anti-communist" Manuel Urrutia as provisional President on January 3 (Lamrani, 2013, p. 18). While Castro had defeated Batista, larger enemies would confront the Cuban Revolution in its first months of power.

The Radicalisation of the Cuban Revolution

American foreign policy towards Cuba has been characterised in several ways. Schoultz (2009) defines America's initial response to the revolution as pragmatic and patient. He characterised this US response as "nudging" Castro towards their interests. Morley (1987) argues that "United States policy toward Cuba after 1959" sought to "destabilise and overthrow the Castro government" (p.72). In his economic analysis, Lamrani (2013) writes that US policy amounted to "economic warfare" (p. 1). He argues that the embargo was designed to destabilise the domestic economy so as to undermine Castro's revolutionary ambitions. While interpretations of US policies vary, the consequences did not. Because of US action, Cuba left the capitalist world and joined the Socialist camp between 1960 and 1963. The US journalist Walter Lipmann asserted that "the thing we should never do in dealing with the revolutionary countries in which the world abounds, is to push them behind an iron curtain raised by ourselves" (cited in, Schoultz, 2009, p. 100). The Cuban Revolution was radicalised by American foreign policy as Castro was forced to choose between forfeiting his revolution and entering the Soviet

sphere. As his political power was dependent on fulfilling the aims of the revolution, he was determined to avoid the mistakes of Árbenz. This required adherence to the political and economic policy of the Soviet Union. This section will explain how the actions of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations pushed Castro away from US interests and towards the Soviet Union.

The US was wary of Fidel Castro's leadership of Cuba prior to the rebel victory in January 1959 (Pérez, 2011, p. 235). While the US did not see Castro as a communist, they were attentive to his anti-US rhetoric and that of other, more radical, members of the cadre. Despite the emerging conflict, key US officials questioned Castro's 'communism.' Dulles informed the US Senate that he did not believe Castro to be a communist (Schoultz, 2009, p. 84). Castro also sought to normalise Cuban-American relations. He appointed the Liberal democratic Urrutia as the constitutional face of the revolution on January 3, 1959 (Pérez-Stable, 2012 p. 66). More significantly, he appointed Felipe Pazos and Regino Boti to the treasury to create a moderate economic plan for Cuba (Pérez-Stable, 2012, p. 68). After recognising Urrutia's Cuba, the US replaced the pro-Batista ambassador, Earl T. Smith, with the liberal Philip Bonsal (Morley, 1987, p. 74). While Bonsal was outwardly intellectual, multicultural and progressive, he was also a fiscal conservative. While in Bolivia "he had proved an effective instrument of [US] policy to slow down the revolution" (Morley, 1987, p. 74). In May the Cubans began their urban reform laws designed to lower rents, utility prices and basic consumer goods (Pérez, 2011, p. 242). While these actions left US investment largely unhindered, Castro's anti-US proclamations and his strategy of a "third position" concerned Washington (Schoultz, 2009, p. 91). Similar to the Argentine Perónists of the 1940s, Castro sought to remove his government's actions from the context of the global Cold War by claiming neutrality between American capitalism and Soviet communists. He extended this neutrality by promising an impartial stance towards both at the UN, when addressing the General Assembly in 1960 (Beschloss, 1991, p. 98). It was these actions, rather than the early economic ones, that alerted US officials of the threat emerging in Cuba. Nevertheless, the NSC began discussing how to remove the rebels from power as early as March 1959. If Castro could not be "nudged" towards US interests, they needed a pretext to dislodge him (Schoultz, 2009, p. 89).

Castro controlled the Cuban Revolution. His utilisation of liberals was designed to procure a sympathetic American response. However, the revolution was based on his populist measures granted to the people. The centrepiece of the economic program was agrarian reform. The Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959 applied to all rural properties exceeding 1,000 acres, except for those producing exportable crops, which were permitted to be 3,333 acres (Pérez, 2011, p. 243). Expropriated land was compensated through government bonds payable after 25 years at the taxable value as of October 1958 (Pérez, 2011, p. 243). The first round of expropriations targeted Cuban landowners. However, by July Americans also faced expropriations. The largest property owner in Cuba was the Kleberg cattle ranch (Morley, 1987, p. 83). Richard Kleberg reacted strongly to this action. He lobbied the State Department and even had a private appointment with President Eisenhower, claiming, "Cuba is being dominated and run by the agents of Soviet communism" (Schoultz, 2009, p. 707). The sugar industry made similar appeals to the US government. In a meeting with the sugar baron Thomas Mass and Lawrence Crosby of the Cuban-American Sugar Council, it was indicated that Castro's actions threatened to destroy the industry (Schoultz, 2009, p. 96). Castro was caught in a difficult position. It was evident that the US was opposed to moderate economic reform in Cuba, as it directly impacted its private investments. Yet, the Cuban Revolution hinged on the high expectations of the people. If he lost popular support, he would lose control of the revolution. Fidel asserted that his agrarian reform was based on the US-led program in post-war Japan (Jones, 2008, p. 82). Nevertheless, the modest reforms proposed by the Agrarian Reform Law were enough to convince the US that Castro was opposed to US interests.

The interests of Cuba and the US continued to diverge in the year following October 1959. The US still hoped that conservative democrats would remain at the top of the revolutionary leadership. However, from October the M26 took control of the Cuban government: on October 17, Raúl Castro became Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Fidel Castro declared the creation of a popular militia to defend the revolution; and on November 25, Guevara was appointed head of the National Bank (Franklin, 1992, p. 28). To prevent US confiscation, Guevara hurriedly transferred Cuba's foreign exchange to Canadian and Swiss banks. Castro began ruling by decree as the Cuban Premier, superseding the power of the weak Presidency of Osvaldo Torrado (Pérez, 2011, p. 251). These

governmental changes solidified the US view of Cuba as anti-American and potentially communist. According to Morley (1987), "sometime during the fall of 1959, officials of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency initiated discussion that culminated in the President's approval in March 1960 of a covert action and economic sabotage memorandum" (p. 85). The political tension grew as Eisenhower's government ceased its attempts to work collaboratively with the Cuban regime, which in turn, led to further conflict. In January 1960, Eisenhower began the process of reducing, and eventually eliminating, Cuba's sugar quota. This led Castro to initiate trade with the Soviet Union (Franklin, 1992, p. 31).[105] In June, US oil properties were expropriated for their refusal to process Soviet crude oil (Morley, 1987, p. 87). Eisenhower responded by cancelling the Cuban sugar quota, driving Castro into further dependence upon the Eastern Bloc. America's regional stance at the OAS meeting in San José, Costa Rica, further indicated its hostility towards the Cuban Revolution (Alexander, 1964, p. 146). Castro (1959) vociferously responded through his famed Declaration of Havana on September 2, 1959. This anti-American tirade was directed at the "free people" of the Americas, in response to the North American Declaration of San José (Castro, 1959). Castro moved further to the left for the duration of 1960. In October 1960, the Cuban government completed the expropriation of all US property, ending all hopes of rapprochement (García-Luis, 2007, pp. 39-44).

The plan to remove Castro was multifaceted under the Eisenhower administration. It sought to demoralise the Cuban people through propaganda, economic sabotage, and ultimately the assassination of the leading cadre (Morley, 1987, p. 85). During 1960, Cuba was bombarded with aerial assaults and domestic acts of terrorism. It also faced propaganda efforts through radio and leaflet drops (Jones, 2008, p. 43). However, Eisenhower's initial strategy did not generate the required results leading to his approval of a plan to aggressively invade Cuba on November 9, 1960 (Jones, 2008, p. 34). His administration approved the Bay of Pigs as the landing site and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. This plan to 'liberate' Cuba through the use of exiles was passed from Eisenhower to the incumbent Kennedy administration. Kennedy was elected on a platform of anti-communism. According to Robert McNamara, "Kennedy insisted that the United States cannot allow the Castro government to exist in Cuba" (Jones, 2008, p. 31).

[105] This will be discussed below.

Kennedy approved the CIA plan to invade Cuba with 1500 Cuban exiles (Jones, 2008, p. 42). The troops were trained in Guatemala during 1960. Nicaragua was an ally in the invasion, providing airstrips for aerial bombing. The US also planned to provide aerial support by dropping 500-pound demolition bombs and 750-pound napalm bombs on strategic targets (Jones, 2008, p. 35). However, little went to plan. In the months leading up to the April invasion, Guatemalans discovered the poorly disguised training facility. Latin American expert Tad Szulc reported this in the *New York Times* (Jones, 2008, p. 65).[106] The Soviets also discovered the plan and warned Castro (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 343). By this time, Castro was well armed with Soviet ammunition (Beschloss, 1991, pp. 112-119). The initial plan to 'liberate' Cuba covertly had been bungled even before the April 17 invasion. Kennedy was caught between calling off the invasion and the JCS's suggestion of full-scale US involvement. Ultimately, he chose the middle-ground by approving the attack with only minimal visible US support, which left the invading force too weak to pose a credible challenge to Castro's Cuba. The US was seen to be invading Cuba and faced protests at its embassies in Moscow, Warsaw, Cairo, Tokyo, New Delhi, Mexico City and Brasília (Beschloss, 1991, p. 118). Yet its efforts failed to have any impact on Castro's control over Cuba.

American foreign policy radicalised the Cuban Revolution. During the first four years of the Cuban Revolution the United States had isolated Cuba from international diplomacy, removed its traditional avenues of trade, sabotaged its attempts to initiate moderate reform and pushed Cuba closer to the Soviet Union. While these actions were designed to remove the Cuban leadership, they actually pushed the Cuban people further to the left as Castro's accusations of anti-Americanism were continually confirmed by US actions. The Cuban Revolution was not fought for communism. However, by 1961 the Cubans were completely dependent upon the USSR for trade and defence.[107] This led the Castros to prioritise "national sovereignty against the United States and pursuing social justice for the classes populare" over "democracy, civil liberties and free elections" (Pérez-Stable, 2012, p. 82). This allowed Castro to come under the security umbrella of the USSR. On December 1, 1961, he confirmed his ideological

[106]Tad Szulc was invited to serve as Edward Murrow's Latin Regional Chief of the US Information Agency (Cull, 2008, p. 197). His ability to shape US and regional opinion towards Latin America was recognised by the US government.
[107] This will be discussed below.

commitment to 'communism'. Castro stated that, "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist to the end of my life" (Castro, as cited in Aguilar, 1988, p. 147). Within this speech Castro made a candid recognition that Cuba was "making a Socialist revolution without Socialists" (Castro, as cited in Aguilar, 1988, p. 144). Following this, Cuba was removed from the capitalist Western Hemisphere (Rabe, 1999, p. 46). Despite Castro's declarations of communism, it was a deviation of the PSP interpretation (Pérez-Stable, 2012, p. 82). The revolutionary government centralised power within the M26, as it received the support of the people. Moreover, Castro appealed to the Soviet Union through his declarations of communism. He did so because the US was attempting to undermine his regime. Nevertheless, his form of socialism was unique from Soviet communism. It was a radical approach to the nationalist desires of the hemisphere. "Nationalism, Socialism, and Anti-Imperialism" were achieved through the armed struggle, and the creation of an alliance with the USSR (Grau, as cited in Ameringer, 2000, p. 44). The revolutionary government went to these lengths because the US would not allow the social democratic goal to be manifested in the hemisphere.

Castro and the Soviets

Cuba left the capitalist world, entering the Soviet sphere between 1960 and 1963. The Cuban government embraced the Soviet system in order to receive economic and military assistance from the USSR, defending it from aggressive US actions. Tunzelman's critique of Cold War historiography states that "the story of the Cuban Revolution, as it is usually told, is not a story about Cuba. The real object at stake… was Berlin. All the important events are presumed to have taken place in Washington or Moscow. What went on in Moscow is widely considered to be irrelevant" (p. 4). In fact, Castro's relationship with the USSR was pragmatic. It was caused by US aggression. According to Shearman (1987), "it was not a question of [Castro] suddenly becoming sympathetic to Marxism-Leninism, but one of national pride and survival in the face of an increasing threat from the United States"(p. 10). Beschloss (1991) suggests "[Nikita] Khrushchev had gained an ally not by subversion by mainly by sheer luck" (p. 129). This undermines the US' assertion that Castro's Revolution was fought for communism, and that Soviet subversion posed a significant threat to Latin American sovereignty. Regardless of the ideological connection between Castro and Khrushchev, the two states became

interconnected militarily and economically between 1960 and 1963. This section will explain how and why that occurred.

The battlelines between Castro and the US were clearly drawn by 1960. To combat Cuba's dependence on sugar exports to the US., Castro turned to the Eastern Bloc in February 1960. He invited a Soviet trade mission led by Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan (Pérez, 2011, p. 247). The Soviets agreed to purchase five million tons of sugar over five years and to provide Cuba with US$100 million credit to combat its foreign exchange crisis (Morley, 1987, p. 87). The Soviets planned to hand over manufactured goods and minimal US currency to Cuba in exchange for sugar (Morley, 1987, p. 87). Castro also signed trading agreements with Eastern European states and with communist China. This infuriated the US and led to further economic embargos and the eventual reduction of the Cuban sugar quota to zero (Pérez, 2011, p. 247). The Soviets also began sending crude oil to Cuba. This both ensured Cuba's energy supplies and further alienated Castro from the oil companies. By the time of the 1960 expropriations, Castro was completely dependent on the Soviets for trade. The US, which had accounted for the majority of pre-revolutionary Cuba's trade, launched an embargo on it (Lamari, 2013, pp. 23-28). While other hemispheric states, including Canada, continued to trade with Cuba until the crisis of October 1962, most of the industrial equipment required by the Cubans was produced in the US (Lamari, 2013, p. 25). By 1963, Cuba was cut off from the capitalist world. In the space of four years, the Cuban economy went from being a dependent appendage of the American-led capitalist economy, to being a dependent appendage of the Soviet-led socialist economy. Castro's professed desire for 'nationalism' and an independent line between capitalism and communism was impossible given the actions of the two superpowers. While Cuba was economically advantaged through its alliance with the Soviets, it was highly dependent on an alien ideology and interests beyond that of Cuba.

Following the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, Khrushchev committed to defending the Cuban Revolution from American aggression. However, Khrushchev always viewed the Cuban situation within the broader context of the global Cold War (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, pp. 209-302, 344-348). Support for Cuba also helped with domestic policies as the euphoria over Castro's victory within the socialist world eased the pressure on the Kremlin to directly confront the US. Khrushchev

took the opportunity to defend the Cuban Revolution. It was a calculated risk that brought the world to the precipice of destruction. After Cuba declared its communist credentials in April and December 1961 the USSR channelled its resources into Cuba (Beschloss, 1991, pp. 122-125). The Soviets began offering large amounts of ammunition, including MIG jets, tanks and transport vehicles (Jones, 2008, p. 75). In September 1962, Castro and Khrushchev signed the Cuban-Soviet Military Agreement, assuring the mutual defence of the Cuban Revolution (Franklin, 1992, p. 55). To this end, 42,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Cuba by October 1962 (Beschloss, 1991, p. 116). The Soviets also began constructing nuclear missile sites in Cuba to deter the predicted US invasion. This inspired more direct military responses from Washington. In August 1962, the CIA conceded that the removal of Castro would necessitate a full-scale invasion and a long-term occupation (Stern, 2003, p. 23). At this stage, the US was willing to go to these lengths to remove Castro. However, American U2 reconnaissance planes identified the missile sites in Cuba on October 26, 1962 (Franklin,1992, p. 58). Cuba played no role in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev negotiated the removal of the missiles with Kennedy. Kennedy assured the Soviets that the US would not invade Cuba, in addition to other Cold War concessions in Europe (Stern, 2003, p. 23). Castro was furious that the missiles were removed without his consultation. Cuba remained economically dependent upon the Soviets and the Missile Crisis demonstrated the divergent interests of the Cubans and Soviets.

Diverging from Social Democracy

The Cuban Revolution was widely supported in Latin America. Many pro-democratic individuals and governments contributed finances to the revolution. They had also provided refuge for Cuban exiles in Mexico and Venezuela. The revolutionary Pact of Caracas was possible due to active Venezuelan support for Cuba's revolution. This enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution led to public celebrations in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 311). Celebrations went beyond the traditional political sphere as Castro's movement represented the desires of large populations. These celebrations were not pro-communist as most Latin Americans viewed the revolution as an "autochthonous product of the continent [that had been] aroused in [the Cuban] people" and held the potential to "spread to other Latin American countries" (Goldenberg, 1965, p.

311). This revolutionary potential motivated the euphoria surrounding the Cuban Revolution. Castro's radical political and economic policies fulfilled the historical desires of this impoverished global region. The tenets of Castroism were integrated into other standing populist political movements. Upon visiting Havana in 1959, Lázaro Cárdenas criticised his successors in Mexico, asking "did they believe in revolutions or didn't they?" (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 311). The Mexican President López Mateos responded by expropriating and redistributing 16.8 million acres of agricultural land, the largest amount since Cárdenas' presidency (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 313). The Brazilian President Jânio da Silva Quadros bestowed the highest military award upon Guevara (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 314). His successor João Goulart was also criticised by the US for his pro-Castro domestic and foreign policy. The regional popularity of the Cuban Revolution posed a critical threat to all other revolutionaries in Latin America.

The ideological divergence between social democracy and Castroism occurred soon after the revolution. Guevara had personally thanked both Betancourt and Figueres for their financial commitment to the revolution in January 1959. Guevara also invited Figueres to tour Cuba. On March 22, 1959, Figueres addressed the 'worker's palace' alongside Castro (Ameringer, 1978, p. 154). Figueres congratulated the revolutionaries, but urged them to adhere to two central tenets. Firstly, Figueres promoted democracy, which was "the only source of permanent sovereignty for the people" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 154). Secondly, Figueres endorsed support for the West in the global Cold War (Ameringer, 1978, p. 154). As he spoke, the head of the Cuban trade unions, David Salvador interjected with, "we cannot be with the Americans who today are oppressing us" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 154). This issue divided the movement. The social democrats idealistically identified with the US global mission, while the Cubans focussed on direct US actions. Castro addressed the crowd with a rebuffal of Figueres' suggestions. He spoke directly of the need to oppose US influence in Latin America. He then turned his attention to Costa Rica. Castro suggested that no revolution had taken place in Costa Rica. Democracy, he asserted, had not liberated the people. Castro personally attacked Figueres, calling him "a bad friend, a bad democrat and a bad revolutionary" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 156). In March 1959 "the break between the democratic left and the Cuban Revolution occurred on a public stage" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 155).

The social democratic leaders of Costa Rica and Venezuela became hostile to Castro during 1959. They sought to undermine Cuba's regional influence. They feared that the liberation of the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua by Castroist forces would give Castro de-facto leadership over the Latin American anti-dictatorial movement (Alexander, 1964, p. 146). In the face of these problems, Figueres embarked on a US lecture tour in April 1959 where he met with significant diplomats such as Adlai Stevenson, Richard Nixon, Milton Eisenhower, Nelson Rockefeller and Roy Rubottom (Ameringer, 1978, p. 158). In meetings he suggested that "the resistance to my suggestions for understanding with the United States seems in a large part from communist infiltration, but it is also a logical reaction to the sufferings endured under the dictatorship" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 156). Figueres was well-received by both major parties. He wrote to Betancourt, "a prophesy of yours is going to be fulfilled, the United States will have to reach an understanding with us, the Latin American liberals, instead of blindly persecuting us" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 158). While in the US he also addressed the Institute for International Labour Research (IILR), speaking at length with Sacha Volman (Ameringer, 1978, p. 164). Figueres would later discover that Volman was a CIA agent. IILR gave US$100,000 to Figueres to start the Institute for Political Education in November 1959. The CIA began funding the expansion of social democratic principles to combat the appeal of Castroism. Figueres was largely a pawn in this process. The Institute sought to mould future leaders and to "determine their ideology in light of their principles, lessons, experiences and achievements of democracy in service of the people" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 162). Figueres also worked with the CIA agent Cord Meyer in July 1960 to established the Inter-American Democratic Social Movement (IADSM) as an "effort to help integrate the popular political parties, and the labour and student groups that are fighting the democratic battle in Latin America" (Ameringer, 1978, p. 169).

The rift between social democracy and Castroism deepened in 1960 when Guevara addressed a group of Venezuelan students, suggesting that they should organise a Sierra Maestra-type revolution against the Betancourt government (Rabe, 1999, p. 146). Alexander (1964) referred to this as "the final ideological break between the Venezuelan Democratic revolution and the Castro revolution" (p. 146). Betancourt was shocked and denounced the "*Fidelista* interference in Venezuelan politics" (Rabe, 1999, p. 146). He further suggested the establishment

of an Andean Sierra Maestra against several South American governments. These proclamations were influential in the South American decision to remove Cuba from the inter-American community. Support for the Cuban Revolution reduced gradually. The open rift with the social democrats gave the US majority support in its dealings with Cuba. However Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador protected the Cubans from US-led resolutions in the OAS (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 321). Fearing domestic reprisals, even conservative regimes, such as Chile's, refused to be seen as influential in the overthrow of Cuba, (Goldenberg, 1965, pp. 238-245). Support for Cuba increased following the Bay of Pigs incident but fell following Castro's December adherence to Marxism-Leninism. On January 21, 1962, Cuba was voted out of the OAS with the six states choosing to abstain rather than to continue defending Cuba and risking their places in the Alliance for Progress (Stern, 2003, p. 17). Cuba's aggressive actions in South America accelerated the American program to eliminate the Cubans from inter-American discourse. They distanced themselves from their previous allies, seeing their vision of revolution as the only acceptable course in the Western Hemisphere.

The New Cold War in Latin America

Castroism posed a unique challenge to US foreign policy in Latin America between 1959 and 1963. The Cuban government under Castro was the first regional state to utilise the global Cold War to further its political and economic interests. However, Castro's embrace of 'communism' was reluctant and pragmatic. He was not aligned to the Cuban communists and continually stifled their attempts to participate in his revolution (Pérez-Stable, 2012, pp. 76-88). The threat posed by Castroism was temporary and isolated. By 1963 the Cuban Revolution had been contained. The remainder of this thesis will explain the two US policy responses to the Cuban Revolution: the economic and social programs of the Alliance for Progress; and the military response of counter-insurgency, increased military assistance and support of authoritarian regimes in the Western Hemisphere. While these responses had significant consequences for individual Latin American states, the threat that provoked them was exaggerated. When Castro sided with the Soviets, Latin American social democratic and populist movements distanced themselves from the Cubans. Latin Americans are historically opposed to foreign intervention. While this thesis has focussed on

literature that demonstrates this in regard to US intervention, it was also true of Soviet leadership in Cuba. While Castro's revolution provided an effective strategy to remove authoritarian rule, few followed his example towards Soviet-directed communism. The revolutionary cadres, which emerged in virtually every hemispheric republic, were small, unorganised and lacked the urban support afforded to Castro. Above all, they were national responses to national problems. By 1965 the threat of Castroist insurgency had passed and the 'olive branches' of economic aid were replaced by realpolitik realignment within the global capitalist economy.

As the threat of Castroism receded, opportunities for a greater, and confirmed anti-communist pretext emerged. The US had claimed that the USSR had threatened hemispheric security since the conclusion of WWII. However, without evidence to support this claim, many nations began deviating from US political and economic philosophy, and foreign policy. This was most evident in Argentina and Brazil. The nationalist development strategies, proposed by elected governments, were just as dangerous as those posed by rural insurgents. That threat was significantly larger in Brazil and Argentina given the size and scope of their national economies, when compared to that of Castro's Cuba. The anti-communist pretext changed following the Cuban Revolution. The relatively benign threat posed by disciplined communist parties was replaced with an indigenous insurgency strategy to remove authoritarian regimes. This new form of 'communism' was less aligned to globalist communist goals than the small parties that preceded them. However, it posed a far greater physical threat to the security of oligarchic and foreign investment in those states. To address these threats, far-reaching military campaigns were required. The example of the Cuban Revolution served to make the entire hemisphere more conservative. The social democratic movement was co-opted by the CIA and by the rhetoric of the AFP. As it moved to the right, a young generation of indigenous insurgents took up the challenge of revolutionary change. The origins of the late Cold War period lie within the strategy of the Cuban Revolution and US policy against it. It is, however, important to define between indigenous insurgent groups and Moscow-orientated communists. It was that lack of definition that made the anti-communist pretext increasingly dangerous in the fallout of the Cuban Revolution, and throughout the following three decades.

Designed to Fail: Anti-communism and the Rhetorical Alliance for Progress

Events in Cuba institutionalised anti-communism in Latin America. However, they also revealed several weaknesses in US policy towards the hemisphere. The regional euphoria surrounding Castro's revolution, combined with the violent displays of anti-Americanism in 1958, demonstrated to the incoming Kennedy administration that Washington had lost its former hold over Latin America. The career diplomat Adolph Berle warned in January 1961 that without the correct policy response, "eight governments may go the way of Cuba in the next six months" (as cited in Rabe, 1999, p. 24). Kennedy attempted to alter Washington's image in Latin America through the Alliance for Progress (AFP). The AFP was a broad-scale aid program, which sought to foster pro-US sentiments throughout the region. It addressed many of the grievances that arose during the late Eisenhower administration, including: US support for right-wing dictatorships; the actions of certain US corporations in Latin America; the urgent need for commodity price for reform; the need for agrarian reform to limit poverty; the need for social reform in education, health care and social security; the need for mass industrialisation; and capital for currency stabilisation (Taffet, 2007, p. 37). As far as rhetoric, Kennedy and the AFP committed to all of these. By 1970, however, Latin Americans had not experienced any significant improvement to their quality of life (McPherson, 2003, p. 91). This thesis asserts that for Latin America, the AFP was designed to fail. Yet for the US it was an astounding success. This thesis will argue that the AFP was a propaganda mission designed to position the US alongside social democratic theory through the Charter of Punta del Este. While the AFP failed to reach Latin American development goals, it was the single greatest foreign policy success of any US administration during the Latin American Cold War, as it built alliances with moderate reformers at the expense of radical elements. The implementation of the economic AFP, and the simultaneous military developments,[108] built the framework for US hegemony during the late Cold War period and beyond.

[108] Which are explained in the final thesis chapter.

An Alliance for 'Progress'

The Alliance for Progress failed to meet its economic and social objectives (McPherson, 2003, p. 91). However, many scholars attribute this to the enormity of the task. Latham (2000) suggests that Kennedy employed leading theorists in the field of "Development theory" (p. 70). He argues, "very few questioned the fundamental assumption that a projection of modern values, resources and tutelage could engineer the dramatic transformation of an underdeveloped region" (Latham, 2000, p. 71). That is, the Kennedy administration believed that it could drastically improve the quality of life for the Latin American people. This is evidenced by the personnel changes in the US State Department. Scheman's (1988) edited collection reasserts that the "Alliance [as] an aberration in the long history of US indifference and neglect of its neighbours" (Scheman, 1988, p. 3). By utilising the views of many surviving Kennedy officials, Scheman (1988) argues that the AFP indeed had a positive impact on Latin America's future. Kennedy's biographers and mainstream historical studies conform to this view of the AFP. Parmet (1983) asserts, "the Alliance held out a middle way in Latin America, the promotion of democracies" (p. 98). This section will explain the political functions of the Alliance for Progress. This will include several structural weaknesses that undermined the AFP from the beginning. The subsequent sections will argue that the failure to enact a social and political revolution in Latin America was not actually a failure, but the centre of the program for the US.

Kennedy adopted a new approach towards Latin America attempting to work with those democratic leaders who opposed the Cuban Revolution (Rabe, 1999, p. 23). Kennedy believed that this would procure maximum support for the American position in the Cold War. One of the central grievances of American foreign policy was the personal attitude of conservative diplomats towards pragmatic reform. The anti-communist paranoia that proliferated throughout the Eisenhower administration led to irrational hostility towards moderate democratic elements. For Figueres, especially, this needed to change. Figueres and Betancourt viewed US policy as discriminatory against democracy. Figueres stated, "there was little chance for a peaceful revolution in Latin America without a clear and forthright policy change by the United States" (as cited in Ameringer, 1978, p. 169). Accordingly, Kennedy built upon his "best and brightest" team of Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and C. Douglas Dillon with a team of leading

Liberals to reformulate US foreign policy in Latin America (Parmet, 1983, pp. 65-72;). He relied upon the presidential aides Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Adolph Berle, Chester Bowles and Richard Goodwin (Latham, 2000, p. 81). These "New Dealers" advised the young President on Latin American grievances. Kennedy indicated his intentions through his appointments. For instance, he and Rusk appointed Robert Woodward as Under-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rabe, 1999, p. 15). The former Costa Rican ambassador was a trusted confidant of Figueres and Betancourt (Ameringer, 1978, p. 162). He was pro-democracy and pro-reform, indicating an evolved approach in Washington. Teodoro Moscoso, a native Puerto Rican, was appointed head of AFP coordination (Taffet, 2007, p. 38). This gave the AFP a seemingly 'Latin' voice. Additionally, Adlai Stevenson was appointed as Ambassador to the United Nations. The career liberal was less hostile to evolutionary change in Latin America than his predecessors (Parmet, 1983, p. 68).

The Kennedy administration utilised leading proponents of "development theory" in formulating the AFP (Latham, 2000, pp. 69-75). It brought in leaders from the fields of economics, sociology and politics to develop the AFP philosophy. Walt Rostow was the central figure in this movement (Milne, 2008, p. 9). His scholarship motivated the philosophy of the AFP. Rostow advocated a "new look" in foreign aid, "a coordinated free world effort with enough resources for development purposes" (Latham, 2000, p. 69). He personally convinced Kennedy to approve Schlesinger's vision for the AFP. Rostow, Schlesinger and Gordon sought to demonstrate "in the hemisphere that economic growth, social equity, and the democratic development of societies can proceed hand in hand" (Latham, 2000, p. 81). Moscoso's appointment to AFP coordinator was also a significant move. He had overseen Operation Bootstrap in his native Puerto Rico (Bailey, 1976, p. 87). Operation Bootstrap was a development project in the US territory that utilised federal funds and the concept of "self-help" (Gordon, 1963, p. 46). Its goal was to change the nature of Puerto Rican exports from primarily agricultural to primarily industrial. The self-help concept gave financial motivation to investors within Puerto Rico, who established industrial factories (Bailey, 1976, p. 87). This transitioned the landed oligarchy to an urban capitalist class. However, little capital was made available for programs of class mobility. Bailey (1976) asserts that Operation Bootstrap "was a failure with the economic development achieved at the expense of the poor and working classes" (p. 87). The idea of transitioning

the rural oligarchy into an urban capitalist class was central to the philosophy of the AFP. However, it was at odds with the concept of the social and democratic revolution espoused by the AFP.

Latin America required a comprehensive social and democratic revolution to live up to the lofty rhetoric of the AFP. The majority of the region's citizens lived in abject poverty (ECLA, cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 74). Despite the mass urbanisation of the 1950s, the majority of Latin Americans still worked as agricultural labourers in 1961 (Rabe, 1988, p. 74). These labourers had no access to healthcare, education, social security, affordable consumer goods, or the widespread labour protection of unions or the government (Rabe, 1988, p. 74). There was no class mobility in Latin America in 1961. The oligarchic class held the vast majority of land (Alba, 1965, p. 75). The situation of Cuba resembled that of much of Latin America.[109] The oligarchic class needed to forfeit a great deal of its political and economic power to enact this revolution. The rhetoric of the AFP suggested that the US sought to support the popular revolution against the oligarchic class (OAS, 1961). Democratic action was central to this revolution but the fulfilment of the desires of the impoverished majority against the privileged few was a radical concept in Latin America. When in practice, democracy had begun to alleviated poverty, increase class mobility and led to rapid economic growth in post-war America and Europe, and had the potential to do so in Latin America (Halperin, Siegel and Weinstein, 2005, p. 2). US rhetoric promoted democracy under the auspices of the AFP. By promoting the policies of land reform, commodity price reform, economic development and humanitarian reform, the US was seen to be siding with masses (OAS, 1961; Cull, 2008, p. 194). The AFP sought to emulate the results of the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions without compromising its aims. Hence the AFP 'revolution' was fundamentally flawed from its inception.

Propaganda

The AFP was a propaganda program designed to counter the effects of the Cuban Revolution. Those scholars critical of the AFP have claimed continuing US indifference towards Latin America. Alba (1965) asserts that the AFP failed because it did not unseat the oligarchy that was "the great force for immobility in

[109] Urban development had alleviated some aspects of this poverty in parts of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil.

Latin America" (p. 76). Frank (1967; 1970) argues that the AFP unfairly advantaged US capitalists that drained capital from the hemisphere. McPherson (2003) argues that "the US misled themselves trying to apply dubious social science theories" and failed "to reach any of its ninety-four numerical goals in health, education and welfare" (p. 91). The AFP failed Latin America for a variety of reasons, however; the AFP was not born of American indifference towards Latin America either. It was created to alter the discourse of the Cold War, and designed to convince the Latin Americans that the US was a force for good in the hemisphere. Cull (2008) identified the propaganda arm of the AFP through the United States Information Agency (USIA) (p. 191). He examined the growth of the USIA in Latin America under Kennedy through the creation of "new posts and specialist staff" (Cull, 2008. p. 191). Kunz (1997) argues that propaganda was the central aim of the AFP (p. 131). He suggests that Kennedy sought to change America's image in Latin America, without fundamentally altering American policies (Kunz, 1997, p. 128). Bailey (1976) reasons that "the greatest single task of American diplomacy in Latin America [was] to divorce the inevitable and necessary Latin American social transformation from connection with and prevent its capture by overseas communist powers" (p. 85). That is, to place the US on the side of reform and remove the revolutionary emphasis emanating from Cuba. This section argues that the AFP was a successful operation in propaganda. The subsequent section will demonstrate how the Kennedy administration 'Latinised' the AFP through additional propaganda. Put together, this thesis will demonstrate that the US achieved its objectives in Latin America between 1961 and 1963 without a substantial change in policy.

The AFP was a propaganda program designed to isolate the Cuban Revolution. Kennedy proclaimed

> To our sister republics south of the border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new Alliance for Progress – to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty (Kennedy, March 1961).

Kennedy attempted to reverse Washington's image in Latin America by advocating a democratic and social revolution in Latin America. Washington's dominant position within the OAS had allowed it to enact such a revolution at any stage from 1948. However, it had not. There had been no threat to US strategic interests prior

to 1959. The Cuban Revolution required this dramatic alteration in American foreign policy, at least in rhetoric. The Mexican agricultural expert, Edmundo Flores argued

> Without Castro, few outside Latin America would care about the region's economic stagnation, its political instability, or its undeniable ability to upset the balance of power in Cold War (Flores, 1963, p. 6).

The AFP was much more effective than the US initially believed. Not only did it "sterilise the example of the Cuban Revolution," it also convinced the Latin Americans that the US was committed to fundamental change (Guevara, 2006, p. 24). The US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, collated the Latin American response to Kennedy's speech in a March memorandum to the President. He informed Kennedy that his speech had "a profound impression in Latin America – the most favourable since Roosevelt's Good Neighbour policy" (SD, June 1961b, p. 1). USIA confirmed this view, identifying one Colombian who called it "the most significant contribution to pan-Americanism in one hundred years" (as cited in Cull, 2008, p. 195). Moreover, the chief objective of the AFP was achieved in March 1961 without a single dollar of aid. The US commitment to democracy and social change was rhetorically emphasised in the Charter of Punta del Este (OAS, 1961). This section will demonstrate how this US rhetoric co-opted the social democratic movement.

Kennedy declared the AFP a democratic and social revolution in Latin America. However, the US had no evidence to support this claim. The social democrats required proof of the US' commitment to democracy. The longstanding mission of the social democrats, dating back to Arévalo's Caribbean Legion, had been to eradicate the Caribbean of the insidious dictatorships of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (Gleijes, 1989, p. 135). The US had created these regimes in the 1930s and continued to flood them with military assistance to establish regional strategic alliances, nominally against those social democratic governments (Roorda, 1998, pp. 44-54; Crawley, 2007, pp. 33-72). Trujillo was considered additionally dangerous as he brazenly organised the failed assassination attempt of Betancourt in Caracas in June 1960 (Patterson, 1989, p. 9). From this moment the CIA began working with Dominican opposition groups. On May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated (Rabe, 1999, p. 39). The US supported the anti-Trujillo opposition and advocated their actions, but was

concerned about the consequences of Trujillo's death. The Dominican incident offered insight into Kennedy's thinking on Latin American democracy:

> There [were] three possibilities on descending order of preference: a descent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim for the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third (as cited in Rabe, 1999, p. 41).

As the communist movement was extremely weak, the US allowed elections in 1962, bringing the social democrat Juan Bosch to power (Rabe. 1999,p. 45). In order to avoid a Castro-type regime, however, the CIA established a new pro-US police force equipped with advanced counter-insurgency training (Gill, 2004, p. 65). This 'Dominican arithmetic' defines Kennedy's handling of Latin American politics generally. The instability of the Dominican situation left the US unwilling to attempt similar actions against the authoritarians of Nicaragua or Haiti. Nevertheless, Kennedy backed up his pro-democratic rhetoric with action.

Agrarian reform was the central aim of social democratic revolutionaries in the tropical regions during the post-war era (Carrol, 1970, pp. 103-107). It was used to procure the support of agrarian peasants, making a key tenet of the "multiclass" revolutions (Ames, 1987, p. 60). As demonstrated, the US actively opposed land reform in Mexico, Venezuela and Guatemala during the early Cold War. In order to reposition its standing, the US committed to the process of land reform in 1961. The charter claimed

> To encourage, in accordance with the characteristics of each country, programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use, with a view to replacing *latifundia* and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure so that…that land will become for the man who works it as the basis of his economic stability (OAS, 1961).

This declaration was a policy reversal that required domestic and foreign landowners to forfeit property to peasants voluntarily. In effect, the US was echoing the revolutionary position of Castro. Alba (1965) asserted "The landowning oligarchy wants no change" (p.81). This led to programmatic stagnation with only minimal land redistributed to peasant farmers during the AFP

period.[110] According to Flores (1963), the US' position on land reform "is tragic and perhaps absurd: it wishes to entrust what is nothing less than a revolution to the very group...which in its own interest must block it" (p. 7). Moreover, the US asked the ruling class to give their land to peasants. The ruling class inevitably took no action.

Latin America's dependency upon export economies made it susceptible to the global fluctuations of commodity prices. The vulnerability of, specifically, coffee and sugar prices to global fluctuations prioritised the concept of commodity price stabilisation. The entrance of decolonised Africa and Asia into the global capitalist economy led to the expansion of production in key commodities such as sugar, coffee, meats, iron ore, copper, tin and nitrates. Adolph Berle (1962) claimed that the US no longer needed Latin American markets and resources, as it had during the 1940s (p. 8). The increased global supply led to a global price recession that favoured developed nations and crippled those of the third world. The comparative advantage of developed goods over raw materials led to a divergence in wealth that followed the division of labour. Latin American leaders, such as Kubitschek, attempted to create cartels to control the distribution and sale of specific raw materials in Latin America (Prebisch, as cited in Overbeek, 1999, p. 576). The AFP granted the Latin Americans' demands for comprehensive commodity price reform through the mechanism of the common market

> 4.11. To strengthen existing agreement on economic integration, with a view to the ultimate fulfilment of aspirations for a Latin American common market that will expand and diversify trade among the Latin American countries and thus contribute to the economic growth of the region (OAS, 1961).

A Latin American common market was detrimental to US trade and investment, as it would increase the price of primary commodities (Prebisch, as cited in Overbeek, 1999, p. 571). No plan was provided to transition Latin America into a common market until the early 1990s, as it was directly counter to US objectives. In 1968, Covey Oliver, the AFP coordinator of the time, quipped, "to speak of fair prices is a medieval concept, for we are in the era of free trade" (as cited in Galliano, 1973, p. 1). Hence, the AFP had no interest in paying 'fair' prices for coffee, or any other raw material.

[110] Most of which occurred in Mexico as a response to the Cuban Revolution (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 312).

The social democratic revolutionaries also advocated sweeping social reforms in order to alleviate poverty and to increase class mobility. This social program advocated education, healthcare, social security, women's rights, unionization and income redistribution. The US had labelled these social democratic reforms as "impractical" during the 1940s and 1950s. However, in 1961 the AFP began advocating the following aspects of the social democratic Revolution:

> 1.7. To eliminate adult illiteracy by 1970....2.1. Comprehensive…national programs of economic and social development…in accordance with democratic principles....2.3…women should be placed on equal footing....2.5 Institutions in both the public and private sectors….including labour unions [should] be strengthened…[so] that social reforms necessary to fair distribution of the fruit of economic and social progress [can] be carried out (OAS, 1961).

In essence, the US promised to create more education institutions as education and healthcare are considered as human rights. However, in the developing world, this substantial capital investment in the population requires increased taxation upon domestic and foreign enterprise to fund it (Ameringer, 2009, p. 34). Also, the OAS committed to strengthen unionism with the eventual aim of widespread income distribution. This placed the onus on governments to arbitrate industrial disputes regarding wages, to the advantage of the poor. As was the case with agrarian reform, the social reforms placed contradictory duties on oligarchic governments (Alba, 1965, 81). As it was against their interests, there was no motivation to conform.

The social democratic movement ended in 1961. Its proponents had failed to bring their philosophy of "nationalism, socialism and anti-Imperialism" to Latin America (Grau, as cited in Ameringer, 2000, p. 44). Those who had tried had been overthrown, killed, or moderated. The revolutionary impetus in Latin America had passed to the young insurgents. The remaining social democratic leaders, including Betancourt and Figueres, aligned their interests with this US rhetoric (Ameringer, 1978, pp. 163-175). The breakdown of relations between elements of the revolutionary left was responsible for this. Figueres' willingness to host the first meeting of the OAS to condemn the Cuban Revolution in 1960 was highly symbolic, as was the 1961 commitment to the AFP in Caracas (Dallek, 2004, p. 468). US

propaganda played a pivotal role in creating that breakdown of relations between Cuba and the democratic revolutionaries. The US had indicated that the intransigent policies of the Eisenhower administration were over. It filled the Latin American bureau of the State Department with liberals who espoused democracy and social reform (Dallek, 2004, pp. 340-345). It authored the Charter of Punta del Este, which was a manifestation of the longstanding desires of the social democrats and their supporters. AFP propaganda drove a bridge between the Cuban Revolution and many Latin American governments. Whether the US committed to that propaganda was irrelevant. It intended to deal with the brief threat posed by revolutionary Cuba. By 1963 that threat had subsided, as Cuba had been painted as the aggressor in the missile crisis and many of the small insurgencies had been defeated. By that time it was clear that AFP rhetoric had been formulated for political purposes. It was also evident that the US had fulfilled its objectives of isolating the Cuban Revolution and aligning itself to the moderate democracies of Latin America.

Latinising the Alliance for Progress

AFP propaganda relied on Kennedy's ability to win the hearts and minds of Latin American leaders. Prior to his inauguration, Kennedy commissioned a Latin American taskforce to develop a strategy to win over Latin Americans. According to this taskforce, many inhabitants of the continent saw the US as an enemy of human freedom (Kunz, 1997,p. 129). This taskforce encouraged Kennedy to assert his keen interest in Latin American affairs. In doing so, the US sought to reclaim the moral position it had taken during WWII, regarding human freedom, social and economic well-being, representative governance and national sovereignty. This position had been forfeited in the regional euphoria surrounding the Cuban Revolution. In this context, the central aim of the AFP was to secure additional regional support to prevent further leftist deviations throughout Latin America. To this end, Kennedy visited the region several times (Dallek, 2004, p. 468). In December 1961 he travelled to Venezuela where in joint declarations with Rómulo Betancourt, Kennedy reaffirmed the US commitment to both the 'Alianza para el Progreso' and the achievements of the Betancourt government (Kennedy, December 1961a). He visited the La Morita resettlement that provided 3.8 million acres of redistributed land to peasant communities. He stated, "this program is at

the heart of the Alianza para el Progreso, for no real progress is possible unless the benefits of increased prosperity are shared by the people themselves" (Kennedy, December 1961a). It was important to link the AFP propaganda with the desires of the hemisphere. However, some saw these declarations as contradictory.

The Cuban delegation led by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara resisted this US vision for the Americas. Guevara directly opposed the Charter of Punta del Este. He was forced to ask the delegations of Latin America: is this "our America or theirs"? (Guevara, 2006, p. 20). The Argentines were against Washington's initiative to take over the Latin American social revolution. The Cuban delegation was specifically opposed to the American utilisation of José Martí's nineteenth-century political analysis. Accordingly, Guevara cited Martí's famous "whose America":

> Whoever speaks of economic union speaks of political union. The nations that buys commands; the nation that sells serves….Let there be neither unions of the Americas against Europe, nor with Europe against a nation of the Americas….If the republics of the Americas have any function at all it is certainly not to be herded by one of them against the future republics (Martí, as cited in Guevara, 2006, p. 20).

Martí had warned against the collective economic assault on individual republics seventy years earlier, which Guevara sought to remind them. He also took issue with the US State Department White Paper that claimed, "the revolutionary regime betrayed their own revolution" and "The Castro regime offers a clear and present danger to the authentic revolutions of the Americas" (Guevara, 2006, p. 25). Guevara (2006) questioned Washington's ability to assess authentic revolutions. He also identified Washington's crimes against the Cuban Revolution and its role in the assassination of Rafael Trujillo (Guevara, 2006, p. 31). Guevara correctly identified that the AFP was a direct response to the Revolution and would not exist without his revolutionary regime. The US was using the AFP politically rather than economically. Nevertheless, following Punta del Este, the Latin American republics committed to the US' position in the global Cold War. Moreover, Cuba had lost its position within the Latin American revolutionary movement.

Many Latin Americans were enthused by the prospect of American economic assistance (Cull, 2008, p. 195). The Charter of Punta del Este was accepted unanimously is 1961. Many Latin Americans believed that the US would commit large amounts of capital and deliver a social and democratic revolution to

the region. Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon was pragmatic about the AFP (SD, August 1961). He realised the impediments and limitations of US policy commitments. However, Latin American expectations were at the heart of the propaganda program. Dillon advocated a modest growth rate of 2.5 per cent per annum throughout the 1960s (SD, August 1961). While the US provided significant capital investment, the majority was to be accumulated domestically; Latin Americans would need to rely upon "self-help" to achieve significant economic development (SD, August 1961). As this was a program of propaganda, rather than a long-term solution, immediate effects were required. Dillon envisaged Washington's role in funding small 'visual' projects in 'communist' threatened regions, as "these measures will have greater political ramifications" (as cited in SD, August, 1961). These visual programs would reaffirm the US' commitment to its rhetoric. Kennedy's December tour of democratic Venezuela was quite effective. However, some regions were much more impoverished and vulnerable to Castroism than oil-rich Venezuela. Areas such as Northeast Brazil received the majority of the initial aid, to quell Castroist critiques of Washington's foreign policy (Robock, 1963, p. 141). While some positive effects were reaped from the construction of roads, schools and hospitals, the political economic inequality was not addressed.

Despite the weaknesses of Kennedy's AFP, his personal charisma ensured Latin Americans of his intentions. Kennedy's tours and proclamations throughout Latin America were effective. His 1961 tour of Latin America was crucial to selling the AFP. Following the Caracas visit, he moved on to Bogotá where he asserted, "The Alianza para el Progreso is a phrase…all of the people of this country…are going to see filling this field in the next months and years" (Kennedy, December 1961b). President Alberto Camargo asked Kennedy, "do you know why these people are cheering for you?" to which he explained, "it's because they think that you are on their side against the oligarchs" (as cited in Skidmore, 1988, p. 48). The peasants were wrong. In Mexico Kennedy recognised that the AFP was ideologically aligned to the Mexican Revolution as both strove for "social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty" (Kennedy, June 1962). Moreover, Kennedy was intentionally aligning the rhetoric of the AFP to the standing revolutionary missions in Latin America. The utilisation of his wife Jackie's Spanish skills in Caracas and Mexico City was a

particular highlight (Leaming, 2001, p. 237). It was a sign of respect to the region. For two centuries the US had looked down on Latin America. For the first time, the US had elected a President who would visit Latin America, speak to its leaders as equals and appoint a First Lady fluent in Spanish. Kennedy's personal charisma ensured regional optimism about the AFP in its early stage. His appointment of new dealers and liberals also provided assurances.

Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963 (Dallek, 2004, p. 694). This brought Lyndon Baines Johnson to the Presidency. Johnson was less enthusiastic about the AFP than Kennedy (Colman, 2010, p. 164). The greatest foreign policy threat to the US was emerging in South East Asia. The Cuban Revolution was contained by the end of 1963, hence, the original objective of AFP had been achieved. Despite Johnson's claims that Latin America was "among the highest concerns of [his] government" and that the AFP sought to "improve and strengthen the role of the US" in Latin America, the region was downgraded to secondary importance (Colman, 2010, p. 164). Johnson purged the department of liberals and idealists (Colman, 2010, p. 164). He installed Thomas C. Mann as Under Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and US AID director for Latin America (Colman, 2010, p. 164). From 1961, he began a regression back to Eisenhower-era foreign policy in Latin America. The unashamed anti-communist installed the 1964 Mann Doctrine (Kunz, 1997, p. 145). The Mann Doctrine highlighted four key points:

> (1) To foster economic growth and be neutral on social reform; (2) to protect US private investment in the hemisphere; (3) to show no preference, through aid or otherwise, for representative democratic institutions; and (4) to oppose communism (Kunz, 1997, p. 145-6).

Mann advocated the political role of economic aid over the humanitarian one. He believed that all US loans should advantage US hemispheric interests. This justified the large loans given to authoritarian governments.

The Economic Alliance

There is a large divergence in economic analyses of the application and legacy of the Alliance for Progress. This divergence is largely centred upon interpretations of economic theory. The Alliance for Progress espoused "Modernisation Theory," which promoted foreign investment to improve the

efficiency of the export economy (Latham, 2000, p. 69). Latham (2000) documents the theoretical approach adopted by the Kennedy administration (pp. 69-85). He argues that Walt Rostow's economic team "insisted that the United States could demonstrate in the Hemisphere that economic growth, social equity, and the democratic development of societies can proceed hand in hand" (Latham, 2000, p. 81). While acknowledging many of the failures, Latham (2000) describes the genuine attempts by the Rostow team to make "Modernisation…a battle of image and identity" Latin America. While this may have been the case, Bailey (1976) argues that these idealistic goals "were swallowed up by the pragmatism of the President and his advisors" (p. 84). The forerunner to the AFP, OPA, espoused developmentalism. Those who have been critical of the AFP come from the background of dependency theory, which supports the position of developmentalism. Developmentalism relied upon the economic theories of Prebisch, Singer, Frank and others regarding the unequal relationship between the US and Latin America (Prebisch, as cited in Dreir, 1963, pp. 25-51; Singer, 1999, pp. 913-915; Frank, 1967, 1970). This thesis will demonstrate those programs that sought to benefit Latin American economies. It will also emphasise obstacles to development under the philosophies of free-trade economics.

The AFP was an economic alliance. While it did not seek to alter the economic relationship between the US and Latin America, it did provide a lot of capital. Moreover, the promises of Dillon were kept. The US lent Latin America US$20 billion over ten years (Taffet, 2007, p. 9). Special emphasis was applied to Colombia. Its conservative government opposed communism and remained pro-US in the face of the Cuban Revolution. Colombia was provided with US$761.9 million between 1962 and 1969 (Taffet, 2007, p. 149). However, Colombia's embattled economy limited the role of capital in economic development. The decline in coffee prices meant that much of the Agency for International Development (AID)'s loans were spent on Colombia's balance of payments and servicing its standing debt accrued during *La Violencia* (Taffet, 2007, p. 159). Moreover, no development could occur. The US used the funds lent to leverage the Colombian economy. It argued that "greater openness in the economy would improve the prospects for US companies hoping to invest" and promote two-way trade (Taffet, 2007, p. 159). Colombia is an ideal case study for the AFP period as its government was not revolutionary. Therefore, its programs of self-help revolved around returning

liquidity to the struggling economy. While Kennedy celebrated the social achievements in Mexico and Venezuela, his government would not promote them elsewhere. The AID loans became increasingly dependent on neoliberal conditions, including "liberalised trade policy and noninflationary fiscal and monetary policies" (Taffet, 2007, p. 166). While these demands ensured stability for investors, they did not address the factors that caused the AFP, making the rhetoric redundant.

In many respects, the AFP solidified the economic philosophy of the Eisenhower administration. The AFP Charter required Latin American states to pursue free-trade economics. Free trade was antithetical, however, to one of the key issues for Latin America – commodity price reform. The US viewed the paying of a fair price for Latin American resources as "a medieval concept" (as cited in Galliano, 1973, p. 1). The AFP's support of modernisation theory sought to increase the export capacities of dependent states (Sikkink, 1992, p. 13). While this could temporarily support employment, and produce government revenues for social services, it did not address the fundamental problem of development in Latin America. In fact, in many aspects the economic problems got worse. Latin American economies were forced to further deregulate their control over commodities in exchange for AFP funding (Taffet, 2007, p. 159). This further opened their economies, making ISI more difficult. The vast majority of AFP funds were used for immediate visual 'humanitarian aid' and grants to 'friendly regimes,' with loans for long-term development coming a distant third (Kunz, 1997, p. 131). Perhaps the biggest flaw of the AFP was the lack of planning. Many states did not produce effective estimates for development projects (Latham, 2000, p. 71). Accordingly, the US gave several contracts to US firms to construct visual projects such as ports, rail, road, and to a lesser extent schools and hospitals in the region (Rabe, 1999, p. 159). These visual projects further enmeshed the dependent economies into the world system. The AFP also failed to address issues of capital flight and Latin American debt, and actively opposed programs of economic nationalism. Far from revising their place in the international capitalist system, the AFP merely reasserted it.

Economic nationalism was advocated as a means of development by several economists, most notably Raúl Prebisch. He argued that the AFP was handicapped by the "failure to strengthen the structure of the Latin American economy so as to

withstand external fluctuations and events" (Prebisch, as cited in Dreir, 1963, p. 33). The issue of nationalism was sensitive for the US as nationalism requires regional leaders to exert sovereignty over trade and investment. The US Congress seized upon the issues of nationalisation, regulation and taxation (Kunz, 1997, p. 133). They opposed any leftist deviation from the AFP outcomes. In 1962 the Governor of Rio de Sul sought to nationalise the interests of the American ITT Company (Kunz, 1997, p. 136). Those actions were questioned by the US State Department. In fact, the US Congress threatened to withdraw AFP funding to all of Brazil if the Governor did not stand down (Kunz, 1997, p. 136). US contradictions had crippled the AFP. In June 1963, Kubitschek and Camargo emphasised "that the alliance had not been granted sufficient resources and that it had lost the confidence of the Latin American peoples" (Kunz, 1997, p. 144). Camargo asserted that "one cannot see anywhere in Latin America the spirit of enthusiasm" required to achieve the AFP (cited in, Kunz, 1997, p. 144). Kubitschek blamed the US for deviating from the statist philosophies of OPA. The basic contradiction was simple: the US sought to promote Latin American development without jeopardising its own dominance in trade and development. What it did not recognise was that American trade and investment was somewhat responsible for the underdevelopment of the hemisphere. Without recognition of this point, the AFP could not end the economic stagnation of the hemisphere.

The greatest obstacle to Latin American development during the 1960s, and beyond, was capital flight. The ECLA studied this problem in detail. It demonstrated that in 1962 a disproportionate 61 per cent of the total export earnings of Latin America were absorbed by what it called 'invisible services' (Frank, 1970, p. 184). These 'invisible services' included: profit remittance by foreign corporations; the service of foreign debt; foreign funds transfers; and freight, travel and insurance (Frank, 1970, p. 184). If one then considered the remainder of its foreign capital, 6 per cent was spent on fuel; 13 per cent on consumer goods and 26 per cent on raw materials including food (Frank, 1970, p. 184). Moreover, without spending a single dollar on development, the Latin Americans together had spent 106 per cent of their foreign exchange (Frank, 1970, p. 185). Andre Frank (1970) called this transfer of capital to developed nations a "cycle of underdevelopment" (p. 186). If one considers the total import-export exchange of Latin America in 1962, we see a balance of payments surplus of

US$1.215 billion (Frank, 1970, p. 186). However, in actual terms the Latin Americans spent 135 per cent of their foreign exchange (Frank, 1970, p. 186). This meant that the 35 per cent would have to be repaid at some stage. Accordingly, in future years 'invisible services' would be considerably higher. While much of the AFP funds were spent balancing the accounts of defunct Latin American regimes, specifically Colombia, no development was achieved (McPherson, 2003, p. 91). A loan program could not work for Latin America. The money had to be repaid at some stage. Latin America required a social revolution. Only then could it alter its place in the global capitalist economy. Kennedy's short-sighted approach to economics condemned Latin America to a problematic future of debt-driven economic crises, which defined the late Cold War period for many states (Roddick, 1988, pp. 4-19).

The US committed to lend Latin America US$20 billion from 1961 until 1970 (Rabe, 1999, p. 153). While this capital was spent on food aid, military equipment and small-scale public works, that money needed to be repaid (Kunz, 1997, p. 134). Roddick (1988) suggests that by 1987, the Latin Americans had paid US$30.1 billion in interest to the US and private institutions throughout the debt crisis that was in part caused by the AFP (p. 7). Any good that could be achieved from the loans was directly undermined by the interest paid. The worst examples of debt accumulation occurred in Mexico and Brazil. During the 1960s Mexico's debt position steadily worsened as a result of the AFP. It culminated in a debt of US$105.6 billion in 1987 (Roddick, 1988, p. 7). The injection of capital into the economy did not alleviate public poverty. Higher capital injections were made throughout the 1970s and 1980s, during a period of increased poverty in Mexico. While Brazil's debt position was onerous prior to the AFP, it worsened during the 1960s (Roddick, 1988, p. 11). Many of these loans directly increased the capacity of the military, both through grants and 'civic action' (Gaillard, 1992, p. 64).[111] Brazil reached a crippling debt position of US$116.9 billion, leading into the debt crisis of 1987 (Roddick, 1988, p. 7). Given that the AFP did not achieve its stated goals, the regional debt accumulated throughout the AFP era was especially damaging. Moreover, the contradiction of the AFP was its failure to "convert [Kennedy's] good words into good deeds" (Kennedy, March 1961). The US had no

[111] This will be explained in the following chapter.

obligation to loosen its economic grip on Latin America and, unsurprisingly, it did not.

Designed to Fail

This thesis asserts that the AFP was designed to fail Latin America. It was antithetical to US interests to conduct a social and democratic revolution in Latin America. The AFP charter was highly contradictory and in some ways illogical. It advocated extensive land reform without creating incentives for landowners to transfer their land to peasants. It advocated commodity price reform without creating the mechanisms to increase the value of raw materials. It advocated social policies, including education, healthcare, gender equality and income redistribution, without creating the economic incentives to make the ruling class enact these reforms. Most significantly, the AFP advocated democracy without US support for constitutional regimes against military coups. The full extent of this will be explained in the final chapter. However, it highlights the contradictions inherent in the AFP. Many historians have asserted that the AFP was a liberal aid program that intended to increase the quality of living in Latin America (Latham, 2000; Scheman, 1988; Taffet, 2007). However, there is little evidence to support this. Economic growth was stagnant during the AFP. The AFP did not follow the recommendations of the ECLA to achieve long-term development, in fact, it actively opposed policies of economic nationalism and did not confront the issue of capital flight. In the end, the AFP period left Latin America with a substantial debt position that crippled the region throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The AFP was designed to fail in Latin America because the success of the AFP would severely handicap the position of US trade and investment in the region. Its success required the US government to act against its own interests. The swift isolation of the Castroist threat de-emphasised the AFP, allowing the US to return to Eisenhower era economic policies under the Mann Doctrine.

The AFP, however, was a success for the US. Within two months of committing to the Charter of Punta del Este, the Cubans were banished from the OAS. The Latin American people were enthusiastic about the AFP. Kennedy was greeted by cheering crowds in Caracas, Bogotá and Mexico City between 1961 and 1963. He was the most celebrated American leader in Latin America, with regional enthusiasm for his polices, exceeding that for Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Policy.

The utilisation of progressive advisors, strong allegiances to social and liberal democratic leaders, and his wife's Spanish language skills, along with the largest foreign economic commitment to Latin America in history, earned Kennedy astounding prestige in Latin America. This notoriety was achieved without any concrete signs of the social and democratic revolution proposed by AFP rhetoric. In fact, the enthusiasm reached its pinnacle prior to the beginning of the AFP. UN Ambassador Stevenson and the USIA division in Latin America informed the President in March 1961 that he had made a profound impression on Latin America. By 1963 that impression had changed. However, the Kennedy administration was unfazed. By 1963: the Cuban Revolution was isolated; the majority of the Castroist insurgencies had occurred and failed; the hemisphere began its progression from democratic to military states; the US increased its military influence in Latin America; the philosophical policies of the AFP were institutionalised; leftist and nationalist development policies were eradicated; and the US had created its own version of political and economic stability that allowed US investment to thrive regionally. While it had not met the stated objectives of the AFP, it was a successful policy for the US. The following chapter will explain the parallel political and military events.

'In the Grip of a Psychosis': Anti-communism, Counterinsurgency and the Rise of a New Militarism

Shortly after the military coup against the Dominican Republic's short experiment with democracy, its deposed President, Juan Bosch, explained to historian Robert Alexander (1995) that, "all of America, with the possible exception of Canada, is in the grip of a psychosis. It's not merely that there is a fear of communism, but there is a fear of anything different" (p. 230). This chapter explains the volatile relationship between 'insurgents', Latin American society, the military and the US that emerged between 1961 and 1965, creating the framework for the remaining 25 years of Cold War in Latin America. By 1962 the Kennedy administration had effectively isolated the Cuban Revolution, gained allies through the AFP, caused schisms within the social democratic movement and legitimised the anti-communist pretext. One final obstacle to regional hegemony came from small insurgent groups, in several Latin American republics, who sought to emulate Castro's Sierra Maestra victory of 1959. These insurgent groups were primarily composed of middle-class intellectuals who had broken away from their national reform parties, attempting to create regional alliances with peasant groups disgruntled with national and regional politicians and military generals. This threat of 'another Cuba' led the Kennedy administration to accelerate counter-insurgency funding and training in Latin America. This 'threat', however, also created an 'opportunity' to increase US influence, as it was integrated with the philosophy of civic action that attempted to dislodge the insurgent groups in rural areas. The considerable expansion of the Latin American armed forces created a new militarism that directly impacted thirteen of the twenty regional republics. This final regression to militarism in the Latin American Cold War was predicated upon the confirmed anti-communist pretext and the US' desire to avoid 'another Cuba'.

Insurgency

Every Latin American country experienced some form of insurgency in the years after the Cuban Revolution (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 311). In most cases, these insurgent groups were easily defeated by national militaries. However, in Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala and parts of Peru, large-scale insurgencies took hold within rural communities (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 39). This thesis will

demonstrate the origins, cause and immediate effects of these insurgencies of the early 1960s. Thomas Whickham-Crowley (1991, 1992) argues that the insurgent movements were formed within the hemisphere. That is, they were not imported from the Soviet Union. Through substantial research, Wickham-Crowley (1992) concludes "guerrilla movements do not begin among the peasants in the countryside but among urban-based intellectuals, especially in the twin milieus of universities and political parties" (p. 30). He goes on to argue that the Cuban example was utilised by other leftist groups that existed within the standing political system. This demonstrates the class origins of the region's leading insurgents. They were not peasants or communist agents, but disenfranchised reformers from the now redundant social democratic movement. Radu (1988) confirms this view, although from a different perspective (pp. 1-15). He argues that guerrilla movements were an "elite phenomenon" made by those "unwilling to accept…the prevailing social conventions of his class or group" (Radu, 1988, p. 3). This thesis adheres to the view that university-educated politicians alienated by the perceived failure of the social democratic parties created the guerrilla movements of 1961-1965. This section will examine the physical and ideological origins of the insurgent movements that sought to emulate the Cuban Revolution.

Following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration became obsessed with avoiding "another Cuba" (Grow, 2008, p. 80). Kennedy argued that

> The free world's security can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, lunatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare or a series of limited wars (as cited in Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 31).

Kennedy's prophecy was not solely directed at Latin America. However, many of these 'peripheral' forces were evident in the region. 'Internal revolutions' were common to the Latin American political experience but were usually conducted by democratic elements and were often followed by elections. Accusations of 'subversion' and 'infiltration' were directed at the USSR. While the Cuban Revolution had reinvigorated the communist parties, no Moscow-orientated party was on the front line of a national revolution (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, pp. 30-33).

The small communist movement often directed its influence of 'Socialism' on many democratic political parties, most ominously in Chile with Salvador Allende. This section will argue that, like Castro's revolution, the insurgent movements were both local to the region and an ideological extension of the national political discourse. It will also demonstrate how insurgent movements formed coalitions with peasants in rural areas of Latin America. Furthermore, it will explain some significant examples of guerrilla warfare in this period.

Insurgencies began in urban settings as the class origins of the insurgents who waged war in Latin America between 1956 and 1965 were predominately middle-class. Wickham-Crowley (1992) identifies the origins of the rural insurgencies within the urban political discourse (p. 30). The example of Castro's revolution encouraged the younger, radical reformers to wage revolution in the countryside. In his anthropological analysis, Radu (1988) identified a "disproportionate amount of upper and middle class elements among the revolutionaries" (p. 3). These revolutionaries began to identify their interests with that of peripheral members of society, including the peasantry. Fidel Castro successfully utilised the desires of the peasantry to realign the national discourse. However, even Castro had taken lessons in rural insurgency from Marti, Zapata and Sandino. He utilised a nationalist collective identity to motivate revolution. This form of revolution is remote from traditional notions of Marxist revolution among the proletarians of Eastern Europe. In fact, "becoming a nationalist is so incompatible with being a Leninist as to be impossible" (Radu, 1988, p. 6). That is why Mexican Revolutionaries, Sandino's guerrillas and the social democratic movement systematically rejected doctrinal Marxism (Radu, 1988, p. 6). They could not serve the national interest by conforming to the foreign political and economic policy of the Soviet Union. The revolutionaries of Latin America fought for independence and the ability to develop a vanguard serving their version of the national interest (Aguilar, 1988, p. 147). While many were sympathetic to components of Marxism, including a socialised welfare state, they were not fighting for the interests of the Soviet Union in the global Cold War. The insurgents motivated the populace through this nationalist rhetoric, far removed from the sentiments of collectivism of authoritarian rule. Such a message could only lead to alienation and defeat, as was the case with each of the doctrinaire Communist Parties in the region.

Virtually every guerrilla movement in Latin America emerged within the reformist parties. The Venezuelan Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) evolved out of the *Acción Democrática* political party (Ratliff, 1976, p. 100). The MIR opposed Betancourt's platform in the 1958 elections and while Betancourt received 49 per cent of the vote, his popularity in Caracas was significantly lower, at 12 per cent (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 44). This demonstrated discontent with moderate reform and reflected the radicalism of AD youth who "forged their political thought in the battle against the increasingly bloody Pérez Jiménez regime" (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 44). In Peru, a similar demographic was drawn away from the *Aprista*s. The Peruvian MIR charged that Haya had become "pro-yanqui and [was] in collusion with the oligarchy" (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 315). Luis de la Puenta, a chief *Aprista* defector, claimed his support for Marxism-Leninism as the only road that "can lead the liberation process" in Peru (Ratliff, 1976, p. 100). In Bolivia, the schism occurred in the months leading to the coup against Estenssoro's MNR. The National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded in 1964 (Ratliff, 1976, p. 123). Its leader, Victor Medina, targeted the "political and military domination of the United States" while distancing himself from Marxism and Cuba (Ratliff, 1976, p. 119). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) emerged out of the fallout of *La Violencia* and coalition rule (Leech, 2011, p. 14). The FARC leadership was ideologically connected to the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), more so than other insurgent group in Latin America (Leech, 2011, pp. 14-17). The PCC had utilised the demise of Gaitán to gain influence over all actors outside of the oligarchy. The FARC has led the longest insurgency in Latin American history, beginning in 1964 (Leech, 2011, pp. 12-35). The urban FARC leadership cadre attempted "to secure power through the unorthodox means of military alliance with the peasantry" (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 44). This followed the example of Castro's Cuba.

The Cubans attempted to support revolution in Latin America as they sought to extend their Sierra Maestra experience to greater Latin American. They utilised widespread enthusiasm for the revolutionary ideology of Castroism to increase their regional significance. Castro also provided material support to the pro-Castro revolutionaries of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (Crawley, 1979, p. 127). Castro's ideology emerged alongside his insurgent tactics. Castro's tactics were enmeshed within the experience of the Sierra Maestra. It was not

dependent on the declarations of Socialism and Marxism-Leninism that followed the revolution. Castroism was distinct from doctrinal communism for a number of reasons. Firstly, it did not rely on the USSR or the Cominform for direction. Quite simply, Latin America "had never been one of Moscow's priorities" (Aguilar, 1988, p. 145). The experience of Cuba did not overtly change this stance. Secondly, Castroism did not emphasise the appointment of leading communists to head the revolution. As Castro declared in 1962, Cuba made "a socialist revolution without Socialists" (Aguilar, 1988, p. 144). Those insurgent groups that had emerged from the social democratic reform parties were sympathetic to Castro's violent struggle. Finally, they saw themselves as the revolutionary vanguard of their nations. According to Aguilar (1988), that "vanguard" did not need to be "a Marxist-Leninist party" and could remain independent of "those parties" (p. 147). Hence Cuba's support of the Latin American revolution was not solely dependent on its professed communism. Rather, its support was a show of support for other "autochthonous product[s] of the continent" (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 311). The urban revolutionaries that enacted many of these insurgencies were not therefore committed to enacting a communist state. However, they were committed to reform, especially when it could procure the support of the peasantry.

Insurgent groups did not emerge in rural areas. However, the small revolutionary cadres were completely dependent upon an organised peasantry. With a few exceptions, Latin American national government authority did not reach into the rural areas. Local landowners and regional police possessed authority in these areas. However, the contract between peasants and landowners was fragile. In cases where discriminate violence was used to either take land or assert further authority, the urban guerrillas took advantage of the peasant need for retribution (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 37). The revolutionary cadres could develop an alliance with rural peasants in several ways. The simplest was material reward – that is, the exchange of goods and services for assistance and shelter. The second was to promise meaningful change, including land reform and fair governance for practical assistance in their struggle (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 37). Those promises of land reform attracted additional troops to the small cadres. Literacy drives and routine health checks also improved the prestige of the guerrillas. However, the most effective method was reprisal. When the government or rural authorities directed an attack on the rebels, unintentionally killing the

peasant population, the rebels could offer the surviving peasants the opportunity for retribution (Radu, 1988, p.). This was most effective in Colombia, where indiscriminate government killing of peasants was common (Leech, 2011, p. 14). Once in control of a rural area, the rebels would create an informal government with laws and responsibilities. The revolutionaries then defended these "guerrilla zones" while targeting further territory (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 65). It was their responsibility to defend the peasants from state-directed violence. However, when the peasants betrayed their movement, the guerrillas carried out punitive action (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 70). This was more isolated than government terror as it was directed at an individual for their actions. Insurgent groups had varying success in establishing guerrilla fronts in rural areas primarily in this manner.

Insurgent groups emerged in several Latin American countries. The clearest examples were in Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala. Colombia's insurgency predates its primary organisation, the FARC. The eradication of Gaitainism propelled the communists, the PCC, to leadership among the leftist community (Leech, 2011, p. 13). In 1961, they took a Castroist line, advocating armed struggle (Leech, 2011, p. 13). This armed struggle, as elsewhere in Latin America, was small and focussed on the peasantry. The communists formed self-defence groups in rural Colombia that the US and the Colombian National Front viewed as 'insurgencies' (Leech, 2011, p. 14). The counter-insurgency operations of 1962, discussed below, were the catalyst for the expanded insurgency and the 1964 establishment of the FARC (Leech, 2011, p. 17). Continuing militarism in Guatemala led to the creation of the Revolutionary Movement 13th November (MR13) during 1961 (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 35). The group was composed of Árbenz-era politicians and military officers, and received the political backing of the Cuban government (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 35). The MR13 engaged in ambush attacks in rural areas. By 1962 "Guatemala was descending into exactly the kind of violent Third World revolution that the Kennedy administration had feared (Streeter, 2006, p. 59). Following Guevara's suggestion, the Venezuelan MIR engaged in a Sierra Maestra-type insurgency in Southern Venezuela from 1960 (Alexander, 1964, p. 146). The MIR received greater support in Caracas than in rural areas. Due to its unique social structure, then, the revolutionary model was ill defined for Venezuela (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 41). The long-term MIR

struggle was not met with the level of force witnessed in Colombia. Wickham-Crowley's (1991) suggestion of the indiscriminate use of force appears correct; the Colombian and Guatemalan insurgencies grew due to government action, while the Venezuelan group stagnated (p. 70).

Counter-Insurgency

The US was responsible for initiating counter-insurgency in Latin America. These operations were multifaceted. They required military training, large amounts of military aid, the implementation of civic action and, most importantly, the education of soldiers as to the communist menace they were confronted with. By indoctrinating domestic police forces through US perceptions of the communist and insurgent threat to Latin American security, the US increased its role in the 'defence' of the Western Hemisphere. As Federico Gil (1988) explains, "the goal of military aid to Latin America evolved from the prevention of outside aggression to the suppression of internal subversion" (p. 19). That is, the US asserted an increased presence within the internal security of individual Latin American countries. While this was perceived as necessary to prevent the Castroist threat, the effects were far reaching. Coatsworth (1994) explains the US military build-up in Latin America from 1.6 per cent of foreign 'aid' and loans under Eisenhower to 5.3 per cent under Kennedy (p106). He states "the Kennedy administration enthusiastically supported programs to improve the image of the local military and increase their capabilities for counterinsurgency operations" (Coatsworth, 1994, p. 106). The increased capacity of the Latin American militaries, combined with their training by US officials, increased their place in civilian politics (Gill, 2004, pp. 59-65). Furthermore, the Latin American militaries could, on the advice of US intelligence, police remote areas of the continent to ensure stability and economic growth (Fishel and Cohen, 1992, p. 51). The anti-communist psychosis convinced many responsible democrats to initiate a level of militarisation unprecedented in the region's history, and which would in turn lead to the downfall of democracy in many of those states.

The Kennedy administration oversaw the most significant evolution of US military relations towards Latin America in its diplomatic history. The policies of counterinsurgency and civic action broke down traditional notions of military aid, military training and national sovereignty. Gill (2004) claims "counterinsurgency

warfare fascinated President Kennedy" (p. 77). Eisenhower's military support for the Batista regime had failed dramatically in 1958 as the regime had been ineffective and received criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. As a result, Kennedy envisaged a new response to the Castroist insurgencies in Latin America. According to Gaillard (1992), "President Kennedy was responsible for organising US foreign affairs and national security agencies to guide and assist governments he considered threatened…to resist the threat of communist inspired insurgency" (p. 63). As was the case for the AFP, propaganda was key to the success of counter-insurgency operations. If the US and its allies were portrayed as the aggressors, then their strategy would fail. It was important that the Latin American militaries win the admiration of their population. To do this, the US had to coordinate all aspects of the mission. These included direct action, training, civic action and allocating resources based on threats. To this end, Kennedy established a "special group" to coordinate counter-insurgency and civic action policies throughout Latin America (Gaillard, 1992, p. 63). This group was composed of Allen Dulles, Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and General Maxwell Taylor (Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 95). The special group coordinated between government agencies to ensure that US funds were directed towards the insurgent threat to US interests. Kennedy's counter-insurgency policies were far more advanced than is traditionally recognised. Within three years, national sovereignty had broken down in Latin America and the US was coordinating the struggle against Castroist insurgencies in Latin America.

Counter-insurgency training began at Fort Gulick, Panama, on July 31, 1961 (Gill, 2004, p. 74). The Kennedy administration oversaw the greatest peacetime expansion of the US Special Forces in its history (Gill, 2004, p. 75). These Special Forces became instrumental to Kennedy's regional foreign policy agenda. In the year preceding the inclusion of the counter-insurgency training course, a battalion of the Seventh Special Forces Group visited Panama (Gill, 2004, p. 75). Forty Latin American students attended the first counter-insurgency program at the LAGS (Gill, 2004, p. 76). They represented twelve Latin American countries and their ranks ranged from Second Lieutenant to Major (Gill, 2004, p. 78). The LAGS was rebranded as the School of the Americas (SOA) in 1963, with an increased enrolment of leading military officials representing the greater role of the military in politics. This phenomenon fed itself indefinitely. While military governments

expanded their participation within the SOA, the growth of the SOA expanded military governments. In addition to military tactics, the students at the SOA were also about their Soviet, communist and miscellaneous enemies. Through this anti-communist pretext it indoctrinated generations of military leaders who attended the SOA (Gill, 2004, p. 79). It was explained to the officers that the enemy was directed from Moscow and posed a permanent threat. The SOA purposely dehumanised insurgents and peasants. For SOA-trained officers, the insurgents were soldiers loyal to Moscow who manipulated the people to support communist doctrine. The role of the military was to destroy the insurgency by all means necessary. The US trainers convinced the Latin American officers who studied at the SOA that it was their duty to prevent communist upheaval. By distorting the definition of communism to include all progressive movements, the US effectively turned the Latin American militaries against their governments, and eventually their own people, to ensure compliant leaders.

Under this philosophy, the definition of national interest and US interest became blurred. Insurgents, unionists, peasants and populist governments were seen to represent a 'foreign' interest, while the army were seen to be patriotic (Gill, 2004, p. 79). This situation was most evident following the US-backed coup in Chile in 1973. According to a member of the democratic Allende administration, Carlos Prats,

> Many of these [soldiers] have responded to the stereotypes and thoughts were inculcated into them during these courses [at the SOA] and, believing they were liberating the country from the internal enemy, have committed a crime which can only be explained by their ingenious, their ignorance and their political short- sightedness (cited in Gill, 2004, pp. 79-80).

Given that the students of the SOA were high-ranking military officials, the indoctrination strategies were widely successful. Those men responsible for foiling democracy held close connections to the US through such training programs (Gill, 2004, p. 80). However, the infiltration of the military elite meant very little without the support of the soldiers directly involved in counter-insurgency operations. Accordingly, the expansion of the LAGS into the SOA was accompanied by a training surge by the US Special Forces in Latin America (Gill, 2004, p. 78). Between 1962 and 1967, more than six hundred Special Forces officers aided in

the expansion of counter-insurgency capabilities within Latin America (Gill, 200, p. 78). The Special Forces were divided into Mobile Training Teams consisting of two Special Forces officers and ten military personnel who were sent “to work with conventional armies, intelligence groups, and paramilitary irregulars” (Gill, 2004, 86).

Civic action was introduced by the US to alter the role of the military within Latin American politics. US military leaders viewed Latin America’s militaries as:

> …the guardians of the national interest by replacing a government that is confronted by growing strikes, riots, and terrorism or one that seems to be in danger of being taken over by a resurgence of labour leftists (Robert Wood, as cited in Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 38).

However, the Latin American peasantry viewed that same military as brutally repressive. Given Washington’s vision for a militarised Latin America under the Mann Doctrine of 1964, public image became increasingly important (Colman, 2010, p. 164). Civic action, introduced in 1961, sought to utilise military personnel and equipment to build public infrastructure and utilities that benefited the impoverished masses of Latin America (Gaillard, 1992, p. 63). The military took an active role in the construction of ports, roads, wells, schools, hospitals and housing. These projects brought economic and social benefits to many people (Gaillard, 1992, p. 64). While the improvement of the military’s image was significant, it was not the primary goal of civic action. The US sought to drastically increase the size and capabilities of Latin American militaries (Gaillard, 1992, p. 63). They also sought to disperse those personnel to regional areas threatened by potential ‘insurgencies’. By utilising mass amounts of US AFP AID resources, the resources of many Latin American militaries significantly increased (Gil, 1988, p. 19). Therefore AID, not MAP, was funding the salaries, training, transport and ammunition of many Latin American militaries (Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 17). This led to an unregulated expansion of those military forces during the 1960s, primarily aimed at preventing a ‘new’ Sierra Maestra in other regional areas of Latin America.

Both AID and the MAP funded counterinsurgency. The MAP’s director, Robert Wood, explained that

> The primary purpose of the proposed fiscal year 1965 Military Assistance Program for Latin America is to counter the threat to the entire area by providing equipment and training which will bolster the internal security

> capabilities of the recipient countries (Wood, as cited in Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 35).

In fact, the official records show a steep decline in MAP funding. There was a 71 per cent decline in MAP funding from the Eisenhower administration averages to the 1965 fiscal year (Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 36). MAP funding to democratic Venezuela, Costa Rica and Uruguay was essentially eliminated (Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 36). This was due to the overlapping of MAP and AID resources through the programs of civic action and counter-insurgency. Federico Gil (1988) states, "through AID a public safety program was launched under which Latin American internal security and police forces were provided with a variety of arms and special equipment" (p. 19). US AID resources were heavily intertwined with civil military operations (Fishel and Cowen, 1992, p. 49). Given that the AFP was a propaganda program, this was an inevitable result. The Latin American military provided the region with stability. However, improperly applied, military involvement could also lead to instability by "alienating the populace" or failing to "deliver basic services" (Fishel and Cowen, 1992, p. 50). Moreover, US AID provisions were spent on coalition building between the Latin American militaries and the civilians. This alienated the insurgency movements and was effective, as most of the guerrilla movements were removed by 1967 (Gil, 1988, p. 20).

Counter-insurgency operations began in Latin America following Kennedy's inauguration in 1961. After the demise of Trujillo, "Kennedy personally ordered aids" to teach the Dominican police force "riot control techniques" (Rabe, 1999, p. 44). The Dominican situation was a priority for the US, as it was concerned that Castroist forces would infiltrate the Bosch government and so sought to bolster Dominican military security (Rabe, 1999, p. 44). The largest counter-insurgency force emerged in Colombia in 1964. "Plan Laso" was a sophisticated counter-insurgency operation that targeted the communist-controlled areas of rural Colombia (Leech, 2011, p. 14). An estimated 7000 US-trained soldiers destroyed the "independent republic of Marquetalia" in 1964 (Leech, 2011, p. 14). The CIA also worked closely with the counter-insurgency effort, providing anti-communist propaganda to the affected areas (Cockcroft, 1996, p. 419). The Colombian counter-insurgency effort also emphasised civic action. However, this was ineffective as it is estimated that the Colombian army killed ten peasants for every insurgent (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 70). This type of force was detrimental to

government control over rural areas in Colombia. In Venezuela, guerrilla zones were regularly bombed (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 65). However, civilian casualties were much lower than in Colombia, as the Venezuelan military initiated "voluntary evacuations" of civilian populations (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 65). The Betancourt government attempted to win the loyalty of the Venezuelan peasantry, eroding the base for the insurgent movement. The early stages of counter-insurgency in Latin America varied in individual countries. However, the rise of small insurgent movements in virtually every nation of Latin America necessitated an increased military presence in Latin America. This was provided by the US through MAP and AID funding, as well as training and leadership in the tactics of counter-insurgency and civic action. This integration of the military and civilian administrations led to the eventual regional regression to authoritarian rule.

Yet Another Regression

The military policies of the so-called Mann Doctrine significantly influenced US diplomacy towards Latin America and the OAS (McPherson, 2003, p. 101). Between 1961 and 1965, the US oversaw anti-democratic coups in Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Bolivia. This military policy culminated in the US invasion of Santo Domingo in 1965. Through this act, the US clearly set its priorities in Latin America. Any government that did not conform to the central themes of anti-communism and free trade economics could not exist in Latin America. There could be no 'second' Castro. The US also actively repressed new left-wing governments that emerged. It stifled progressives in elections in both Chile and Guatemala as the US also fought against the election of the Socialist Salvador Allende in the elections of 1960 and 1964. The most blatant support was given to Eduardo Frei in 1964; the CIA donated US$20 million to his electoral campaign. James Petras (1969) asserts that: "US government intervention in Chile in 1964 was blatant and almost obscene" and "an unusual influx of US military personnel into Chile" was also evident prior to the election (p. 19). The US was motivated by two criteria. Firstly, Allende was viewed as a leftist threat. Secondly, Frei was an adherent to US fiscal policy. This led to vast private investments through the AFP infrastructure. Chile was an ideal ally and the US sought to maintain the status quo by utilising the anti-communist pretext. The US had

demanded free elections in Guatemala in 1963; however, when Arévalo ascended as a returning presidential hopeful, the US' position changed (Coatsworth, 1994, p. 104). Arévalo's candidacy brought renewed hope to Guatemalans. He promised to reverse the counter-revolution. On March 31 1963 the head of the armed forces, General Enrique Peralta Azurdia, seized power from Ydígoras Fuentes, claiming that Arévalo was heading a communist conspiracy in Central America (Coatsworth, 1994, p. 104). The US would not, under any circumstances, let another ally fall into hostile hands.

Arturo Frondizi's four-year showdown with the Argentine military finally ended with his ousting in 1962 (Szusterman, 1993, p. 219). The 'deal' made with Perón in 1958 allowed for the eventual transition of Perónists back into Argentine politics (James, 1988, p. 141). Frondizi confidently asserted that his economic achievements would undermine the populist policies of Perónism. Potash (1980) demonstrates, "Frondizi failed to break Perón's hold over the working class" (p. 377). This failure turned the military against his administration (Potash, 1980, p. 377). The March 1962 municipal elections reversed his fortunes. In line with his 1958 commitment, he allowed Perónists, under the banner of the *Unión Popular*, to participate in municipal elections (Szusterman, 1993, p. 212). Perónists won ten of the fourteen provincial elections, including Buenos Aires (James, 1988, p. 152). In response, he attempted to overturn seven of the elections, launch a proactive attack on all communists and permanently ban all signs and symbols of Perón under decree 2542 (James, 1988, p. 152). Nevertheless, the armed forces overthrew Frondizi (Potash, 1980, p. 230). The US State Department accepted the outcome of the coup as the military condemned Castro's revolution, yet it also requested immediate elections (Bailey, 1976, p. 83). The results of the 1963 presidential elections were telling. The blank vote, representing the Perónists, received 19 per cent, while the victor only achieved 25.8 per cent (Szusterman, 1993, p. 210). When Perónists re-joined the system in 1965, their success led to the overthrow of another democratic regime the following year (Rock, 1986, p. 250). As Szusterman (1993) identifies, "democracy in Argentina was liable to produce the 'wrong' result" (p. 219). The military attempted to run a 'democratic' system in which an estimated 20-30 per cent of the population were excluded. By outlawing the political manifestations of Perónism, Argentina was condemned to cyclical military interventions until that appeal was decreased.

Military coups also disrupted democratic rule in Peru and Bolivia during the first years of the AFP. In Peru, President Manuel Prado legalised *Aprista* participation in the 1962 presidential elections (Klaren, 2000, p. 320). However, by 1962 APRA had split along ideological grounds (Ratliff, 1976, p. 100). The moderate wing remained under the control of Haya de la Torre, while the radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was led by ex-*Aprista* Luis de la Puente (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 315). The conservatives promoted the candidacy of Fernando Belaúnde. Despite the forthcoming democratic elections, it was clear that the military would not accept an APRA or MIR victory. One key general warned the US ambassador that those "which originally drank at the communist fountains had changed their political programs in a cynical play for power" (Klaren, 2000, p. 320). On July 18, 1962 the military removed Prado, along with the perceived threat of *Aprismo* (Klaren, 2000, p. 320). The Bolivian MNR faced opposition from both the left and the right during the 1960s. On November 4, 1964, the Bolivian army staged a coup against the President Víctor Paz Estenssoro (Malloy and Gamarra, 1988, p. 1). This was a counter-revolutionary coup against a constitutional revolutionary regime that held power for over a decade (Malloy and Gamarra, p. 3). By 1964, Paz faced opposition from both the left and the right. The left opposed the moderation of the MNR through its economic interaction with US oil and gas companies (Klein, 1992, p. 249); the right blamed Paz for the economic stagnation that burdened the economy (Klein, 1992, p. 248). By the time the military moved against Paz, it had support from conservative MNR members. However, soon after the military assumed power a guerrilla struggle began, with the assistance of Cuban forces. It was in Bolivia, in 1967, that the CIA finally killed Guevara (Prados Salmon, 1987, pp. 99-120).

Democracy was also eradicated in Honduras and the Dominican Republic during this period. The Honduran example highlights the hypocrisy of the AFP period. Ramón Villeda was an exception within the AFP. He naively believed the AFP charter (MacCameron, 1983, p. 178). He followed the recommendations on agrarian reform despite the fact that it discriminated against most Honduran politicians, who were landholders (MacCameron, 1983, p. 178). He enacted a land reform policy that was strikingly similar to Árbenz's 1951 Decree 900. The military and the oligarchy deposed Villeda on October 3, 1963 (Coatsworth, 1994, p. 102). While the US, under the AFP, promoted 'democracy,' no condemnation eventuated.

On December 14 the US recognised the military regime (Coatsworth, 1994, p. 102). The Dominican example highlighted US uncertainty over Latin American democracy. Kennedy's Dominican arithmetic left Juan Bosch in a precarious position. Bosch was an idealistic social democrat. He was not a communist. He believed in political freedoms. He asserted in 1962 that the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD) would allow the communists to participate in the political sphere, despite his negative views on communism and Castroism (Bosch, as cited in Alexander, 1995, p. 224). Bosch indicated that there was a disconnect between State Department rhetoric and the American military. He argued that the Ambassador sought to strengthen his regime, while the Pentagon colluded with the Dominican military (Bosch, as cited in Alexander, 1995, p. 227). The Pentagon won. In January 1963 Bosch was removed through a coup (Rabe, 1999, p. 47). Bosch believed that "the only group in the [DR] that had not been corrupted [was] the masses of the people," but he refused to have the people fight the military to return him to power (as cited in Alexander, 1995, p. 232). In his view, the Dominican Republic had missed the opportunity to develop as the military returned power to the Trujillo family.

Brazil remained at the centre of Washington's thinking on Latin America. The removal of João Goulart was inevitable in the Cold War context. The US opposed the governments of Quadros and Goulart due to their sympathy for the Cuban Revolution (Dallek, 2003, p. 521). The State Department foresaw a "foreign policy orientated increasingly toward the Soviet bloc in world affairs…" (Dallek, 2003, p. 521). Ambassador Gordon asserted that the 1964 coup,

> Can indeed be included along with the Marshall Plan proposal, the Berlin Blockade, the defeat of communist aggression in Korea, and the resolution of the missile crisis in Cuba as one of the major turning points in world history in the middle of the twentieth century (Skidmore, 1988, p. 28).

Due to their interpretation of Latin American politics, the US viewed the overthrow of democratic Latin American governments, such as Goulart's, as pivotal victories in the Cold War. Despite the good relations between Kennedy and Kubitschek, the Brazilians had continually frustrated the Kennedy administration. Brazil's was one of the few governments who refused to condemn the Cuban Revolution (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 314). It was also the greatest critic of US AID allocations, despite being the greatest recipient (Alexander, 1991, p. 149). Kubitschek, Quadros

and Goulart were nationalists. They opposed foreign monopolisation of commodities, capital and trade (Alexander, 1991, p. 296). Moreover, they opposed the economic philosophy of the US. Although the US disapproved of Quadros, it was alarmed when he resigned in 1962, leaving Goulart as President (Goldenberg, 1965, p. 314). It demanded a reduced capacity for the leftist president, which the military and Congress adhered to. When Goulart attempted to rule by decree in 1964, the military overthrew his government (Skidmore, 1988, p. 26). While the US saw this in the context of the Cold War, Goulart had sought to promote economic policies that benefited Brazilians. He was not a communist. However, the psychosis of the time made this fact irrelevant.

A consistent theme in this regional regression is clear. The American AFP rhetoric had been accepted in Latin America. Accordingly, the regions leaders opened their systems to more democratic elections. The problem existed in American commitment to this rhetoric. While they spoke of democracy they chose military coups over a return of Peron and Haya, or any new form of democratic action emerging in Honduran and the Dominican Republic. Anti-communism motivated this new regression, but it Communism was clearly not the only enemy. Conflicted US rhetoric was responsible for the overthrow of: Arturo Frondizi for his links to Perónism; Manuel Prado for the support granted by the *Apristas*; the moderate reformist Paz Estensarro; the naïve reformer Manuel Vidella; Juan Bosch for refusing to ban communism; and the left labour leader João Goulart. Anti-communism also prevented the democratic revolution of the socialist Salvador Allende and social democrat Juan José Arévalo. According to Coatsworth (1994), the Kennedy and Johnson administrations "viewed many of the political and social organisations most committed to addressing the region's social problems as pro-Cuban" (p. 111). However, the removal of these civilian governments dramatically increased the impetus of insurgent organisations. The only governments who survived the first four years of the AFP as entirely constitutional were Uruguay, Costa Rica Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Panama. The other thirteen Latin American nations suffered some form of military government during the early AFP period. Given that the AFP was sold as regional democratic revolution, this seems problematic. However, the AFP was not pro-democracy; it was anti-Cuban. The clearest enunciation of US policy towards Latin American democracy, again, comes from Kennedy himself. His stated preference for government in the

Dominican Republic was democratic (Kennedy, as cited in Rabe, 1999, p. 41). However, if a democracy risked the possible emergence of a Castroist regime, then the preference became a right-wing military dictatorship (Kennedy, as cited in Rabe, 1999, p. 41). This is where the pervasiveness of the anti-communist pretext emerges. The US had long viewed any deviation in political and economic policy as communism, or the 'communist line.' Given this misinterpretation of social democracy, populism, labour democracy, left-liberalism, and even some forms of nationalism, Kennedy's preferred rule in Latin America became right-wing dictatorships. Since right-wing dictatorships provoke the greatest levels of insurgent resistance, this position seems self-serving, as leftist resistance to authoritarian rule is the greatest long-term justification for authoritarian rule throughout Latin America – a situation that continued throughout the Cold War.

In the Grip of a Psychosis?

The Cold War dominated regional politics throughout the 1960s. The tragedy of the Cold War in Latin America was that the insurgents of that time would have followed the constitutional road had it been provided to them. If democracy had prevailed in Latin America during the 1940s and 1950s, the insurgency of the 1960s would not have eventuated. Fidel Castro exemplifies this point. Without Chibás' 1951 death and the 1952 Batista coup, there would not have been a Sierra Maestra movement in Cuban history. And without Castro many other groups to the left of the social democrats would have continued to follow the electoral road. Despite the reality of the causes of the Cold War in Latin America, it had certainly arrived by 1965. The Soviet Union supported the Cuban economy and political system, which posed a credible threat to several Latin American governments. The support and training afforded to insurgent groups necessitated a military response. When domestic militaries were not capable of imposing coercive rule, the US military became involved. 20,000 US marines invaded the Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965 (Crandle, 2006, p. 22). President Johnson asserted that "for the first time in the history of the [OAS], it has created and sent…an international peace keeping military force" (as cited in Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 210). He also suggested that the OAS should maintain a constant force for such purposes. Despite Johnson's claim that this was a multilateral effort, it was unilateral; this was the first US invasion in the Western Hemisphere for over

three decades (Crandle, 2006, p. 66). Some allied OAS troops were involved in the occupation, however the US executed the invasion alone. The irony of the Dominican invasion was its cause. The insignificant 14th of June Revolution Party was completely subordinate to Bosch's PRD, who the bulk of the citizenry had deposed the military to elect (Rabe, 1999, p. 192). The US invaded the Dominican Republic because of its geographic proximity to Cuba, rather than any shared ideological conviction between Castro and Bosch. Few within the OAS condemned this action.

The Cold War changed the notion of warfare in Latin America. The psychosis that dominated Latin America exacerbated social divisions. The anti-communist pretext created enemies within Latin American societies and politics. The key actors within this struggle included: the landed oligarchy, an emerging capitalist class, the military, middle-class workers, the union movement, democratic political movements, radical insurgent groups and, on the periphery, the communists. This is an extremely complicated social structure that varied in individual nations. To understand the interests of each competing class and organisation would require a separate thesis in and of itself. However, the anti-communist psychosis is the focus of this thesis, and chapter. This is of particular importance as certain classes were grouped together and defined as enemies of the state. The military forces became hegemonic during this period. They were supported, and funded, by the landed oligarchy, the capitalist class and the US (Barber and Ronning, 1966, p. 38). In every nation the composition of support was different. Nevertheless, the military had an evolved purpose in Latin America. Those who challenged the position of their funders and supporters were characterised as communist and, in turn, enemies. Democrats, unionists, peasants or reformers of any creed were seen as a challenge to the standing order. The roots of Operation Condor lie within this context. The militaries of the Southern Cone did not make an isolated decision to target leftists. It was part of the anti-communist pretext, and psychosis, that proliferated throughout Latin America from the 1960s onward. Under this pretext, a war was waged against the Latin American people. Any dissident activity was closely monitored and eventually persecuted. The expansion of military capabilities was a direct result of US policy during the 1960s. While the US could not foresee, and often condemned, the human rights abuses that followed, it was directly responsible for the conditions that motivated them.

The political-economic machinations of the empire demanded subservience, and this was the cost.

By 1965, the Cold War had been institutionalised in Latin America. The sides were established for the bloodiest conflict in the Western Hemisphere's twentieth century history. This chapter has demonstrated that the doctrine of counter-insurgency, under the pretext of anti-communism, set the stage for this conflict. This conflict took place in three Cold War theatres during the 1960s: geopolitical, political-economic and militaristic. The primary struggle against Castrosim required a submissive response. Castro's alliance with the USSR allowed the Cubans to exist peacefully. Cuba was, hence, isolated from its geopolitical place in the OAS.[112] Second were the domestic theatres that served the political-economic interests of the US. This 'new regression' allowed for a rapid economic integration of Latin America into the world economic system. The extermination of economic nationalism was largely caused by military coups. These coups were predicated by loans and grants made possible through the AFP. The final form was direct military intervention. In 1933 Cordell Hull forfeited Washington's right to invade sovereign states. Thirty-two years later, the US reclaimed their militaristic imperial presence in Latin America. Hence, the US had come full circle. While US actions responded to individual circumstances, it is difficult to overlook its achievements. In that thirty-two years: the US became the dominant trading nation in the Western Hemisphere; it monopolised the finances of Latin America; it monopolised weapons sales and military training; its businesses flourished; it developed a continually improved terms of trade; and, most significantly, it had demonised all the opponents to US rule who had forced Hull into his 1933 commitment. The Cold War in Latin America gave Washington the opportunity to reclaim its dominant position in Latin America. It possessed subservient satellite regimes indoctrinated to the psychosis of anti-communism. This accounts for a more pervasive form of Imperialism to that merely defined by military invasions.

[112] An isolation that continued until June 3 2009.

Conclusion: The Ghosts of Soviet Communism

By 1965 the notion of a 'Cold' War in Latin America had effectively ended. The anti-communist paranoia of the early Cold War increased during the ensuing decades, as many of the conflicts turned into open warfare. Latin American oligarchs became increasingly indoctrinated by anti-communism. By the late 1970s, the prolonged war against 'communists,' 'insurgents,' political opponents, academics, journalists, unions and peasants had gained momentum. The US could no longer control the anti-communist pretext that it had effectively unleashed. The Central American states of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador suffered under military rule that led to violent civil wars (LaFeber, 1984, pp. 240-255). Those civil wars cost an estimated 350,000 lives between 1965 and 1990 (LaFeber, 1984, pp. 240-255). The Sandinista victory in 1979 goaded the Reagan administration into launching a covert 'Contra' war against the government of Daniel Ortega during the 1980s, without congressional or public approval (Kinzer, 1991, pp. 65-75). The Caribbean region saw the occupation of the Dominican Republic as well as the invasion of Grenada in October 1983, in an attempt to maintain the isolation of the Cuban Revolution (Crandle, 2006, p. 66; Grow, 2008, pp. 140-143). However, it was in South America that the full toll of anti-communist paranoia was most visible. The militarisation of South America following several domestic military coups and the US intervention in Chile, 1973, laid the way for the regional 'Operation Condor' (Dinges, 2006, pp. 1-21). The military regimes of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay waged a war against their populations under the banner of anti-communism (Klaiber, 1998, pp. 71-125); this was a transnational 'dirty-war' against intellectuals, progressives, unions, peasants and anyone who could be characterised as a 'communist' (Dinges, 2006, p. 6). This thesis has explained the origins of the anti-communist pretext between 1933 and 1965. The effects of this pretext were the hot wars of Latin America that were waged between 1965 and 1990.

Social Democracy: The Myth of Soviet Communism

The social democratic movement that emerged in Latin America during the 1930s was a definable phenomenon with transnational significance. The leaders of this movement have often been relegated within national histories. However, it is evident that there is an ideological correlation between the movements for social

democracy in Latin America between 1933 and 1965. Their leaders – Ramón Grau and Eduardo Chibás in Cuba, Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, José Figueres Ferrer in Costa Rica, Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, and Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic and the movements that they represented – all shared a common ideology. This ideology was defined by "nationalism, socialism and anti-Imperialism" (Chibás, as cited in Ameringer, 2000, p. 34). It expressed itself in policies including economic nationalism, education, healthcare, labour reform, land reform and social security. These policies are defined within the European political tradition of social democracy, but are also present within the American New Deal. Social democracy is evident throughout the developed world. It is the standing ideology of all parties of the democratic left, including Labour parties. Social democrats seek to bring a moderate form of socialism to their societies through government regulation and income redistribution through high taxation, big government and social services. This was evident in Latin America between 1933 and 1965. Others have suggested that these politicians were 'populists'. That is, that their policies were designed to procure maximum support from the urban and rural poor. Yet this stance overlooks the participation of sectors of the 'under-classes' within the social democratic program. It also overlooks the fact that these leaders clung to their vision through times of intense hardship, including persecution and exile. Populist leaders routinely alter their ideological stance on the basis of political events. This makes the sacrifice of the generation of social democratic leaders that emerged during the 1930s and 1940s distinct. They developed an Latin American variation of a common European ideology designed to deliver incremental social progress without the violence associated with communist revolutions.

A brief biography of the social democratic leaders and their associated movements has also been provided through constant comparison, and has demonstrated the correlations, both ideological and chronological, between the social democratic leaders. Several factors bind this group together. The class and educational origins of these leaders were a significant contributor to their adoption of social democratic theory. Most of these leaders were middle-upper class: Betancourt's family owned cattle ranches in Southern Venezuela; Ramón Grau descended from an aristocratic tobacco growing family; Arévalo studied

abroad, becoming a professor of philosophy in Buenos Aires prior to his return to Guatemala; while Haya de la Torre, Figueres, Bosch and Gaitán all received family support to go to university. This set them apart from the class of people whose interests they represented. Moreover, the social democrats were middle-class revolutionaries who sought to evolve the political system for ideological reasons. Their ideology was developed while studying European ideas in American and European universities. While these ideas would have likely included the remote theory of Marxism, social democracy was also seen as an adaptation of liberalism. Their ideas of liberalism and socialism were fostered by the oppressive dictatorships they lived under. Each of these leaders reached physical and political maturity during times of oppression. These circumstances shaped the central tenet of their movement, the anti-dictatorial struggle. This thesis has explained that these leaders were similar in their upbringing, their education and their political situation. This shaped the views of those who created the Latin American social democratic movement.

This thesis has explained the policies of economic nationalism and how it was characterised within the 'communist line' by the US. Economic nationalism emerged within the social democratic philosophy of "nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism" (Chibás, as cited in Ameringer, 2000, p. 34). Moreover, the emphasis on serving the interests of the nation over that of foreign empires, both formal and informal, was the economic foundation of social democracy. It required the strict regulation of the market economies in order to gradually increase the quality of life of the citizenry. The Latin American version of this philosophy emerged during the 1930s in Mexico. The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas saw the expropriation of the vast majority of foreign-owned agricultural property and, more significantly, the foreign-owned oil reserves. Mexico also created the platforms for agrarian reform, market reform and labour reform. These actions set the precedent for those emerging social democratic regimes of the 1940s. Expropriation of land and resources was emulated in Venezuela and Guatemala. Market reform was emulated in Peru. Meanwhile, labour reforms were enacted throughout the social democratic regimes. The social democratic governments of the 1940s were engaged in a moderate revolution that swung the balance of power from the ruling oligarchic class towards the urban and rural poor. Unfortunately for those leaders embracing this moderate form of socialism, the global Cold War

emerged in the 1940s. This effectively meant that their reforms were viewed within the context of that Cold War. Hence, they were required to abandon the reforms that the US characterised as 'the communist line.' In its dealing with Mexico in 1949, the communist line was defined as "any radical ideas they disapproved of" (as cited in Niblo, 2006, p. 236). This demonised the moderate actions of economic nationalists, relegating their potential to historical and economic irrelevancy.

This thesis has demonstrated that social democracy posed a challenge to US global interests in the aftermath of WWII, from which the it emerged as the undisputed victor. It had reshaped the international system, including its economy. The European empires had been dismantled and the US stood as the leader of the capitalist world. This reality was pervasive in Latin America. Prior to the Great Depression, the US had not held a dominant economic position in Latin America. British and German trade and investment was significant throughout South America, while the US focussed on the small Caribbean plantation states. The political effects of WWII brought Latin America into Washington's sphere of influence for the first time. However, the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms masked its political and economic intentions. With the closure of markets in Eastern Europe in 1945 and China in 1949, the US placed increased emphasis on its economic interaction with Latin America. Unfortunately for the burgeoning social democratic movement, and those populists in Argentina and Brazil, the US philosophy of free trade liberalism was a direct contradiction to the policies of economic nationalism in Latin America. While the Guatemalan case provided the most glaring example of the US interfering in the domestic economy of a sovereign democratic state, it was not unique. During the late 1940s, the US waged economic warfare against the populist revolution of Perón in Argentina. It ensured that Argentina would remain a poor appendage of the capitalist system by blocking finance and markets to Europe and isolating Argentinean goods within inter-American trade. The US was threatened by economic nationalism because its own national interest focussed on increasing domestic output of industrial goods, which required cheap raw materials. While Latin America decreased in significance throughout the 1950s and 1960s, due to decolonisation, it provided the economic platform for the US to become the global hegemon between 1933 and 1950.

These social democrats were not communists. The thesis has provided extensive research into the Latin American communist movement that demonstrates the peripheral nature of Marxism. Communism is a revolutionary philosophy that involves the violent overthrow of a society to create class equality. This requires the dismantling of all sectors of government and the capitalist class. The Moscow-orientated parties of Latin America were never able to gain support for this vision. Even those quasi-communist revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua preached an evolutionary economic program and emerged outside of the communist movement. The social democrats advocated an evolutionary response to economic challenges. Similar to their European counterparts, they sought to bring about socialism through slow pragmatic changes that were supported by the majority of the population. These changes improved the lives of the rural and urban poor enough to gain support for renewed changes. The fatal flaw in Latin America, when compared to post-war Western Europe, was the reactionary response to these evolutionary changes by the oligarchic classes and their military backers. The distinction between communism and democratic socialism is key to this thesis. Yes, some of the outcomes were similar. Both advocated large-scale social changes that would re-shape their national political discourse. However, the threat that the US suggested and propagated through the anti-communist pretext did not exist. The assertion that the Moscow-orientated parties dominated the social democratic movement was false. The social democrats were nationalists who had no allegiance to Moscow. In fact, their philosophy was much closer to the American New Deal, and they constantly reiterated their support for the US in their Cold War with Russia.

The Anti-communist Pretext: The Convenient Enemy

This thesis has demonstrated that the use of anti-communist propaganda was an intentional mechanism to destabilise governments that confronted US regional interests. This preceded any notion of a Cold War in Latin America. In fact, it significantly preceded the global Cold War. America's disdain for progressive politics had created a prolonged paranoia around the term 'communism.' Anti-communist characterisation was levied at: Mexico and Nicaragua in 1927 by Frank Kellogg; Peruvian *Apristas* in 1931 by Fred Dearing; Cuban *Auténticos* in 1933-4 by Sumner Welles; Colombian *Gaitánistas* in 1948 by George C Marshall; Guatemala's

democracy in 1954 by John F. Dulles; Peruvian and Venezuelan protesters in 1958 by Richard M. Nixon; and the Dominican Democrats led by Juan Bosch in 1965, leading to Lyndon B. Johnson's invasion. Moreover, anti-communism was a long-standing philosophy of American diplomats in Latin America. As has been demonstrated, accusations of anti-communism were not only levied at communist parties and associated organisations but also came to include the social democratic movement. This was an effective pretext as 'communism' was seen as a foreign ideology that posed a threat to Latin American sovereignty. Ironically, those who were characterised as part of the 'communist line' were the same leaders who were attempting to protect national sovereignty from the invasion of free-trade capitalism.

The US brought the Cold War to Latin America from April 9, 1948. The period preceding the Colombian *Bogotázo* witnessed a democratic revolution in Latin America. Ten dictatorial governments fell to democratic advocates between 1941 and 1948. This left only five military regimes administering the twenty Latin American republics that existed in early 1948. While social gains were limited and short-lived in Haiti, El Salvador and Honduras, social democratic governments were established in Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru and Costa Rica (Ameringer, 2009, pp. 130-170). Additionally, elections in Brazil and Argentina consolidated the gains of those military populist leaders (Rapoport, 1992, p. 117; Bethal, 1992, p. 45). Moreover, a democratic revolution swept through Latin America during this period. This democratic revolution posed a unique threat to American interests in the hemisphere, as explained above. Hence, when the Colombian *Bogotázo* erupted in response to Gaitán's assassination on April 9, 1948, the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, created a calculated anti-communist pretext in Latin America. While in Bogotá for the first meeting of the OAS during the *Bogotázo*, He posited that the domestic unrest was intertwined with the global Cold War that the US was waging in Eurasia. Despite Marshall's department keeping extensive records on Gaitán's movement, and acknowledging that neither he, nor his followers, were communists, Marshall concluded that events in Colombia must be seen within the context of the global Cold War. This calculated falsification led the OAS delegations to commit to condemn regional communism.

This thesis has explained how this anti-communist pretext worked after its emergence between 1948 and 1950. Following the establishment of this pretext in

April 1948, the gains made by democrats were reversed. Conservative military coups occurred in Peru, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay and Argentina between 1948 and 1955. Additionally, the US overthrew the Guatemalan government and the Brazilian President, Getúlio Vargas, committed suicide while enduring constant military pressure. This regional regression was motivated by an altered stance on democracy within the US State Department. Cold War pragmatists overtook the Latin American Bureau of the US State Department during the McCarthyist crusade of the second Truman administration. This caused an abandonment of the pro-democratic vision of Latin America held by the moderate Spruille Braden. Cold War realpolitik replaced this view. Following the extensive reports into Latin American democracy and the communist threat authored by George Kennan, Louis Halle and Francis Truslow, the US Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, George Miller, enacted an anti-communist doctrine, which favoured Latin American military regimes as a regional bulwark against an advancing 'communist' threat. While the 'communist' threat included progressive thinkers, such as social democrats, the Latin American militaries quickly seized upon the promise of international recognition granted by Washington's anti-democratic stance. These military governments opened their intelligence files to the CIA on democrats and communists alike. They also actively persecuted individuals posing threats to their longevity and US interests in the region. While the US was only actively involved in Guatemala, it was implicitly involved in all of the military coups as it began the regional regression against democracy through the pretext of anti-communism.

This thesis has argued that the Cuban Revolution altered the notion of the 'Cold War' in Latin America between 1959 and 1965. The Sierra Maestra movement was the pinnacle of a regional backlash against dictatorial governance in Latin America. Once again, between 1956 and 1961 ten dictatorial leaders succumbed to more progressive forces. Cuba however was unique. It had an armed revolution that allied the interests of middle-class urban revolutionaries with the rural peasantry through guerrilla warfare. Castro's intellectual evolution took place within the social democratic tradition, but he became increasingly frustrated with its leaders' inability to enact meaningful reform or assert independence from the US. Hence, he followed Eddy Chibás into the breakaway organisation of the *Ortodoxos*, which was further radicalised by Chibás' death in 1951 and the Batista

coup of 1952. This radicalisation process led to the development of a revolutionary cadre which, after the failed assault in 1953, sought to overthrow the Batista regime. The Castro movement was underestimated by every sector. Social democrats, both in Cuba and in greater Latin America, supported it, believing that Castro would restore democracy and pragmatic reform. The US did not believe that a domestic revolution could challenge its position in Latin America until its victory was assured in late 1958. The Soviet Union thought little of Castro's attempts as it had avoided acting in America's sphere of influence prior to 1960. However, during 1959 and 1960 Castro changed the nature of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. He distanced himself from the social democrats and drew closer to Marxism, despite his loathing of the Cuban Moscow-orientated party. The regional euphoria over Castro's revolution led young discontents in Latin America to attempt to emulate his efforts. Throughout the region the social democratic movement splintered as radical wings turned to armed struggle, in certain cases against their former leaders. While Castro did not begin as a communist, he did change the approach to socialism in Latin America. The constitutional road was replaced by a group of violent insurgencies that shook Latin America between 1961 and 1965. Ironically, these insurgencies were still not led by communists, but by urban discontents of the social democratic movement.

Finally, this thesis has laid the platform for a thorough revision of Cold War historiography. It does not claim to be a holistic revision of the Cold War in Latin America. Instead, it has used selected case studies to demonstrate the emergence of a social democratic movement and a sustained campaign against it. It has however challenged many assumptions, including that: the Latin American Cold War was a proxy theatre of the global struggle; communists were the primary target of anti-communism; the US believed there was a genuine communist menace in the *Bogotázo*; Guatemala was an isolated Cold War error made by the Eisenhower administration; Latin America, as a region, was ever in danger of turning 'communist;' the Cold War began in 1959, with the Cuban Revolution; the insurgent movements were led by Moscow; and that the US wanted to support change through its Alliance for Progress. This thesis has brought together many narratives to support its central arguments. Yet it has also left several areas open to reinterpretation. This reinterpretation is necessary to a full understanding of the Cold War in Latin America. There is a lack of revisionist history in this area

beyond the central case studies of Guatemala, Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua. The Latin American Cold War cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created millions of internal refugees. A revision of its causes is significant to understanding this generational conflict and to preventing a twenty-first century reoccurrence.

Contribution to the field

This thesis has contributed to the field of study a political definition of the Latin American social democratic movement. Relatively little work has been conducted into the transnational nature of this political movement in Latin America. The work that has been completed has focussed disproportionately on Castroism and populism within the discourse. This thesis has applied the political scaffold of social democracy onto a generation of political leaders in Latin America. In doing so, it has offered the political definition of that generation. While these leaders' policies fit within the concept of social democracy, however, they were developed independently to the Socialist International, which emerged in Europe after WWII. Hence, the Latin Americans responded to their individual political crises by creating a more 'Latin' version of social democracy. America's apparent endorsement of democratic rule was a necessary prerequisite. The failure to apply the more radical doctrine of communism to the Latin American condition was in fact the failure to apply the theoretical doctrine to the actual political circumstances. The ability to alter their political platform within their ideological convictions allowed the social democrats to be adaptable. The political economic circumstances were different from Mexico to Cuba, from Guatemala to Colombia and from Peru to Costa Rica. Hence, the policies of the social democrats had to be applicable to the circumstances. Nevertheless, their constant ideological conviction to adhere to this democratic form of socialism remained, even as the policies changed. Social democracy was a unique political view in Latin American history. This thesis has demonstrated how it emerged and adapted to the Latin American condition.

The thesis has also provided a reinterpretation of the political economic influence upon regional historic events. It has shown how the economic policies of each social democratic party were dictated by their economic circumstances. In Venezuela, the emphasis was on the utilisation of increased oil revenues to redistribute income and social services to a greater number of individuals. In

Guatemala, however, the only discernible commodity was land. Hence the social democratic movement there focussed on land reform and the modernisation of the agrarian economy. The ideological purpose was the same – to improve the quality of life for the greatest amount of people. However the resources, and thus the polices, were very different. Political economy also defined the class conflicts that followed evolutionary social democratic policies such as land and commodity reform. In agrarian economies such as those of Cuba and Guatemala, the dominant class was the rural oligarchy. Hence, they responded by supporting conservative military coups. In Argentina, the class structure was far more complex, with industrial and foreign influences being negotiated against the Perónist union movement and military influences. The political economy shaped the political condition. It also defined the extent to which the US would go to prevent evolutionary change. There can be no generalisation within Latin American politics; there is far too much diversity. This thesis has attempted to define the ideology over the political party. Each political party was unique and their policies reflected national conditions. This complex situation has prevented a thorough political, or political economic, analysis of the social democrats until this stage.

This thesis has also offered a revision of the events that contributed to the Cold War in Latin America, the most violent period in the region's twentieth century history. It has paid especial attention to rhetoric and propaganda. In many ways, the Latin American Cold War emerged through anti-communist propaganda. The mischaracterisation of social democratic and populist leaders led to two widespread conservative regressions in Latin America between 1948 and 1965. The US was pivotal in extending the anti-communist paranoia that created and reasserted the pretext. Latin American history contains several dictatorial-democratic cycles. It would not therefore be wise to say that every coup was directly motivated by the US or anti-communism. However, there is a distinct pattern in the causes and timing of dozens of military coups. And certainly, the domestic militaries used anti-communism as a pretext for coups that they may have undertaken anyway. However, this supports the thesis' position. The US created a climate in which the Latin American conservative militaries could remove progressive democratic governments and, in turn, receive US diplomatic and financial support for doing so. This thesis is not suggesting that none of these coups would have occurred without anti-communism. However, the US did swing

the pendulum in favour of the conservative militaries against the social democrats under the pretext of anti-communism. This was the principal battleground of the Latin American Cold War. The struggle encompassed far more than Guatemala, Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua. It was a continental struggle between distinct visions for the region's participation within the global capitalist economy. The US propagated one vision. In doing so, they condoned and supported several military regimes that oppressed their populations.

Finally, this thesis has provided a historical lens through which to view the political movements of modern Latin America that will be applicable to studies on 'twenty-first century socialism'. This thesis has demonstrated the nature of the struggle between two ideological visions. This struggle re-emerged after the Cold War. Once again, propaganda was used to discredit the reform regimes of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Argentina and Paraguay. This propaganda highlighted the use of socialism that unfairly targeted the wealthier elements of Latin American society. The US and conservative media sources characterised these leaders as a violent minority that were harming their societies. Given that each of these leaders was elected, this accusation was a falsification. Nevertheless, the propaganda seriously damaged each of those reform regimes, with the downfall of leaders in Honduras and Paraguay and the significant weakening of the others. This demonstrates a historical correlation to the thesis' focus area. Propaganda is an effective foreign policy mechanism. It allowed the US to reshape Latin America in its service during the Cold War. This pattern of foreign policy by propaganda has re-emerged in recent years. Hence, the position of this thesis is still relevant to modern Latin American politics. As George Santayana (1998) famously uttered, "those who cannot remember the past are condemned repeat it" (p. 46). Thus, the thesis has attempted to expose the propaganda strategy of the Cold War that is being emulated in modern Latin America.

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